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Abstract: The Context of Augustine’s Early Theology of the Imago Dei 
Gerald Peter Boersma 
 
This thesis engages with Augustine’s early thought to analyze what sources 
influenced and shaped the African Doctor’s initial theology of the imago dei and 
allowed him to affirm the “image of God” of both Christ and the human person.  My 
thesis is attentive to two significant sources of influence.  First, I argue that 
Augustine’s early theology of image builds on that of Hilary of Poitiers, Marius 
Victorinus, and Ambrose of Milan.  Latin pro-Nicene theology was committed to an 
articulation of the “image of God” that was aligned with the doctrine of the 
homoousion.  Defenders of the Nicene cause considered anathema any expression of 
“image of God” that suggested that as image Christ was secondary, subordinate, or 
different from his source in substance. Latin pro-Nicene theology could envision the 
imago dei only as equality with God.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, it was difficult for 
such theology to link the imago dei with the notion that the human person was created 
in the image of God. 
The second significant source of influence on Augustine’s early theology of 
the imago dei is a Plotinian philosophical conception of the world.  At the heart of 
Plotinus’s cosmogony and metaphysics lies a philosophy of image.  In this 
framework, an image is derived, revelatory, and, ultimately, ordered to return to its 
primary source.  By definition, this conception of an image entails subordination and 
is ideally suited to articulate the human person as imago dei.   
The genius of Augustine’s theology, evident already clearly in his early 
writings, is his synthesis of these two influences.  By drawing on Plotinian thought, 
Augustine articulates a theology of the imago dei that had eluded his Latin pro-Nicene 
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predecessors. My thesis suggests that this achievement was the result of Augustine’s 
early deep engagement with Plotinian philosophy. 
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Introduction  
 
Image theology takes on particular significance in the wake of the reception of the 
council of Nicaea.  What does it mean for Christ to be the “image of God”?  And, if 
Christ is the “image of God,” could the human person also unequivocally be 
understood as the “image of God”?  Augustine’s early theology of the imago dei, 
prior to his ordination, is a significant departure from Latin pro-Nicene theologies 
only a generation earlier. This thesis argues that although Augustine’s early theology 
of image builds on that of Hilary of Poitiers, Marius Victorinus, and Ambrose of 
Milan, Augustine was able to affirm, in ways that his predecessors were not, that both 
Christ and the human person are the imago dei.  
The various answers to the question of what it means for Christ to be the 
“image of God” lie at the heart of Christological debates of the fourth century.  Was 
the image a derivation from its source?  Does the image serve to reveal its source?  
Does a positive answer to these two questions imply that the image is ontologically 
inferior to its source?  What is the relation between the image and source?  Are they 
two separate substances?   New Testament descriptions of Christ as “image of God” 
were ambiguous and were certainly claimed as proof texts by all parties involved in 
the post-Nicene debates.  The letter to the Hebrews describes Christ as the “brightness 
of God’s glory” (ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης) and the “image of his substance” 
(χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως) (Hebrews 1:3).  In the same vein, the Apostle Paul 
describes Christ as the “image of God” (εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ) (2 Corinthians 4:4).  The 
“image passage” that appeared most frequently in Christological controversy was 
Colossians 1:15-20: 
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15 
He is the image of the invisible God (εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου), 
the first-born of all creation; 
16 
for in him all things were created, in 
heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or 
dominions or principalities or authorities—all things were created 
through him and for him. 
17 
He is before all things, and in him all 
things hold together. 
18 
He is the head of the body, the church; he is the 
beginning (ἀρχή), the first-born from the dead, that in everything he 
might be pre-eminent. 
19 
For in him all the fulness of God was pleased 
to dwell, 
20 
and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether 
on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his cross. (RSV) 
Paul’s description of Christ as “image” is the first term in a series of cascading 
Christological descriptors.  The Apostle first notes the relation of the eternal image to 
the “invisible God” and the radical transcendence of the image from all created things.  
Paul then shifts to articulate the work of the image in reconciling creation.  The 
Fathers saw in this two-step Christology of Colossians 1 a distinction between the 
theologia of the image and the oikonomia of the Son.  Naturally, this passage in 
Colossians 1 would be fertile ground for all parties to the Nicene debates.  Is the 
image also invisible?  Or is the image the visible manifestation of an invisible 
substance?  The image is shown in the work of creation – of all creation, visible and 
invisible, material and spiritual.  The image is, then, not a creature but distinct from 
all things; indeed, all created things (τὰ πάντα) exist in him.  However, what is his 
relation to the invisible God?  All the parties involved in the debate noted that in the 
oikonomia or dispensatio the image is the archetype and fulfillment of humanity.  He 
is the head (κεφαλή) of the church, that is to say, the beginning (ἀρχή) of restored 
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humanity because he is firstborn (πρωτότοκος) of the dead.  As head of reconciled 
humanity the image assumes “preminence” (πρωτεύων) in everything.  In interpreting 
Colossians 1 the Fathers attempted to make a distinction that Paul does not explicitly 
make between Christ the image of the invisible God (theologia) and his role as head 
of reconciled humanity (oikonomia).  Indeed, it is the same subject – the image of the 
invisible God – that Paul fluidly describes as image, firstborn, creator, beginning, and 
reconciler.  What, then, did it mean to say that in the image “the fullness of God was 
pleased to dwell”? 
 The first three chapters of this thesis present three Western pro-Nicene 
theologies of the imago dei.  They face, I suggest, common problems and questions in 
attempting to articulate what it means to say that Christ is the image of God.  Hilary 
of Poitiers, Marius Victorinus, and Ambrose of Milan all are unequivocal that the 
imago dei is principally a Christological term.  As such, it designates a unity of divine 
substance.  No inferiority is to be predicated of the image vis-à-vis the source; rather, 
the entire being, life, and essence of the Father is received in the eternal image.  A 
difficulty that confronts all three theologians is the interpretation of Genesis 1:26.  If 
Christ is “image of God,” how is the human person also an “image of God”?  Given 
the loaded theological import that the imago dei has garnered in the Nicene 
controversy the term clearly cannot unequivocally be transferred to the creature.  
Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose give differing answers to the problematic in their 
struggle to preserve the unique Christological character of “image” language while 
still attempting to do justice to the unambiguous language of Genesis 1:26. 
The second half of my thesis turns to Augustine’s early theology of the imago 
dei.  I argue that Augustine’s philosophical immersion in a Plotinian account of image 
allows him to affirm the imago dei of both Christ and the human person in a way that 
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eluded his predecessors.  As such, I am focusing on two streams of influence that 
shape Augustine’s early theology of image: Nicene Christologies and a Plotinian 
philosophy of image. 
 In chapter one I suggest that Hilary builds his image Christology on the 
foundation of the anti-Monarchian theology of Tertullian and Novatian.  Important to 
these early Latin theologians is the distinction between the eternal unity of Father and 
Son and the dispensatio of the Son in time.  The eternal image is, like its source, 
invisible, immaterial, and eternal.  However, “for us men and for our salvation” the 
invisible image becomes visible.  Thus, theology of the dispensatio initiates a logos-
sarx theology that distinguishes between the eternal logos, who is the invisible image, 
and Christ, who takes on flesh.  Colossians 1:15, for Tertullian and Novatian, does not 
refer to the sarx, but to the logos.  The theophanies of the Old Testament, on the other 
hand, especially to Hagar and Abraham, are linked in anticipation to the Incarnation.  
They are manifestations of Christ, not as the invisible image but as the visible flesh.  
Hilary reworks this anti-Monarchian logos-sarx theology.  The Bishop of Poitiers 
sustains a developed trope based on Philippians 2 distinguishing between the forma 
dei and the forma servi.  Like the logos-sarx theology of Tertullian and Novatian this 
distinction preserves the nature of the invisible image, in whom there is “no diversity 
of substance,” from the Father, while allowing for the visible manifestation in time. 
 Given that “image of God” refers to the forma dei, Hilary will not speak of the 
human person as created in the image of God but as created ad imaginem dei, that is 
to say, the human person is created after the exemplum of the eternal image.  
However, as the eternal image is one with its source, having no diversity of substance, 
the image after which the human person is created is a “common image.”  The unity 
of divine substance entails, for Hilary, that there is no “likeness” (similitudo) in the 
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eternal image.  The human person is, in turn, created in the likeness of a common 
image, that is, of the one image who said “Let us make man in our image and 
likeness.”  Thus, for Hilary, Christ as forma dei is the image of God who in the 
economy becomes visible (as forma servi).  The human person, on the other hand, is 
created ad imaginem dei, that is, according to the likeness of the consubstantial unity 
of the divine persons. 
 Embroiled in the same controversies as Hilary, but being much more 
comfortable deploying philosophical distinctions in the Nicene cause, Marius 
Victorinus insisted against his imagined Arian opponent Candidus that the divine 
image could in no way be of a different substance than his source.  While other 
images are, philosophically speaking, antithetical to the substance they image, that is, 
they have a borrowed, derived, and secondary character, divine simplicity entails that 
in God image and source are one.  Victorinus articulates this simplicity and unity of 
image and source with the language of act and potency.  To distinguish between act 
and potency in God is only to maintain a logical distinction; ultimately, the revelation 
of God in act cannot be separated from who God remains in potency, maintains 
Victorinus.  He, much like Hilary, uses Colossians 1 as a critical proof text in his 
image theology: the articulation of the creative and reconciling work of the image 
attests to the shared divine substance of the image. 
 Like Hilary, Victorinus maintains that the human person should not be 
considered the image of God, but is created secundum imaginem.  The imago dei 
refers to divine simplicity; to the consubstantial unity of image and source.  The 
human person, on the other hand, is created according to this eternal image and is 
made according to the likeness (similitudo) of God.  The preferred term of 
Victorinus’s opponents with regards to the Son – homoiousion (similar or like with 
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respect to being) – is a logical absurdity, insists Victorinus; there can be no “likeness” 
in one simple substance.  Only the human person is homoiousion and in the likeness 
of God.  How, for Victorinus, is the human person created secundum imaginem?  He 
is comprised of two souls or logoi after the two natures of the Logos.  The heavenly 
soul is an image of the “triad on high”; this heavenly soul is an image of the 
consubstantial unity of esse, vivere, and intellegere, according to which the human 
person is fashioned as described in Genesis 1:26 (“Let us make man to our image”).  
The material soul is suggested in Genesis 2:7; here Adam is formed out of the dust of 
the earth, anticipating the material embodied nature of the Logos.  Nevertheless, 
Victorinus insists on the unity of these two souls that form one composite as they 
image the two natures of Christ.  For Victorinus, therefore, the human person created 
secundum imaginem is intelligible only in light of Christ who is the imago dei. 
The imago dei is, then, for Hilary and Victorinus in the first place a 
Christological term, and the human person is understood as image only in a derivative 
sense.  Ambrose of Milan follows this Nicene intuition.  However, while Hilary and 
Victorinus assiduously avoid predicating the imago dei of the human person, 
preferring instead the phrase ad imaginem dei or secundum imaginem, Ambrose is 
less circumspect.  Certainly also for the Bishop of Milan the imago dei refers 
principally to Christ.  To Ambrose, Colossians 1:15 is unambiguous in insisting that 
the image is like its source – invisible, immaterial, and eternal.  What it means for the 
human person to be the image of God is seen in light of Christ; it is not a temporal 
and material image, but an eternal and immaterial one; the imago dei is of the spiritual 
order.  One should not, therefore, look to the body as the image of God, but to the 
soul.  Nevertheless, of the three Latin theologians it is Ambrose who is most attentive 
to the embodied character of the human person and the corollary moral implications.   
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A rich ethical theology derived from the imago dei is evident in Ambrose’s 
preaching, particularly in his sermons to the catechumens.  These sermons are 
suffused with Platonized Stoic injunctions to “flee the body.”  I argue, however, that 
Ambrose adopts this counsel not to set up a body-soul dualism, but to invite his 
hearers to embrace a spirit of detachment towards temporal and material goods, 
including the body.  I suggest that Ambrose does not denigrate the body, but urges a 
“transvaluation” of bodily desires.  Ambrose does so along the lines of two 
foundational Stoic ethical categories that he infuses with Christian content.  First, he 
develops the Stoic ideal of sequi naturam.  To follow one’s nature as a creature in the 
imago dei is, for Ambrose, to transvalue one’s desires from the temporal to the 
eternal.  Second, a Stoic ethic of apatheia (or equanimity of soul) allows one to 
perfect this spirit of detachment towards temporal goods. 
 The created imago dei is not, for Ambrose, a static datum of nature that can be 
made philosophically intelligible as may seem to be the case for Hilary and 
Victorinus, for whom the image-like nature of the human person is expressed as an 
ontological predicate of human nature.  Precisely because of the ethical dimension of 
Ambrose’s theology, the imago dei seems to be held much more tenuously.  Indeed, 
in some of Ambrose’s preaching the image is presented as a treasured gift that can be 
lost when it fails as an image to imitate its source.  That the image of God is realized 
in its propensity to imitate is, for Ambrose, integral to the definition of an image.  The 
imago dei is, in the human person, a dynamic movement by which one is being 
“conformed to the image of his Son” (Romans 8:29).  Thus, the moral imperative that 
issues from Ambrose’s theology of the imago dei is not peripheral or an addendum to 
his thought on the image of God, but rather is integral thereto; it is in imitation of 
virtue that the human person is constituted as an image of God. 
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 Evidently a recurring problematic in Nicene theology of the image of God is 
the way in which the human person can be described as the imago dei when this is 
most immediately a Christological term of loaded significance in the Nicene 
controversy.  Augustine’s early theology, however, approaches this problematic not 
immediately from within the context of the Nicene debate; instead his early dialogues 
at Cassiciacum develop a philosophy of image apart from the Nicene controversy.  
This philosophical account of image will bring new possibilities to the original 
problematic.  In the Soliloquies Augustine is attentive to the dual nature – both 
negative and positive – of an image.  This is the focus of chapter four.  An image has, 
first of all, a negative or false character.  It claims to be something that it is not; it is a 
simulacrum, a deceptive dissemblance.  One can think here of the Greek mythological 
figure Narcissus, who confuses his image with reality.  However, this negative 
evaluation of image is predicated on a more primordial positive evaluation, suggests 
Augustine.  Only because an image participates in its source can it be a genuine 
reflection. 
Augustine’s philosophy of image expressed in the dialogues builds on a 
Plotinian metaphysic in which all finite reality is an image of ultimate reality.  This 
image has in its genesis an egress from this eternal, immaterial realm, and the image 
is destined to return to this source of which it is an image.  An awareness, then, of the 
dual nature of image is critical to Augustine’s early thought.  An image is true rather 
than deceptive when it is recognized to exist in a participatory union with its source, 
that is to say, when the temporal, material order is not absolutized, but recognized to 
be a reflection of ultimate reality.  My thesis suggests that it is this positive, Platonic 
and participatory evaluation of the nature of image that allows Augustine’s early 
theology of the imago dei to go beyond that of his Latin predecessors.  
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Chapter five is devoted to the theology of image operative in Contra 
Academicos.  This dialogue is committed to exploring the question of whether eternal, 
immaterial truth can be known in the temporal, material order.  The title of the 
dialogue intimates that the focus of Augustine’s intentions is to refute the 
philosophical skepticism held by the New Academy.  A philosophy of image is 
fundamental to this enterprise.  The dialogue introduces the literary figure Proteus, 
“the reflected image of truth.”  Proteus was known to reveal truth to whomever 
captured him, but he was impossible to capture, as he would perennially change form 
as soon as he was thought to be grasped by the hand.  Only if Proteus was handed 
over by a god could access to the truth be had.  I argue that Augustine uses the literary 
figure of Proteus as an analogy of the incarnate Christ.  Proteus affirms the possibility 
that eternal truth can be known in the temporal state of flux if it is revealed by a god.  
As an analogy of the incarnate Christ, Proteus overcomes the skepticism of the New 
Academy by affirming the possibility that the finite order can participate in and reveal 
infinite reality.   
In chapter six I turn to consider Augustine’s early theology of the imago dei.  
The previously developed philosophical account of an image, which is “true” or 
revelatory inasmuch as it is seen not as static and “unhinged” but as existing by way 
of participation in the source that draws it to return to itself, is the ground of 
Augustine’s early theology of the imago dei.  In De diversis quaestionibus octoginta 
tribus Augustine suggests that image is not identical with equality; there can be more 
or less equal images.  The same is true of the imago dei.  Augustine is intent to affirm 
that both Christ and the human person are imago dei, but in an unequal likeness.  This 
is a significant departure from pro-Nicene theology, which had been hesitant to 
describe the human person as “image of God” simpliciter.  However, it is precisely 
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the character of image expressed at Cassiciacum, namely that a finite reality can point 
to and participate in something beyond itself, that allows for various degrees of 
likeness to an image and, therefore, of various degrees of likeness to the imago dei.  
Augustine also goes beyond the Latin pro-Nicene tradition in affirming the imago dei 
of the human person’s embodied nature.  Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose were 
unequivocal that the image resides solely in the human person’s intellectual faculties.  
Already in Augustine’s first commentary on Genesis, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 
Augustine is keen to affirm that the body also participates in the image of God.  This 
is predicated, once again, on the philosophy of image developed in the dialogues: the 
temporal, material order can function as “the reflected image of truth.” 
Finally, chapter seven focuses on De vera religione.  This work is the 
culmination of Augustine’s early theology of the imago dei.  I suggest that in De vera 
religione Augustine articulates a theology of ascent in the context of a Plotinian 
metaphysic of the return of an image to participate most fully in its source.  If the 
figure Proteus introduced in Contra Academicos hints towards a theology of the 
Incarnation that makes possible finite participation in eternal truth, De vera relgione 
makes this theology explicit.  Augustine insists that a successful ascent of the image is 
predicated on the initial descent of the imago dei in the Incarnation.  Augustine’s 
early theology of ascent expressed in De vera religione suggests that the created 
image of God needs to be refashioned according to the eternal image of God.   
Augustine’s early theology – composed before his ordination – is unique when 
compared to the previous generation of Latin pro-Nicene theologians in linking the 
human image and the divine image.  Although his thought clearly builds on Hilary, 
Victorinus, and Ambrose, this earlier Latin tradition had been reluctant to associate 
Christ the image of God with the creature, created ad imaginem dei.  In contrast, the 
11 
 
broad participatory ontology that Augustine received from the neo-Platonic tradition 
allowed him to posit various degrees of likeness to an image and, in turn, provided 
him the latitude to affirm that both Christ and the human person were the imago dei.  
A recurring motif in Augustine’s early thought is that all finite good functions as a 
likeness of God and ought to lead the rational creature – the image of God – to ascend 
and return to God.  This fulfillment and realization of human nature as a created 
image is, however, predicated on the prior descent of the divine image that restores 
the image after himself.   
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Chapter I: Hilary of Poitiers 
 
Image theology takes on particular importance in the reception of Nicaea in the 
second half of the fourth century.  In the wake of the “the Blasphemy of Sirmium” in 
357, the articulation of how the eternal Son is to be understood as “image of God” 
develops in its Western theological expressions with unprecedented precision.  This 
chapter will study the theology of the imago dei in Hilary of Poitiers (300-368).  The 
challenge of the Homoian crisis that occupied Hilary forged a unique and 
Christologically focused theology of the imago dei that stands in sharp relief to that of 
Augustine.  In the second half of this thesis I will articulate the way that Augustine 
was able to affirm the imago dei of both Christ and the human person.  This chapter, 
then, expresses how this synthesis eluded Hilary of Poitiers.  I will argue that the 
Nicene debate informed Hilary’s exegesis of key Christological and anthropological 
scriptural passages regarding the image of God (Colossians 1:15 and Genesis 1:26) 
and that, in this debate, Hilary deployed a Western anti-Monarchian image theology 
that, while well-suited to the task at hand of the defence of the homoousion, did little 
to advance his anthropology.  I will proceed in three steps.  First, I will interact with 
the anti-Monarchian Latin predecessors to Hilary’s writings.  I will argue in support 
of recent scholarship that suggests the significance of this earlier Western period for 
the Gaullist Bishop’s thought.  As yet unaffected by the Eastern controversy 
surrounding Nicaea, Hilary’s early writings demonstrate a profound engagement with 
the Western theological tradition of Novatian (circa 200-258) and Tertullian (160-
225).  Second, I will explore how Hilary’s understanding of image directly develops 
and builds on that of Tertullian and Novatian.  Third, I will analyze Hilary’s later 
image theology in its Nicene context.  I will interact in detail with a number of key 
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passages in Hilary’s De Synodis, De Trinitate, and Tractus super Psalmos in order to 
present a systematic expression of what could be described as Hilary’s mature 
“theology of image.”  I will suggest that in his engagement with the controversies 
surrounding Nicaea, “image” becomes a stand-in for “equal,” and I will further argue 
that, as such, “image” language cannot operate in the same manner in his 
anthropology.  There is a tension between Hilary’s exegesis of Colossians 1:15 (Christ 
as image) and his exegesis of Genesis 1:26 (the human person as image).  The tension 
that marks these two different expressions of the imago dei in Hilary’s thought also 
comes to the fore – albeit in different forms – in Hilary’s Nicene contemporaries.  
This chapter, then, serves to add one example of a difficulty that is common to Latin 
pro-Nicene theologies of the image of God.  As such, this is the first of three chapters 
in which I establish the theological context for Augustine’s early theology of the 
imago dei. 
 
Image in the anti-Monarchian Writings (Tertullian and Novatian) 
Hilary’s initial theological formation was unaffected by the Nicene controversy.  
Indeed, the works written before his exile (356-361) do not show any real engagement 
with what was, at this point, largely an Eastern concern.  Rather, Hilary’s early 
writings demonstrate a profound reliance on the traditional Latin anti-Monarchian 
theology that dominated the West in the first half of the fourth century, that is, the 
theology of Novatian and Tertullian. 
 At its most basic level Monarchianism was a theological attempt to preserve 
the unity of God by proposing that the one God reveals himself sometimes as Father 
14 
 
and at other times as Son or Spirit.
1
  The theological response to Monarchian theology 
became profoundly significant for subsequent Western theology.
2
  Preeminent among 
the anti-Monarchian works is Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeas.3  This polemical work 
was probably penned in AD 213; it can be inferred from the treatise that 
Monarchianism had lain dormant for some time but had recently sprung up again.
4
  
Tertullian seems to indicate that the movement arose as a response to polytheism 
                                                          
1
 One of scholarship’s great sources for knowledge about Monarchianism is the 
Roman presbyter Hippolytus’s treatises, Refutatio omnium haeresium and contra 
Noetum; given Hippolytus’s polemical nature, the accuracy of these writings has has 
been questioned.  Ronald Heine has suggested that our knowledge of Monarchianism 
is well served by turning to other sources verifying Hippolytus’s treatment.  Heine 
points to two sources in particular: first, the beginning of Origen’s commentary on the 
Gospel of John (Io. 1-2).  In this work, suggests Heine, Origen is retrospectively 
considering his time in Rome, particularly during the difficult season of the 
Monarchian controversy.  The second source is Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeas.  
Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 
(1998): 56-91.  Other propitious literature surrounding the Monarchian controversy is 
Cuthbert H. Turner, “The ‘Blessed Presbyters’ Who Condemned Noetus,” Journal of 
Theological Studies 23 (1921-1922): 28-35; George La Piana, “The Roman Church at 
the End of the Second Century,” Harvard Theology Review 18 (1925): 201-277; 
Robert Sample, “The Christology of the Council of Antioch (268 CE) reconsidered,” 
Church History 48 (1979): 18-26; Manlio Simonetti, “Sabellio e il sabellianismo,” 
Studi storico-religiosi 4 (1980): 7-28.  The history of the Monarchian movement is 
traced by J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London: Black, 1977), pp. 115-
126.  
2
 “Monarchians” may have been the self-styled term used by the movement begun by 
Noetus and continuing until Sabellius.  In addition to this self-referential description, 
later Greek writers would refer to them as Sabellians after the writer who gave the 
most articulate philosophical defense to their teachings.  Latin Fathers would describe 
them as patripassians because their doctrine results in the Father suffering as Son in 
the passion.  In modern history they have been termed modalists, a term coined by 
Adolf von Harnack that accurately portrays the “modes” in which they understood 
God to manifest himself.  Ernest Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas 
(London: S.P.C.K., 1948), p. 10.  Cf. “Monarchianism” in Encyclopedia of Early 
Christianity, ed. Everett Ferguson (New York: Garland, 1997). 
3
 Evans, Praxeas, p. 8.  This accounts for Tertullian’s derision of the “novelty of 
Praxeas” whose opinions arose only recently; Praxeas manifests the “comparative 
lateness of all heretics,” and stands as a warning that “whatever is earliest is true and 
whatever is later is counterfeit.” Adv. Prax 2.   
4
 Prax. 1.  An excellent treatment of Tertullian’s theological response to 
Monarchianim is offered by Joseph Moingt, Théologie Trinitaire de Tertullien, vol 1, 
Histoire, doctrine, méthodes (Paris: Aubier, 1966), pp. 183-276. 
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among under-catechized Christians intent on preserving monotheism.
5
  They taught 
that the “Father himself came down into the virgin, himself was born of her, himself 
suffered, in short himself is Jesus Christ.”6  A certain Praxeas initially propagated the 
heresy during the pontificate of Victor (193-202), explains Tertullian.  Praxeas, who 
came to Rome from Asia, was a man of “restless character” and filled with pride; he 
considered himself a confessor for the faith on account of a “mere short discomfort of 
imprisonment.”7 
In Adversus Praxean 14-15 Tertullian attempts to distinguish, against 
modalism, the Father and the Son.  Initially, he follows the thesis that the Father is 
invisible and the Son visible: God said, “You cannot see My face, for no man can see 
Me and live!” (Ex. 33.20).  However, many patriarchs and prophets did see God, 
notes Tertullian.  Abraham, Jacob, Isaiah, and Ezekiel all saw God and did not die.  
What is one to make of this apparently blatant contradiction?  Tertullian suggests a 
certain “regulating principle” (regula) to govern the discussion, namely, that there are 
always two – Father and Son.  Thus, the Old Testament theophanies reveal “another,” 
                                                          
5
 Prax. 3: “For all the simple people, that I say not the thoughtless and ignorant (who 
are always the majority of the faithful), since the Rule of Faith itself brings <us> over 
from the many gods of the world to the one only true God, not understanding that 
while they must believe in one only <God> yet they must believe in him along with 
his economy, shy at the economy.  They claim that the plurality and ordinance of 
trinity is a division of unity” (brackets in original). 
6
 Prax. 1. 
7
 Prax. 1. Since Praxeas remains an historically shadowy figure it is difficult to know 
precisely how he raised the ire of Tertullian.  Regardless, Tertullian’s pique is not 
simply on account of the heresy Praxeas propagated.  Rather, Tertullian suffered a 
personal setback on Praxeas’ account.  Pope Victor had just sent out letters giving his 
imprimatur to the new prophecies of the Montanists with which Tertullian was very 
involved when Praxeas put forth all sorts of “false assertions concerning the prophets 
themselves and their churches.”  Prax. 1. Victor recalled his letters of peace and 
discontinued his support of Tertullian’s prophetic movement.  Tertullian was left 
furious: “Thus Praxeas at Rome managed two pieces of the devil’s business: he drove 
out prophecy and introduced heresy: he put to fight the Paraclete and crucified the 
Father.”  Prax. 1. 
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that is to say, the Son.  (Iam ergo alius erit qui uidebatur.)  But now, in pressing the 
distinction of the divine Persons contra modalism, Tertullian realizes he has opened 
himself up to the charge of predicating “another” God – a lower, visible God who is 
“seen” in the theophanies.  The challenge for Tertullian is to chart a course between 
the Scylla of failing to properly distinguish the divine Persons, as in modalism, and 
the Charybdis of proposing another God.  Tertullian quickly affirms that the “other” 
(alius) who is seen in the theopanies is also God in every sense. By way of analogy he 
suggests the distinction between the sun and its rays.  The Son, considered according 
to his substance (ex substantiae condicione), is also Word and Spirit of God (sermo et 
spiritus dei) and, therefore, like the Father is invisible.
8
  Nevertheless, in the economy 
of salvation the Son allows himself to be seen.  Thus, the Old Testament theophanies 
are anticipations of the Incarnation, and the visibility of the Son is, for Tertullian, 
understood in light of this Incarnational principle. 
Tertullian introduces the foundational Western exegetical tradition regarding 
the Old Testament theophanies: while it is, indeed, the Son who is seen in these 
manifestations, he is seen according to his mission or proper to the economy of 
salvation.  According to his divine nature or substance, the Son remains of the same 
invisible substance with the Father.  The Old Testament theophanies reveal that 
“another was seen….  [I]t will follow that we must understand the Father as invisible 
because of the fullness of his majesty; let us recognize the Son as visible in 
accordance with the limitation of derivation (uisibilem uero filium agnoscamus pro 
modulo deriuationis).”9  And so, Tertullian initiates an anti-Monarchian line of 
interpretation, taken up by Novatian and then redeployed with much more precision 
                                                          
8
 Prax. 14 (CCSL 2 1177): Dicimus enim et filium suo nomine eatenus inuisibilem, 
qua sermo et spiritus dei, ex substantiae condicione iam nunc. 
9
 Prax. 14. 
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by Hilary, in whom the theophanies of the Old Testament are said to be 
manifestations of the pre-incarnate Christ that demonstrate the distinction of the 
divine Persons and by implication the illegitimacy of Monarchian modalism.   
 For Tertullian, the nature of the Son as “image of God” does not, therefore, 
entail that the Son is the visible manifestation of the invisible God.  According to 
substance (as Word and Spirit), the Son shares the invisible nature of the Father.
10
  
Tertullian’s interpretation of the language of “image” in Colossians 1:15 emphasizes 
that the eternal image, like its source, is by nature invisible.  Christ is not the visible 
image mediating the invisible God.  The distinction between Father and Son does not 
correspond to a distinction between a visible and an invisible God, maintains 
Tertullian.
11
  Christ was with the Father in the beginning and shares the fullness of the 
divine glory with Him, and thus, also of the Son does Scripture say that no one can 
see God and live.
12
  Tertullian links the “image of God” in Colossians 1:15 with the 
following verse, which describes the creative power of the image. (“In him all things 
were created…”).  The “image of the invisible God” cannot be less or of a different 
substance than its source, because the following verse, and indeed all of Scripture, 
describes one creative power working to fashion creation.  Linking Colossians 1:15 
with the Logos of the prologue of the Gospel of John, Tertullian notes that the creative 
                                                          
10
 Tertullian speaks of “image of God” in a various ways.  A number of times 
Tertullian uses “image of God” language in interesting, but for my purposes, 
theologically insignificant ways.  In two different works he describes an activity in the 
bacchanalian festivities of the Roman amphitheaters in which a condemned criminal 
would wear a mask (imago) representing a god so as to cover the face of the indicted 
criminal.  Cf. Apologeticus 15.12 and De spectaculis 18.2. 
11
 Marc. 5.19.    
12
 Marc. 5.19. 
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power of the Son is evidence that the fullness of the Godhead dwells in him.
13
  As will 
become clear, Hilary adheres closely to Tertullian’s exegesis of Colossians 1:15. 
It is in condescension to the weakness of humanity that the Son was made 
visible to manifest the invisible God.  And so, insists Tertullian, when Scripture 
maintains that no one has ever seen God, we must ask, “Which God?”14  Clearly not 
the Father, because the Apostle John says, “We have seen and heard and handled the 
Word of Life.”15  It was the Son who was seen, heard, and handled.  The Father, on 
the other hand, is described by the Apostle Paul as dwelling in light unapproachable, 
as the “king eternal, immortal, invisible, the only God.”16  By nature the Son is in the 
bosom of the Father – he too is eternal, immortal, invisible – but in the economy the 
Son is seen, heard and handled.  For Tertullian, as later for Novatian and Hilary, there 
is continuity between the theophanies of the Old Testament and the incarnate Christ: 
“[F]rom the beginning he always was seen who was seen at the end, and that he was 
not seen at the end who from the beginning had not been seen.”17  Both in the Old 
Testament theophanies and in the Gospel, asserts Tertullian, there are two, “one seen 
and one unseen.”18  Even in his anti-Monarchian Adversus Praxeam, Tertullian is 
keen to clarify that an underlying unity of substance is prior to the distinction between 
the visible and invisible God.  This distinction, afterall, posits merely a dispensation 
in which the Logos is revealed as sarx.  Tertullian writes, “We are also sure that the 
Son, being indivisible from Him, is everywhere with Him. Nevertheless, in the 
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 Marc. 5.19. 
14
 Prax. 15. 
15
 Prax. 15. 
16 Prax. 15. 
17
 Prax. 15. 
18
 Prax. 15.  While the theophanies are intelligible in light of the principle of the 
incarnation, they are not identical with the incarnation.  Tertullian wants to underscore 
that in the theophanies of the Old Testament Christ was seen dimly as through a glass. 
Prax. 14. 
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economy itself, the Father willed that the Son should be regarded as on earth, and 
Himself in heaven. (Tamen in ipsa oikonomia pater uoluit filium in terris haberi, se 
uero in caelis).”19  The subtlety of the logos-sarx theology in Tertullian’s thought 
allows him to affirm both the distinction of the persons as manifest in the economy of 
salvation (particularly against the Monarchians) and the unity of divine substance.
20
  
Tertullian does not limit the imago dei to Christ.  For Tertullian, the human 
person also can legitimately be described as imago dei.  At times Tertullian will speak 
of the human person as fashioned “towards” the image of God (ad imaginem dei) and 
sometimes simply as imago dei.
21
  In De Baptismo, Tertullian asserts that the baptized 
are given new life according to the likeness of God; this likeness, which had been lost 
in the fall, is now restored in baptism through the breath of the Holy Spirit.  Tertullian 
distinguishes between the human form – the created datum of the “image” (ad 
imaginem dei) – and the spiritual “likeness” (similitudo) given with the breath of God 
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 Prax. 23. 
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 In a significant article on Augustine’s exegesis of “seeing God” in Matthew 5:8, 
Michel Barnes argues that prior to Hillary and Augustine the Latin tradition had 
always distinguished between the visible Son and the invisible Father.   Barnes writes, 
“This way of distinguishing Father from Son is the bedrock of Latin Trinitarian 
theology: the Son is distinguished from the Father as the visible Image of the invisible 
Father.”  Michel Barnes, “The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity,” Modern 
Theology 19 (2003): 341.  While on the whole I believe this is certainly accurate, it 
does not capture the whole picture.  The distinction between the visible Image and the 
invisible Father pertains, for Tertullian, only to the economy of salvation.  Thus, while 
Barnes maintains that it is only with Hilary that we first find a Latin who “will argue 
that the Son, too, is invisible, and that the Son must be invisible if he is truly the 
Image” (Barnes, 341), it seems to me that this is equally already the position of 
Tertullian.  Another helpful article that traces the Latin distinction between the visible 
Son and the invisible Father is offered by Kari Kloos, “Seeing the Invisible God: 
Augustine’s Reconfiguration of Theophany Narrative Exegesis,” Augustinian Studies 
36 (2005): 397–420.  Kloos does not interact with the influence of the anti-
Monarchian theologians on Augustine, but rather with Justin Martyr, Hilary, and 
Ambrose.   
21
 In De Spectaculis 2 Tertullian describes the efforts of the Devil to undo the unique 
relation of the human person to God; this relation derives from God’s creative intent 
to fashion creatures as his “work and image (opus et imaginem dei).”  
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through which the human person is fashioned for eternity.
22
  As created in the image 
of God the human person bears certain divine elements – an immortal soul, free will, 
and rational capacity.  It is not in his physical appearance – the beauty of his face or 
the shape of his body – that the image of God is said to reside; rather, a divine, 
spiritual stamp gets impressed on the human soul.
23
  This notion of a divine stamp on 
the human soul has a a two-fold implication for Tertullian’s anthropology.  First, the 
human person is ordered to know God through the power of the intellect; and, second, 
through the endowment of free will the human person can love him whom he 
knows.
24
  Thus, the intellectual and volitional faculties of the human soul are 
expressions, for Tertullian, of the image of God.  Tertullian frequently reiterates the 
spiritual constituent of the imago dei.  God is spirit, and so the image too must be 
spiritual.  
Nevertheless, the human person remains radically dissimilar to the divine 
power; always reliant on that power in which he participates but which is not his by 
nature.
25
  In many ways Tertullian’s exegesis of Genesis 1:26 acts as a precursor to 
that of Augustine.  Tertullian suggests that not all images are equal; this gives him the 
theological leverage to describe both Christ and the human person as imago dei, but 
not in the same sense.  Tertullian notes, “Now the image is not in any case equal to 
the very thing.  It is one thing to be like the reality, and another thing to be the reality 
itself.”26  In his discussion of the human person as image, Tertullian goes on to 
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 Bapt. 5. 
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 Marc. 2.5; CSEL 47 340. 
24
 Marc. 2.6; CSEL 47 341. 
25
 Marc. 5.19; CSEL 47 643-46. 
26
 Marc. 2.9; CSEL 347 46.  Porro imago ueritati non usquequaque adaequabitur. 
Likewise, in a discussion surrounding a prophecy in Ezekiel about the resurrection, 
Tertullian writes, “Now, although there is a sketch of the true thing in its image, the 
image itself still possesses a truth of its own.”  Res. 30; CSEL 47 68. 
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explain that an image is by definition less than the reality it shows forth: “An image, 
although it may express all the lineaments of the reality, is yet wanting in its intrinsic 
power.”27  Although the image is a spiritual characteristic of the human person, it is of 
a different spirit than the Spirit of God, remaining “unable to express the simple 
power thereof”; the human image, for Tertullian, exists in this anomalous state, 
coming from God and participating in God but not sharing in God’s essence: “[N]ot 
everything which pertains to God will be regarded as God.”28 
 Tertullian’s understanding of the imago dei, then, is that it constitutes a certain 
share in the divine nature while retaining the human person’s distinction from God.  A 
general account of image as derived from its source but inferior to its source informs 
his account of the human person as image of God and also gives shape to his exegesis 
of the creation narrative.  Christ as imago dei is a unique exception to this general 
understanding of image.  The context of Colossians 1:15 affirms, for Tertullian, that 
Christ as image is not only invisible, like its source, but also shares in the divine 
creative power and nature of its source.  As image, Christ is the same substance as his 
source and not the mediating visible image of the invisible God.  Nevertheless, in the 
economy of salvation, Tertullian distinguishes between the Logos, who as invisible 
image shares the invisible substance of the Father, and the sarx – the visible image 
that Christ manifested in the theophanies of the Old Testament and the Incarnation.  
Thus, within anti-Monarchian logos-sarx theology Tertullian will speak of both an 
invisible and visible God. 
Like Tertullian, Novatian works out a theology regarding the distinction of the 
divine Persons based on the theophanies of the Old Testament.  However, some of the 
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 Marc. 2.9; CSEL 47 346. 
28
 Marc. 2.9; CSEL 47 346. 
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subtly of Tertullian’s image theology is absent in Novatian.  Tertullian was able to 
employ the category of imago dei to describe the Son (Colossians 1:15) without 
succumbing to the subordinationist implications of distinguishing between a visible 
and invisible God.  Novation does not employ the distinction between economy and 
theology as clearly and definitively as did Tertullian.  While Tertullian was adamant 
that the Old Testament theophanies and the Incarnation belong clearly to the 
dispensation and do not imply a difference of substance this distinction is less 
apparent in Novatian.  The difference between the two theologians is most apparent in 
their respective interpretations of Colossians 1:15.  While most Latin theologians, 
including Tertullian, interpret the “image of the invisible God” of Colossians 1:15 as 
in no way secondary or inferior to its source, by insisting that the image also is 
invisible, Novatian stands as a notable exception.  In his De Trinitate Novatian 
distinguishes sharply between the Father who was never seen and the Son who 
descended to take on the frailty of human nature.  The Son is the image of the 
invisible God as a condescension to human weakness.
29
  In this sense the incarnate 
Christ, the image of God, is the last and most perfect divine self-expression in a long 
history of theophanies – of manifestations of the image of God.  Slowly the human 
race was being strengthened and accustomed to see the radiance of God.  Novatian 
adopts and develops Tertullian’s analogy of the distinction between the sun and its 
rays.  If Christ had revealed himself in his glory rather than as the visible image, the 
human race would have been blinded by the glory of God’s self-revelation; therefore, 
in the economy of grace, God deigned to show himself in the flesh as the image of 
God.  Novatian writes, “And thus the weakness and imperfection of the human 
destiny is nourished, led up, and educated by Him; so that, being accustomed to look 
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 Trin. 18. 
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upon the Son, it may one day be able to see God the Father.”30  Novatian situates the 
mediation of God’s self-revelation through the visible image of the Incarnate Son as a 
final step within the divine pedagogy.  While Novatian’s De Trinitate smacks at times 
of subordinationism, his anti-Monarchian intention is to distinguish the Father from 
the Son; he does so along the lines of image theology.  The imago dei makes the 
invisible God visible.  
The anti-Monarchian intention is also the context in which Novatian’s “angel 
Christology” should be understood.31  Novatian wants to affirm both that the Son is 
true God and that he is distinct from the Father – an angelic messenger announcing 
the Father’s mind and will.  As the “Angel of Great Counsel,” Christ assures the 
continuity between the theophonies of the Old Testament and the dispensation in 
Jesus Christ.
32
  It is Christ, the angelic messenger, who appears to Hagar, the 
maidservant of Sarah.  For this reason, explains Novatian, Scripture describes the 
angel as both Lord and God, because only God could give a promise of future 
offspring.
33
  While it certainly was not the Father who was seen, it was, nevertheless, 
God who was seen, maintains Novatian.  This appearance of the divine messenger to 
Hagar describes neither an ordinary angelic appearance nor the appearance of the 
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 Trin. 18 (CCSL 4 44): Imago est enim inuisibilis Dei, ut mediocritas et fragilitas 
condicionis humanae Deum Patrem uidere aliquando iam tunc assuesceret in imagine 
Dei, hoc est in Filio Dei.  Gradatim enim et per incrementa fragilitas humana nutriri 
debuit per imaginem ad istam gloriam, ut Deum Patrem uidere posset aliquando. 
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 Novatian’s “angel Christology” is developed in De Trinitate 20.  Cf. Felix 
Scheidweiler, “Novatian und die Engelchristologie,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 
66 (1954/55): 126-139; P. Joseph Barbel, “Zur ‘Engelchristologie’ bei Novatian,” 
Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift 67 (1958): 96-105; and idem, Christos Angelos: Die 
Anschauung von Christus als Bote und Engel usw (Theophaneia 3; Bonn: Peter 
Hanstein, 1941). 
32
 For a discussion of Novatian’s treatment of the theophanies in the Old Testament 
see Jean Daniélou, History of Early Christian Doctrine Before the Council of Nicaea, 
vol. 3, Origins of Latin Christianity, trans. David Smith and John Austin Baker 
(London: Westminster, 1977), pp. 229-38. 
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 Trin. 18. 
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Father; rather, the “person of Christ … the Announcer of the Father’s mind”34 
appeared to comfort Hagar with the promise of a child.  Likewise, it was the same 
divine messenger who came to Abraham to prophesy of the child Isaac and who also 
came to carry out the destruction of Sodom.  Like Hagar, Abraham calls this angel 
“Lord.”  In entertaining the divine messenger, Abraham was certainly not showing 
hospitality to the Father, but rather to the Son.  Novatian explains“So that the proper 
invisibility should be restored to the Father, and the proper moderate status should be 
remitted to the angel (propria mediocritas remittitur), it should be believed that no 
other than the Son of God, who is also God was seen by Abraham and received by 
him as a guest.”35  And so, it was not the Father who was seen by Abraham but the 
Son; similarly, it was the Son who was made visible in the Incarnation while the 
Father remains at all times invisible.
36
  The distinction of the divine Persons underlies 
Novatian’s understanding of the Son as the revelation or messenger of the Father.37 
Novatian’s anti-Monarchian polemic is likewise at work in the interpretation 
of the beatitude that the pure in heart shall see God (Matthew 5:8).  Novatian explains 
that by this beatitude Christ was distinguishing himself, who was seen by all, from the 
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Father, who will be seen only by the pure in heart.  The invisible God, explains 
Novatian, was hereby pointed out by the visible image of God.
38
  In responding to his 
Monarchian interlocutor, Novatian is keen to underscore both the distinction between 
the image of God and the invisible God and the union between the image and its 
source.   
Novatian’s De Trinitate demonstrates a sustained subordinationist theology of 
the image of God predicated on the key distinction between the visible Son and the 
invisible Father.  Erik Peterson succinctly notes, “The subordinationist note of his 
predecessors is not wanting in Novatian.  Only the Father is invisible; the Son 
manifested Himself in the theophanies.  He is subordinate and inferior to the 
Father.”39  Keilbach rightly comments, “In fact the Father according to Novatian 
could not descend; otherwise He would be enclosed in space.  This, however, involves 
a manifest and absolute repugnance, since the Father Himself encloses all space and 
cannot be in any place, but rather all place is in Him.  For the Son, indeed, according 
to Novatian’s statements, such a repugnance does not hold.  He therefore could 
descend.”40  Keilbach rightly draws attention to the necessary “inferiority” of the Son 
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Trinitate,” Bogoslovska Smotra 21 (1933): 208. 
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in relation to the Father; this is a tension in Novatian’s thought, in which he fails to 
articulate as clearly as Tertullian the distinction between Christ’s divine nature and his 
temporal dispensation. 
Novatian will at times emphasize the divinity of the Son by frequent recourse 
to passages in the Gospel of John such as “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30).  
Again, it is Novatian’s theology of image that allows him to express his understanding 
of the relation between Father and Son.  Russel Simone notes the value of this image 
theology to affirm divine unity while retaining the distinction of the Persons: “[Image 
theology] expresses very well the relation of origin between the Father and the Son, 
their unity, and the role of revealer of the Father which is incumbent on the Son.  
Since an image is a relative name that supposes and opposes an origin, duality of 
persons results; moreover the perfect image of God cannot but be also God, hence 
unity of nature.”41  
Novatian is less clear than Tertullian in distinguishing between the eternal 
nature of the Son and his manifestation in the economy (logos-sarx theology).  For 
Novatian, Christ as “image of God” is most fundamentally revealer of the Father.  His 
nature as revealer is evident both in the Old Testament theophanies and in the 
Incarnation.  If the image is to be the visible manifestation of the invisible God, he 
must be united to and distinct from the Father, maintains Novatian, in traditional anti-
Monarchian terms. 
 
Hilary’s Development of Anti-Monarchian Image Theology  
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Mark Weedman, among others, has noted the importance of Latin anti-Monarchian 
theology in Hilary’s early work, particularly his In Matthaeum.42  Weedman focuses 
on three theological loci in which he sees clear evidence that the earlier Latin tradition 
is taken up by Hilary.  First, Hilary adopts Tertullian’s regula fidei, which 
underscores the pre-existence of the Son and includes the language of “substance” to 
bespeak the unity of Father and Son.
43
  Second, the logos-sarx Christology of 
Tertullian and Novatian features prominently in Hilary’s In Matthaeum.  Like his 
Latin predecessors, Hilary distinguishes between the Word and the flesh of the Son; 
he insists that both the substance of the divinity and the substance of the humanity 
must be affirmed.
44
  Lastly, Weedman notes that in interpreting the passion of Christ, 
Hilary follows closely the received theology of his Latin theological predecessors.  
Hilary maintains that the Son’s fear and suffering do not mitigate his union with the 
Father; nor is it the case that the Father suffered in the Son; rather, the Son’s passion 
is articulated as present to his humanity but not to his divinity.
45
  By drawing on the 
theology of his Latin predecessors, Hilary preserves both the Son’s union with the 
Father and his distinction from the Father.  These elements of anti-Monarchian 
theology served him well in the Nicene debate. 
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While Hilary’s familiarity with the earlier Latin anti-Monarchian tradition is 
well documented, particularly by Mark Weedman’s study, an investigation of how 
this tradition informs Hilary’s theology of image has not been undertaken.  Having 
considered the theology of image operative in the anti-Monarchian writers, I now 
want to move in two steps.  First, in this section, I will consider how this anti-
Monarchian image theology is adopted in Hilary’s writtings, particularly De Trinitate.  
In the second section I will to turn to to Hilary’s pro-Nicene works that demonstrate 
his reliance on and adaptation of an anti-Monarchian theology of image.  
In many ways, Hilary, whose obvious concern is Homoian subordinationism, 
adheres more closely to Tertullian’s interpretation of Colossians 1:15 than to that of 
Novatian.  Hilary allows for a distinction between the visible and the invisible God 
only with the caveat that the “visible God” is understood to be a “dispensation only 
and not a change of nature.”  (Dispensatio itque tantum est, non demutatio.)46  That is, 
in the context of the Nicene crisis Hilary permits discussion of a “visible God” under 
the rubric of the logos-sarx theology as it has developed from Tertullian.  However, 
Hilary explicitly does not follow Novatian in interpreting Colossians 1:15 as the 
visible manifestation of the invisible God.  Rather, more like Tertullian, Hilary 
interprets the image as eternally invisible and the Incarnation as only a temporal 
dispensation.   
I will focus on two significant topics in Hilary’s exegesis of Scripture that 
indicate the influence and development of Latin anti-Monarchian theology in Hilary’s 
thought: first, his development of Novatian’s “angel Christology” and, second, his re-
articulation of logos-sarx theology in ways consonant with the faith of Nicaea.  
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The theophanies of the Old Testament explored by Tertullian and Novatian – 
such as the Angel of God appearing to Abraham and to Hagar – are also mined for 
their Christological import by Hilary.  There are, however, certain significant 
departures, where Hilary takes up the interpretive tradition from Novatian.  I have 
already pointed out how for the anti-Monarchian writers the appearance of the 
messenger of God in the Old Testament theophanies served to underscore the 
distinction between Christ and the Father.  Novatian’s De Trinitate was less 
concerned with the underlying subordinationist implications of “angel Christology.”  
Hilary’s own De Trinitate, however, explicitly has subordinationist theologies in his 
scope and, as such, his understanding of the appearance of Christ in these two 
narratives in Genesis departs in some significant ways from the interpretive tradition 
articulated by Novatian. 
 Hilary notes that an “Angel of the Lord” came to Hagar comforting her with 
the promise of a rich posterity.  Like Novatian, Hilary notes that this promise far 
exceeds the office of an angel; indeed, the angel “spoke about matters that are proper 
to God alone.”47  Also, like Novatian, Hilary notes that Hagar called the angel “Lord” 
and “God,” thereby indicating that this angel was “the angel of Great Council.”  
Clearly, Hilary is marching in step with the Latin exegetical tradition of Tertullian and 
Novatian in this passage.  He concludes, “In order that the distinction of persons 
should be complete, He was called the angel of God, for He who is God from God is 
also the angel of God.”48  The anti-Monarchian concern regarding the distinction of 
the divine Persons is thus affirmed in Hilary’s interpretation. 
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 Immediately following his discussion of the appearance of the divine 
messenger to Hagar, Hilary considers the appearance of the same messenger to 
Abraham.  A promise of posterity is made also to Abraham and his wife Sarah, again 
indicating that this is no ordinary angel.  Hilary writes, “It is God, therefore, who is 
also the angel, because He who is also the angel of God is God, born of God.  He was 
called the angel of God, therefore, because He is the angel of the great council.”49  
Clearly, Hilary is content to follow Novatian’s exegesis of the theophanies in the Old 
Testament as manifestations of Christ that distinguish the Father from the Son.  
However, Hilary does not adopt Novatian’s language that contrasted the “visible 
God” and the “invisible God.”  What smacked of subordinationism in Novatian’s 
exegesis is purged in Hilary’s interpretation.  Indeed, Hilary is keen to insist that the 
divine messenger is God in the fullest sense.  When Hagar and Abraham call the angel 
“Lord” and “God,” they are articulating a reality about his divine nature: “A name is 
suited to the nature.”50  Hilary writes, “Although Abraham saw Him as a man, he 
adored Him as the Lord, that is, he recognized the mystery of the future 
Incarnation.”51  Like the Incarnation, the appearances of Christ in the theophanies of 
the Old Testament are a dispensation only and not a change of the Son’s divine 
nature, nor an indication of his ontological inferiority to the Father. 
 Hilary’s development of the logos-sarx theology of the anti-Monarchians, 
particularly Tertullian, allows him to advance beyond the subordinationism of 
Novatian’s thought.  In Book Nine of De Trinitate, Hilary adopts Philippians 2 as a 
prism through which to read those scriptural passages that seem to suggest the 
inferiority of the Son.  In accepting the form of a servant (forma servi) Christ does not 
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lose his form of God (forma dei).  Hilary insists, “Keep in your mind that in our Lord 
Jesus Christ we are discussing a person of two natures, because He who was in the 
form of God received the form of a slave in which he was obedient unto death.  The 
obedience unto death is not in the form of God, just as the form of God is not in the 
form of a slave.”52  By rightly distinguishing those passages that speak of the forma 
servi from those that speak of the forma dei Hilary suggest that an anti-Monarchian 
logos-sarx Christology can still be judiciously employed against Homoian 
subordinationism. 
 All of Book Nine of Hilary’s De Trinitate is devoted to defending the “unity 
of the undivided Godhead.”53  Novatian’s and Tertullian’s logos-sarx theology is 
amplified and given theological precision with the forma dei / forma servi trope.  The 
Son is certainly image, manifesting the Father (as in the theophanies of the Old 
Testament), but he is the perfect image, sharing the substance and nature of the 
Father.  Hilary writes, “He is the image which comes from Him.  He reveals what is in 
Him, while He is the image and the true nature of His origin, for the perfect birth 
bestows the perfect image.”54  Imago dei, then, is said not of the forma servi, but of 
the forma dei.  
It is precisely on account of the two natures of Christ that human salvation is 
won:  
 
Jesus Christ, therefore, who became all these things for our sake, and who 
was born as the man of our flesh, spoke in accordance with the custom of 
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our nature, but does not forget that He is God in accordance with His own 
nature.  Even though He performed the deeds of our nature in the birth, 
passion, and death, He did all these very things by the power of His own 
nature, while He Himself is the cause of His own birth, while He wills to 
suffer what He could not suffer, while He who dies lives.
55
   
 
The forma dei / forma servi trope, then, is a sustained attempt by Hilary to hold in 
dialectic tension Christ’s two natures.  Christ is seen in the Gospels as at once weak, 
ignorant, and dying, as well as invincible, all-knowing, and resurrected.  Hilary 
insists, “While each action is done in accordance with its proper nature, bear in mind 
that it is the one Christ who is present in each of them.”56  The assumed flesh, Hilary 
refers to as a “dispensation” in which Christ emptied Himself of the form of God to 
take on a new nature without losing his divine nature, only changing in his 
appearance.
57
  Only the two natures could save the fallen human race; while assuming 
the form of a slave Christ retained the nature of the form of God in order to “glorify 
the form of a slave with Himself.”58  And so the form of slave is adopted that it might 
participate in the form of God. 
The forma dei / forma servi theology is thus the outworking of the anti-
Monarchian logos-sarx tradition, particularly molded so as to safeguard the unity and 
equality of the divine nature while allowing for the economy of salvation.  The eternal 
image of God is in no way less than its source; admittedly, the image of God took on 
the form of a slave, but this was to assume a temporal dispensation only and did not 
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imply a change in divine nature.  The Son is an image, and, therefore, he does indeed 
say, “The Father is greater than I.”  But precisely because he is perfect image and 
perfect expression of the Father, the Son is just as great as the Father, since the Father 
“bestows the image of His unbegotten nature upon Him by the mystery of the birth, 
since he begets Him from Himself and into His own form, since He again renews Him 
from the form of a slave into the form of God.”59  “Form of God” and “image of God” 
are synonyms for Hilary; thus, after the temporal dispensation in which Christ raised 
up and glorified the form of the slave that he assumed, he again takes up the image 
and form which is eternally his. 
 Hilary follows Novatian by linking the theophanies of the Old Testament 
(“angel Christology”) with the Incarnation.  Both are a manifestation of God, a 
proclamation of the mind and will of God.  Indeed, the theophanies of Genesis to 
Hagar and Abraham are, for Hilary, prophecies of the future Incarnation, for which 
reason Christ will say, “‘Abraham your father rejoiced that he was to see my day.  He 
saw it and was glad.’  The man who was seen, therefore promises that He will 
return.”60  However, unlike Novatian, Hilary does not predicate this linkage upon an 
understanding of Christ as the “visible image.”  The anti-Homoian intention of 
Hilary’s De Trinitate does not allow him to follow Novatian down the 
subordinationist path of distinguishing between the “visible God” and the “invisible 
God.”  Rather, Hilary builds on the anti-Monarchian logos-sarx Christology, reading 
the theophanies and the Incarnation through the lens of Philippians 2.  
 
Hilary’s Image Theology in the Nicene Context 
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Having become sole Emperor of both East and West in 350, Constantius forged ahead 
with unifying the Empire around the Homoian cause.
61
  An aggressive campaign was 
begun in the West at Constantius’s bidding, spearheaded by two Eastern bishops, 
Valens and Ursacius, to depose bishops who refused to subscribe to the condemnation 
of Athanasius.  The Synods of Arles (353), Milan (355) and Beziers (356) were 
effective in condemning Athanasius and gave, perhaps unwittingly, assent to 
Homoian theology.
62
  The theological intentions of Valens and Ursacius became 
transparent at the Council of Sirmium in 357.  The Creed issued at Sirmium was 
explicit in its subordinationism and also banned all language of ousia as unbiblical.  
Only after the Council of Sirmium in 357 do we have major Latin pro-Nicene figures 
responding to the challenge.  It is within this Christologically charged context that I 
want to consider Hilary of Poitiers’s image theology as a response to Homoian 
polemics.
63
 
 De Synodis is Hilary’s attempt to educate the Latin bishops about Eastern 
theology of the homoousion as it had developed from Nicaea and to argue against 
Homoian doctrine.
64
  “Image” in this work is used to identify the relation between 
Father and Son.  Although an image must be distinguished from its original, it is also 
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the “species and nature” of the original.65  Hilary is keen to note the ontological 
identity between the image and its source: “[A]n image is the figured and 
indistinguishable likeness of one thing equated to another.”  (Imago itaque est rei ad 
rem coaequandae imaginata et indiscreta similitudo.)
66
  For one to be the “image of 
God” is, according to Hilary, to share the “properties” (propria) of the Father – to 
share the Father’s “glory, worth, power, invisibility, and essence (gloria, virtus, 
potestas, invisibilis, essentia).”67  De Synodis unequivocally asserts that the Son as 
image is “indistinguishable and entirely similar” to the Father.68  Indeed, there is no 
“diversity of substance” (diversitatem substantiae); rather, the image “embraces in 
Himself the whole form of His Father’s divinity both in kind and in amount.”69  Image 
is, for Hilary, another way of denoting the equality of the Son’s nature with that of the 
Father.  
Sharing the “properties” of the Father is essential to the Son’s nature as image, 
for he reflects “the truth of the Father’s form by perfect likeness of the nature imaged 
in Himself.”70  If the Son is to be “truly an image,” writes Hilary, he “must have in 
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himself his original’s species, nature and essence in virtue of the fact that he is an 
image.”71  In De Synodis, then, Hilary develops a theology of image in precise 
response to the Homoian crisis; the polemical context of the work entails that the 
ontological identity between image and its source is accentuated.
72
  Mark Weedman 
rightly notes that the overarching intention of Hilary’s treatment of the relation 
between Father and Son is to affirm that they “are distinct but not diverse … whatever 
is granted or given by the ‘original’ (origo), whether that is ‘life’ or ‘image,’ shares a 
similar substance to the original.”73  Hilary, then, develops pro-Nicene language of 
“image” to defend the homoousion.  “Image” in this context is used to bespeak the 
unity of being of Father and Son.  Colossians 1:15 (“Christ the image of the invisible 
God, first-born of all creation”) is the preeminent image text marshaled by Hilary to 
indentify the equality of Father and Son.  Given the Christologically charged context, 
in which “image” is used to affirm or deny the co-equality of the Son with the Father, 
Hilary will not use give “image” language the same meaning in his exegesis of 
Genesis 1:26, where “image” refers to a created, temporal human being.74 
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Image as a Christological Term (Colossians 1:15) 
A lemma search of Hilary’s corpus for the use of some form of imago dei reveals that 
the Bishop uses such language 47 times.
75
  These instances are nearly equally divided 
between two major works: the Tractus super Psalmos and De Trinitate.  The vast 
majority of the uses of “image” language occur in an anti-Homoian context in which 
Colossians 1:15 is quoted.  Hilary underscores two theological motifs in this verse in 
his dealings with the Homoians: the unity of creative power in Father and Son and the 
invisible nature of the image.  I have argued that these two interpretive accents were 
critical elements in anti-Monarchian theology.  First, Tertullian and Novatian 
underscore the unity of the Son’s creative power with the Father in their exegesis of 
“image” in Colossians 1:15.  Hilary will follow this emphasis, and, like them, link this 
verse with the creative Logos of the Johannine prologue.  Second, Tertullian’s 
emphasis in exegeteing Colossians 1:15 is that the substance of the Son is also 
invisible.  Hilary will strategically adapt both these elements in what is essentially 
cultivated anti-Monarchian theology. 
The image in Colossians 1:15 is associated with creative power: the following 
verse reads, “By Him all things were created, both in the heavens and on earth, visible 
and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities – all things have 
been created through Him and for Him.”76  Hilary will argue that the unity of creative 
power between Father and Son testifies to their unity of being.  (As a proof text Hilary 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Paul Burns, The Christology in Hilary of Poitiers’s Commentary on Mathew (Roma: 
Institutum Patristicum, 1981).  
75
 Cf. Library of Latin Texts electronic database (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols). 
76
 Psal. 91. 4 (CSEL 22 348): Qui est imago dei, primogenitus omnis creaturae, quia 
in ipso constituta sunt omnia in caelis et in terra, uisibilia et inuisibilia, siue throni 
siue dominationes siue principatus siue potestates: omnia in ipso et per ipsum facta 
sunt.  
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quotes John 5:17: “My Father is working until now, and I Myself am working.”)77  
The second theological motif of importance to Hilary in Colossians 1:15 is that the 
image is also invisible.  The Son, as “image of the invisible God” is not a 
manifestation of an invisible God.  Appreciating the invisible nature of the image of 
the invisible God undermines Homoian exegesis of this passage, which considered the 
image to be of a subordinate and different substance as the image is derived and 
revelatory and, on that account, made visible in the Incarnation.
78
  I will analyze both 
these elements of image theology in Hilary’s exegesis of Colossians 1:15. 
In the Tractatus on Psalm 91, Hilary notes the greatness of God displayed in 
creation – the heavens, the sun, stars, and other lights.  In the creation narrative, 
maintains Hilary, Moses taught a knowledge of God from the glory of creation in 
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 Psal. 91. 4 (CSEL 22 348): Verum cum in omnibus Christus operetur, eius tamen 
opus est, qui operatur in Christo: et ideo, Pater meus, ait, cotidie operatur, et ego 
operor, quia opus Patris est, quicquid manente in se Deo Patre, Filius Dei Deus 
Christus operatur; atque ita per filium cotidie omnia, quia omnia Pater operatur in 
filio.   
78
 Representative of this Latin Homoian position that contrasts the visible Christ with 
the invisible Father is a fragment from Palladius collected in the Scolia Arriana.  
Palladius writes, “There is the question of whether the Son is the invisible God. It is 
written of the Father: ‘No man has ever seen, nor can see’ [1 Tim. 6.16] him; and 
similarly, ‘The invisible, immortal, only God’ [1 Tim. 6:17]; and ‘No one has seen 
God and lived’ [Ex. 33.20]; and again ‘No one has ever seen God, the only-begotten 
who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known’ [Jn. 1.18]. But about the 
Son it is said, ‘We have seen his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father’ 
[Jn. 1.14]; and ‘God appeared to Abraham by the oaks of Mamre’ [Gen. 18.1]; and 
then there is the episode with the blind man, who said, ‘Where is the Son of God, that 
I may believe in him?’ and the Son of God himself said in reply, ‘He whom you 
would see, and to whom you would speak, I am that one.’ [Jn. 9.36–37].”  Fragments 
of Palladius, #106. Gryson, Scolies Ariennes, pp. 290–291.  See also Michel Barnes’s 
commentary on this passage: Barnes, “The Visible Christ,” 337.  It is important to 
recognize that although Hilary’s rhetoric lumps Homoian theology under the category 
of “Arian,” and assumes of their theology the blunt Arian distinction between the 
visible created God and the invisible uncreated God, in actuality Homoian 
Christology was much more complex and subtle.  Homoian Christology recognized 
degrees of divinity and invisibility and affirmed Christ’s divine sonship.  Cf. Hanson, 
Search, pp. 348-86.  Nevertheless, as is clear in De Synodis, for Hilary, imago dei 
indicates unity of divine substance – a position he thinks is lacking in Homoian 
Christology. 
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order that people “could understand and see through these great visible works [God’s] 
power, who made it, and that by the admiration of the creature they might understand 
the power of the Creator.”79  In the New Testament Paul teaches the same truth as 
Moses, explains Hilary, this time not with milk but with bread.  Quoting Colossians 
1:15-16 Hilary asserts that all things in heaven and on earth – these great visible 
works of God’s power – are created by the Son and exist in him.  It is in Christ, who 
is firstborn of God the Father, that heaven and earth are created and upheld in being.
80
  
Colossians 1:16, therefore, is ideally suited to Hilary’s anti-Homoian polemic, 
because this verse demonstrates that “image” does not necessitate a different or 
reduced ontological status of the Son, but that the image is rather one in creative 
power with the Father, expressing the Father’s action and will.  Jean Doignon 
expresses this well: “La présence en Dieu de son image explique, comme une 
véritable connaturalité du Père et du Fils dans la connaissance, que le Fils voie à 
l’intérieur de la volonté du Père l’image de son action, parce que tout est formé 
comme un archétype de l’avenir dans la predestination divine.”81  Thus, Hilary finds 
this ontological identity of image and source represented in the description of the one 
creative power articulated in Colossians 1:16.
82
 
Hilary frequently groups Colossians 1:15 with both John 1:1 and a prophet of 
the Old Testament so that a prophet, the Evangelist, and the Apostle all testify to the 
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 Psal. 91. 4 (CSEL 22 348) (my translation): quae possent intellegi et uideri, ut per 
hanc conspicabilium operum magnitudinem uirtus eius, qui operatus est, 
cognosceretur et creatoris potestas per creaturae admirationem posset intellegi.  
80
 Psal. 91. 4 (CSEL 22 348): Verum haec ex nutu dei patris et in caelis et in terra 
manent atque existerunt, et licet per filium omnia, tamen a deo omnia.  
81
 Jean Doignon, Hilaire de Poitiers: Disciple et témoins de la Verité, 356-367 (Paris: 
Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 2005), p. 106. 
82
 For a discussion of Hilary’s exegesis of Colossians 1:15 in terms of creative power, 
see C. F. A. Borchardt, Hilary of Poitiers’ Role in the Arian Struggle (Hague: Nijhoff, 
1966), p. 104. 
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unity of Father and Son in the work of creation.
83
  The unity of operations in the 
creation narrative attested to throughout Scripture is, for Hilary, evidence that the Son, 
as image, is coequal with the Father.
84
  Hilary writes: 
 
Do you now know what it is to be the image of God?  It surely means that 
all things were created through Him and unto Him.  Since all things are 
created in Him, then understand that He whose image He is also creates 
all things in Him.  But, since these things which are created in Him are 
created through Him, then realize that in Him who is the image there is 
also present the nature of Him whose image He is (in hoc quoque qui 
imago est naturam eius cuius imago est in esse cognosce).  He creates 
through Himself (Per se enim creat) what is created in Him, just as all 
things are reconciled in Him through Himself.  Since they are reconciled 
                                                          
83
 Psal. 125. 6 (CSEL 22 609): cognoscentes a propheta: ego sum, qui feci caelum et 
terram ex nihilo, credentes ab euangelio: in principio erat uerbum et uerbum erat 
apud deum et deus erat uerbum, pronuntiantes ab apostolo: qui est imago dei 
inuisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae, quia in ipso constituta sunt omnia in caelis 
et in terra.  Psal. 148. 4 (CSEL 22 862): facta autem sunt per eum, de quo euangelista 
testatus est: omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil et apostolus ait: 
qui est imago dei inuisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturae, quia in ipso condita sunt 
omnia in caelis et in terra, uisibilia et inuisibilia; siue sedes, siue dominationes, siue 
principatus, siue potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso condita sunt.  et Sapientia ita 
de se locuta est: ego eram apud illum conponens; mihi adgaudebat, cum laetaretur 
orbe perfecto.  Here John 1:1 and Colossians 1:15 are tied with Proverbs 8, a 
frequently quoted Christological referent employed by both Arian and pro-Nicene 
parties. 
84
 While unity of power and unity of operations are distinct Hilary, in his anti-
Homoian theology, usually pairs them.  Thus, the work of creation demonstrates one 
work done through one power.  Cf. Trin. 8.51 (CCSL 62 A 363-64).  Both a 
“similarity of power” and a “similarity of operation” are for Hilary demonstrative of a 
similarity of nature. 
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in Him, grasp the nature of the paternal unity in Him that reconciles all 
things to Himself in Him!
85
 
 
With recourse to image language, Hilary reiterates the ontological identity of Father 
and Son.  The same united power operative in creation is also at work in recreation.  
As all things were created in the Son, so too, all things are restored in the Son.  
However, both operations are carried out through one divine power.
86
  In reconciling 
all things in Himself, the Son reconciles all things into the unity He shares with the 
Father.
87
 
  The second theological motif of importance to Hilary’s exegesis of Colossians 
1:15 is that while the Son is the “image of God,” he is not the visible mediation of the 
invisible God; the Son is not “image” as a midway point between God and humanity 
who as ontologically inferior reveals the incomprehensible Father.
88
  This is a 
radically different account of image than one would expect from a thoroughgoing 
Platonic model in which image is revelatory of its source but remains derived, 
secondary, and inferior to it.
89
  Indeed, it is precisely this Platonic understanding of 
                                                          
85
 Trin. 8.51 (CCSL 62 A 363-64). 
86
 “[W]e acknowledge the same similarity of power and the fullness of the divinity in 
each of them.  The Son received everything from the Father, and He is the form of 
God and the image of His substance.”  Trin. 3.23 (CCSL 62 95). 
87
 Doignon notes, “La similitude du Père et du Fils donne son fondement à leur 
égalité, car il ne peut y avoir d’égalité entre des choses dissemblables; elle requiert 
une unité d’essence.”  Doignon, Hilaire de Poitiers: ‘Disciple et témoins de la Verité,’ 
356-367, pp. 104-5. 
88
 “For the Father to be in the Son and the Son to be in the Father means that there is a 
perfect fullness of the Godhead in each of them.  The Son is not a diminution of the 
Father nor is He the imperfect Son from the Father.”  Trin. 3.23 (CCSL 62 95). 
89
 Hilary’s writings demonstrate genuine reluctance to adopt Platonic explanations 
perhaps because they were prevalent in Homoian theology.  Cf. H. D. Saffrey, “Saint 
Hilaire et la philosophie,” in Hilaire et son temps: Actes du Colloque de Poitiers 
(Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1969), pp. 247-265. 
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image adopted by the Homoian party to which Hilary is responding.
90
  The image too 
is invisible, stresses Hilary.
91
  While the Son draws his life from the Father he 
receives the fullness of divinity from the Father, perfect from perfect, whole from 
whole, “The invisible one from the invisible one, because He is the image of the 
invisible God and because He who sees the Son sees also the Father.”92  The Arians 
praise God’s incomparable attributes, contends Hilary, not out of pious devotion, but 
to distance the image of God from its source.
93
  The Arians consider the Son weak and 
the Father mighty; how then is the Son a true image?  They call the Father 
incorporeal, but the Son incarnate; how then is the Son the form of the incorporeal 
God?  They call the Father ineffable (Ineffabilis Pater est), but the Son revealed in 
speech (Filium sermo conplectitur); however, outside of the image, explains Hilary, 
the Son’s nature is also ineffable (extra imaginem inenarrabilis est natura 
narrabilis.)
94
  In short, how can a true image be less than its source?  Against his 
Homoian interlocutor, Hilary asserts, “The Apostle could not teach the nature of the 
Godhead in the Son more explicitly than by the invisibility of God, so that Christ is 
the image of the invisible God, and certainly He whose substance is visible would not 
reproduce the image of an invisible nature.”95  “Image” is demonstrative of equality, 
                                                          
90
 For a discussion of how this theology of the invisible image is operative in 
Augustine’s thought see Barnes, “Visible Christ,” 329-55.  
91
 Manlio Simonetti has demonstrated that Hilary’s emphasis on the invisible nature 
of the image in his exegesis of Colossians 1:15 follows Origen: “D’altra parte, nella 
tradizione di Origene, Ilario ribadisce che, in quanto immagine, il Figlio è invisible 
alla pari del Padre di cui è immagine, anzi incomprensibile comme quello.”  Manlio 
Simonetti, “L’esegesi ilariana di Col 1, 15a,” Vetera Christianorum 2 (1965): 167. 
92
 De Trinitate, 2.11 (CCSL 62 48): Inconpraehensibilis ab inconpraehensibili: nouit 
enim nemo nisi inuicem. Inuisibilis ab inuisibili, quia imago Dei inuisibilis est, et quia 
qui uidit Filium, uidit et Patrem.   
93
 Trin. 11.5 (CCSL 62 A 533-34). 
94
 Trin. 11.5 (CCSL 62 A 533). 
95
 Trin. 11.5 (CCSL 62 A 534).  Michel Barnes rightly notes, “According to Latin 
Homoians in the second half of the fourth century, the appearance of the Son in the 
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for Hilary, for which reason the image cannot be anything less than its invisible 
source. 
Nearly every time Hilary quotes Colossians 1:15 in De Trinitate, he stresses 
the invisible nature of the image.  Christ does not present the Father visibly, for as 
image of the Father he is the same form as that of which he is an image.
96
  God is 
Spirit and Christ is spirit, and a corporeal Christ cannot be the image of the invisible 
God.
97
  Hilary asks rhetorically, “I ask whether there is a visible image of the invisible 
God, and whether the infinite God can be brought together in an image so that He is 
visible through the image of a limited form?”98  After quoting Colossians 1:15 again, 
Hilary writes, “Certainly, the creator of invisible things is not compelled by any 
necessity of nature to be the visible image of the invisible God.  And in order that we 
might not regard Him as the image of the form rather than of the nature, He is 
therefore the image of the invisible God; the nature of God in him is to be understood 
                                                                                                                                                                      
theophanies and the Incarnation serves as proof that the Son is not true God; only the 
invisible – and non-appearing – Father is the true or real God.  These appearances by 
the Son, his visibility, constitute sufficient evidence that the Son is not God.” Barnes, 
“Visible Christ,” 336.  
96
 Trin. 2.11 (CCSL 62 48): “Again comprehend the mystery of the undivided nature, 
while the one is, as it were, the image of the one!  He is an image in such a manner 
that the brightness does not proceed from the reflected image of an external nature, 
but, a living nature is identical with a living nature, since it is the whole from the 
whole, and since, while it is the only-begotten nature, it possesses the Father in itself 
and abides in the Father, while it is God.”  
97
 Trin. 8.48 (CCSL 62 A 360-61): Sed numquid doctor gentium Paulus uirtutem dicti 
dominici aut ignorauit aut tacuit, dicens: Qui est imago Dei inuisibilis? Et interrogo, 
utrum uisibilis imago est inuisibilis Dei, et utrum infinitus Deus per formae imaginem 
coimaginari possit ad speciem? Imago enim formam necesse est eius reddat, cuius et 
imago est. Qui uolunt autem alterius generis in Filio esse naturam, constituant 
cuiusmodi Filium imaginem esse inuisibilis Dei uelint. Anne corpoream et 
contemplabilem et ex locis in loca motu incessu que circumuagam? Meminerint tamen 
secundum euangelia et profetas et Christum Spiritum et Deum Spiritum.Qui si 
circumscribent hunc Spiritum Christum formabili et corporali modo, non erit 
inuisibilis Dei imago corporeus, nec indefiniti species definita moderatio.   
98
 Trin. 8.48 (CCSL 62 A 360). 
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through the power of his nature, not in a visible property.”99  Contrary to his Homoian 
opponents, Hilary maintains that the visibility and materiality of Christ’s Incarnation 
does not in the least mitigate the Son’s divine nature, which, like the Father, is 
spiritual and invisible.
100
   
The relation of source and image is not one of gradations or even of different 
natures, insists Hilary.  Unlike the seal of wax that is a different nature than the 
impressing iron, the form of God is nothing other than God.
101
  Hilary writes: 
 
He is also the living image of the living nature (uiuentis quoque naturae 
esse uiuentem imaginem), and the form of God in God has been impressed 
upon Him by nature (consignatam naturaliter Dei in Deo formam) to such 
an extent that they are indistinguishable both in power and substance, so 
that in Him neither the work, nor the speech, nor the appearance differ 
from those of the Father, but, since the image naturally possesses in itself 
the nature of its author, the author also worked, spoke and was seen 
through His natural image (sui imago naturam).
102
 
  
                                                          
99
 Trin. 8.49 (CCSL 62 A 361-62): Nam utique inuisibilium conditor non est in ea 
naturae necessitate, ut inuisibilis Dei imago uisibilis sit. Ac ne formae potius quam 
naturae imago esse intellegeretur, idcirco inuisibilis Dei imago est: natura in eo Dei 
per naturae suae uirtutem intellegenda, non in uisibili qualitate.  
100
 “For, as the Father is inexplicable by the fact that He is unborn, so the Son cannot 
be described because He is the only-begotten, since He who is born is the image of the 
unborn.  When we conceive an image in our mind and words, we must also include in 
it the one of whom He is the image.  But we are pursuing invisible things, and we are 
venturing upon incomprehensible things, we whose understanding is restricted to 
visible and material objects.”  Trin. 3.18 (CCSL 62 90). 
101
 Trin. 8.46 (CCSL 62 A 358-59). 
102
 Trin. 10.6 (CCSL 62 A 463). 
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Being the image of God is not to be less than God; rather, it is precisely as image that 
the Son is God.
103
  When the Son did take on a visible form in the Incarnation, this did 
not undermine his divine nature; he remained always God, always the invisible image, 
but for a time also appearing visibly in the flesh.  Hilary will therefore describe the 
Incarnation as a “dispensation only” and not a change of this invisible nature.  
(Dispensatio itaque tantum est, non demutatio.)
104
 
Thus, Hilary’s exegesis of Colossians 1:15 is that “image” is demonstrative of 
ontological identity.
105
  He makes this explicit in two ways: first, in his interpretation 
of the Apostle’s statement in the following verse that all things are created in Christ 
and through Him;
106
 second, in the fact that the image is ontologically identical with 
what it images – Christ is the invisible image of the invisible God.  The Son’s creative 
power and sustaining love exist on account of the shared divine nature with the 
Father.  Giving expression to this theology Hilary writes, “[R]ealize that in [the Son] 
who is the image there is also the nature of Him whose image He is.”107  Hilary adapts 
these two key components of anti-Monarchian theology to fit his response to 
                                                          
103
 Trin. 8.50 (CCSL 62 A 363): Qui cum Filius sit, imago est; cum imago Dei est.   
104
 Trin. 11.49 (CCSL 62 A 577): Dispensatio itaque tantum est, non demutatio: in eo 
enim est in quo erat.  Simonetti suggests that in stressing the invisible nature of the 
image, Hilary might target Marcellus of Ancyra, who interpreted Colossians 1:15 as 
the image made visible in the Incarnation.  Simonetti writes that perhaps there can be 
detected “una punta polemica contra Marcello di Ancira, che aveva attribuito Col. 
1,15 al Cristo incarnato, insistendo proprio sul fatto che immagine, in quanto tale, 
deve necessariamente essere visibile, per poterci far conoscere l’invisibile modello.”  
Simonetti, “Esegesi Ilariana,” 168. 
105
 Because imago dei denotes, for Hilary, the ontological identity of Father and Son, 
he refers in the Tractus super Psalmos 118 to the imago dei as one Christological 
referent among many, such as power of God, wisdom of God, and arm of God: “Os 
autem Dei est ille qui et uirtus Dei est, qui et sapientia Dei est, qui et bracchium Dei 
est, qui et imago Dei est, Deus scilicet et Dominus noster Iesus Christus.”  Hilary, 
Psal. 118. teth, 9 (CCSL 61A, 87). 
106
 In this vein Hilary asserts, “He is the image of God by the power of these works.” 
(Per horum igitur operum uirtutem imago Dei est.)  Trin. 8.49 (CCSL 62 A 361). 
107
 Trin. 8.51 (CCSL 62 A 363): in hoc quoque qui imago est naturam eius cuius 
imago est inesse cognosce.   
46 
 
Homoian subordinationism.  Thus, Hilary’s writings, borne out of the Nicene 
controversy, make clear that image is meant to denote the equality of the Father and 
the Son. 
 
Image as an Anthropological Term (Genesis 1:26) 
Hilary consistently employs image language gleaned from Colossians 1:15 to denote 
the unity of being of Father and Son.  The Son as image attests to the common nature 
of the two divine Persons – everything that the Father has is shared in and reflected by 
the Son.  Unsurprisingly, the Christological identification of image as denoting co-
equality and unity of divine being entails that Hilary cannot refer to the human person 
as “image” in the same sense, and his exegesis of Genesis 1:26 reflects this tension.  
At only one point in Hilary’s corpus are Genesis 1:26 and Colossians 1:15 referred to 
in the same context.
108
  In his Tractus super Psalmos 118 10.7 Hilary refers to both 
texts to differentiate sharply between the anthropological and Christological image.  
The human person is created ad imaginem dei.
109
  Thus, he is not the image of God, 
writes Hilary, because the image of God is the firstborn of all creation (Colossians 
                                                          
108
 Hilary is not alone in keeping two almost hermetically sealed theologies of image 
operative in his theology, namely, the Christology of Colossians 1:15 and the 
anthropology of Genesis 1:26.  Frances Young has noted that in addition to these 
image texts there is also the prohibition against images in Exodus 20:4.  These three 
concentric Scripture texts regarding image receive a lot of treatment in the fourth 
century.  Nevertheless, Young is struck by the fact that fourth-century authors never 
explicitly relate these three scriptural discussions of image to each other.  Frances 
Young, “God’s Image: The ‘Elephant in the Room’ in the Fourth Century?” Studia 
Patristica 50 (2011): 57-71.  The lack of explicit connection between these texts 
might simply reflect a disinterest in systematic theological presentation in its modern 
form, but it could also be explained, as I am arguing in this chapter, by the place of 
anti-Homoian polemics in the Christological account of image, which is ill-suited to 
linking various theologies of image.  That is to say, if image denotes equality of 
nature, then Genesis 1:26 cannot be read in a straightforward manner.    
109
 Psal. 118. iod, 7 (CCSL 61A 92): Non Dei imago, quia imago Dei est 
primogenitus omnis creaturae; sed ad imaginem, id est secundum imaginis et 
similitudinis speciem.  
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1:15), rather, to be ad imaginem is to have the character of the “image and likeness” 
of God (Genesis 1:26).
110
  The human soul has a divine and an incorporeal element by 
which he is said to be created according to the image and likeness of God, that is, 
according to the exemplum of the image of God, the firstborn of all creation.
111
 
 The sustained emphasis on divine unity and simplicity entails that when Hilary 
speaks of the human person as image he means not merely image after the exemplum 
of the eternal image, but more frequently image of the Trinity.  In his exegesis of 
Genesis 1:26, Hilary finds more Scriptural warrant for the unity of Father and Son.  
He writes, “By declaring: ‘Let us make mankind in our image and likeness,’ He does 
away with any idea of isolation, since He reveals this mutual participation.”112  The 
verb faciamus and the pronoun nostram indicate that God is not alone; He is not a 
monad, as “both of them possess the property of the one nature, because He says ‘our 
image’ and not ‘our images.’”113   
A number of times in De Trinitate Hilary refers to a “common image” (imago 
communis est).
114
  God made the human person in a “common image and in the same 
                                                          
110
 The distinction between imago referring to the eternal Son and ad imaginem 
referring to the created human person is of venerable tradition.  Cf. Philo, Op. 24; All. 
3,96.  Origen, Cels. 6,63; 7,66.  Hilary, Psal. 118 iod 7.  Ambrose, Psal. 118,10,16; 
Luc. 10,49. 
111
Psal. 118. iod, 7 (CCSL 61A 92): Diuinum in eo et incorporale condendum, quod 
secundum imaginem Dei et similitudinem tum fiebat; exemplum scilicet quoddam in 
nobis imaginis Dei est et similitudinis institutum. Est ergo in hac rationali et 
incorporali animae nostrae substantia primum, quod ad imaginem Dei factum sit.   
112
 Trin. 4.17 (CCSL 62 120): Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem 
nostram. Sustulit singularis intellegentiam professione consortii. 
113
 Trin. 4.18 (CCSL 62 121).  See the discussion of the “common image” in 
Borchardt, Hilary of Poitiers’ Role, pp. 60-61. 
114
 Trin. 4.8 (CCSL 62 158); Trin. 5.8 (CCSL 62 158): Discerne si quid potes in 
hac imaginis communione uerum adque falsum.  Trin. 5.9 (CCSL 62 159): Et fecit 
Deus hominem, ad imaginem Dei fecit eum. Imago communis est. Deus ad imaginem 
Dei hominem fecit.  
48 
 
likeness of God.”115  This demonstrates for Hilary both that the Creator does not work 
in isolation, and, at the same time, that there is no diversity in the Godhead on account 
of the commonality of the image.
116
  Nostram suggests, for Hilary, that “there is no 
union, no unlikeness, no distinction” in God; rather, the human race was fashioned 
“according to a common image.”117  Even though Hilary does not want to relate the 
Christology of the image of God to his anthropology of the image of God, he does use 
the language of Genesis 1:26 in De Trinitate as an exegetical support to defend the 
homoousion: 
 
Man is fashioned according to the image of the Father and the Son.  
The name [of the nature] does not differ, nor is there any distinction in 
their nature.  The image after which man was made has only one form.  
And how will the true nature be lost, since the two of them have a 
mutual share in what was made, as well as in the truth of the common 
image? …  For now we will remain with this question: was he true 
God or not of whom the true God said, ‘Let us make man according to 
our own image and likeness?’  Distinguish, if you can, anything true or 
false in this sharing together!  In your heretical rage, divide what is 
indivisible!  For they are one according to whose image and likeness 
mankind is the one copy.
118
 
                                                          
115
 Trin. 4.18 (CCSL 62 121). 
116
 Trin. 4.18 (CCSL 62 121-22): Adque ita Deus ad communem sibi cum Deo 
imaginem adque eandem similitudinem hominem repperitur operari, ut nec solitudinis 
intellegentiam significatio efficientis admittat, nec diuinitatis diuersitatem ad eandem 
imaginem ac similitudinem constituta patiatur operatio.   
117
 Trin. 5.8 (CCSL 62 158). 
118
 Trin. 5.8 (CCSL 62 158-59): Ad Patris et Fili imaginem homo conditur. Nomen 
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Hilary’s exegesis of Genesis 1:26 affirms that while the human person is made 
after the exemplum of the Son (because all things are made through the Son), the unity 
of the Godhead does not allow for diversity; rather, the unity of the divine nature 
necessitates a common image: “Imago communis est.”119 
The human person is fashioned after the common image of the Father and the 
Son.  Hilary writes, “He is according to the image (ad imaginem) and likeness of God 
the Father and God the Son.”120  There is no likeness within this common eternal 
image, insists Hilary.  While the human person is created according to the likeness of 
a common image, the Father and Son have no likeness, because they are one image.
121
  
Therefore, Genesis 1:26 describes the human person as fashioned according to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
non discrepat, natura non differt. Vna enim est imaginis ad quam homo creatus est 
species. Et inter haec ueritas ubi deperit, manente inter utrumque et facti 
communione et communis imaginis ueritate? ... Nunc interim hoc tenemus, an uerus 
Deus non sit cui uerus Deus dixerit: Faciamus ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. 
Discerne si quid potes in hac imaginis communione uerum adque falsum, et heretico 
furore haec indissecabilia decide. Vnum enim sunt, quorum imaginis et similitudinis 
unum est homo factus exemplum.   
119
 Trin. 5.9 (CCSL 62 159). 
120
 C. Const. 20.  Translation mine.  While the human person is fashioned according to 
a “common image,” there is still the sense that the imago dei is principally the Son 
(who is one with the Father) and that the human person is created as image of the 
eternal image.  Hilary seems to be the first Latin author to speak of the creation of the 
human person according to a common image.  This language is, however, similar to 
that of Ambrose.  Like Hilary, Ambrose develops an anti-Homoian theology out of 
the grammar of Genesis 1:26: God (in the singular pronoun) creates one image, notes 
Ambrose.  He writes, “At the beginning of the universe itself, as I read, the Father and 
the Son existed, and I see one creation.  I hear Him that speaks.  I acknowledge Him 
that does: but it is of one image, one likeness, that I read.  This likeness belongs not to 
diversity but to unity” Fid. 1.53; CSEL 78 23.  Likewise, “The Father says to the Son 
‘in Our image and likeness,’ and you say that the Son of God is unlike the Father”  De 
fide 1.51; CSEL 78 23.  Also, in De spiritu sancto, Ambrose writes, “[T]he Father 
confesses the Son as equal to Himself in the oneness of the work, saying, ‘Let us 
make man to Our image and likeness.’  For what else do image and working and 
common likeness signify than the oneness of the same majesty?”  Spir. II.2; CSEL 79 
87. 
121
 C. Const. 20: Nunc autem homo ad similitudinem et imaginem Dei conditur, non 
etiam similitudo intra Patrem et Filium praedicatur.   
50 
 
image and likeness of God, but of the Son Scripture says nothing about likeness; 
rather, the Apostle Paul synonymously describes the Son as image and equal.
122
  The 
Nicene debate informed Hilary’s exegesis of Colossians 1:15 and Genesis 1:26; the 
debate committed him to interpreting “image of God” as coequality with God, for 
which reason imago dei was a Christological rather than an anthropological term.  
 I have suggested that Hilary’s theology of image is the development of anti-
Monarchian theology applied in the Homoian crisis.  Tertullian and Novatian 
developed a logos-sarx hermeneutic to express the dispensation in which the Son as 
image reveals the Father.  This logos-sarx dialectic retained both the invisible divine 
nature of the Son and his nature as the disclosing image of the Father in the economy.  
Hilary is evidently familiar with this tradition.  In his theology this logos-sarx 
tradition is expressed with the forma dei / forma servi trope.  This allows Hilary to 
interpret Colossians 1:15 along traditional anti-Monarchian lines: the image is both 
invisible and creative; these two properties manifest the consubstantial union of the 
divine nature.  To be the imago dei is to share the properties of God.  The theophanies 
of the Old Testament and the Incarnation are a dispensation only – the taking on of 
the form of a servant – and not a change in divine nature.  The implication of this for 
Hilary is that the human person cannot be referred to as imago dei, as this is a 
Christological term (Colossians 1:15).  Although the human person is fashioned ad 
imaginem dei, that is, after the exemplum of the Son, the consubstantial union of the 
divine Persons necessarily entails that the human person is fashioned after the one 
common image of the substance of God.  Hilary’s emphasis in the creation narrative 
                                                          
122
 C. Const. 21: Quae ergo callida religionis tuae professio est similem secundum 
Scripturas Patri Filium dicere, cum ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei homo tantum 
factus sit?  Quid itaque uerbis fallis? quid arte eludis? cur non aequalem Deo, hoc 
enim secundum Scripturas, pie dicis?   
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on the “common image” after which the human person is fashioned initiates an 
exegetical tradition in Latin theology that appears again in Marius Victorinus and 
Ambrose and becomes a focal point in Augustine’s theology of the imago dei. 
In this first of three chapters on Latin pro-Nicene theologies of the image of 
God, I have depicted Hilary as committed to a Nicene theology of the imago dei that 
serves as an expression of the equality of Father and Son and that necessarily excludes 
the human person from the image.  The second half of my thesis will maintain that 
Augustine breaks with this pro-Nicene theology.  Augustine is intent to underscore the 
continuity of “image” language in his exegesis of Genesis 1:26 and Colossians 1:15.  
Three interlocking terms swirl about the discussion of the image of God: likeness, 
image, and equality.  Augustine’s early writings will endow these words with a 
different sense than his predecessors.  Hilary is typical of Latin fourth-century 
theology that contrasts “image” and “likeness.”  For the Bishop of Poitiers there could 
be no likeness in the Son because he was the image of God, which is to say equal with 
God.  Conversely, the human person was not equal with God and, therefore, not the 
image of God, but merely the likeness of God. 
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Chapter II: Marius Victorinus 
 
Among a protracted list of “illustrious men” of the Church, Jerome includes Marius 
Victorinus (circa 300-370), accompanied by a very pithy and not too flattering 
description of what he considers to be Victorinus’s impenetrable style.  Victorinus, 
writes Jerome, was an African who taught in Rome under the emperor Constantius.  
“In extreme old age, yielding himself to faith in Christ he wrote books against Arius, 
written in dialectic style and very obscure language, books which can only be 
understood by the learned.”1  Were it not for Augustine’s writings, Jerome’s brief 
description would be all we would have to go on for knowledge of the famed Roman 
philosopher.  Prior to his late conversion into the Church, Victorinus wrote 
prolifically: he composed treatises on grammar, rhetoric, and logic and wrote 
commentaries and translations of the ancient philosophers – Cicero, Aristotle, and 
Porphyry.  In this way he brought the treasures of Greek learning to Roman culture.  
Robert Markus notes that more than anyone else Victorinus is the “link between 
Greek philosophy and the Latin world in the fourth century.”2 
It is this link between Greek philosophy and the Latin world that allowed 
Victorinus to be the force he was against the Arians.  His command of the Platonic 
tradition provided him a philosophically robust response to the Arian challenge as he 
defended the Nicene doctrine of the consubstantial nature of the Father and the Son.
3
  
                                                          
1
 Jerome, De vir. Ill. 101. 
2
 Robert Markus, “Marius Victorinus,” in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and 
Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967), p. 332.   
3
 Mary Clark writes, “Victorinus seems to have been aware, as many Latins were not, 
not only of the intransitive sense of hypostasis which corresponds to the substantia, 
but also of the active sense in which Eastern theologians used the term.”  Mary Clark, 
“The Neoplatonism of Marius Victorinus,” Studia Patristica 11 (1972): 13.  
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Nowhere is this more evident than in his theology of “image.”  That the Son is the 
image of the Father attested to their unity of being, maintained Victorinus, in standard 
pro-Nicene language.  His profoundly philosophical account of “image” was, like that 
of Hilary of Poitiers, forged in the heat of Arian controversy.  Victorinus demonstrates 
concerns regarding the equality of image and source that become much less 
pronounced in Augustine’s early theology of image.  Writing thirty years after 
Victorinus, Augustine is content to suggest that not all images are equal with their 
source.  It is this insight, we will see, that affords Augustine the latitude to describe 
both Christ and the human person as imago dei in a way that escaped Victorinus.  
Victorinus and Augustine shared a Platonic theology in which created being 
exists as an image of uncreated being.  However, in this chapter I will argue that 
Victorinus’s rigorous adherence to a distinction between substance and image resulted 
in a particular understanding of Christ as image of God that, while it might have been 
well suited to the Nicene debates, did not afford Victorinus the latitude to describe the 
human person in his own right as imago dei.  As such, this chapter is a second 
example of the common difficulty in Latin pro-Nicene image theology of affirming 
the imago dei of the human person, because the term functions primarily 
Christologically.  I will proceed in three steps.  First, I will consider Victorinus’s strict 
philosophical distinction between substance and image.  Second, I will suggest that 
the clear separation of the substance from the image of created being meant that 
Victorinus needed to employ a subtle theological move when speaking of Christ as 
“image of God.”  Appealing to the utter simplicity of God, Victorinus insists that in 
God image and substance are one.  Thus, for Victorinus, the imago dei is God’s own 
life.  Third, I will argue that the identification of the imago dei with God’s own 
substance entails that, for Victorinus, the human person could not be termed “image 
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of God”; rather, the human person is created secundum imaginem, that is, according to 
the image of Christ.  Ultimately, however, the inclusive participatory Christology that 
Victorinus develops entails that the human person, as “image of the image,” is not 
excluded from the imago dei, but as a unique participant in the Logos bears the image 
of Christ’s consubstantial unity.  And so, in the final analysis, since Victorinus 
understands the human soul as image of the image, he does see it, in some sense, as 
the imago dei.  
 
Substance and Image  
As with other pro-Nicenes, the theology of image is integral to Victorinus’s defense 
of the homoousion. While other Nicenes, such as Hilary and Ambrose, are content to 
use standard proof texts such as Colossians 1:15 and Hebrews 1:3 filtered through the 
anti-Monarchian tradition, Victorinus develops a self-standing theology of image to fit 
the Homoousian cause.  While this theology can function as a philosophically self-
contained synthesis of Plotinian and Aristotelian understandings of image, Victorinus 
is always attentive to the fact that his theology is thoroughly grounded in Scripture; 
Victorinus is keen to present a biblical theology of the imago dei. 
Victorinus’s commentators have noted his commitment to remaining 
scripturally tethered.
4
  Indeed, Victorinus himself states, “[A]ll that I say is said by 
Holy Scripture and comes from Holy Scripture.”5  The African philosopher’s Nicene 
treatise, Adversus Arium, may best be described as a “biblical theology” of the 
                                                          
4
 “Despite his extensive use of Neoplatonic terminology and thought … Victorinus 
regarded Scripture as foundational for theological discussion.”  Stephen Andrew 
Cooper, Marius Victorinus’ Commentary on Galatians (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), p. 31. 
5
 Adv. Ar. I 46. 
55 
 
homoousion.
6
  In this work Victorinus is mining Scripture to demonstrate the 
consubstantial unity of Father and Son.
7
  The Arians maintained that no one could 
speak of the Son’s generation and that his relation with the Father was unintelligible 
to the human mind.  On the contrary, asserts Victorinus, Scripture discloses something 
of the mystery of the relation of the Father to the Son.  He tells Candidus, “But since 
you are a Christian in name, you must necessarily accept and venerate the Scriptures 
which proclaim the Lord Jesus Christ.”8  And so, Adversus Arium – particularly Book 
I – is a study of the biblical names of the Son.  I will limit my inquiry predominantly 
to Book I.
9
  In this first book, Victorinus first methodically moves through the Gospel 
of John to develop a biblical theology of the Logos.
10
  Then he turns to the Synoptics
11
 
and the Pauline Epistles
12
 before finally proposing a theology consonant with Nicaea 
                                                          
6
 Cf. Gustavus Koffmane, De Mario Victorino philosopho christiano (Breslau: 
Lindner, 1880), p. 12; John Voelker, “Marius Victorinus’ Exegetical Arguments for 
Nicene Definition in Adversus Arium,” Studia Patristica 38 (2001): 406-502. 
7
 Stephen Cooper writes, “While it is an exaggeration to say that for Victorinus 
exegesis was theology, it would be more distorting to minimize the importance of 
Scripture and theology in his Christianity on account of the Neoplatonic elements 
which find a place in both his Trinitarian treatises and his exegetical work.”  Cooper, 
Galatians, p. 31. 
8
 Ad Cand. I 1. 
9
 I will be limiting my focus especially to Book I.  The four books of Adversus Arium 
were almost certainly originally separate and self-standing works comprising nine 
treatises.  Cf. Pierre Hadot, Marius Victorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres 
(Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1971), pp. 253-80; Stephen Cooper, “Marius 
Victorinus” in The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, ed. Lloyd 
Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 540-41.  The first four 
treatises are presented as an epistolary exchange between Candidus “the Arian” and 
Victorinus.  The fourth letter, which is framed as the second response of Victorinus to 
Candidus, is by far the longest letter.  I will focus my attention on this letter.  Here 
Victorinus intends to demonstrate from Scripture that the same Son who is “born” is 
“substantially Son.”  Adv. Ar. I 2.  The subsequent five treatises (5-9) express 
Victorinus’s concerns both with the proposal of homoiousion suggested by Basil of 
Ancyra and with the conclusions of the Council of Ariminum (359).  
10
 Adv. Ar. I 5-15. 
11
 Adv. Ar. I 15-17. 
12
 Adv. Ar. I 17-26. 
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constructed on the foundation of this biblical study.
13
  This structure comports with 
Victorinus’s understanding of the theological task before him: to offer a biblical 
theology of the image of God that remains impervious to Arian philosophical 
challenges.   
What does it mean for the Father and the Son to be consubstantial?  How does 
Victorinus understand substance?  Victorinus’s De definitionibus demonstrates that 
the African philosopher was, at the very least, familiar with Aristotle’s Categories.  
This is significant because it is Aristotle’s Categories that famously distinguish 
between a substance and its various qualities or properties.
14
  Victorinus’s familiarity 
with this work stems from the fact that he not only translated Aristotle’s Categories, 
but also both the Aristotelian Peri Hermaneias
15
 and Porphyry’s Isagoge, which is an 
introduction to Aristotle’s Categories.  Unfortunately, none of these three translations 
                                                          
13
 The same structure of beginning with an exposition of Scripture and from there 
defending the homoousion is employed by Victorinus in his first response to 
Candidus.  This is a deliberate attempt to reverse the order of operations employed by 
Candidus and to underscore the primacy of Scripture in the defense of the 
consubstantial nature of Father and Son.  In his commentary Pierre Hadot notes, 
“Candidus avait terminé sa lettre par la citation de quelques textes d’Écriture; 
Victorinus fait l’inverse: il commence par elle, montrant ainsi que sa pensée veut 
partir du texte sacré.   Hadot, Commentaire, p. 692 in Marius Victorinus: Traités 
théologiques sur la Trinité, trans. and ed. Pierre Hadot, Sources Chrétiennes 69 (Paris: 
Cerf, 1960). 
14
 “[E]ach [individual term] signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a 
relative or where or when or being in a position or having or doing or being affected. 
To give a rough idea, ideas of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four foot, five 
foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of a relative: double, half, larger; of where: 
in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last year; of being in a 
position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: 
cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, being-burnt.” Aristotle, Categories, 
1b25 - 2a4.  Trans. John Lloyd Ackrill in Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Oxford 
Univeristy Press, 1963). 
15
 The Peri Hermaneias was formerly ascribed to Aristotle, but seems in fact to be a 
later developed commentary on Aristotle’s Categories.   
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in the Aristotelian tradition remain extant.
16
  Only Boethius’s (improved) translations 
and commentaries on these three works provide a witness to the significant 
philosophical debt that Victorinus owed to Aristotle.
17
  Can we, then, say that 
Victorinus’s understanding of “substance” was influenced by Aristotle?  I propose a 
positive answer to this question, while keeping the significant caveat in mind that 
there is no extant literary witness to Victorinus’s familiarity with the Categories or 
with the subsequent commentarial tradition on the Categories.  Nevertheless, three 
reasons lead me to suggest a positive answer to the question.  First, although 
Victorinus’s translation of the Categories, the Peri Hermaneias, and the Isagoge are 
no longer available, we can be certain from Boethius that Victorinus did translate 
them.  Second, in De definitionibus Victorinus demonstrates striking familiarity with 
Aristotle’s definition of substance.18  Here Victorinus defines substantia in terms of 
                                                          
16
 See Pierre Hadot’s impressive research surrounding Victorinus’s translation of the 
Categories, the Isagoge and the Peri Hermaneias.  Hadot, Victorinus: Recherches, pp. 
179-90. 
17
 Boethius preserves in part Victorinus’s translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge.  Cf. 
Cooper, “Victorinus,” p. 539.  Significantly, Boethius remarks on Victorinus’s 
introduction of the philosophically momentous term contingens as the Latin 
equivalent to Aristotle’s “accidental.”  Cf. Hadot, Victorinus: Recherches, p. 189.  
18
 De definitionibus, which follows the translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge and refers to 
the work, is, as the title would suggest, a series of definitions of philosophical terms 
both of Ciceronian and Aristotelian provenance.  It is unique as it is the only work of 
antiquity dedicated to definitions.  Pierre Hadot, Marius Victorinus: Recherches, p. 
164.  For my purposes it is worth noting that De Definitionibus defines “substance” in 
terms of Aristotle’s five predicables: Quidam tamen, cautiores plenioresque in 
docendo, definitionis ipsius quasi quaedam membra constituunt dicuntque eam debere 
consistere – perfectam definitionem istam quam appello substantialem – ex quinque 
partibus: id est genere, specie, differentia, accidenti, proprio.  Sed accidens in 
definitione minimum, proprium plurimum valet.  Et recte quidem ac vere ista 
commemorant, nec aliena aut a principe harum artium Aristotele aut a Tullio, qui de 
istis praecepta tradiderunt, iudicanda sunt: constat enim hi quinque partibus veluti 
membris suis integra definitio. Marius Victorinus, De Definitionibus ed. Th. Stangle, 
Tulliana et Mario-Victoriniana, Munich: Programm, 1888) 8.31-9.9.  Pierre Hadot 
provides an overview of the structure of De Definitionibus and comments on 
significant Aristotlian and Ciceronian terminology.  He also notes the historical 
reception of this text.  Hadot, Victorinus: Recherches, pp. 164-78. 
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Aristotle’s five predicables.  Third, I will argue that an Aristotelian distinction 
between substance and qualities renders intelligible much of Victorinus’s theological 
argument in the treatises of the Adversus Arium. 
For Aristotle, “substance” is the ontological substructure that remains despite 
any changes that may occur in various categories.  A material substance appears only 
as a composite of form and matter; it is the categories of a form that reveals the 
substance.  The senses apprehend the matter and the mind makes a judgment 
regarding the form from the sense data.  Hence, Aristotle’s well known dictum: “All 
knowledge comes through the senses.”  Victorinus adopts Aristotle’s understanding of 
substance from the Categories.  He writes, “For the heavens and all in them and the 
entire world are a mixture consisting of hule (matter) and form; therefore it is not 
simple.”19  It is the categories of material existence that the senses apprehend; the 
mind then renders a judgment regarding the substantial form. 
The intellect turns to a material subject to ask, “What is it?”  The senses can 
only respond by describing the material qualities that are changeable and transient, 
explains Victorinus.  However, the intellect in turn translates the material sense data, 
understanding them according to their immaterial and unchanging form.  So, sense 
knowledge, for Victorinus, is “an imitation of intellectual knowing.”20  The material 
order is understood through “intelligence but intelligence according to sense (sed 
iuxta sensum intellegentia) and according to sense they are changeable and alterable 
(versibilia et mutabilia), but according to intelligence unchangeable and unalterable 
(inversibilia et inmutabilia).”21  The senses can only understand the qualities, what 
Aristotle called “categories,” and not the underlying substance, explains Victorinus.  
                                                          
19
 Ad Cand. I 9. 
20
 Ad Cand. I 9: imitationem intellegendi etiam sensu. 
21
 Ad Cand. I 9. 
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(Sensus nihil aliud conprehendit nisi qualitates.)
22
  The objects of sense observation 
are “an image (simulacrum) of what is understood and an imitation (imitamentum) of 
intellectual knowing.”23  The substance that the mind knows in material things is a 
substance that holds its being tenuously.  It is being, but it is a being given to non-
being.  Victorinus writes, “[I]n some way they are onta (existents) insofar as they 
have a soul, and in some way they are me onta (nonexistence) insofar as they have a 
changeable hulen (matter) and changeable qualities.”24  It is the qualities (or 
categories) that render material existence transitory, fleeting, and, therefore, not a 
substance, but rather an image.  Victorinus sustains this distinction throughout 
Adversus Arium: 
 
Now everything which is to each thing its own “to be” is substance.  
But this “to be” of which we speak must be understood in one way 
with respect to that which is “to be,” in another way with respect to 
that which is “to be in a certain mode”; inasmuch as the former is that 
of substance, the latter that of quality.
25
 
 
Victorinus’s commitment to an Aristotelian understanding of substance entails 
that for him image and substance are antithetical.  He underscores the borrowed 
existence that is fundamental to the nature of a material image.  They are as “a sort of 
shadow in air or in water through a sort of corporeal light formed through the 
                                                          
22
 Ad Cand. I 9. 
23
 Ad Cand. I 9. 
24
 Ad Cand. I 10. 
25
 Adv. Ar. III 1: Omne autem quod est unicuique suum esse, substantia est.  Sed hoc 
esse quod dicimus, aliud intellegi debet in eo quod est esse, aliud vero in eo quod est 
ita esse, ut unum sit substantiae, aliud qualitatis. 
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reflection of a corporeal emanation.”26  Substance, on the other hand, is the form that 
subsists and that the changing and transitory categories relate to the senses.  The 
corporeal nature of the created image entails its dependence on the form of a more 
primary light without which is “no longer anything nor anywhere.”27  The nature of a 
created “image” is that it is derivative and secondary.  It is an expression and 
manifestation of another – of a more primary source, namely, substance. 
While the distinction between form and matter is of Aristotelian provenance, 
the view of material images as fundamentally ephemeral in character is a standard 
Neoplatonic theme.  Victorinus points to shadows that we see cast in the air or in the 
water; we understand that they have no independent being.  The African philosopher 
writes, “By itself [an image] is nothing nor has it movement of its own – only what is 
manifested by it is a substance; and it has neither body, nor senses, nor 
understanding.”28  The image is wholly dependent on, and less than, its source – it 
reflects the movements, energy, and life of its source.  A created image is 
fundamentally different from its form as it has no substance of its own: “[T]he image 
is other, according to substance, from that which can be imaged.”29  Victorinus notes 
that every existing thing is a substance inasmuch as it has a unique species that 
defines it, and this form is, properly speaking, its substance, whereas its material 
manifestation (image) exists only in potency to reflect its form.  It is likely that the 
Aristotelian tradition, to which Victorinus devoted so much attention, lies behind his 
identification of substance with form, and behind his notion that the qualities are 
given by the sense data.  Victorinus, however, infuses Neoplatonic language into the 
                                                          
26
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
27
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
28
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
29
 Adv. Ar. I 19: aliud secundum substantiam ab eo quod imaginabile est.   
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Aristotelian description of an image to underscore the fleeting and unsubstantial 
character of an image.  
 God is radically beyond matter and form.  God is beyond being.  Standing in 
the tradition of Plato,
30
 Victorinus writes: “God is above all existence, above all life, 
above all knowledge, above every on (existent) and the ontos onta (truly existents); 
indeed he is unknowable, infinite, invisible, without idea, insubstantial, inconceivable, 
and because transcendent, he is nothing of existence, and because he is above 
existents, he has nothing from existence.  God is therefore me on (nonexistent).”31  
There is no real relation on the part of God to the creature, insists Victorinus; his 
understanding of creation ex nihilo entails that God is not a substance like any other;
32
 
indeed, any understanding of being in relation to God must be negated – ultimately, 
God is only “knowable in ignorance.”33  On account of this infinite transcendence, 
Victorinus’s theology moves away from an Aristotelian understanding of substance as 
revealed by categories in his discussion of the character of God.   
                                                          
30
 Cf. Plato, Rep. 509b, where Socrates compares the sun, which provides “generation, 
growth, and nourishment,” while being itself none of those things, with the eternal 
Being / Good: “[E]xistence and being are in [things] besides as a result of it, although 
the good isn’t being but is still beyond being.”  Victorinus sustains the Platonic 
dialectic between the presence of Being animating all things and the utter 
transcendence and remove of Being from all things. 
31
 Ad Cand. I 13.  Victorinus is sympathetic, therefore, to those who say that God is 
anousion (without substance), but suggests that since we confess that God is, it is 
better to speak of huperousion (hypersubstance): “For his ‘to be’ is his substance, but 
not that substance known to us; but he himself, because he is ‘To Be’ itself, is not 
from substance but is substance itself, the parent of all substances, giving himself ‘to 
be’ from himself, first substance, universal substance, substance before substance.”  
Adv. Ar. II 1. 
32
 Hadot, Commentaire, p. 713. 
33
 Ad Cand. I 13.  The presence of apophatic theology in Victorinus’s writing is 
explored by Chiara O. Tommasi Moreschini, “Linguistic Coinages in Marius 
Victorinus’s Negative Theology,” Studia Patristica 43 (2006): 505-510.  Mark 
Edwards remarks categorically: “The negative theology of Victorinus is floridly 
expressed beyond all precedent in Latin, though its logical rigour bears witness to his 
schooling in philosophy.”  Mark Edwards, “Marius Victorinus and the Homoousion,” 
Studia Patristica 46 (2010): 115. 
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 It is the Son who reveals the Father.  The Father is above on (existent) or, 
better yet, the “hidden on (existent)”34; he produces from himself the manifestation of 
himself, and this manifestation is the “begetting” of the Son.  However, the revelation 
of God is nothing other than God himself, insists Victorinus.  The hidden on (existent) 
and the begotten on (existent) exist as one substance: “[T]he on (existent) in 
potentiality begets the on (existent) in action.”35  Victorinus introduces what prima 
facie seems like an improbable distinction between God in potency and God in act.  
He uses the analogy of someone who is pregnant and contains within her that which 
will be begotten.  He writes, “For the embryo is not nonexistent before birth but it is 
hidden and by birth there comes into manifestation the on (existent) in action which 
was on (existent) in potentiality.”36  This is a fertile analogy because it illustrates 
Victorinus’s intention of highlighting both distinction and union between the hidden 
and the begotten God. 
The radical simplicity of God – infinitely more so than is indicated by the 
analogy of a pregnancy – entails that the distinction of God as esse (being) and agere 
(act) remains purely logical, as the Son is esse in act.  There is one Logos, who is both 
hidden and manifest.  Victorinus writes, “God acts through the Logos and always acts.  
The Logos is therefore the active power which puts itself in motion so that what was 
potentiality might be actuality.”37  It is the distinction between God in potency (esse) 
                                                          
34
 Ad Cand. I 14. 
35
 Ad Cand. I 14. 
36
 Hadot rightly notes that for Victorinus “God in potency” is not simply privation of 
actuality.  “L’Existant en puissance n’est donc pas simple possiblité d’être, mais 
superabundance de puissance.”  Hadot, Commentaire, p. 719.  The language of the 
hidden and revealed Logos is confusing in Victorinus because sometime he employs 
this language to distinguish between the begotten and unbegotten and at other times to 
refer to the hidden Logos as the Holy Spirit in distinction from the visible Logos of 
the incarnate Christ (Cf. Adv. Ar. I 13).   
37
 Ad Cand. I 17. 
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and God in act (agere) that allows for a relation on the part of the creature to God.  
God manifests his goodness in movement outside of himself (agere) while remaining 
utterly simple: “For up there ‘to be’ does not differ from ‘to act.’  For that ‘to be’ is 
one and simple and always one and alone.”38  Thus, Victorinus wants to underscore 
the simple unity of the one substance.  Esse and agere are the movement of one 
substance: “For in ‘to be’ there is also inherent ‘to act.’”39  Act follows upon being as 
a logical progression; however, for Victorinus, this notion of progression must be 
stripped of all temporal and material associations because God is utterly simple and 
outside of time.
40
 
While the language distinguishing esse and agere or God in potency and God 
in act, is unique to Victorinus it articulates a common Nicene tradition that St. 
Thomas will later refer to as the doctrine of “appropriation,” according to which 
names particularly predicated of one of the divine persons can without exclusion be 
applied to the other divine persons on account of the divine simplicity, excepting 
those terms of relative relation such as filiation or paternity.
41
  Immediately after the 
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 Ad Cand. I 19. 
39
 Ad Cand. I 20. 
40
 The apophatic element in Victorinus’s thought is critical to his preservation of 
divine simplicity.  Material and temporal distinctions are inappropriate analogues for 
the distinction between esse and agere in God.  Mark Edwards expresses this well: 
“[O]ur notions of numerical distinctness, which we derive from the observation of 
material particulars, become otiose and misleading [when applied to God].”  Edwards, 
“Marius Victorinus,” 109. 
41
  Theological “appropriation” refers to the attribution of a name or quality to all 
three of the divine persons based on the doctrine of divine simplicity; the name or 
quality, however, principally designates one of the persons.  For example, the Father 
is principally designated as omnipotent, the Son as wisdom, and the Holy Spirit as 
love, but on account of “appropriation” all three of the divine persons can be 
designated, omnipotent, wisdom, and love.  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST I, Q. 39 A. 7-8.  
The principle of analogy is foundational to an account of appropriation; language 
regarding creation and created relations is analogically transposed to bespeak divine 
realties and divine relations.  Further, the analogical language employed in 
appropriation finds its source in revelation.  Other examples where one might point to 
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introduction to Adversus Arium, Victorinus sums up the distinction between Father 
and Son that he sees in the Gospel of John: “[T]he Son will differentiate himself this 
way, that he moves himself and acts for the sake of manifestation, whereas the Father, 
because of his transcendent divinity, acts in a way unknowable to us.  For the Father 
is beyond beatitude, and for that reason he is ‘to repose’ itself.”42  For Victorinus, the 
outward movement (agere) is integral to the nature of the first principle.  Although 
esse exists in repose, what is esse, asks Victorinus, except action, life and 
understanding?
43
  Therefore, esse cannot be referred to apart from agere; in 
Victorinus’s words, they are “simultaneous and simple.”44  The doctrine of 
“appropriation,” then, plays a key theological role in Victorinus’s understanding of 
the relation between Father and Son.  The only way to differentiate Father and Son is 
in reference to generation – for in all else, they are one substance and the names 
principally attributed to designate one of the divine Persons (e.g. esse) can be 
appropriated by the others.  Victorinus writes, “[I]t is generation which defines and 
divides them according to repose into ‘to be’ and substance, and according to 
movement into action, operation.”45   
                                                                                                                                                                      
a doctrine of appropriation in the Latin Fathers of the fourth and fifth century are 
Hilary, De Trin II.1 and Augustine, De Trin VI.10.  It is perhaps stretching the 
definition to describe Victorinus’s distinction between esse and agere as 
“appropriation” because these terms are not technically of Scriptural provenance. 
42
 Adv. Ar. I 3. 
43
 Adv. Ar. I 4. 
44
 Adv. Ar. I 4. 
45
 Adv. Ar. I 4.  In concluding Book Three of Adversus Arium, Victorinus explains that 
the doctrine of appropriation necessitates the identity and simplicity of persons who 
are distinguished in eternity only by generation and in the economy by their acts: “For 
these among themselves are identical; without any conjoining they are one and 
without multiplicity they are simple, different only by their own act of existing – but 
by strength and power, since never is there one without the other, they are identically 
one; they are different only by their acts, since, while the act which is exterior 
advances even to the experiencing of suffering, the other act remains always interior 
and eternal, being original and substantial.”  Adv. Ar. III 17.  
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 Victorinus’s understanding of appropriation entails that the agere of the Son is 
a manifestation of the entire Trinity.  This is expressed in Victorinus’s interpretation 
of Jesus’ words in John 7:37: “[I]f anyone thirsts, let him come and drink.  Whoever 
believes in me as the Scripture has said, out of him flow streams of living water.”46  
The living water is the Spirit, but the source of this water is Christ.  Victorinus writes, 
“Now therefore Jesus is the source whence flow the streams of the Spirit.  For just as 
the Son is from the bosom of the Father and ‘in the bosom’ of the Father, so the Spirit 
is from within the Son.  The three are therefore homoousioi (consubstantial) and on 
that account in all there is one God.”47  Victorinus goes on to describe the 
consubstantial unity as “one sole movement.”48  The Father simply is; the Son is act, 
and the Spirit that which acts.
49
  The Son receives being from the Father, the Spirit 
receives being from the Son and therefore also from the Father.  This unity of being 
Victorinus expresses with the triad of “to be” (esse) “to live” (vivere) and “to 
understand” (intellegere).50  Esse is predicated principally of the Father, vivere of the 
                                                          
46
 Adv. Ar. I 8. 
47
 Adv. Ar. I 8. 
48
 Adv. Ar. I 13. 
49
 Adv. Ar. I 13.  The distinction between the Father who simply is, the Son who is 
act, and the Spirit which acts is a logical distinction and secondary to the unity of 
substance.  Victorinus insists, “All three are therefore homoousia (consubstantial) 
with respect to action and homoousia (consubstantial) with respect to substance, 
because all three are Spirit; and because Spirit is from the Father, substance is from 
the Father” Adv. Ar. I 18.  
50
 Adv. Ar. I 13.  This triad, repeated frequently throughout Adversus Arium, is first 
expressed here at Adv. Ar. I 13.   The triad of esse, vivere, and intellegere plays a 
critical role in Victorinus’s theology.  The Neoplatonic triad is fitted to serve 
Victorinus’s Nicene cause.  Victorinus develops a theological articulation of this triad 
in Adv. Ar. III 4-17.  The immediate source for the triad is likely Plotinus and 
Porphyry.  The triad also appears in Proclus’s Elements of Theology 252-54.  Given 
the length of discussion surrounding the triad, the significant theological role it plays 
in Victorinus’s thought, and Victorinus’s own philosophical background it is likely he 
was also familiar with the more remote sources of the triad, particularly Plato’s 
Sophist 250A, 254D and the Phaedo 105C as well as Aristotle’s De anima II 4 (415b 
13).  Cf. Hadot, “L’Image,” 411-24.  One of the best essays that broadly traces the 
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Son, and intellegere of the Holy Spirit.  Of course, the doctrine of appropriation 
                                                                                                                                                                      
philosophical origins and later medieval expressions of Victorinus’s triad is David 
Neil Bell, “Esse, vivere, intelligere: The Noetic Triad and the Image of God,” 
Recherches de Théologie ancienne et medievale 52 (1985): 5-43.  Matthias Baltes 
accurately expresses the inexpugnable unity operative in this triad for Victorinus: 
“Alles ist hier in allem, weil alle Momente zirkulär aufeinander bezogen sind und 
jedes an jedem teilhat oder vielmehr jedes zugleich mit allen anderen existiert und alle 
gleichsam eine in sich geschlossene Kugel bilden, die erste und vollkommenste Kugel 
überhaupt.”  Matthias Baltes, Marius Victorinus: Zur Philosophie in seinen 
theologischen Schriften (München: K.G. Saur, 2002), p. 77. 
The triad appears clearly in Plotinus: Enneads I,6, 7; V,4, 2; V,6, 6; VI,6, 15; 
and VI,6, 18.  Discussion surrounding the Plotinian origins of the triad esse, vivere, 
and intellegere is found in Pierre Hadot, “Être, vie, pensée chez Plotin et avant 
Plotin,” in Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique, vol. 5, (Vandoeuvres-Geneva: 
Fondation Hardt, 1960), pp. 107-57.  In this work Hadot has suggested that Plotinus’s 
immediate source is Aristotle.  Hadot, “Être, vie, pensée chez Plotin,” p. 112.  See 
also Peter Manchester, “The Noetic Triad in Plotinus, Marius Victorinus, and 
Augustine,” in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, ed. R.T. Wallis, Studies in 
Neoplatonism, Ancient and Modern 6 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), pp. 207-22.   
Plotinus’s disciple, Porphyry, is also recognized to be a well-spring for 
Victorinus’s understanding of the noetic triad. Cf. Mark Edwards, “Porphyry and the 
Intelligible Triad,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 110 (1990): 14-25; Andrew Smith, 
Porphyry’s Place in the Neo-Platonic Tradition (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974); Pierre 
Hadot, Porphyry et Victorinus (Paris, Études augustiniennes, 1968); Pierre Hadot, 
“Citations de Porphyre dans Augustin,” Revue des Études augustiniennes 6 (1960): 
205-244; Pierre Courcelle, Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources, trans. Harry 
Wedeck (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969); John O’Meara, 
Porphyry’s philosophy from Oracles in Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica and 
Augustine’s Dialogues of Cassiciacum (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1969); idem, 
Porphyry’s Philosophy from the Oracles in Augustine (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 
1959); Willy Theiler, Porphyrios und Augustin (Halle: Niemeyer, 1933). 
Also, Luise Abramowski has noted striking similarities between Victorinus’s 
triad and the triad operative in the Gnostic Allogenes of the Coptic Gnostic writings in 
the Nag Hammadi Library. She has presented a compelling case for a mutual 
dependency on Porphyry in Victorinus and the Allogenes.  Luise Abramowski, 
“Marius Victorinus, Porphyrius und die römischen Gnostiker,” Zeitschrift für die 
neutestamentliche  Wissenschaft 74 (1983): 108-28.  Here, she lends support to the 
arguments laid out in Hadot’s great work, Porphyry et Victorinus (Paris: Études 
augustiniennes, 1968).  Ruth Majercik has built on the research of Abramowski and 
Hadot to underscore the mutual dependence not just on the Allogenes, but also other 
literature of the Nag Hammadi Library, such as the Steles, Seth, and Zostrianos.  
Majercik’s article focuses particularly on the exchange of ideas between Porphyry and 
these Coptic Gnostic texts, but she frequently notes that, like Abramowski, Victorinus 
had access to the same Porphyryian source evident in the Gnostic texts; this is, for 
Majercik, most evident in Victorinus’s use of the term tridunamos.  Ruth Majercik, 
“The Existence-Life-Intellect Triad in Gnosticism and Neoplatonism,” The Classical 
Quarterly 42 (1992): 475-88.    
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governs these terms, as well, so that all three divine persons are equally esse, vivere, 
and intellegere, precisely because they “are named in accordance with that which 
predominates in each one (sed ita ut qua suo plurimo sunt, hoc nominentur et esse 
dicantur).”51 
 The first half of Adversus Arium is devoted to an analysis of scriptural proof 
texts regarding the divinity and equality of the Son.  It is from Scripture that 
Victorinus wants to demonstrate the principle that “in God there is completely identity 
between power, substance, divinity, and act.  For in him all is unity and simple 
unity.”52  Sometimes Scripture speaks of Christ as inferior to the Father, such as when 
Jesus says, “The Father is greater than I” (John 14:28).  At other times the Son is 
described as equal to the Father, as when St. Paul says, “He did not consider it 
robbery to be equal to God” (Phil 2:6).  Victorinus explains that this variation is 
because sometimes Scripture refers to Christ in his consubstantial unity with the 
Father and at other times in point of view to his eternal generation: 
 
But the Father is great because he gave all to the Son and is cause of the 
Son’s being and action…. But the Son receives being and advancing by 
action towards act, comes into perfection by achieving fullness by 
movement, having made all things which exist.  But since ‘in him, for 
him, through him are created all things,’ he is always the fullness and 
                                                          
51
 Adv. Ar. IV 5.  This principle of predomination within the triad of esse, vivere, and 
intellegere (for which I have borrowed the term “appropriation”) is expressed very 
well by Hadot: “L’unité des trois est assurée par le principe de prédominance, cf. I 
20,15-16 n.; I 54,9-12 n.; II 3,41.  Chacun est, par son être même, les autres (5,45-47 
= 1,15-16), donc est trois, mais est nommé par ce qu’il est le plus.”  Hadot, 
Commentaire, p. 989. 
52
 Adv. Ar. I 9. 
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always the receptacle; for this reason he is both impassible and passible.  
Therefore he is both equal and unequal.  Hence the Father is greater.
53
 
  
Scripture affirms both the Son’s unity of being with the Father and the Father’s 
generation of the Son.  It is within this dialectic of the Son’s equality of nature and 
inferiority of origin that Victorinus presents an account of Christ as image of God. 
 Victorinus is intent to present a biblical theology of the Son’s equality with the 
Father.  However, his philosophical background is inexpugnably operative in the task 
at hand – the defense of the homoousion.  He turns to Aristotle for a definition of 
substance and adopts the latter’s differentiation of form and matter.  The categories of 
material existence are subject to the vicissitudes of time and change.  Following 
Plotinus and Porphyry, Victorinus is attentive to the “image-like” nature of material 
existence.  Substance, in this sense, is held in contradistinction to image.  The 
substance of God, however, is radically unlike this Aristotelian conception of 
substance; Victorinus instead borrows the Aristotelian language of potency and act to 
explain how God is repose as well as movement, while endowing these terms with a 
meaning consonant with the eternal simplicity of God.
54
  
 
Christ as Imago Dei 
                                                          
53
 Adv. Ar. I 13. 
54
 Although one point of contact for the distinction in the philosophical tradition 
between “God in potency” and “God in act” certainly seems to be Aristotle, the 
distinction is also (and perhaps more immediately) present in Porphyry and the 
Gnostic text of the Nag Hammadi Library, particularly Allogenes.  Ruth Majercik has 
noted that Victorinus’s description of the Father as the being which “remains in 
himself (manens in se) … also called silence, rest, and immobility (silentium, quies, 
cessation)” (Adv. Ar. III 7) finds a source in Allogenes and the Prophyryian reflections 
on the Oracles.  Cf. Majercik, “Existence-Life-Intellect Triad,” 482-83.  
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It is the doctrine of the homoousion – the unity of the divine substance – that 
Victorinus sets out to defend in Adversus Arium.  Although there are distinctions in 
terms of esse and agere as well as different names deriving from paternity and 
filiation that are particularly suited to one Person of the Holy Trinity, Victorinus 
always circles back to the Nicene understanding of consubstantiality.  It is in 
exegeting the Pauline epistles that Victorinus is confronted with the language of 
image.  That Christ is the image of God seems, prima facie, better suited to the 
Homoioan cause.
55
  Indeed, image language in the neo-Platonic tradition of which 
Victorinus availed himself seems ineluctably associated with that which is derived, 
secondary, and even fleeting.  Does an image not necessitate a different substance?  Is 
image not by definition an emanation from another?
56
 
                                                          
55
 Homoians cannot simply be equated with Arians.  There is a diversity and 
broadness in fourth-century Christological expression to which the appellations 
“Arian” and “Homoioan” are insufficiently subtle.  Regardless, in Victorinus’s 
polemics he is content to lump “Homoioans” under the umbrella of Arians.  Cf. Lewis 
Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 133-66.      
56
 Victorinus’s Arian interlocutor, Candidius, is also aware of his philosophical 
advantage as a Platonist.  Immutability is the sine qua non of the first principle.  The 
unbegotten must be unbegetting, or else he shall cease to be immutable.  To beget is 
to undergo change in the Platonic (and Aristotelian) worldview.  Victorinus puts the 
Platonic objection in the mouth of his interlocutor: “For to beget or to be begotten is a 
certain change and alteration.  Moreover, to beget is to give something to the one 
begotten: either all or part.  Whoever begets something either perishes, if he gives all, 
or is diminished, if he gives a part.  But then God remains always the same.  
Therefore he does not beget.”  Cand. Ad Vict. 3.  In appealing all the more forcefully 
to the utter simplicity of the first principle, Victorinus attempts to evade the charge of 
mutability: in the simplicity of eternity, begetting is not change.  Marcia Colish has 
proposed that Victorinus evades the charge of divine mutability by appealing to Stoic 
categories of thought: “Rejecting the idea that activity or motion signify imperfection, 
a view shared by both the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, [Victorinus] draws on the 
Stoic conception of God as dynamic energy, associating action and motion with 
divine perfection and using this constellation of ideas to describe God’s self-creation 
and plenitude of being.”  Marcia Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the 
Early Middle Ages, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1985), p. 135.  
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In Adversus Arium IA 19-20, Victorinus gives a detailed exposé of what it 
means for Christ to be the “image of God” while at the same time holding to the 
consubstantial unity of Father and Son.  The description of Christ as the “image of 
God” by the Apostle Paul affirms, for Victorinus, Christ’s teaching that he is from 
God.
57
  And yet, given his Nicene context, Victorinus knows that the nature of this 
image must be different from all other images.  While every other image is an 
expression of another, and, therefore, has a different and more fleeting substance than 
that which it expresses, Christ the “image of God” is consubstantial with the Father; 
somehow, Christ the image does have his own movement, energy, and life in union 
with his source. 
Generally, Victorinus admits, an image is, indeed, “second and different in 
substance from that which is manifested.”58  But in this case, “God is manifested.”59  
The nature of this image is such that it participates in the simplicity of God; this 
image cannot be of different substance from that which it manifests, because then it 
would not be a manifestation of the simple God.  While some Neoplatonic emanation 
accounts of image seem ideally suited to the Homoian cause,
60
 Victorinus’s insistence 
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 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
58
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
59
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
60
 Certainly not all neo-Platonic thought equally supports Homoian interests.  Peter 
Manchester has made a compelling argument that while the more “hierarchical 
scheme” of Plotinus’s “noetic triad” is conducive to a subordinationsist theology, 
Plotinus’s vision was by no means adopted tout court: “The Plotinian hypostatic 
series never made a plausible model for the Christian trinity even when it held the 
field more or less alone.”  Peter Manchester, “The Noetic Triad in Plotinus, Marius 
Victorinus, and Augustine,” in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, ed. Rich Wallis and Jay 
Bregman (New York: SUNY, 1992), p. 208.  Manchester suggests that as opposed to 
the “vertical” and “derivational” model of Plotinus, the model that had more traction 
for contending Christologies was that of Porphyry, which in dialectic with Gnostic 
Nag Hammadi literature and the Porphyryian Chaldaean Oracles, presents a more 
“horizontal” triad.  Ultimately, this is the “noetic triad” that most influenced Adversus 
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on the utter simplicity of the first principle will not allow for a division between 
source and image.
61
  Victorinus writes, “But we do not conceive the image up there 
(ibi) as it is in sensible things (sicuti in sensibilibus).  For here we do not conceive the 
image to be substance (substantiam).  For it is a shadow in air or in water through a 
sort of corporeal light formed through the reflection of a corporeal emanation.”62  The 
fleeting, secondary and derivative nature of sensible images is the reason why the 
Arians misunderstand the nature of Christ, asserts Victorinus; they confuse Christ as 
image with the nature of all other images.   
Certainly, temporal and material images are nothing on their own; they exist 
only as reflection of a more primary substance; they lack their own substance and 
movement: “[O]nly what is manifested by it is a substance; and it has neither body, 
nor senses, nor understanding.”63  Christ the image of God is not image in this way.  
(Alio igitur modo dicimus Christum imaginem dei esse.)  Rather, Christ the image of 
God has being from himself; the eternal image is knowing, living, and life giving.
 64
  
Mary Clark argues that Victorinus evades the subordinationism of Platonism by 
becoming more Platonic rather than less Platonic.  Appealing to the Platonic 
sensibilities of his interlocutor, Victorinus insists on the absolute simplicity of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Arium, suggests Manchester: “There is no doubt that, following Porphyry, 
[Victorinus] has ‘telescoped’ the Plotinian distinction between the One and Nous.”  
Manchester, “Noetic Triad,” 215. 
61
 Robert Markus writes, “Victorinus’s originality is the result of the tension between 
his concern to vindicate the equality and consubstantiality of the divine hypostases, 
and his use of a conceptual framework with a strong tendency to subordinate the 
hypostases to one another.”  Robert Markus, “Marius Victorinus and Augustine,” in 
The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.H. 
Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 323. 
62
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
63
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
64
 Adv. Ar. I 19: Primum esse et per semet esse et quae sit intellegens esse et viventem 
dicimus imaginem et vivefacientem et semen omnium quae sunt; logos enim per quem 
omnia et sine isto nihil.   
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First Principle.  Pure esse does not have qualities; his qualities are his substance.  
Thus, the revelation, relation, and action of God are not secondary and subordinate to 
him, but are who he is.
65
  By appealing all the more strongly to his interlocutor’s 
Platonic proclivities regarding the absolute simplicity of the One, Victorinus evades 
the subordinationism of image that his philosophical commitments would seem 
initially to involve.
66
   
Like many pro-Nicene writers, Victorinus points to the role of the Logos in the 
creation account to argue that Christ as image is not derivative and secondary but the 
eternal cause of all that is derivative and secondary.  Everything was created through 
the Logos and is held in being by him; the Logos is described as “vivefacientem [sic] 
et semen omnium.”67  Clearly, to be Creator is the role of God alone and not that of a 
created image.  Victorinus logically concludes, “Therefore God and the Logos are 
homoousion (consubstantial).”68  The unity of operations manifest in the creation 
account serves for Victorinus as the theological demonstration of Christ being the 
consubstantial image of the Father. 
                                                          
65
 On this score, Mary Clark rightly notes, “This doctrine of the ontological priority of 
being over act and of their identity results from substantializing among divine realities 
what is merely accidental among finite things.”  Mary Clark, “The Neoplatonism of 
Marius Victorinus,” Studia Patristica 11 (1972): 16. 
66
 Mark Edwards has also suggested that Victorinus evades the implications of 
subordinationism latent in a Platonic doctrine of image by a more rigorous 
engagement with Platonic principles.  However, Edwards suggests that means 
Victorinus reworks the concept of image itself so that it no longer is imbued with a 
derivative and secondary sense, but understood instead as a participatory union with 
its source.  Edwards writes, “Victorinus replies [to the charge of subordinationism] by 
adopting a Platonic interpretation of the word eikôn (‘image’), according to which it 
signifies not the ectype but the archetype – not mere iteration, in a new medium, of an 
object which, if present, would be as open to inspection as the image, but the 
representation of that which, but for the image, would have remained unknowable, 
even to itself.  The image is, in short, the objectification of the subject; it is that in 
actuality which the subject is potentially.”  Edwards, “Victorinus,” 111.  
67
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
68
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
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I have suggested that Victorinus’s understanding of the unity of the divine 
substance within the diversity of the Persons is predicated upon an Aristotelian 
distinction between “God in potency” and “God in act” – a distinction between esse 
and agere.  This distinction is developed within Victorinus’s Christology, particularly 
his theology of Christ as image.  This distinction, which does much of the heavy 
lifting in Victorinus’s treatise against the Arians, is the first of its kind in theological 
literature.  The distinction is fundamental to Victorinus’s understanding of how the 
Logos is the image of God; he writes, “God is hidden, for he is in potentiality; but the 
Logos is manifest, for he is action.”69  The image cannot be separate from the source 
because his action is nothing other than a manifestation of the hidden God.  Action 
and potentiality are intimately united; the Logos in act shares all being, life, and 
knowledge with the Father.  Victorinus writes, “That is why action is the image of all 
that which is in potentiality.”70  Outside of time, the Father is the cause of the Son, 
giving being to the image.  Nevertheless, their union remains one of perfect 
simplicity, so that we can speak of only one being, existing simultaneously in potency 
and in act.   
On account of divine simplicity, Victorinus is hesitant to press the distinction 
between the Father as potentiality and the Son as action.  He writes, “For both ‘to be’ 
and ‘to act’ are one and simple there.”71  Since the two Persons are consubstantial, the 
Father shares in the agere of the Son and the Son in the esse of the Father.  Potency 
gives birth to act, and act springs from potency; apart from each other they are 
unintelligible.  Victorinus follows Aristotle, whom he translated, in speaking causally 
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 Adv. Ar. I 19: Quoniam deus in occulto, in potentia enim; logos autem in manifesto, 
actio enim.  
70
 Adv. Ar. I 19. 
71
 Adv. Ar. I 20: Unum enim et simplex ibi et esse et operari.   
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about the relationship between Father and Son by maintaining that being precedes act.  
However, Victorinus is also quick to assert that in God this remains a purely logical 
distinction; being and act are one: homoousioi.
72
  Victorinus writes, “[T]here is one 
Father according to ‘to be,’ one Son according to ‘to act,’ each one of them 
simultaneously existing in the other, as has been proven.  They are therefore 
homoousioi.”73 
It is particular to the agere of the image to give form to that which is in 
potentiality.   Victorinus says that image specifies “each one of the things which are in 
potentiality.”74  Everything, explains Victorinus, has its own form (speciem), which is 
the substance of a particular being.  In the created order the form cannot be separated 
from the esse of a being – so too, in the eternal relations, esse and agere are 
inextricably one and are only logically distinguished.
75
  Nevertheless, it is agere that 
informs esse because it is always the species that defines “to be” (quod definitum facit 
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species illud quod est esse).
76
  Therefore, in Victorinus’s terms, the image manifests 
esse: “[F]or this reason ‘to be’ is the Father, the species is the Son.”77 
One analogy that Victorinus finds valuable to express the distinction of esse 
and agere within one divine substance is that of light.  He argues that the article of the 
Creed, lumen de lumine, could just as well be rendered “light in light” because there is 
only one common term that is twice heard and understood.
78
  Both Father and Son are 
light.  Consequently, Victorinus writes, “that which is born of it, the image, is not by 
division nor by emanation, but by radiance; not by extension but by appearance, not 
so much duplicating the power as activating the power.”79  The inseparability of 
power and action, of esse and agere, is why the Victorinus uses the analogy of light – 
light from light is the same as light in light.  No distinction is possible except a logical 
distinction deriving from causality.  While power only manifests itself in action, the 
analogy of light underscores that it is one substance that is manifest. 
Light is also a valuable analogy because it illumines, that is, it manifests what 
is hidden.  Clearly, the analogy breaks down at some point, because what is manifest 
is also light (lumen de lumine).  Regardless, Victorinus weaves “image” language in 
with the language of “light” to express that it is through Christ that we see and know 
God.  It is in Christ, in the true image who as perfect image is the same substance 
(lumen de lumine), that the Father is known.  Light is both revelatory and a 
continuation of the same being.   The Platonic understanding of the terms nous and 
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“form” expresses the light or image of the second Person of the Trinity that makes the 
eternal esse known.  The divine esse is, of course, unknowable; it is, suggests 
Victorinus, “huparktoteta (superabundance), ousioteta (substantiality) ontoteta 
(existentiality).”80  Victorinus explains that with all these terms esse remains “perfect 
in all ways, full, absolute, above all perfections.  This is God, above the Nous, above 
truth, omnipotent power, and for that reason not a form.”81  Nevertheless, the 
revealing form is not less than the hidden esse.  It is the nature of the illuminating 
image to be the nous and form revealing the unknowable esse; the image or form is 
“an identical substance … inseparably linked to the power of God the Father,”82 for 
how else, asks Victorinus, could it be an image?  The Father is called “silence, repose, 
immobility.”83  The manifestation of this silent, immutable power, then, is not a 
separation but a “continuation”; it does not leave “that from which it proceeds, but is 
progress with continuity.”84  And so for Victorinus esse and agere are one movement, 
one life, one substance, all in perfect simplicity.  (“For there on high there is not 
anything which is an accident.”85) 
Although Christ is the image of God, that is, the agere of the Father’s esse, 
Victorinus reminds Candidus that all this is “without reference to time”; it is, rather, a 
causal distinction; the Father is Father and the Son is Son only in reference to 
generation.  Nevertheless, in respect to esse Father and Son are homoousion.  The 
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distinction between potentiality and action is a causal distinction of generation, not a 
differentiation of substance.  Victorinus recalls the text from the Gospel of John 
previously considered: “All that the Father has, the Son likewise has.”  That is to say, 
“[T]here all is simplicity…. For the ‘to be’ itself of the two is homoousion 
(consubstantial).  But because one is from the other, there is the image, and there is 
that which is represented.”86  The distinction between Father and Son, between 
unbegotten and begotten is outside of reference to time, and its eternity secures its 
simplicity.    
Victorinus’s Christology maintains the basic neo-Platonic understanding of an 
image as derived and revelatory, manifesting that of which it is an image, while not 
succumbing to the subordinationism that this theology would, at first blush, seem to 
imply.  Appealing to the utter simplicity of God, Victorinus suggests that agere is 
inextricably linked to esse as light from light.  There is a continuation of one 
principle, the manifestation of one movement; the Son as agere fully participates in 
the Father’s esse.  Thus, the hidden potentiality of the Father is manifested in the 
action of the Son as image—all, however, within the simplicity of eternity, so that the 
manifestation is consubstantial with what is manifested. 
 
The Human Person secundum imaginem 
Christ as image is one substance with what is manifest.  Is the human person also the 
image of God?  To be image of God means, for Victorinus, to manifest the substance 
of God, which on account of the divine simplicity entails nothing other than being 
God; there can be no distinction of substance, between esse and agere.  Temporal 
created images, on the other hand, are of different, reduced, and fleeting substance.  
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The Nicene definition of the homoousion that Victorinus is defending remains present 
in his exegesis of Genesis 1:26.  Victorinus, therefore, quite simply asserts that the 
human person is not made in the image of God.  Human beings are made “according 
to the image” and only Christ is the image of God simpliciter.  Victorinus will bluntly 
say, “homo non imago dei, sed secundum imaginem.”87  While being and act are one 
in the divine nature (the image being one of consubstantial unity) the human person is 
radically dissimilar to God and can only be said to be created secundum imaginem.  
He is created in the image of the image;
88
 his soul is rational but it is not the Logos.  
The soul is only logikos because it participates in the Logos.
89
 
Victorinus devotes considerable attention to the distinction between “image” 
and “likeness.”  The two terms are anything but a tautology: “image” bespeaks 
substance while “likeness” conveys a quality.90  Christ is one substance (imago) with 
the Father, and the human person is made according to this image.  “Likeness” 
expresses a quality inherent in this substance; it is a relational denomination that 
conveys the association of two terms.
91
  Thus, although there cannot be more or less 
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“image,” there can be more or less “likeness.”92  Indeed, Victorinus distinguishes 
between the initial static gift of the “image” at creation and the dynamic “likeness” 
that one matures towards, which is finally perfected through faith in Christ in the 
eschaton.
93
  The human soul is fashioned secundum imaginem inasmuch as it 
participates by the interior man in the Logos and it is secundum similitudinem 
inasmuch as it is to be perfected by grace.  This distinction is not peripheral to the 
context of Victorinus’s theological intentions in the treatise.  When the Homoians 
describe Christ as “like the Father” (homoiousion), this, to Victorinus’s ears, is 
tantamount to blasphemy.  Christ does not move towards perfection, but is the perfect 
image, which, he always insists, is said according to substance.  The perfect imago 
cannot be more or less in likeness, which the creature secundum imaginem is able to 
be, because in God imago is equivalent with substance. 
As we will see Augustine do in the Soliloquia and De diversis quaestionibus 
octoginta tribus, so Victorinus here introduces the term “equality” into the discussion 
of image and likeness.
94
  Remarking on the Apostle Paul’s Christological hymn in 
Philippians 2, which describes Christ as “existing equal to God,” Victorinus notes the 
distinction between the human person created secundum similitudinem and Christ who 
is aequalis deo.  Just as “image,” so “equality” is predicated of the substance of God, 
again, on account of God’s simplicity.  Since Victorinus explains aequalitas in Christ 
philosophically in the same way as imago, the introduction of aequalis deo does not 
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bring anything new to Victorinus’s discussion of “image.”95  Victorinus notes simply, 
“[T]he substance of man is one thing, the substance of God another.”96  And so, when 
Philippians 2 describes Christ as being equal “in the form of God” he is referring to 
the Son’s nature as image.  The Logos as form or image “is always ‘with God’; the 
Logos is homoousion (consubstantial) with God.”97  
A substance cannot be more or less similar; because image is, as Victorinus 
repeats, synonymous with substance, neither can an image be more or less similar.  
The preferred term of the Homoians, homoiousion, is for Victorinus, as I have 
suggested, a logical absurdity.
98
  There can be no similarity or likeness within the 
same substance: only with different genera can one speak of similarity or likeness.
99
  
In God there are, however, not two principles but one: “[T]he Father is the cause of all 
existents through the Logos who was ‘in the principle’ and consequently always 
was.”100  Quite simply, “a like God is ‘another God.’”101  Leaning on Aristotle’s 
distinction between substance and accidents, Victorinus understands “likeness” to 
bespeak a quality of a different genus, and so is a predicate of human nature, whereas 
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“image” is a predicate of the divine nature.102  He writes, “But Jesus, that is, the 
Logos, is the ‘image of God,’ not the likeness.  He is called ‘image of God’; for God 
is not image, but God as image and God as substance are not as two things: for there 
is one substance and one image, whence there is one God and one Logos and one 
Father, one Son and they are one.”103  Clearly, Victorinus’s account of Christ as image 
assumes the doctrine of divine simplicity and proceeds from that premise of the unity 
of substance in discussing divine relations.  The human soul is “an image of the 
image;”104 it is created from the life of the Logos.  Victorinus, therefore, borrows the 
term dear to the Homoians and describes the human soul as homoiousios (similar) to 
God in whose image and likeness it is fashioned (whereas only Christ is homoousios 
with the Father).
105
  
The human soul is located at a midway point between the intelligible world and the 
world of matter (hule).
106
  It is created as an image of the eternal image, participating 
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in the Logos and in nous, but when it inclines to the mortal it turns away from the life 
in which it has being.  Here Victorinus’s psychology is proximate to that of Plotinus.  
Plotinus’s cosmogony finds its origin in the movement of eternal Soul outside of 
itself.  As such Soul has two phases: the contemplative and the active.  Inasmuch as it 
is contemplative, Soul retains the link to Intelligence (the second hypostasis) and 
thereby to the One.  However, in action Soul generates a multitude of images (matter).  
Thus, Soul has two distinct elements: the contemplative, “higher part” of Soul, which 
retains unity with Intelligence, and the active “lower part” of Soul, which is the life 
source in all material existence.  In contact with matter and in the drama of bodily 
existence, the “lower part” of Soul can forget its union with Intelligence and the One.  
The task of the “return” is the charge laid on the “lower part” of Soul.  The human 
soul, in Plotinus’s thought, mirrors eternal Soul.  It too is composed of a “higher” and 
“lower” part.  It too is deceived by material images when it forgets its divine origins.  
The injunction to “return” through contemplation to the higher region from whence 
the soul has its origin animates Plotinus’s entire psychology.  Victorinus’s account of 
the two-fold soul – heavenly and material – is intelligible in light of Plotinus’s 
psychology.  Victorinus writes, “It is not Nous, but when it looks toward the Nous, it 
is as if it were Nous.  For there, vision is union.”107  It is the nature of the soul as 
secundum imaginem to move, by retaining the vision of the Logos, back to that of 
which it is an image by participation.  Victorinus underscores the tenuous nature of 
participatory existence for a created image.  When the soul turns away from this 
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vision, in which is its union, it becomes like that which it desires – temporal and 
intellectual; it descends towards the material.   
The participatory ontology that undergirds Victorinus’s understanding of the 
human soul suggests the influence of Plotinus’s anthropology.  The human person is 
comprised of a body made out of the four elements (symbolized by the dust of the 
earth) and a two-fold soul, heavenly and material.  The material soul is shared with all 
living creatures that have the breath of life.  The heavenly soul, which is rational, is 
reserved for the human person, since God breathed his own life into the face of Adam.  
Victorinus sees these two souls or logoi in the human person suggested in the Gospel 
passage that describes the two women grinding at the mill (Matthew 24).
108
  
Victorinus equates the Apostle Paul’s “inner man” with the immaterial or divine soul 
and contrasts it with the material soul – the “outer man.”   
Some commentators have suggested that Victorinus’s Platonic influences 
entail a thoroughgoing dualism – even more so than in Plotinus – and that 
Victorinus’s understanding of matter and embodied existence is de facto Gnostic.  
Marcia Colish, for example, states emphatically: 
  
The body is not redeemed, in any way; it is, rather, to be cast aside.  And, 
far less than Plotinus, does he [Victorinus] argue that material things can 
be treated as rungs on a ladder of ascent to the deity, or as adumbrations 
of the splendor of the deity, which yield a partial but helpful knowledge of 
Him that is to be used even as it is transcended.… By flesh he means, 
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literally, the material body, which alone is the source of the human 
dilemma.
109
 
  
This reading of Victorinus, to my mind, fails to take into account his commitments as 
a biblical theologian.  Adversus Arium I 62-64 is an attempt to wrestle with the 
embodied nature of the human person presented in Genesis 1:26. 
Victorinus is inquiring how Scripture can describe the human person as 
secundum imaginem (which is immaterial) while “God ‘took dust and formed Adam’ 
[Genesis 2:7].”110  How does the Bible relate the immaterial soul and the material 
body vivified by the material soul?  Scripture distinguishes between the creation of 
the soul as image of God in Genesis 1:26 and the creation of the human body in 
Genesis 2:7, and the Apostle Paul likewise distinguishes between the heavenly man 
and the earthly man.
111
  For this reason, Victorinus suggests that the human person is 
comprised of two souls (logoi), the heavenly and the material.  On the one hand, it is 
the heavenly soul that is in the image of the “triad on high”; the consubstantial unity 
                                                          
109
 Marcia Colish, “The Neoplatonic Tradition: The Contribution of Marius 
Victorinus,” in The Fathers and Beyond, Marcia Colish, ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2008), p. 63.  This supposed denigration of the body (the material soul) further entails 
that Victorinus maintains that only faith is salvific, because it is by nature spiritual 
and, as an immaterial aspect of the human soul, inclines upwards; works, on the other 
hand, are grounded in the material – the very locus of the human problematic – and 
pull the soul down.  A discussion of the soteriological implications of Victorinus’s 
alleged dualisms is presented by Werner Erdt, Marius Victorinus Afer.  Der erste 
lateinische Pauluskommentar (Frankfurt: Lang, 1980), pp. 60-78. Colish is certainly 
not unique in criticizing Victorinus for dualism.  Mark Edwards maintains that 
Victorinus “holds not merely that the body is less essential to our humanity than the 
soul, but that it is radically depraved.”  Edwards, “Marius Victorinus,” 116.  See also, 
Arjo Vanderjagt, “Mysterium magnum: Marius Victorinus on Man’s Corporeal 
Relationship with God,” Studia Patristica 28 (1993): 130-34.    
110
 Adv. Ar. I 62. 
111
 The distinction between the creation of the soul in Genesis 1:26 and the creation of 
the body in Genesis 2:7 is prominent especially in the Eastern tradition and goes back, 
ultimately, to Philo.  It finds later expression in Numenius, Clement, and Origin.  Cf. 
Clark, “Psychology of Marius Victorinus,” 163. 
85 
 
of esse, vivere, and intellegere in the heavenly soul images the simple unity of the 
eternal Trinity.  It is for this reason that God says, “Let us make man to our image.”  
On the other hand, it is the material soul that is suggested in Genesis 2:7 when God 
takes dust and forms Adam.  It is important for Victorinus, however, that the 
distinction between the two-fold soul is not absolute: indeed, he insists on the integral 
unity of the heavenly and the material souls.  It is the material soul that is perfected by 
the Logos to become united with the heavenly soul.  Salvation is the perfection of the 
one composite: “But the divine soul (divina anima) is itself in the material mind 
(hylico spiritu), the material mind (hylicus autem spiritus) in the material soul (hylica 
anima), the material soul (hylica autem anima) in the carnal body (carnali corpore) 
which, with all three, must be purified to receive the eternal light and eternal life.”112  
Salvation is an embodied experience and the body too is taken up in the purification 
of the soul.
 113
  Indeed, body and flesh, too, must rise, reminds Victorinus; however, 
they shall rise as “spiritual flesh,” as Christ did when he ascended to heaven.114  Thus, 
when Scripture speaks of the human person created “according to the image” it refers 
to this resurrected, “higher flesh of the Logos.”115  The material soul by which the 
human person is rational and the divine soul through which he inclines to God are 
thoroughly integrated and will be perfectly ordered within the resurrected body.  How 
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this integration is to be understood remains a “great mystery (magnum mysterium),”116 
admits Victorinus. 
The movement of life flowing from the eternal Logos outside of himself into 
creation and the Incarnation safeguards Victorinus from the charge of dualism.  
Indeed, Victorinus distinguishes between the Logos-Christ who is eternally generated 
from the Father and the Carnal Christ who comes in the flesh.  It is perhaps 
Victorinus’s Christology that provides the ultimate defense against the charge of 
dualism.  Victorinus sees in the two souls of the human person (the heavenly and the 
material soul) an image of the two natures of Christ.  The creation in Genesis 1:26 of 
the heavenly soul is a mirror of that triad on high – esse, vivere, and intellegere – and, 
therefore, is an image of the Logos-Christ.  Genesis 2:7 refers to the creation of the 
material soul, which, in turn, is an image of the Carnal Christ.
117
  The earthly man (or 
material soul) is created by God and taken on and redeemed by Christ in the 
Incarnation.  As a biblical theologian, Victorinus is commited to the reality of the 
Incarnation, and therefore maintains, that the distinction between the heavenly and the 
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The birthing reveals something feminine, while it remains the masculine Father who 
sends the Son and the masculine Spirit by whom he is conceived.  God did not just 
create the heavenly soul as image of the image; “he also says this: ‘He made him 
male-female,’ … it is evident that also according to the body and the flesh, extremely 
mystically, he made him according to the image of God, the Logos being himself both 
male and female.”  Adv. Ar. I 64.  Similar statements are found in Origin (De 
principiis I 7.1) and Gregory of Nyssa (De opificio hominis 16).  
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earthly soul is not absolute.  With evangelical fervor (and without a trace of dualism) 
Victorinus writes, 
 
In the flesh itself, therefore, life is present, that is, the Logos of life; it 
follows that Christ is present, whereas the ‘Logos has been made flesh.’  It 
is not astonishing then that the Logos has taken flesh mysteriously to 
come to the aid of the flesh and of man.  But when he took on flesh, he 
took the universal logos of flesh (universalem λόγοv carnis sumpsit).  
Now for that reason he had triumphed, in the flesh (in carne triumphavit), 
over the powers of all flesh, and for that reason he has come to the aid of 
all flesh, as was said in Isaiah: ‘All flesh will see you as the salvation of 
God.’  And in the book of Psalms: ‘All flesh will come to you.’  Likewise 
he also took the universal logos of the soul (universalem λόγοv animae).  
For it is clear that he had a soul, since the Savior said: ‘My soul is 
sorrowful even unto death.’  ….  Therefore the whole man has been taken 
(adsumptus), both taken and liberated.  For in him were all universals, 
universal flesh, universal soul (universalis caro, anima universalis); and 
these universals have been raised upon the cross and purified by the 
Savior God, the Logos, the universal of all universals.
118
 
 
Victorinus unapologetically insists that salvation is achieved in the flesh and life is 
given in the flesh.  This incarnational motif is sustained in his writings but has mostly 
evaded scholarly attention.  Because of the Incarnation, Christ is no longer simply the 
source of the heavenly image in the human person, but has also joined himself to the 
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 Adv. Ar. III 3. 
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earthly image.
119
  The “universal logos” is, through the Incarnation, the archetype of 
both souls – the material and the heavenly.  Pierre Hadot has rightly noted that for 
Victorinus Christ assumes not just a particular soul and a particular body, but in the 
Incarnation, assumes all bodies and souls.
120
  Victorinus is able to situate a 
thoroughgoing incarnational theology within a neo-Platonic context.
121
  
How then is the human soul an image of the image of God?  The substance of 
the soul, suggests Victorinus, is the form of the human person.  In this way it mirrors 
the forma dei.  In the divine substance, the eternal form expresses the esse of the 
Father.  Victorinus writes, “But since this form is substance which is that image and 
Logos that we call the Son of God, insofar as it is the Logos, is the Logos of all 
existents.”122  So too, the human soul as form expresses the nature of the person.  On 
account of the divine simplicity, the eternal image as forma and vivere remains itself 
impassible even in its movement outside of itself in expression of the divine esse.  In 
the Incarnation, insists Victorinus, the Son retains his impassible divine nature: 
“[T]here is no suffering of the Logos, that is, of the Son.  Therefore, according to the 
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 Likewise, in one of his hymns Victorinus writes, 
Have mercy Lord!  Have mercy Christ! 
Thou art the Logos of my spirit! 
Thou art the Logos of my soul! 
Thou art the Logos of my flesh!  
(Second Hymn, 2) 
120
 Hadot, Commentaire, p. 937-38.  Discussion of Christ assuming “universal flesh” 
is not unique to Victorinus.  It is suggested perhaps most pointedly in Irenaeus’s 
doctrine of recapitulation, and it also sustains Athanasius’s theology of the 
Incarnation.  In the West prior to Victorinus, Hilary writes, “Naturam in se universae 
carnis adsupsit per quam effectus vera vitis, genus in se universae propaginis tenet.” 
(Psal. 51.16; PL 9,317 c).  Likewise, in his De Trinitate, Hilary repeats twice: 
“Assumptione carnis unius interna universae carnis incoleret.”  Trin. II 24; PL 10,66 
a-b and Trin. II 25; PL 10,67 a.  Finally, in the commentary on Matthew, Hilary 
writes, “Erat in Christo Iesu homo totus, atque ideo in famulatum spiritus corpus 
adsumptum, omne in se sacramentum nostrae salutis explevit.” Mat. II 5; PL 9,927 a. 
121
 Plotinus famously writes, “Soul, then, is one and many, one in its nature, many in 
those other things.”  Enn. VI, 2, 6. 
122
 Adv. Ar. I 22. 
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flesh the Savior has suffered, but according to the Spirit which he was before he was 
in the flesh, he is without suffering.”123  The human soul also bears this distinction 
between the impassible logos and the passible flesh because, as image of the Logos, it 
too has a heavenly and material soul.  The soul as a participant in the Logos (as 
logikos) is both impassible and passible.  The esse of the interior man, the heavenly 
man, is a united movement of vivere and intellegere.  Suffering, passions, and 
passibility occur when the movements of vivere and intellegere come in contact with 
an external object to vivify and know.
124
  Thus, as the Logos is only passible in his 
flesh, so too the soul is only passible in its contact with the flesh.  The soul, in its 
inner impassibility and exterior passibility, is an image of the interior and exterior 
movements of the Logos.
125
 
 Through the breath received from God, the human person comes to share in 
the nous and Logos of God; the created image is fashioned according to the eternal 
image.  However, because the eternal image is never alone, but on account of his 
consubstantial nature perfectly manifests the Father, the created image also somehow 
participates in this consubstantial unity.  The soul is an image of the image; it is 
therefore an image of the entire Trinity; the created image is also esse, vivere, and 
intellegere.
126
  Victorinus writes, “‘[T]o live’ is the Logos, and if life itself is ‘to be,’ 
and ‘to be’ is the Father, if again, life itself is ‘to understand,’ and this is the Holy 
Spirit, all these are three, in each one are the three, and the three are one and 
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 Adv. Ar. I 44. 
124
 Adv. Ar. I 45-46.  This is in imitation of Plotinus’s eternal Soul that becomes 
passible in its “lower part” by contact with matter.  Cf. Mary Clark, “Psychology of 
Marius Victorinus,” p. 159. 
125
 Here too Victorinus is proximate to Plotinus.  Cf. Enn I, 1, 2. 
126
 Adv. Ar. I 63.   
90 
 
absolutely homoousia (consubstantial).”127  The soul participates in the esse, vivere, 
and intellegere that the eternal image has because of its simplicity.  The soul, says 
Victorinus, is, therefore, “the image of the image of the Triad on High.”128  Esse, 
vivere, and intellegere inhere in the soul as in one movement; like the eternal Trinity, 
this “unique second Trinity” always exists consubstantially.129  Victorinus writes, 
“The soul is therefore also homoousion (consubstantial) in its unity, and it is of similar 
substance in its triple power; it therefore begets itself, moves itself, is always in 
movement, as source and principle of movement in the world.”130  Victorinus’s 
understanding of the soul as image is sustained by a participatory understanding of the 
nature of an image.  He writes, “But everything which is from the divine reality is 
related to them not as part of them but as an image.”131  The created image has 
everything from the uncreated image, even a share in the consubstantial union that the 
eternal image enjoys. 
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 Adv. Ar. I 63. 
128
 Adv. Ar. I 63.  For a discussion of this triad in the human soul as an image of the 
Trinity on high see David Bell, “Esse, Vivere, Intelligere: The Noetic Triad and the 
Image of God,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 52 (1985): 6-43.  
Victorinus elsewhere suggests that not just the human soul, but all things share an 
“appropriate ‘to be,’ ‘to live,’ ‘to understand,’ ‘to feel,’ so that these are the shadow or 
the image of [the] three highest of all.” (Est enim in omnibus esse suum, vivere suum, 
intellegere suum suum que sentire, ut sint ista umbra vel imago trium omnium 
superiorum.) Adv. Ar. IV 22. 
129
 Adv. Ar. I 64.  How is the unity of the triad esse, vivere, and intellegere to be 
understood?  Victorinus suggests the example of vision.  The power of sight is the 
esse of vision; the act of seeing is vivere, and finally the comprehension of vision can 
be understood as intellegere.  However, this distinction remains a purely logical one; 
in reality they are simple: “[B]y their very ‘to be’ vision, seeing, and discernment are 
only one.”  All three are present to each other as one, “all are in each one, or each one 
is all or all are one.”  Adv. Ar. III 5.  This simple unity is likewise present in the divine 
Trinity: “This will then make it clear enough that ‘to be’ which is the Father, that life, 
which is the Son, that knowledge which is the Holy Spirit, are one sole substance, 
while being three subsistences.”  (Hoc igitur satis clarum faciet, esse quod pater est et 
vitam quod est filius et cognoscentiam quod est spiritus sanctus, unum esse et unam 
esse substantiam, subsistentias tres.) Adv. Ar. III.9. 
130
 Adv. Ar. I 63. 
131
 Adv. Ar. III 1. 
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As image of the image, the soul exists in participation with the consubstantial 
Trinity.  In an effort to demonstrate that the term homoousion is scriptural even 
though it is not explicitly found in Scripture, Victorinus notes the petition of the Our 
Father: “Dos hemin epiousion arton (Give us our supersubstantial bread) [Matthew 
6:11].”132  What, asks Victorinus, is this supersubstantial bread?  This is the bread of 
life, he explains, that came down from heaven (John 6: 51); it is “bread from the same 
substance, that is, consubstantial life coming from the life of God.  For whence would 
we be sons of God except by participation of eternal life (nisi participatio vitae 
aeternae)?”133  The epiousion arton is bread from the substance of God.134  Not only 
does this demonstrate that Scripture does, in fact, speak of “substance” in relation to 
God, but also, maintains Victorinus, it suggests that the human person can participate 
in this divine substance.  It is this participation in the divine substance that Victorinus 
understands the Epistle of Titus to refer to.  In this letter Paul describes those who are 
redeemed as a people close to God’s substance (laos periousios).135  It is the substance 
of life that “Christ both has and gives (habet et dat)” that human beings can 
participate in.
136
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 Adv. Ar. II 8. 
133
 Adv. Ar. II 8. 
134
 The Greek epiousion is rendered cotidianum (daily) by the Latins, explains 
Victorinus, perhaps “because they could not render it in their own langue.”  Adv. Ar. 
II.8. 
135
 Adv. Ar. II 8.  “[T]hat he might redeem us from all iniquity and might cleanse to 
himself a people around his substance (periousion), a pursuer of good works” (Titus 
2:14). 
136
 It is likely that Victorinus is here quoting a Eucharistic prayer offered in the 
presence of the consecrated elements, which borrows from Titus 2:14: “Thus the 
payer of oblation, understood in that way, is addressed to God: soson periousion laon 
zeloten kalon ergon (save a people around your substance, a pursuer of good works).” 
Adv. Ar. II.8.  Cf. Klaus Gamber, “Ein kleines Fragment aus der Liturgie des 4. 
Jahrhunderts,” Revue Bénédictine 77 (1967): 148-55. 
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Victorinus’s theology of image, I have suggested, is in many ways a neo-
Platonic and Aristotelian commentary on scriptural texts that consider the relation of 
Father and Son.  It could accurately be said that Victorinus is attempting to present a 
philosophically rigorous biblical theology of the homoousion.  In this context the 
broad and often nebulous concept of “participation” plays a pivotal role in his 
thought.  The Son as agere “participates” in the esse of the Father; the image 
“participates” in its source.  This participation is, of course, not the participation of 
diverse substances, but expresses one sole movement, one being.  The human person 
as image also participates in God.  As image of the image he reflects the triad of esse, 
vivere, and intellegere on high.  The Eucharistic connotations of the petition in the 
Lord’s Prayer suggest, for Victorinus, a participation in the divine substance.137  
Likewise, those united and sanctified in the Eucharistic sacrifice are a people who 
participate in the divine substance (laos periousios).   
The participation of the created image is of a different order than that of the 
eternal image, as the divine vivere is different from the created vivere.
138
  What then is 
the “participatory relation” that links these two orders of vivere?  Victorinus appeals 
to what “Plato calls these ‘ideas’ (Has Plato ideas vocat).”139  The Logos is both the 
life of all (vivere) and contains the purest forms of all being (specierum species 
principales).
140
  Victorinus explains, “Therefore the genera of all genera are poured 
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 Adv. Ar. II 8: Unde enim filii dei erimus, nisi participatio vitae aeternae, quam 
nobis Christus a patre adferens dedit? 
138
 Adv. Ar. IV 5: “But this ‘to live’ of God is the ‘to live’ from which all those things, 
according to their mode of existence, receive life and live, he somehow advancing and 
breathing on them in the measure that they are capable of receiving the power of his 
living strength.”   
139
 Adv. Ar. IV 5. 
140
 Adv. Ar. IV 5. 
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forth abundantly by God.”141  The Platonic understanding of participation in universal 
substances is given Christian, indeed Christological, expression by Victorinus.  
Everything has being and life inasmuch as it exists in the eternal image.  This is the 
meaning of the prologue of John: “That which has been made in him is life.”142  All 
things have life in him because the Son is the image and form of God, the image and 
form of primordial vivere.
143
  Christ is “universal life,” who does not have vivere from 
another, but participates by nature in the very esse and vivere of God “by the gift of 
the Father”.144  All temporal, created, contingent being is life in Christ.145  Victorinus 
writes, “[T]here is a force, a power by which all things are vivified, by which, as from 
a source of life, they are raised into vital spirits so that they are living, they have ‘to 
be’ by participation (esse sortita sint).”146  The understanding of Christ as imago dei is 
critical to Victorinus’s theology of participation.  The image or form of life is 
impressed on the creature according to his capacity to receive it.
147
 
Victorinus understands the human soul in the context of image theology.  The 
human person is not the imago dei – a term reserved for Christ, who shares the 
substance of God – rather, the human person is created secundum similitudinem, that 
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 Adv. Ar. IV 5. 
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 Adv. Ar. IV 6. 
143
 Adv. Ar. IV 8. 
144
 Adv. Ar. IV 11. 
145
 Victorinus suggests an analogy between the tenuous nature of participated being 
existing as image and the fleeting nature of time.  Heraclitus famously stated that one 
cannot step into the same river twice.  The present is the only time we have, explains 
Victorinus, but it is never in our grasp: “[T]ime, is said to be the image tou aionos (of 
the aeon), that is, of eternity.”  Adv. Ar. IV 15.  Created being and time are fleeting 
and effervescent but find their intelligibility as participating in eternity.  Cf. Lenka 
Karfíková, “Time according to Marius Victorinus, Adversus Arium IV 15,” Studia 
Patristica 46 (2010): 119-123. 
146
 Adv. Ar. IV 11: [U]tique confitendum est esse vim quandam vel potentiam qua 
cuncta vivefiant et, quasi vivendi fonte, in vitales spiritus erigantur ut, ex hoc, et 
vivant, et quia vivunt, esse sortita sint. 
147
 Adv. Ar. IV 12: “[He] gives ‘to be’ to all others, dispensing, according to the 
proper force and power of those who receive it, the power and substance of ‘to live.’” 
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is to say, he progresses towards God in imitation.  Victorinus’s understanding of the 
human person as image remains fundamentally Christological.  The soul is an image 
of the eternal image existing in participation with this image, sharing its divine 
substance.  The two-fold soul with which the human person is endowed mirrors the 
two natures of Christ.  The material soul corresponds to the Carnal Christ revealed in 
the Incarnation.  As such, it is passible, because it comes in contact with that which is 
passible.  The heavenly soul corresponds to the Logos Christ and is impassible.  
Genesis 1:26 refers to the heavenly soul that, because it is an image of Christ, is also 
an image of the consubstantial unity of the triad on high: esse, vivere, and intellegere.  
Genesis 2:7 refers to the created material soul that Christ assumed.  The two souls of 
the human person and of Christ are allegorically suggested in the Gospel accounts of 
the two men working in the field and the two women grinding at the mill (Matt. 
24.39-41; Luke 17.34-3).
148
  Although the two souls are distinct, there is an 
underlying unity in the human composite, because Christ assumed a unity of two 
natures.  Victorinus insists that the body too is adopted by Christ and redeemed 
inasmuch as it participates in his universal substance. 
The Aristotelian and Neoplatonic background that informs Victorinus’s 
theology distinguishes sharply between image and substance.  The fleeting temporal 
nature of an image is, therefore, by definition unsubstantial.  Victorinus insists that 
Christ is the imago dei in a completely different manner.  I have argued that 
Victorinus’s theological commitment to divine simplicity allows him to evade the 
subordinationism that image theology seems prima facie to involve on account of his 
philosophical background.  The result that this seems to entail is a strict opposition 
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 Adv. Ar. I 62: Ergo qui in argo, λóγοι duo sunt vel νόες, λόγος caelestis et alius 
hylicus, et molentes, duae animae, caelestis et hylica.   
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between Christ who is the image of God and the human person who is not the image 
of God but created secundum imaginem.  Ultimately, I am arguing, Augustine will 
advance beyond this stark opposition and will instead posit a continuity of image 
theology as it refers to Christ and to the human person.  Nevertheless, the breadth of 
Victorinus’s Christology entails that even for him the human person is not ultimately 
excluded from the imago dei: inasmuch as he participates in the universal substance of 
the Logos, his soul shares in the divine consubstantial triad of esse, vivere, and 
intellegere. 
The common pro-Nicene difficulty of affirming the imago dei of the human 
person when that is most immediately a Christological term is clearly evident also in 
Victorinus.  However, the sustained emphasis on participation in Victorinus’s 
theology of the image of God anticipates what is essential to Augustine’s early 
thought.  Like Augustine, Victorinus leans on a neo-Platonic philosophy of 
participation to link Christ and the human person as imago dei. 
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Chapter III: Ambrose of Milan 
 
What most struck Augustine about Ambrose’s (337-397) preaching was his theology 
of the imago dei.  Augustine recounts in Confessions VI that it was Ambrose’s 
theology of the image of God in the human person that brought him to the Catholic 
faith.
1
  Augustine credits Ambrose with dissuading him from a crude Manichean 
materialist understanding of the image and leading him to consider the possibility of 
spiritual substances.  That the human person is created in the image and likeness of 
God with respect to his immaterial soul is something Augustine heard frequently 
reiterated in the preaching of Ambrose.  Indeed, it is especially in his preaching to 
catechumens and his sermons on the days of creation that Ambrose delved deeply into 
the implications of a theology of the imago dei.  This chapter will argue that 
Ambrose’s theology of the human person as imago dei is predicated on his 
Christology.  Most fundamentally, for Ambrose, Christ is the image of God.  The 
human person is image by way of a dynamic movement of imitation towards its 
source; this movement is realized in the transvaluing of desires from the temporal to 
the eternal.   
 What, in Ambrose’s theology, is the imago dei?  Christ is the image of God 
and the human person is the image of God inasmuch as he imitates Christ.  Ambrose’s 
theology of the image of God operates similarly to that of Hilary and Victorinus: the 
                                                          
1
 The “knotty problems and clever calumnies” regarding the creation of the human 
person in the image and likeness of God raised by the Manichaean s dissolved when 
Augustine heard Ambrose preaching: “I also learnt that your sons, whom you have 
regenerated by grace through their mother the Catholic Church, understood the text 
concerning man being made by you in your image (Gen. 1:26) not to mean that they 
believed and thought you to be bounded by the form of a human body…. I had been 
barking for years not against the Catholic faith but against mental figments of physical 
images.” Conf. VI.3.4. 
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imago dei is principally a Christological denominator that affirms the unity of the 
divine substance.  As image of God, Christ shares the nature of the Father; the Son as 
image is also immaterial, invisible, and eternal.  As for Hilary and Victorinus, so for 
Ambrose, Colossians 1:15 serves as the standard proof text to articulate his pro-
Nicene image theology. 
In the previous two chapters, I suggested that Hilary and Victorinus interpret 
imago dei as a Christological term.  Both Latin theologians are intent to draw the 
human person into this Christological denominator.  Hilary, I noted, considers the 
human person to be created ad imaginem dei; that is, Hilary regards him as fashioned 
after the “common image” of the Holy Trinity.  Victorinus notes that the Logos has 
two natures, passible and impassible.  The human person is created secundum 
imaginem because he is the image of the Logos, imaging the eternal image according 
to the interior and exterior man. 
Ambrose is less reluctant than either Hilary or Victorinus to use the term 
imago dei to refer to the human person.  Instead, Ambrose distinguishes between 
Christ who has the image by nature and the human person who has the image by 
imitation.  In this third chapter, I offer one last example of the recurring Latin pro-
Nicene difficulty in giving anthropological expression to the imago dei when as a 
result of the Nicene crisis this title was endowed with unique Christological 
resonances.  Nevertheless, Ambrose is more willing to affirm the imago dei of the 
human person, and this situates his thought closer than either Hilary or Victorinus to 
Augustine’s early theology.   
This chapter will proceed in three steps.  First, I will suggest that like Hilary 
and Victorinus, Ambrose sees the imago dei principally as a Christological referent, 
and as such as a spiritual reality – immaterial, invisible and eternal.  Second, I will 
98 
 
argue that despite regarding the imago dei as a spiritual reality, Ambrose has a 
profound appreciation for the unity of body and soul.  I will suggest that at the base of 
his anthropology there is an insistence on the nature of the human person as a 
composite; aware of the post-lapsarian disorder in the body-soul relation, Ambrose 
hedges his optimism surrounding the composite nature of body and soul with a 
Pauline and Plotinian injunction to flee the body.  Third, I will demonstrate that 
Ambrose reworks a Stoic philosophy of apatheia; however, he does not counsel 
detachment simpliciter, but urges a transvaluation of desires from the temporal and 
material to the eternal and immaterial.  His understanding of the soul as image of God 
entails that this transvaluation of desire is, in fact, consonant with the Stoic aphorism 
sequi naturam.  
 
The Imago Dei as a Spiritual Reality  
Image theology, for Ambrose, is in the first place Christology.  Even in the last book 
of the Hexameron, in which Ambrose discusses the creation of the human person, the 
discussion is framed around the divine discourse of the Holy Trinity.  The Father says 
to the Son, “Let us make mankind … in our image and likeness.”2  What does “our 
image and likeness” refer to?   It cannot be anything material.  God is not flesh, but 
spirit; spirit has no commonality with flesh.  Ambrose makes the opposition clear: 
“[T]he spirit is in the “incorporeal and invisible.”3  Clearly, then, the image too is 
incorporeal and invisible.  What, then, does it mean for the Father to say to the Son, 
“Let us make mankind … in our image and likeness”?  Ambrose answers, “Listen to 
the Apostle who tells us who is the image of God: ‘Who has rescued us from the 
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 Hex. VI.7.40 (CSEL 32.1 231). 
3
 Hex. VI.7.40 (CSEL 32.1 231). 
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power of darkness … who is the image of the invisible God and the first-born of every 
creature.”4  It is almost reflexive for Ambrose to turn to Colossians 1:15 in explaining 
the character of “our image and likeness.”  Like other pro-Nicenes, Ambrose insists 
that the image is, like its source, eternal and invisible. The image refered to in “our 
image and likeness” is one with the Father, “possessing the likeness of the Father so 
as to have a unity of divinity and of plenitude.”5  The verb faciamus and the pronoun 
noster indicate to Ambrose a unity of operation that manifests a unity of substance.
6
 
To understand what it means for the human person to be created in the image 
of God, Ambrose first directs his listeners to the eternal image of God.  Genesis 1:26 
is to be read in light of Colossians 1:15, and so the created image too must be 
incorporeal and invisible.  Thus, Ambrose’s insistence that the proper locus of the 
imago dei is the soul rather than the body is not primarily predicated on an undue 
adherence to Platonic dualism,
7
 but issues from his Nicene theological vision that the 
imago dei is primarily a Christological referent.  It is because the eternal image is 
incorporeal and invisible that the created image must also be incorporeal and 
invisible.
8
 
It is, therefore, important to situate Ambrose’s theology of the imago dei 
within the Christological discussion of image issuing from the Nicene debates.  
Ambrose’s understanding of Christ as image of God stands squarely in the pro-Nicene 
tradition considered in chapters one and two.  Marius Victorinus and Hilary of 
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 Hex. VI.7.41 (CSEL 32.1 232). 
5
 Hex. VI.7.41 (CSEL 32.1 233). 
6
 Hex. VI.7.41 (CSEL 32.1 233). 
7
 Even the construal of neo-Platonic literature popular in Ambrose’s time as 
“dualistic” is problematic, as Margaret Miles has persuasively demonstrated in her 
book, Plotinus on Body and Beauty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).  
8
 In De paradiso I.5 Ambrose writes, “Take note that He placed man [in the garden] 
not in respect to the image of God, but in respect to the body of man.  The incorporeal 
does not exist in a place.”   
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Poitiers, building on the theology of the anti-Monarchians, insisted that the image of 
the invisible God fully shares the properties and nature of the invisible God; the 
image, too, is invisible and eternal: “If you are seeking after the splendor of God,” 
writes Ambrose, “the Son is the image of the invisible God.  As God is, so is the 
image.  God is invisible; then the image also is invisible.  It is ‘the brightness of the 
glory of His Father and an image of His substance.’”9  Like Victorinus and Hilary, 
Ambrose maintains that the unity of the divine substance attested to in Colossians 
1:15 is manifest in the creation narrative; for this reason the following verse (1:16) 
considers the role of the eternal image in creation (“Through Him all things were 
created…”).10  Ambrose, like other pro-Nicenes, interprets Colossians 1:16 as an 
affirmation of the unity of operations between Father and Son, confirming the unity of 
substance that he sees in the Apostle Paul’s use of image language in Colossians 1:15. 
In the first doctrinal treatise of his episcopacy, De fide 1-2, presented at 
Emperor Gratian’s request,11 Ambrose defends the homoousion with the same 
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 Hex. I.5.19 (CSEL 32.1 15).  The materiality and visibility of the incarnation are not 
to be “divided” from Christ’s immaterial and invisible nature, asserts Ambrose.  In De 
incarnationis dominicae sacramento 7.75 (CSEL 79 262) he writes, “When we adore 
both His divinity and flesh, do we divide Christ?  When we adore the image of God in 
Him and the cross, do we divide Him?” 
10 Hex. I.5.19.   
11
 The questions surrounding why Emperor Gratian chose Ambrose to give a defence 
of the Nicene faith are addressed by D. H. Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of 
the Nicene-Arian Conflicts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 128-148 and Neil 
McLynn, Ambrose of Milan: Church and Court in a Christian Capital 
Transformation of the Classical Heritage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994), pp. 79-157.  Most studies date the first two books of De fide between the death 
of Emperor Valens in August 378 and the ascension of Theodosius to power in 
January 379.  Cf. Jean-Rémy Palanque, Saint Ambroise et l’Empire romain: 
Contribution à l’histoire de l’Eglise et de l’Etat à la fin du IVe siècle (Paris: E. de 
Boccard, 1933), p. 498; Homes F. Dudden, The Life and Times of Saint Ambrose, vol. 
1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 189; Angelo Paredi, Saint Ambrose: 
His Life and Times, trans. J. Costelloe (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1964), p. 180; Williams, Ambrose, p. 129. 
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theological argumentation deployed by his Latin predecessors.
12
  The theology of 
image plays an important role in Ambrose’s anti-Arian intentions in De fide.  In this 
work Ambrose also turns to the creation of the human person in the image and 
likeness of God to argue for the unity of the divine substance.  The human person is 
created after the common image shared by the divine persons, and this attests to the 
one nature of God.
13
  Scripture uses the singular noun “God,” who creates one, 
singular image, notes Ambrose; Scripture thereby retains both the unity of operation 
and the unity of the divine name (igitur unitas operationis seruatur et nominis).
14
  
Ambrose writes, 
 
At the beginning of the universe itself, as I read, the Father and the Son 
existed, and I see one creation.  I hear Him that speaks.  I acknowledge 
Him that does: but it is of one image, one likeness, that I read.  This 
likeness belongs not to diversity but to unity.  What, therefore, you claim 
for yourself, you take from the Son of God, seeing, indeed, that you 
cannot be in the image of God, save by help of the image of God.
15
 
 
                                                          
12
 D. H. Williams rightly notes that the first two books of De fide do not show any 
theological ingenuity but follow standard pro-Nicene argumentation.  Williams, 
Ambrose, p. 147. 
13
 “The Father says to the Son ‘in Our image and likeness,’ and you say that the Son 
of God is unlike the Father” Fid. 1.51; CSEL 78 23.   
14
 Fid. I.23 (CSEL 78 12).  Similarly in De spiritu sancto, Ambrose writes, “[T]he 
Father confesses the Son as equal to Himself in the oneness of the work, saying, ‘Let 
us make man to Our image and likeness.’  For what else do image and working and 
common likeness signify than the oneness of the same majesty?”  Spir. II.2; CSEL 79 
87. 
15
 Fid. I.53 (CSEL 78 23). 
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If the human person is made according to the image of God, he must be made after 
one, united image; the creation account confirms, for Ambrose, the common image of 
the Father and Son.  
 When Ambrose speaks of the human person created in the image of God he 
tends also to speak about the uncreated image.  He does so here, as well.  Referring to 
Colossians 1:15, Ambrose notes that Paul describes Christ as the image of the 
invisible God.  Thus, if the Apostle explicitly calls Christ image of the Father, why 
does Arius call Christ dissimilar to the Father?
16
  If the Son is image, he cannot be 
homoiousios (similar); the image must have perfect likeness.  Seizing the rhetorical 
advantage, Ambrose notes that whenever people have a painting made of themselves 
they do not tolerate a dissimilar representation, yet the Arians would have the Father 
begetting a dissimilar image, as he would somehow be unable to generate a Son in his 
likeness: “Why, then, is He called an image, if He has no likeness?  Men will not have 
their portraits unlike them, and Arius contends that the Father is unlike the Son, and 
would have it that the Father has begotten one unlike Himself, as though unable to 
generate His like.”17  Clearly, Ambrose sees “image” and “likeness” as synonyms.  
Christ is both the image and perfect likeness. 
 Ambrose’s understanding of “image” and “likeness” as synonyms is different 
from Hilary and Victorinus.  In chapter one I suggested that for Hilary there is no 
likeness between Father and Son.  Image, for him, denotes unity of substance and, 
therefore, while the human person is in the likeness of God and is created ad 
imaginem dei, only the Son is the image of God.  Likewise, in chapter two I suggested 
                                                          
16
 Fid. I.48 (CSEL 78 21): Imaginem apostolus dicit, et Arrius dicit esse dissimilem? 
17
 Fid. I.48 (CSEL 78 21): Cur imago, si similitudinem non habet? In picturis 
homines nolunt esse dissimiles, et Arrius dissimilem patrem contendit in filio et uult, 
ut pater dissimilem genuerit sui, quasi inpotens, qui generare similem non potuerit. 
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that for Victorinus, also, image is a Christological term and the human person is 
created secundum imaginem.  Both Hilary and Victorinus distinguish between image 
and likeness.  “Image” is the language of substance, the language of the homoousion, 
whereas “likeness” expresses a quality of gradation; something can be more or less 
“like” another.  It is precisely because of the Homoian crisis that Hilary and 
Victorinus avoid the use of “likeness” (similitudo) to bespeak the Son, insisting that 
there can be no likeness within a common substance.  Ambrose, however, does not 
understand similitudo in this way.  For the bishop of Milan something is either 
“similar” (similis) or “dissimilar” (dissimilis) and, therefore, either an image or not an 
image.  “Image” and “likeness” are synonymous terms and both are Christological 
referents. 
The Book of Wisdom suggests how the unity of Father and Son should be 
expressed, explains Ambrose: “Wisdom is the brightness of everlasting light, and the 
spotless mirror of God’s majesty, the image of His goodness” (Wisdom 7:26).  
Ambrose writes, 
 
See what great names are declared! “Brightness,” because in the Son the 
Father’s glory shines clearly: “spotless mirror,” because the Father is seen 
in the Son: “image of goodness,” because it is not one body seen reflected 
in another, but the whole power [of the Godhead] in the Son. The word 
“image” teaches us that there is no difference; “expression,” that He is the 
counterpart of the Father’s form; and “brightness” declares His eternity. 
The “image” in truth is not that of a bodily countenance, not one made up 
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of colours, nor modeled in wax, but simply derived from God, coming out 
from the Father, drawn from the fountainhead.
18
   
   
The eternal procession of the Son from the Father is articulated with the traditional 
Latin analogy of the fountainhead of a spring.
19
  The unity of the divine substance is 
affirmed with the Nicene understanding of “image” expressing of ontological identity.  
Like others in the pro-Nicene tradition, Ambrose is keen to note that as image the 
Son, like the Father, is invisible.  When Philip asks Jesus to show his disciples the 
Father (John 14:9-10), Jesus responds that the one who has seen him has already seen 
the Father.  Christ does not say this because he is the visible expression of the 
invisible God, explains Ambrose, but because Christ shares everything of the divine 
nature with the Father; he who sees Christ sees “Truth, Righteousness, [and] the 
Power of God.”20  The description of the Son in Scripture as “image,” “effulgence,” or 
                                                          
18
 Fid. I.49 (CSEL 78 22): Vide quanta dicantur: Splendor, quod claritas paternae 
lucis in filio sit, speculum sine macula, quod pater uideatur in filio, imago bonitatis, 
quod non corpus in corpore, sed uirtus in filio tota cernatur. Imago docet non esse 
dissimilem, character expressum esse significat, splendor signat aeternum. Imago 
itaque non uultus est corporalis, non fucis conposita, non ceris, sed simplex de deo, 
“egressa de patre”, expressa de fonte. 
19
 The imagery of a river and a fountainhead, the rays and the sun, and a tree and its 
root are all stock anti-Monarchian images employed by Tertullian, Novatian and 
Lactantius to express the union of divine substance within the diversity of persons.  
Cf. Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 
70-76. 
20 
Fid. I.50 (CSEL 78 22).  Similarly, in the Sermon against Auxentius, Ambrose 
states, “I only know of one Image, that is the Image of the invisible God, of whom 
God has said: ‘Let us make man in our image and our likeness’ [Genesis 1:26]; that 
Image of which it is written, that Christ is the brightness of his glory and the image of 
His substance [Hebrews 1:3].  In that Image I perceive the Father, as the Lord Jesus 
himself has said: ‘He that sees me sees the Father’ [John 14:9].  For this Image is not 
separated from the Father.  (Sed in ecclesia unam imaginem novi hoc est imaginem dei 
invisibilis de qua dixit deus: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem 
nostram; illam imaginem de qua scriptum est quia Christus splendor gloriae 
et imago substantiae eius. In ista imagine patrem cerno sicut dixit ipse dominus Iesus: 
Qui me videt videt et patrem. Non enim haec imago a patre est separata.)”  Aux. 32. 
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“expression” of God does not entail that the Son somehow makes the inscrutable 
Father visible.  Ambrose asserts, “[The same] incomprehensible and unsearchable 
Majesty [is] dwelling in the Son, and the expression of His likeness [is] in Him.”21  
Ambrose also deploys “image theology” against the Arians in De 
Incarnationis dominicae sacramento.  Ambrose admits that the Arians pose a subtle 
distinction in suggesting that the Son is “like” the Father while not being of one 
substance with him.
22
  However, Ambrose insists that the Arian “likeness” 
(similitudo) implies “unlikeness” (dissimilitudo).  Following Hilary and Victorinus, he 
notes that the Arian use of similitudo suggests a distinction between two distinct 
natures.  Milk, a swan, and snow are all “alike” in whiteness but differ completely in 
their nature.  Of course, in the invisible God there is no material form or colour.  
However, this only serves, a fortiori, to make the term “alike” all the more untenable: 
“How, then, can these men say that the Father and the Son are similar, who deny their 
unity of substance?”23  If Christ is the splendour, glory and figure of the Father’s 
substance, as Scripture asserts, he must be perfectly “like” the Father, that is to say, he 
must be the “image” of the Father.  The manner in which the Arians use the term 
“likeness” for the Son, asserts Ambrose, is simply a roundabout way of proposing 
dissimilarity between Father and Son.  If “likeness” appropriately describes the Son, it 
cannot be understood to include any dissimilarity of substance; rather, it must be a 
perfect likeness, which is to say, an image.
24
  A study of Ambrose’s theology of the 
                                                          
21
 Fid. II.8 (CSEL 78 60).  Similarly, Ambrose writes, “Why need I tell you that the 
Son is of one substance with the Father, when we have read that the Son is the image 
of the Father’s substance, that you may understand that there is nothing wherein, so 
far as Godhead is regarded, the Son differs from the Father.” Fid. III.108 (CSEL 146-
47). 
22
 Incarn. 10.106 (CSEL 79 275). 
23
 Incarn. 10.108 (CSEL 79 276). 
24
 Fid. I.48 (CSEL 79 21). 
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image of God must situate the Bishop’s thought within his Nicene context and be 
attentive to the theological denotation of the term “image of God.” 
When Ambrose considers the human person as created in the image of God, as 
in the Hexameron, he always links the discussion with Colossians 1:15; it is in light of 
the eternal image that the human person as image becomes intelligible.  “We shall be 
like him,” says the letter of John, and yet the Arians refuse to admit this even of 
Christ.  How then can they themselves be created in the image of God? asks 
Ambrose.
25
  The image in the human person is spiritual and immaterial because 
Christ, the image of God, is spiritual and immaterial.  In De Incarnationis dominicae 
for instance, Ambrose writes, “For one likeness is according to imitation, another 
according to nature.”  (Alia enim secundum imitationem similitudo, alia secundum 
naturam.)
26
  The image in the human person is held tenuously and only inasmuch as 
he exists as image of the image.   
The created image of God, for Ambrose, is most properly the soul.  
Deuteronomy 4:9 states, “Attend to thyself alone.”27  Interpreting this injunction, 
Ambrose suggests we distinguish between “ourselves,” “ours,” and “what surrounds 
                                                          
25
 Fid. I.52 (CSEL 79 23).  In De mysteriis, Ambrose writes, “Let your works also 
shine and bring forth the image of God, according to whose image you were made.”  
Myst. 7.41 (CSEL 73 106).  The created image attains to the eternal image through the 
Holy Spirit.  In De spiritu sancto, Ambrose insists that the Spirit too is of the same 
divine substance as the Father and Son: “Who, then, can dare to say that the Holy 
Spirit is separated from the Father and the Son, since through Him we attain to the 
image and likeness of God, and through Him, as the Apostle Peter says, are partakers 
of the divine nature?  In which there is certainly not the inheritance of carnal 
succession, but the spiritual connection of the grace of adoption.”  Spir. I.80 (CSEL 
79 48). 
26
 Incarn. 10.111 (CSEL 79 277-79). 
27
 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 233). Similarly, in De Isaac, Ambrose writes, “For a wise 
man should remove himself from fleshly pleasures, elevate his soul, and draw away 
from the body; this is to know oneself.”  Is. 1.1 (CSEL 32.Pref. 642). 
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us.”28  Here he is following a standard Stoic interpretation of the Delphic oracle.29  
“Ourselves” refers to the body and the soul; “ours” consists of our bodies and senses; 
“what surrounds us” consists of money, slaves and possessions.  Ambrose numbers 
the body both with “ourselves” (body and soul) and with the material contrast “ours” 
(bodies and senses).  Thus, while insisting that the imago dei is a spiritual reality of 
the human person, Ambrose, nevertheless, refers to both body and soul as 
“ourselves.”30  “Body” has two different senses for Ambrose.  On the one hand, the 
body can draw the soul down as a distraction and temptation.  On the other hand, the 
body is also the instrument of the soul, which the soul can skilfully play and direct.  I 
will elaborate further on this distinction in the next section of this chapter.  Suffice it 
to say for now that these two senses of “body” are critical to understanding 
Ambrose’s anthropology of the imago dei and are already subtly suggested in the 
Hexameron: the body, inasmuch as it is united to the soul, is “ourselves”; and when 
the body is considered as distinct from the soul it is consigned to be with the senses: 
“ours.”    
The Delphic oracle and Scripture both call us to attend to our soul and mind, 
suggests Ambrose, because only there “is the fullness of wisdom, the plenitude of 
                                                          
28
 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 233). 
29
 Cf. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 13-14.  Ambrose’s reference to the precept of the 
Delphic oracle is sustained throughout his writing.  Cf. Pierre Courcelle, “Saint 
Ambroise devant le précepte delphique,” in Forma futuri: Studi in onore del cardinale 
Michele Pellegrino (Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1975), pp. 178-88.  Helen North has 
demonstrated the importance of the Delphic oracle in classical education and presents 
an accurate picture of the type of education that Ambrose received.  Helen North, 
Sophrosyne: Self-knowledge and Self-restraint in Greek Literature (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1966), pp. 121-96. 
30
 Warren Smith also takes note of this passage.  Warren Smith, Christian Grace and 
Pagan Virtue: The Theological Foundation of Ambrose’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), p. 17-18. 
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piety and justice of which God speaks.”31  And yet such virtue is only manifest 
through the operations of the body.  The actions of the body are not virtuous per se, 
but are so only when actions derive from the deliberation and intention of a soul 
acting in accordance with wisdom, piety and justice.
32
  In this sense too, the soul is 
distinct from and superior to the body.  Bodily actions manifest the state and intention 
of the soul; likewise, the reward and glory of a virtuous act belong to the soul because 
from it “all our deliberations emanate.”33  The nobility and virtue of a beautiful soul 
is, of course, incorporeal and invisible, but it is “painted by God, who holds in himself 
the flashing beauty of virtue and the splendor of piety.”34  The beautiful soul is the 
invisible painting of God that radiates through visible embodied action. 
 In what way is the soul the image of God?
35
  The soul constitutes everything 
that is essential to the human person, maintains Ambrose: In hac totus es, homo, quia 
sine hac nihil es.
36
  Ambrose epigrammatically states, “Your soul is made to the 
image of God, whereas your body is related to the beasts.”37  If the body were to be in 
the image of God, one would have to come to the ludicrous conclusion that God is 
corporeal, weak, and given to passions.  Rather, it is the soul that is the refulgence of 
God, painted by the divine artist as his own image, and that by “its brilliance is in 
accord with that divine reflection.”38  Ambrose certainly does not denigrate the body: 
                                                          
31
 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 233). 
32
 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 233). 
33
 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 234). 
34
 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 233-34). 
35
  The anthropology that issues from Ambrose’s theology of the imago dei is 
addressed in S. E. Szydzik, Ad imaginem Dei: Die Lehre von der Gottebenbildlichkeit 
des Menschen bei Ambrosius von Mailand (Diss., Free University, Berlin, 1961), 
especially pp. 24-33, 34-75.  Also, idem, “Die geistigen Ursprünge der Imago-Dei-
Lehre bei Ambrosius von Mailand,” Theologie und Glaube 53 (1963): 161-76. 
36
 Hex. VI.7.43 (CSEL 32.1 234).   Cf. Smith, Ambrose’s Ethics, p. 20.  
37
 Hex. VI.7.43 (CSEL 32.1 234). 
38
 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 233). 
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he notes the body’s erect stature, the ability to see and hear.  Yet, despite its manifest 
abilities, he regards the body as limited by material constraints.  Sight and hearing are 
quickly impeded.  Embodiment entails specificity of place.  The soul is not 
encumbered in this way.  Ambrose writes, “Our souls are able to envisage and reflect 
on all things (quae considerando spectat omnia).”39  The soul can see itself in Italy, 
have dealings with people in Persia, and imagine people living in Africa.  The soul 
can be united with those absent in a land far away or even entertain those who have 
passed away.
40
  The soul, as image of God, is endowed “with that vigour of the mind 
which sees those absent, encounters with sight places across the sea, scans with its 
gaze, surveys hidden things (sed mentis uigore, quae absentes uidet, transmarina uisu 
obit, transcurrit aspectu, scrutatur abdita).”41  Most importantly the soul alone is 
fitted to embrace God, because it is the nature of the soul to attain to immaterial 
being.  Therefore, Paul describes our true citizenship as being in heaven.
42
  
 Not only is the body encumbered by material constraints, but it is also limited 
by its mortality.  The human body is something that is given unto death, while the 
soul, created in the image of God, shares in immortality.  Therefore, Scripture offers 
the comfort that one should not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.
43
  
Of course, the corollary principle to this comfort is the fear engendered in those who 
presume in the flesh, because their hope lies in what is mortal.
44
  The body 
(considered apart from its relation to the soul) is a body of death; in its materiality, 
distraction, and weight, it is not only dead but deadly, because it can pull down the 
                                                          
39
 Hex. VI.8.45 (CSEL 32.1 236). 
40
 Hex. VI.8.45 (CSEL 32.1 236). 
41
 Hex. VI.8.45 (CSEL 32.1 236). 
42
 Hex. VI.8.48 (CSEL 32.1 239). 
43 Hex. VI.7.43 (CSEL 32.1 234). 
44 Hex. VI.7.43 (CSEL 32.1 234). 
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immortal soul with it.  Indeed, this was the downfall of Adam.  He preferred the 
temporal image to the eternal and lost his immortal image by loving the mortal 
image.
45
  Ambrose writes, “Let us flee from this image which cannot enter the city of 
God, for it is written: ‘In thy city, O Lord, thou shall bring their image to nothing.’”46  
When the soul prefers temporal goods to eternal good, it is dragged down to that 
which it prefers and abandons its own dignity. 
Ambrose’s theology of the image of God in his exposition on Psalm 118 (119) 
has received little scholarly attention.  Nevertheless, many of the themes expressed in 
the sixth book of the Hexameron and in De fide are rearticulated in Ambrose’s 
commentary on this psalm.  Ambrose distinguishes sharply between body and soul, 
insisting – as he does in the Hexameron – that the locus of the imago dei is the soul.  
As in De fide, Ambrose maintains that it is precisely because “image” is principally a 
Christological referent – that is to say, the image is immaterial, invisible and eternal 
(Colossians 1:15) – that the image of Genesis 1:26 refers especially to the soul rather 
than to the body.  After all, the soul too is immaterial, invisible, and eternal.  
Commenting on verse 63 of Psalm 118 (119) (“Your hands have made me and 
formed me; give me understanding that I may learn your commandments.”47), 
Ambrose notes the splendour of created existence, particularly of human beings.  
Despite being creatures of clay, “clothed in flesh” and “woven of bones and nerves,” 
God’s handiwork is marvellously displayed.48  Ambrose remarks on the beauty of the 
                                                          
45 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 234). 
46
 Hex. VI.7.42 (CSEL 32.1 234). 
47
 I have consulted Íde Ní Riain’s translation of Ambrose’s use of the Septuagint.  
Ambrose, Homilies of Saint Ambrose on Psalm 118 (119), trans., Íde Ní Riain 
(Dublin: Halcyon, 1998), 3.20.  
48
 Psal. 118, 10.6. 
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person: his tall, dignified stance, august demeanour, and beautiful hair.
49
  Particularly 
noble and distinctive is the human person’s ability to stand upright and “freely look 
up to the heavens.”50  Despite all this, the imago dei does not reside in the human 
being’s corporeal existence: “Man, however, is lovelier in that which is not seen than 
in the body that is seen.”51  He is the only creature aware of his created dignity and 
splendour, and is thereby “an eloquent witness of his maker.”52  Further, the human 
person bears eternity within him, something on which the corrosive vicissitudes of 
history and the ravages of time have no effect.  Ambrose writes, “In this terrestrial 
lodging he is clothed with heavenly habitation; he who simultaneously is visible on 
earth is also joined to God.”53  From the beginning, creatures made in the image of 
God are unique participants of God.  
 Thus, the phrasing of the Psalm, “Your hands have made me and formed me,” 
recalls for Ambrose the creation narrative, in which God decreed, “Let us make man 
to our image and likeness” (Gen 1:26).54  The creation account, for Ambrose, confers 
a special dignity on the human person; he is more than dust and matter, for he bears 
within himself an eternal and immaterial soul: “Know yourself, O soul; know that you 
are not of earth and clay: God has breathed on you and made you a living soul.”55  
Obeying the Delphic oracle – to know oneself – means, for Ambrose to know that 
one’s soul, not one’s body, partakes of the image of God.  In his sermon, this 
                                                          
49
 Psal. 118, 10.6. 
50
 Psal. 118, 10.6.  Cf. Psalm 118, 5.32: “So lift up your mind and make use of your 
natural intelligence.  You are made in the likeness of God.  You must seek the things 
that are above, rather than things that are below, bending your neck to take upon it the 
weight of this world.”  
51
 Psal. 118, 10.7. 
52
 Psal. 118, 10.6. 
53
 Psal. 118, 10.7. 
54
 Psal. 118,  10.8. 
55
 Psal. 118, 10.10. 
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insistence is coupled with a moral injunction: to raise the mind to things above; it is 
beyond the dignity of the human soul, created in the image of God, to be trapped in 
“worldly and mundane things”:56   
 
Learn, O man, in what you are great, in what you are precious.  Earth 
shows you to be vile, but virtue makes you glorious.  Faith makes you 
rare, the likeness you bear makes you precious (imago pretiosum).  For 
what is so precious as an image of God? (an quicquam tam pretiosum 
quam imago est dei?)  This likeness to him should fill you with faith.  A 
sort of picture of your maker should shine out from your heart, so that if 
anyone were to question your soul they would not fail to find the creator.
57
 
 
For Ambrose, the beauty of the human body is secondary to the eternal soul in which 
his true glory resides: the image of God. 
Ambrose’s theology of the image of God frequently links creation of the flesh 
with redemption through the flesh.  God came to dwell with human beings, notes 
Ambrose, and thereby made them participants of his glory.  The bishop writes, “For 
our sake he took flesh.  Rather, he received us in that flesh which established the Son 
                                                          
56
 Psal. 118, 10.10. Hence, Ambrose tells his congregation to live according to the 
image within them: “The Lord made your soul in his own image and likeness.  He 
made it rational, just and chaste.  You are in God’s image if you are so just as to be 
the very image of justice; and if you are so chaste as to be a shining reflection of 
God’s immaculate purity.” Psal. 118, 8.23. 
57
 Psal. 118, 10.10.  Similarly Ambrose writes: “To her the Spouse replies: ‘Place me 
as a seal upon your heart, as a seal upon your arm’ [Song of Songs 8:6] because you 
have kept both the new and the old for me.  You are my seal; in my image and 
likeness. Let the image of justice, wisdom and power shine in you.  And because the 
image of God is in your heart, may it also be in your works; let the portrait of the 
Gospel be in your deeds, so that you keep my precepts in all your ways.” Psal. 118, 
22.34. 
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of Man upon God’s throne….  I read that not angels but men are buried with Christ 
and rise again with Christ.  Consequently, the Apostle says, ‘He brought us to life 
with Christ – it is through grace, you have been saved – and at the same time he raised 
us up to sit with him in heaven, in Christ Jesus [Eph 2:5-6].’”58  Ambrose here 
introduces the Incarnation as a corollary to the doctrine of creation in the imago dei.  
Human beings are raised to participate with Christ in glory because of his 
condescension in participating in our humanity.
59
 
Commensurate with and following from Ambrose’s discussion of the imago 
dei, is an exposition on the nature of Christ.  He is most properly the image of God, 
whereas the human person is made to Christ’s image: “The Image comes to him who 
is made in the image.  The Image seeks him who is made in his likeness to put his 
mark on him again.”60  Thus, for Ambrose, human beings have the imago dei by 
participation in the eternal image.  Following the Apostle Paul he, therefore, enjoins 
the faithful to “put on the new man, renewed in the image of his creator (Col 3:9-
11).”61  Recreation follows the pattern of creation.  As Ambrose puts it: “The Lord 
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 Psal. 118, 10.13. 
59
 Similarly, in his exposition on the Gospel of Luke, Ambrose writes, “For whoever 
receives the imitator of Christ receives Christ, and whoever has received the image of 
God receives God.  But because we could not see the image of God, His presence 
came into being for us through the Incarnation of the Word, so that the Godhead 
which is above us may be united with us.”  Luc. 7.24 (CSEL 32.4 292).  Again, it is 
clear that the created image of God becomes intelligible in light of the eternal image, 
and there is, therefore, a moral imperative issuing from this linkage.  Christ’s 
identification with the marginalized in Matthew 25 is given ontological density in the 
lived moral order: the image that is lost in Adam is regained in Christ by participating 
in him with the vulnerable.  Cf. Luc. 7.24 (CSEL 32.4 292).   
60
 Psal. 118, 10.16.  Ambrose’s insistence that human beings are made according to 
the image of Christ (ad imaginem dei) implies some element of dynamic maturation 
into, and growth towards, the image of God.  That the created image is realized in 
imitation of the eternal image is a theme I will explore in the next section of this 
chapter. 
61
 Psal. 118, 10.17.  Allan Fitzgerald notes that Paul is the theological bridge that for 
Ambrose holds together the Old Testament and the life of Christ: “Just as the 
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Jesus, who first made man in his image, is also the author of our body, which he 
shaped out of clay.  He wanted to keep what he had made and to save what he had 
molded.”62  Christ, the image of God, refashions human beings in himself, explains 
Ambrose, so that they once again reflect their prototype. 
Colossians 1:15 is the lens through which Ambrose articulates his theology of 
the image of God in the human person.  The sixth book of the Hexameron, De fide, 
and Expositio psalmi cxviii all understand the created image to be immaterial, 
invisible, and eternal because that is the nature of Christ, the image of God.  Like 
Victorinus and Hilary, Ambrose employs image theology (especially Colossians 1:15) 
to express the relation between the Father and the Son, that is, between the source and 
the image.  The eternal image shares the nature and substance of the Father.  If the 
eternal image of God is immaterial, eternal, and invisible, the created image must also 
somehow share these properties.  For this reason, the imago dei, which constitutes the 
essence of the human person, is, for Ambrose, a spiritual reality; it is the soul that is 
fashioned in the imago dei.  
 
The Embodied Imago  
                                                                                                                                                                      
organization of the liturgy of the Word passed from prophet to apostle to Christ, so 
does the role of the apostle Paul hold together – as glue – Ambrose’s efforts to unite 
the human experience he finds in David’s words with the daily ideals he proposes 
from the life of Christ. Paul does appear to have a specific role in facilitating the 
passage from shadow to reality, from the human to the divine, from the incomplete or 
imperfect to the all, the fullness or the perfection of Christ.”  See, “Ambrose, Paul, 
and Expositio Psalmi CXVIII,” Augustiniana 54 (2004): 141.  Viktor Hahn has also 
underscored Ambrose’s Paulinism.  Viktor Hahn, Das wahre Gesetz: Eine 
Untersuchung der Auffassung des Ambrosius von Mailand vom Verhältnis der beiden 
Testamente (Münster: Aschendorff, 1969), p. 514. 
62
 Psal. 118, 10.17.  Similarly, in Luc. 7.24 (CSEL 32.4 292) Ambrose writes, “It is 
possible to understand, here, the likeness of the human race in one man.  Adam was, 
and we were all in him.  Adam was lost, and in him all were lost.  Man is refashioned 
in the man who was lost, and he is made in the likeness of God and restored to His 
image through Divine patience and magnanimity.”   
115 
 
Ambrose regards the soul as the locus of the imago dei.  The soul is image because it 
is invisible, incorporeal, and eternal, like the eternal image.  Naturally, this raises the 
question, “Does the body, too, participate in the image of God?”  For Ambrose this is 
a complex question.  On the one hand, he says this is certainly not the case, as it 
would lead to the implication that flesh, passions, and mortality are likewise 
applicable to God.  On the other hand, the body is inextricably tied up in the life of the 
soul and expresses the life, deliberation, and virtue of the soul.  I have alluded already 
to Ambrose’s use of two senses of the word “body.”  The body is “ourselves” 
inasmuch as it is the instrument manifesting the virtue of the soul, but it is “ours” 
inasmuch as it is distinct from the soul, tempting the soul with material loves, 
dragging it down through concupiscence.
63
  It is in this latter sense that Ambrose 
states with remarkable terseness, “God preferably seeks the soul when it is alone, thus 
dissociating Himself from the slime of the body and cupidity of the flesh.”64  Ambrose 
constructs an account of the body in relation to the soul by exploiting a similar tension 
found in Romans 7.  In what follows, I will suggest that this Pauline tension, which 
expresses “body” in two distinct ways, accounts for the Bishop’s reluctance to fully 
embrace a neo-Platonic understanding of the body-soul relation.  Thus, while urging 
the soul to flee the body, Ambrose will also describe body and soul as a harmonious 
and integral unit.
65
 
Ambrose’s understanding of the relation between soul and body is expressed 
most clearly in De Isaac.
66
  This work is related directly to Ambrose’s preaching to 
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 Hex. VI.7.42. (CSEL 32.1 233).   
64
 Hex. VI.8.46 (CSEL 32.1 237).   
65
 Cf. Donna M. Foley, “The Religious Significance of the Human Body in the 
Writings of Ambrose of Milan,” Ph.D. Diss (Ottawa, University of Saint Paul, 1996). 
66
 Helpful literature surrounding De Isaac et anima that touches on the theology of the 
image of God includes Alan Fitzgerald, “Ambrose at the Well: De Isaac et anima,” 
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the catechumens who were being prepared to receive the Easter mysteries.
67
  This 
context is important.  Before baptism, the soul of the catechumen was to be purified, 
formed, and educated in the life of virtue, after the models of Isaac and Rachel.  
Fundamental to this process was the extrication of the soul from material attachments.  
This is why the story of Isaac begins with the Patriarch going out into the field to 
meditate: “For a wise man should remove himself from fleshly pleasures, elevate his 
soul, and draw away from the body.”68  The ability to follow the injunction of the 
Delphic oracle, an injunction that Ambrose sees reiterated throughout Scripture, is 
predicated on a proper understanding of human nature.  “What, then, is man?” asks 
Ambrose, “soul, or body, or a union of both? (quid est itaque homo? utrum anima an 
caro an utriusque copula?)”69  This is the key question that De Isaac will address.70   
                                                                                                                                                                      
Revue des études Augustiniennes 48 (2002): 79-99; Volker Henning Drecoll, 
“Neuplatonismus und Christentum bei Ambrosius, De Isaac et anima,” Zeitschrift für 
antikes Christentum 5 (2001): 104-30; Roberto Iacoangeli, “Anima ed eternità nel De 
Isaac di Sant’Ambrogio,” in Morte e immortalità nella catechesi dei Padri del III-IV 
seculo, ed. Sergio Felici (Roma: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 1985), pp. 103-37; Gerard 
Nauroy, “La structure du De Isaac vel Anima et la cohérence de l’allégorèse 
d’Ambroise de Milan,” Revue des Études Latines 63 (1985): 210-236; Luigi F. 
Pizzolato, La dottrina esegetica di Sant’Ambrogio (Milano: Università Cattolica del 
Sacro Cuore, 1978);  Solange Sagot, “La Triple sagesse dans le De Isaac vel anima: 
Essai sur les procédés de composition de saint Ambroise,” in Ambroise de Milan: XVI 
centenaire de son élection épiscopale, ed. Yves-Marie Duval (Paris: Études 
Augustiniennes, 1974), pp. 67-114; Giuseppe Piccolo, “Per lo studio della spiritualità 
ambrosiana: I sermoni De Isaac vel anima,” La Scuola cattolica 98 (1970): 32-74; 
Pierre Hadot, “Explication du ‘De Isaac’ d’Ambroise,” Annuaire de l’École pratique 
des hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses 73 (1965-66): 150-52.  
67
 For the context of Ambrose’s preaching on the patriarchs, see Marcia Colish, 
Ambrose’s Patriarchs: Ethics for the Common Man (Notre Dame, IN.: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2005), pp. 13-29. 
68
 Is. 1.1 (CSEL 32.pref. 642).   
69
 Is. 2.3 (CSEL 32.pref. 643).   
70
 An excellent study of Ambrose’s understanding of body and spirit is offered by 
Wolfgang Seibel, Fleisch und Geist beim heiligen Ambrosius (München: Zink, 1958), 
pp. 7-9, 16-69. See also Ragnar Holte, Beatitude et Sagesse (Paris: Etudes 
Augustiniennes, 1962), pp. 167-76. 
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Themes found in the Hexameron are also expressed in De Isaac, with many of 
the same linguistic tropes and philosophical references employed.  Employing a 
distinction similar to that between “ourselves,” “ours,” and “what surrounds us,” 
Ambrose writes in De Isaac, “We are one thing, our possessions are something else; 
he who is clothed is one person, his clothing something else.”71  Clearly, clothing, that 
is, one’s possessions, is distinct from the human person.  But this does not yet answer 
the question regarding the relation of body and soul; rather, Ambrose has only 
sharpened the question more precisely. 
The question “What, then, is man?” is complex, explains Ambrose, because 
Scripture itself refers to “man” in two ways: first, “all souls (omnes animae) that went 
into Egypt” is a reference to human beings; second, “My spirit shall not remain those 
men, since they are flesh (carnes)” bespeaks a judgement.72  In Scripture, there are, 
therefore, two ways of understanding “man”: either in terms of the soul (anima) or in 
terms of flesh (caro).  The first is a neutral term indicating the human composite of 
soul and body.  When Scripture uses the term “soul,” it expresses the man “who 
cleaves to God, and not to the body (corpori).”73  The second term, flesh (caro), is a 
negative judgment of the body that drags down the soul. “[W]hen ‘flesh’ (caro) is 
employed in reference to man, a sinner is meant.”74  Although one might wish for 
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 Is. 2.3 (CSEL 32.pref. 643).   
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 Is. 2.3 (CSEL 32.pref. 643-44).   
73
 Is. 2.3 (CSEL 32.pref. 644).   
74
 Is. 2.3 (CSEL 32.pref. 644).   Referencing the same scriptural citations in the 
Exhortatio uirginitatis, Ambrose suggests that the imago dei implies an “ought”; the 
soul ought not to follow corporeal beauty but, rather, its inner beauty: “Scire ergo se 
debet siue uir, siue mulier, quia ad imaginem dei est et similitudinem, ut animae 
sequatur, non corporis, pulchritudinem.”  Exh. uirg. 10.68 (PL 16 372).  Ambrose 
inquires, “In what are we?”  The true self, he answers, consists in the substance of the 
soul and in the strength of mind. (In quo enim sumus? In animae substantia et mentis 
uigore.)  Exh. uirg. 10.68 (PL 16 372).  As the soul is the true self, David does not 
fear what flesh (caro) can do to him, because he knows he is spirit (spiritus).  Those 
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consistency in the use of caro to convey a negative valuation of the “body” pulling 
down the soul and of corpus as a neutral expression of the “body” as a composite with 
the soul, Ambrose uses caro and corpus interchangeably.  Warren Smith has rightly 
suggested that only the context can indicate how Ambrose understands “body.”75 
 The tension between two ways of expressing “body” is for Ambrose in many 
ways a commentary on the same tension in the Apostle Paul.  Ambrose devotes 
considerable attention to Romans 7.  Paul writes, “I am carnal, sold into the power of 
sin.  For I do not understand what I do, for it is not what I wish to do, but what I hate, 
that I do” (Rom. 7:15).  It is almost as if there are two men wrestling inside the 
Apostle, notes Ambrose, because Paul says, “I see a law of my flesh warring against 
the law of my mind and making me prisoner to the law of sin” (Rom. 7:23).76  The 
Apostle’s soul is warring against his body – not the body as it part of the composite, 
but as it is “flesh,” and desirous of material good.  This is why, explains Ambrose, 
Paul prefers to speak of the internal and the external man.
77
  Both inner and outer man 
are “Paul,” and yet the Apostle indentifies with the inner man; – it is the true man, the 
soul that cries out, “Who will deliver me from this body of death?” (Rom. 7:24).78 
                                                                                                                                                                      
who rely on the flesh rely on a body of death, for which reason the Lord says, “My 
spirit shall not remain in them, since they are flesh (quia caro sunt).” Exh. uirg. 10.68 
(PL 16 372).  Here too Ambrose makes Moses’s command to the people of Israel 
something consonant with the Delphic oracle: know thyself.  Moses instructs the 
people: “Attend to yourself, that is to your soul in order that you do not lose it, that 
you do not become carnal (Et ideo tibi dicit Moyses: Attende tibi, hoc est animae tuae, 
ne pereat, ne carnalis fias).” Exh. uirg. 10.68 (PL 16 372).  Frequently, Ambrose 
compares the soul as image of God to Jerusalem, whose walls have been painted by 
the Lord to reflect his glory (Ecce ego, Ierusalem, pinxi muros tuos).  Exh. uirg. 10.68 
(PL 16 372). 
75
 Smith, Ambrose’s Ethics, p. 22. 
76
 Is. 2.3 (CSEL 32.pref. 644).   
77
 Cf. Goulven Madec, “L’Homme intérieure selon saint Ambroise,” in Ambroise de 
Milan: XVIe centenaire de son élection épiscopale, ed. Yves-Marie Duval (Paris: 
Études Augustiniennes, 1974), pp. 283-308. 
78
 Is. 2.3 (CSEL 32.pref. 644).   
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The inner man, the soul, is the true man.  Ambrose is clear that the soul both 
rules and gives life to the body.  Apart from the soul, the body is only dust and earth: 
“Man according to the image of God is not like to vanity, but he who has lost it and 
has fallen into sin and has tumbled into material things – such a man is like to 
vanity.”79  The nature of the soul created as the image of God is excellent, but 
becomes corrupt by turning from his rational nature and inclining to “bodily 
pleasures”; not retaining an equilibrium, the soul “turns to matter, and is glued to the 
body.”80  The perfect soul, on the other hand, moves in the opposite direction; it turns 
from matter and all that is excessive: “It is attentive to things divine but shuns earthly 
matter.”81  
Marcia Colish has called attention to Ambrose’s positive evaluation of the 
body-soul unity.  While Ambrose differentiates between the rational and the irrational 
element of the human person, neither is superfluous.
82
  The soul is both the ruling and 
animating principle of the body; this necessitates for Ambrose that they belong 
together.  Indeed, insisting on the unity of body and soul, Ambrose borrows the 
Platonic language of the soul as the form of the body.  The soul gives the body its life 
and essence – what the Platonic tradition would call its “animating principle” and 
“formal cause.”  Ambrose writes, “Like a highly skilled artisan the soul leads the 
body in its service where it will, fashions out of it the form it has chosen, and makes 
the virtues it has willed resound in it: now it composes the melodies of chastity, again 
those of temperance, the song of sobriety, the charm of uprightness, the sweetness of 
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 Is. 2.4 (CSEL 32.pref. 645).   
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 Is. 2.5 (CSEL 32.pref. 645).   
81
 Is. 3.6 (CSEL 32.pref. 646).   
82
 Colish, Ambrose’s Patriarchs, p. 33.  Colish suggests that Ambrose’s evaluation of 
the unity of body and soul situates him squarely in the Aristotelian tradition: 
“Ambrose comes down vigorously in favour of a hylomorphic understanding of 
human nature.” Colish, Ambrose’s Patriarchs, p. 33. 
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virginity, the seriousness of widowhood.”83  With rhetorical prowess, Ambrose 
exploits the analogy in the Phaedo of a musical instrument, which on its own is 
lifeless and dumb, but in the hands of an accomplished musician becomes alive and 
sonorous.  Later in this chapter, I will draw attention to the ethical implications, in 
terms of human flourishing, of Ambrose’s adoption of this integrated anthropology.  It 
is important, however, first to note the complications that afflict what should be a 
united composit: post-lapsarian existence adversely effects the desires of the soul and 
drives a wedge between body and soul. 
The unity of body and soul entails, for Ambrose, that sin and disordered 
desires expressed through the body are not to be attributed to faults in the body; their 
originating principle are the misdirected loves of the soul.  While it is true that bodily 
loves can affect the soul, even darkening the soul, this concupiscence and ignorance 
affecting the soul are “to be ascribed more to form than to matter.”84  Nevertheless, 
because form and matter co-inhere there is a certain “culpability” even in the body: 
“The flesh is matter, ignorance and concupiscence form.  Then why is the flesh 
blamed when there are such great blemishes in the form?  Because the form can do 
nothing without the matter.  For what would concupiscence be if the flesh did not 
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 Bon. mort. 6.25 (CSEL 32.pref. 726).    Likely, the Phaedo lies behind Ambrose’s 
musical analogy: “One might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and 
very beautiful and divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its strings are 
bodies, and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that which is mortal…. 
And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe 
the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together 
by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony 
of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed. Now if the soul is a 
harmony, it is clear that when the body is too much relaxed or is too tightly strung by 
diseases or other ills, the soul must of necessity perish, no matter how divine it is, like 
other harmonies in sounds and in all the works of artists.” Phaedo, 85e-86c. 
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 Is. 7.60 (CSEL 32.pref. 685).   
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inflame it?”85  For Ambrose, evil cannot simply be attributed to misdirected desires 
stemming from the soul that act on a morally neutral body.  There is something, as 
Paul would say, in the “flesh” that also affects the soul.  And so, body and soul or 
matter and form act as a loop, each affecting the other.  The result is that even the 
body can adversely affect the life of the soul; what Paul describes as the external man, 
positively or negatively affects the internal man. 
I have suggested that both Ambrose’s Christology and his insistence on 
understanding body and soul as a composite should mitigate any hasty judgements of 
undue commitment on Ambrose’s part to Platonic dualism.  Indeed, representative of 
the Bishop’s thought is a line from De Abraham, “So now man is saved, not in part, 
but in his whole body.”86  However, this is not a complete picture; there are, as I have 
explained, complications in Ambrose’s understanding of “body.”  He can certainly 
speak positively of the body as part of a holistic, Aristotelian composite, but he can 
also speak of it with Pauline disparagement, as the “body of death” weighing down 
the soul.  The negative connotation of “body” is typically expressed with recourse to 
Plotinian language.  It is particularly in Ambrose’s catechetical works, in which he 
urges his neophytes to abandon temporal, material delights, that the presence of 
Plotinian metaphors, tropes and quotations are evident.
87
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 Is. 7.60 (CSEL 32.pref. 685).   
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 Abr. I.4.29 (CSEL 32.pref. 524): Iam enim non ex parte, sed totus homo saluatur in 
corpore, saluatur in anima.   
87
 Pierre Courcelle has offered an invaluable study of the place of Plotinian thought in 
Ambrose’s sermons, particularly those that Courcelle suggests Augustine heard when 
he was present to hear the Bishop preach in Milan.  Courcelle points to echoes of 
Plotinus’s Enneads 1.6, 1.7, and 3.5 in two of Ambrose’s sermons: De bono mortis 
and De Isaac.  Courcelle sees not only traces of Plotinus, but also of Porphyry in these 
two sermons.  Pierre Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin 
(Paris: De Boccard, 1968), pp. 93-138.  Cf. idem, “Plotin et saint Ambroise,” Revue 
de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes 76 (1950): 29-56.  See also idem, 
“Nouvelle aspectes du platonisme chez saint Ambroise,” Revue des études latines 34 
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Pierre Courcelle has demonstrated that two of Ambrose’s sermons preached to 
catechumens, De bono mortis and De Isaac, borrow and adapt from Plotinus’s 
Enneads.  In De Isaac 8.78, Ambrose urges the new Christians to take up wings like 
flames to the higher regions.  He enjoins them, “Let each man divest his soul of her 
base coverings and approve her when she is cleansed of the mire just as he would 
approve gold cleansed by fire.  For the soul is cleansed just like the finest gold.”88  
Plotinus similarly writes, “This is the soul’s ugliness, not being pure and unmixed, 
like gold, but full of earthiness; if anyone takes the earthy stuff away the gold is left, 
and it is beautiful, when it is singled out from other things and is alone by itself.”89  
The parallels are unmistakable; Plotinus’s call to take flight from materiality and 
bodily distractions is adopted by Ambrose. 
A passage in one of Plotinus’s Enneads most well-known in the ancient world 
urges its readers not to be caught up by temporal, ephemeral images but to seize 
reality itself: 
 
Let us fly to our dear country….  Our country from which we came … our 
Father is there.  How shall we travel to it, where is our way of escape?  
We cannot get there either on foot; for our feet only carry us everywhere 
in this world….  You must not get ready a carriage, either, or a boat.  Let 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(1956): 220-39; and Aimé Solignac, “Nouveaux parallèles entre saint Ambroise et 
Plotin,” Archives de philosophie 19 (1956): 148-56.  Also, in De bono mortis and De 
Isaac, Pierre Hadot has discovered additional citations from Plotinus (Enneads 1.8; 
4.8), as well as references to the Phaedo and the Phaedrus.  Pierre Hadot, “Platon et 
Plotin dans trois sermons de saint Ambroise,” Revue des études latines 34 (1956): 
202-20. 
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 Is. 8.78 (CSEL 32.pref. 696-97).   
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 Plotinus, Eneads I.6.5 (Loeb 440 249). 
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all these things go, and do not look.  Shut your eyes, and change to and 
wake another way of seeing, which everyone has but few use.
90
   
 
Ambrose is clearly familiar with Plotinus’s injunction; adopting the same metaphor, 
language, and urgency the Bishop writes: 
 
Let us flee therefore to our real, true fatherland.  There is our fatherland 
and there is our Father, by whom we have been created, where there is the 
city of Jerusalem, which is the mother of all men.  But what is this flight?  
Not at all a flight with the feet, which belong to the body; for wherever 
they run, they run upon the earth and pass from one soil to another.  Let us 
not flee neither on ships or chariots or horses, which are impeded and fall, 
but let us flee with the spirit and eyes and feet that are within.
91
 
 
Ambrose has reworked Plotinus’s language of the “fatherland” into the ecclesial and 
eschatological discourse of the maternal Jerusalem.  Following Plotinus, Ambrose 
underscores that this flight is of a spiritual nature: the body cannot travel this journey.  
Thus, it is especially in urging the catechumens to “flee the body” that Ambrose 
aligns himself closely with Plotinus, quoting his language and adopting his 
analogies.
92
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 Plotinus, Eneads I.6.8 (Loeb 440 255-51). 
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92
 Ambrose’s proximity to and familiarity with Plotinus is far-reaching.  I have limited 
my focus to the relation between soul and body. 
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The new “way of seeing” that Plotinus enjoins, which is a turning within to 
make one’s soul beautiful like a polished and chiselled image of a statue,93 is 
reworked by Ambrose.  The Bishop also urges the neophytes to “cleanse that inner 
eye”; but the statue which they are called to chisel and polish is the soul that is 
“conformed to the image of His Son.”94  Plotinus writes that the soul must become 
like that of which it is an image: “No eye ever saw the sun without becoming sun-like, 
nor can a soul see beauty without becoming beautiful.  You must become first all 
godlike and all beautiful if you intend to see God and beauty.”95  Ambrose echoes this 
call: “This is the eye that looks upon the true and great beauty.  Only the strong and 
healthy eye can see the sun; only the good soul can see the good.”96  The 
quintessentially Plotinian language of inner purification and flight from the world is 
ideally suited to Ambrose’s hortatory intentions in De Isaac.  Therefore, this work, 
more explicitly than most, exhibits the tension in Ambrose’s anthropology between 
body and soul. 
Ambrose’s catechetical preaching makes clear that it is difficult for him to 
affirm the created unity and the integrity of body and soul, precisely because, like 
Plotinus, Ambrose is profoundly attentive to the tension of the body-soul union in 
temporal, material existence.
97
  Ambrose cautions against the dangers lurking in the 
body-soul union: “For if there is a joining, the flesh (caro), which is the lesser 
element, becomes better than the soul, which is the greater, because the soul gives life 
to the body (corpori), but the flesh (caro) pours death into the soul.”98  Therefore, 
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 Plotinus, Eneads I.6.9  (Loeb 440 260). 
96
 Is. 8.79 (CSEL 32.pref. 699). 
97
 Warren Smith, Ambrose’s Ethics, p. 31.  
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 Bon mort. 7.26 (CSEL 32.pref. 727). 
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rather than discard the unity of body and soul, Ambrose’s catechetical works point to 
the dangers of this union for the higher soul, which is dragged down by the desires of 
the body.  The soul is immaterial and eternal because it is the image of the immaterial 
and eternal, but it is led to lust after material beauty and goods on account of its union 
with the body.  Ambrose urges his catechumens, “Therefore let us flee evils and 
elevate our souls to the image and likeness of God.  The flight from evils is the 
likeness of God, and the image of God is gained through the virtues.”99  The soul of 
the intemperate and greedy becomes subject to intemperance and greed when it no 
longer plays the instrument of the body with dexterity but instead “is brought down by 
the allurements.”100 
There is, therefore, a certain tension in Ambrose’s thought.  While he is 
committed to affirming the composite nature of the body-soul union, he is at the same 
time profoundly aware of the weight of the body that drags down the soul; the strain 
that Paul feels between his flesh and spirit is a tension that Ambrose also feels.  
Warren Smith sums up this tension well: “[T]he soul gives life to the body by being in 
the body and yet is able to govern the body rightly only by remaining sufficiently 
detached from the pleasures of the body that it may properly be focused upon God.”101  
Ideally, the soul animates and rules the body like the proverbial Platonic charioteer.
102
  
Ambrose writes, “The soul, then, is the user, the body that which is being used, and 
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thus the one is in command, the other in service; the one is what we are, the other 
what belongs to us.”103  Ambrose is well aware, however, that this ideal of a soul in 
control of the body is not realized in human experience.  Ambrose’s attentiveness to 
the reality of post-lapsarian existence means that he complements his affirmation of 
the created body-soul integrity with a healthy dose of Plotinian thought, particularly, 
its injunction to flee the body. 
 
The Moral Imperative of the Imago Dei 
For Ambrose the embodied imago dei is not a simply a static datum that can be 
explained by means of an Aristotelian distinction between form and matter, 
corresponding to the union of soul and body.  I have drawn attention to the 
complexity of Ambrose’s understanding of embodied human nature, particularly in its 
post-lapsarian existence, which necessitates a Pauline-Plotinian caveat.  This 
complexity is also reflected in Ambrose’s ethics.  In the last section of this chapter, I 
will consider how Ambrose expresses an ethical theology in light of the complex 
relation between the soul and the body.  Ambrose’s sermons lend themselves to such 
an analysis as he is constantly urging his congregation to redirect their desires from 
the temporal to the eternal.  Attentiveness to the two senses of “body,” which we can 
find throughout Ambrose’s writings, is critical to understand his ethics.  Prima facie, 
Ambrose, in typically Plotinian fashion, urges his catechumens simply to flee the 
body.  However, as I have suggested, Ambrose is profoundly attuned to the realities of 
embodied existence, and his ethics, therefore, do not simply counsel the abandonment 
of the body.   
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In this next section, then, I will inquire what Ambrose means when he urges 
his catechumens to “flee the body.”  I will suggest that while employing Stoic ethical 
categories, Ambrose invites the neophytes to a life of detachment; not detachment 
predicated on a dualism of body and soul, but detachment couched in terms of a 
“transvaluation” of bodily desires.  Two key ethical motifs operative in Stoic 
philosophy are ubiquitous in Ambrose’s writings.  First, he develops the ideal of sequi 
naturam.  Ambrose enjoins his audience to obey the Delphic oracle – “know thyself.”  
This counsel is interpreted as a self-understanding of one’s true spiritual nature as 
created in the imago dei, thereby fulfilling one’s nature.  Second, to follow one’s true 
nature as image of God it is necessary to perfect a spirit of detachment with regard to 
material and temporal goods.  Thus, a Stoic ethic of apatheia governs Ambrose’s 
moral theology.  I will engage with Ambrose’s Christian appropriation and 
transposition of these two Stoic ethical categories of sequi naturam and apatheia in 
two profoundly embodied loci: cosmetics and virginity.  This analysis will help 
articulate the moral imperative issuing from the Bishop’s theology of the image of 
God.  I will conclude this section by considering desire and imitation as integral to the 
realization of the image of God in the human person.    
The place of Stoic thought in Ambrose’s writings has received frequent 
attention.
104
  In many ways, Ambrose invites this attention; De officiis ministrorum is, 
after all, a Christian transposition of Cicero’s work by the same title.105  It is 
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particularly in his account of human nature, and in the ethical imperative that derives 
from this account of nature, that Ambrose is beholden to Stoic thought.  However, as 
has been pointed out by Ivor Davidson, it is a transposition in the fullest sense of the 
word.  Ambrose completely reworks his Stoic sources: the goal of a well ordered life 
is no longer to thrive in the world but to prepare for the world to come.   
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve into a Stoic philosophy of nature 
or to consider in detail what it means to live according to nature.
106
  I will consider 
instead how Ambrose appropriates and then re-informs a Stoic ethic of sequi naturam 
with Christian content.  For Ambrose, human nature is to be understood in light of the 
imago dei; to ask what sequi naturam means is to ask what it means to live according 
to one’s nature as image of God.  Certainly, nature remains a normative principle; the 
implications of the natural law articulated in the Stoic tradition continue to find an 
echo in Ambrose’s writing.  Thus, for example, the universality of reason and its 
accesibility to the human intellect is a theme dear to Ambrose; likewise, his insistence 
on human equality, the communal ownership of property, and the priority of the 
common good over the private good are all essential elements of a Stoic ethic derived 
from natural law, which finds deep resonance in Ambrose’s moral theology.107 
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Ambrose, however, radically reorders the adage sequi naturam in light of the 
imago dei.  That the human person has his origins in the word of God, that he is 
intelligible only in light of this source, and that he is directed back to this source 
provides a Christological backdrop to Ambrose’s understanding of natural law.  
Natural law now receives a clarity and precision on account of the revealed Word of 
God.  Thus, in De fuga saeculi Ambrose recognizes a “two-fold” law: the natural law 
written on the heart and the written law given on the tablets of stone.  Ambrose 
explains that while “nature herself is the teacher of good conduct,” the written law 
was given for “recognition of sin.”108  For Ambrose, the natural law inscribed in the 
heart is more than an abstract universal norm accessible to all (though it certainly 
remains such); rather, it issues from human nature as image and implies a dynamic 
movement realized in imitation of its source.  Ambrose writes,  
 
[T]he flight consists in this: to keep away from sins, to take up the rule of 
the virtues unto the likeness and image of God, to enlarge our strength 
unto the imitation of God according to the limits of our potential.  For the 
perfect man is the image and glory of God….  This, therefore, is to be like 
God, to possess justice, to possess wisdom, and to be perfect in virtue.  
For God is without sin, and so the man who flees from sin is like to the 
image of God.
109
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Ambrose has thoroughly “Christianized” natural law.  For the ideal Stoic sage sequi 
naturam implies justice, wisdom, and virtue; for the Christian, however, these virtues 
are concretized in the person of Christ and realized in imitation of that model.  
Ambrose takes up a Stoic account of natural law and informs it by his image theology. 
The “perfect man” now fulfils the adage of sequi naturam inasmuch as he is 
conformed to the image of God.  To live according to one’s nature is to live according 
to one’s nature as image, insists Ambrose.  Thus, both the origin and the end of the 
human person are informed by image theology, something that significantly 
transposes Ambrose’s Stoic account of the natural law.110  Colish puts Ambrose’s 
relationship with Stoic thought very well: “Ambrose does not labour under the 
uncritical delusion that Stoicism is isomorphic with Christianity.  Nor does he reveal 
the slightest need to agonize or to fulminate over the relation between Athens and 
Jerusalem.”111  Indeed, Ambrose’s fusion of Stoic natural law tradition with image 
theology is demonstrative of his effortless appropriation of differing intellectual 
paradigms.   
Similar to his reworking of the Stoic natural law tradition, Ambrose also 
reworks the Stoic ethic of apatheia (equanimity of soul).
112
  The transvaluation of 
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desire that, as I have already noted, is foundational to Ambrose’s Lenten sermons, is 
couched in terms of Stoic ethics.  The patriarchs, whom Ambrose holds up as 
paragons of the various virtues, have much in common with the Stoic sage.  The 
patriarchs resemble Ambrose’s ideal, stalwart Stoic exemplum, whose soul remains 
unaffected by material forces.  However, both the reason for the inner peace of the 
patriarchs and the ultimate goal of this inner peace are radically altered.  The apatheia 
that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph manifest in the face of pleasure, pain, desire, 
and fear springs not from inner reserves but from the grace of Christ.
113
  The inner 
peace of the patriarch’s is the peace of Christ.  The patriarchs disdain material riches 
not so much because they prefer inner stability, but because they now desire eternal 
riches.
114
  Colish writes, “What [Ambrose] borrows, Christianizes, and transmits, 
therefore, is not a pure and unadulterated Stoicism but Stoicism as he himself 
appropriates it.”115  The apatheia of the patriarchs derives from grace and is ordered 
to glory; Ambrose significantly transvaluates Stoic values, and it is these re-forged 
virtues manifest in the lives of the patriarchs that Ambrose holds up as ideals for his 
catechumens.   
The exhortation to apatheia in the face of the allures and fleeting nature of 
material and temporal existence is most stark in the exegetical works that Ambrose 
preached to the catechumens preparing to receive the Easter mysteries.  The intention 
is obvious.  Ambrose wants the neophytes to reorder their desires and loves from the 
temporal to the eternal, from the material to the immaterial, from the body to the soul.  
It is these sermons in particular, then, that at first impression may seem dualistic.  The 
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Bishop of Milan writes, “And so the good soul scorns visible and material things and 
does not linger over them or delay or tarry in despising them.  Rather, she rises to 
things eternal and immaterial and [is] filled with wonders, for she rises with pure 
thought from pious mind.”116  The urgency is unmistakable.  The soul has been 
“darkened” by its union with the body, so that it no longer knows itself, no longer 
knows its true nature.  It has disregarded the injunction of the Delphic oracle.
117
  
Apatheia is achieved, suggests Ambrose, by turning again to the ancient oracle, γνῶθι 
σεαυτόν; turn within to consider the nature of the soul as image, he urges.  Adopting 
scriptural language to fuse together the Delphic oracle and the Stoic adage, sequi 
naturam, Ambrose reminds the catechumens: “[K]now yourself and the beauty of 
your nature…. The kingdom of God is within you.”118 
Despite what is at first blush starkly dualistic language, Ambrose does not 
denigrate the body or material existence; nor does he counsel a flight into Platonic 
spiritualism.  The key word in De Isaac is detachment.  Ambrose writes that the flight 
from earthly matter “is not to depart from the earth but to remain on the earth, to hold 
to justice and temperance, to renounce the vices in material goods, not their use.”119  
For Ambrose, the virtuous man is, in the words of Marcia Colish, “the man who 
knows how to live in this world with innocence and without reproach.”120  This is 
why, in preparation for Rachel’s coming, Isaac retreats to the field to meditate.  He is 
a model of detachment and tranquillity.
121
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The call to abandon bodily pleasures is always couched in the language of 
moderation and of avoiding excess; Ambrose does not counsel extreme asceticism.  
Here too he is in line with the Stoic tradition; Isaac models the chief cardinal virtue of 
temperance for the catechumens.  Like the perfected Stoic sage, Isaac is not given to 
excesses; his use of material goods follows a spirit of detachment, moderation and 
equanimity.  Colish writes, “Unaffected either by good or bad fortune, he possesses 
tranquility of mind, the only true riches.  The peace he enjoys is the peace that passes 
all understanding.… His untroubled soul is rooted in faith, grounded in charity, and 
perfected in Christ.”122  Thus, Ambrose has redefined the Stoic principle of apatheia, 
making it amenable to Christian teaching. 
This dialectic in the exhortation “to renounce the vices in material goods, not 
their use,”123 is ubiquitous in Ambrose’s preaching.  The exhortation both to use and 
renounce material goods follows the Stoic adage, sequi naturam, maintains Ambrose, 
because our true nature is spiritual, not material, and the spiritual is called to have 
dominion over the material.  Ambrose writes, “For like a musician with his 
instruments, or a physician with his medications, or a shipwright with the things 
needful for the fitting out of a ship … how much more does the wise man who lives 
according to nature (uiuit secundum naturam) adjudge his own whatever is natural!  
For he remembers that he is made in the image of God.”124  Constituted in the imago 
dei, the soul skilfully uses the material like an instrument, while, like the Stoic sage, 
the soul also retains sovereign detachment from it. 
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The transposition of a Stoic ethic of sequi naturam and apatheia so as to fit it 
with a Christian theology of the imago dei is evident in Ambrose’s concern with two 
profoundly material and embodied practices: the application of cosmetics and the life 
of virginity.  Ambrose’s invective against makeup in his discussion of the image of 
God in the Hexameron is, on first reading, rather perplexing.  However, when read in 
light of his principle of renouncing only the vice in material goods rather than their 
use as such, some sense can be made of this passage.  Ambrose describes God as an 
artist – “a craftsman and a painter of distinction” – who paints beautiful images after 
himself.
125
  One would do grave injury and injustice to “erase that painting, one that is 
the product of truth, not of semblance, a picture, expressed not in mere wax, but by 
the grace of God.”126  At first glance it seems that Ambrose is speaking of a spiritual 
reality.  He has suggested that the justified soul is an image conformed to Christ and 
that this “painting” must be safeguarded.  Surprisingly, however, in the very next 
sentence Ambrose launches into a tirade against the rather bodily practice: the 
application of makeup.  He writes,  
 
I speak, also, of women.  They erase that painting by smearing on their 
complexion a color of material whiteness or by applying an artificial 
rouge.  The result is a work not of beauty, but of ugliness; not of 
simplicity, but of deceit.  It is a temporal creation, a prey to perspiration or 
to rain.  It is a snare and a deception which displeases the person you aim 
to please, for he realizes that all this is an alien thing and not your own.  
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This is also displeasing to your Creator, who sees His own work 
obliterated.
127
 
  
Prima facie, this paragraph is most unusual in terms of its placement.  Ambrose has 
been describing the soul made beautiful, the soul that by imitation is transformed and 
conformed to Christ, the image of God.  He has been describing the work of the 
divine artist, the “painter of distinction,” who paints an immaterial and incorporeal 
image of justice after his own likeness.  Why this tirade against cosmetics?  How does 
this bodily practice obliterate the immaterial image? 
Ambrose’s invective against cosmetics has, especially in popular portrayals of 
the Bishop’s thought, been simply read as another manifestation of his ambivalence 
and even outright hostility to the body and sexuality.  John Moorhead, for example, 
writes that Ambrose’s neo-Platonic influences inculcate in him a distaste and 
suspicion of the body, which for the Bishop is like a prison.  It is especially 
Ambrose’s understanding of human sexuality and gender that Moorhead finds 
distasteful.  No one, exclaims Moorhead, “could accuse Ambrose of having been well 
disposed to the human body.”128  Likewise, Peter Brown suggests that Ambrose’s 
Platonic influences inculcated in the Bishop “a dualism of soul and body of 
exceptional sharpness.”129  
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           It is important to situate Ambrose’s concern with cosmetics within his broader 
understanding of the body as expressing the virtue of the soul.  He regards the 
artificial colouring of the face a manifestation of misplaced love.  It is attempting to 
endow the temporal with eternity and the mortal with immorality.  This is why 
Ambrose underscores the fleeting nature of cosmetics: it falls “prey to perspiration or 
to rain.”  Cosmetics is a simulacrum that snares and deceives by suggesting eternity 
when, in fact, the body is subject to death.  Here again we see the distinction between 
two types of “body” in Ambrose.  The body with makeup is not, for Ambrose, an 
instrument of the soul that expresses the soul’s virtue; rather, it is the “body” 
inasmuch as it stands in opposition to the soul.  The soul is destined for immortal, 
immaterial good, while the body displayed with makeup pulls the soul down to mortal 
and material goods.  In short, cosmetics, for Ambrose, mistake the temporal for the 
eternal.     
The soul as the image painted by the “painter of distinction” has profound 
dignity and integrity; it is “product of truth, not of semblance.”  While Ambrose 
concerns himself with the soul, his vociferous opposition to makeup indicates that the 
soul’s virtue is expressed bodily.  I would contend that Ambrose is not principally 
concerned with makeup, because he is never concerned with the body per se.  Rather 
his concern is that the soul perfect its spirit of apatheia with respect to the body and 
conform, secundum naturam, to that of which it is an image.  In typically Stoic 
fashion, Ambrose maintains that it is the body that expresses the desires of the soul.  
Image, I have suggested, is for Ambrose a dynamic term, a movement of love towards 
an end.  The soul no longer expresses the divine image truthfully when it ceases to be 
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conformed to the artist, and instead loves temporal and material goods.
130
  This 
“material whiteness” and “artificial rouge” expresses bodily the disorder of the soul 
that loves fleeting and unsubstantial reality.
131
  Of course, on this reading, the use of 
makeup, for Ambrose, reflects a more disordered love of temporal and material good.  
The principle of apatheia remains “to renounce the vices in material goods, not their 
use.”132 
Ambrose’s writings on virginity have come under similar censure as indicative 
of an antipathy to the body.
133
  Ambrose’s theology of virginity needs to be read, 
much like his theology of cosmetics, in the light of his re-articulation of Stoic themes 
of detachment and of his counsel to transvaluate temporal desires.  In nearly every 
treatise devoted to the state of virginity, Ambrose links the discussion with 
martyrdom.  This literary trope provides insight into Ambrose’s understanding of 
virginity and by extension of the goods of embodied existence.  He initiates De 
virginibus with an encomium on St. Agnes the virgin martyr, on whose birthday 
Ambrose states he is writing the treatise.  Girls at the age of twelve are generally 
unable to bear the angry look of a parent, and they shriek at the prick of a needle, 
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exclaims Ambrose; yet, St. Agnes was completely unmoved by the thought of pain.  
Ambrose writes, “She was fearless under the cruel hands of the executioners, she was 
unmoved by the heavy weight of the creaking chains, offering her whole body to the 
sword of the raging soldier, as yet ignorant of death, but ready for it.”134  Ambrose 
marvels at her Stoic resolve, her apatheia, in the face of pain and death.  While Agnes 
displays the virtue of a Stoic sage, the origin of her apatheia is not an inner store of 
resolve, but the grace of Christ, and her goal is not inner stability, but desire for 
eternity. 
The Stoic detachment that Agnes displays in the face of her martyrdom is 
inseparable from her virginity, maintains Ambrose.   There is “in one victim a twofold 
martyrdom.”135  In both cases, Ambrose suggests, Agnes abandons the temporal and 
material goods of the body (both of life and of marriage) not because they are not 
goods, but because they are penultimate goods; Agnes’s desires have been 
transvalued.  Virginity is that which makes for martyrdom, states Ambrose, because it 
is the spirit of virginal detachment to earthly goods that trains the soul to suffer 
martyrdom for the sake of that which is eternal.
136
  Surprising as it may seem, 
therefore, Agnes’s “twofold martyrdom” is in keeping with the Stoic adage of sequi 
naturam; because her true desire as an image is to be united with her source.   
Commenting on the verse of the Canticle, “A garden enclosed is my sister, my 
spouse, a garden enclosed, a fountain sealed” (Song 4:12), Ambrose suggests that this 
enclosed garden with its pure and sealed fountain is an allegory of the soul of a virgin, 
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which likewise “shines, reflecting the features of the image of God.”137  To use 
Ambrose’s metaphor, her detachment from the body allows the body to become the 
instrument of her chaste soul.  She uses her body to express the transvalued desires of 
her soul.  The virgin says in the Canticle, “Set me as a signet upon your heart, and as a 
seal upon your arm,” because in her detachment from the body she is given what she 
truly desires: “[T]he Son is the image of the Father, and in the Spirit is the seal of the 
Son.”138  In De institutione uirginis Ambrose contrasts the outer man from the inner 
man.  Consecrated virginity, he suggests, originates in the rightly ordered desire of the 
inner man to be conformed to the image and likeness of God.
139
  While one ought 
certainly to praise the beauty of the created body, much greater beauty is to be found 
in the grace of the inner man, for that beauty, Ambrose explains, is the image of 
God.
140
  
Thus, rather than denigrate the body and sexuality per se, Ambrose’s writings 
on virginity suggest that by perfecting a spirit of apatheia the soul can use its 
embodied state to anticipate the life to come.  That is to say, by recognizing the 
penultimate nature of the body and sexuality, the soul can skillfully use its embodied 
existence like an instrument.  In panegyric style, Ambrose writes, “Virginity has 
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verse in De institutione uirginis: “Fons signatus es, uirgo, nemo aquam tuam polluat, 
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heavenly image.” Spir. I.79 (CSEL 79 48).  In a letter to Irenaeus (Ep. 80) Ambrose 
writes, “[The soul] will receive Christ like a signet ring upon her, for He is the image 
of God.  Then, she will be according to that image, because heavenly is the heavenly 
man.  And we need to bear the image of the heavenly one, that is, peace.”  
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140
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dei est intus, non foris comptior.   
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brought from heaven that which it may imitate on earth.  And not unfittingly has she 
sought her manner of life from heaven, who has found for herself a Spouse in 
heaven.”141  Ambrose’s use of a traditional Stoic ethic of detachment should not 
simply be attributed to Plotinian suspicions of the body; rather, it derives from his 
understanding of the body, which in its temporality and materiality is a penultimate 
good – something that is good inasmuch as it can be used to live already, like St. 
Agnes, so as to attain the eternity and immateriality of heaven.
142
  Ambrose is, 
therefore, urging his catechumens to transvalue their desires from the earthly to the 
heavenly, that is, from the concerns of the body to those of the soul. 
For Ambrose, the apatheia that the soul ought to have towards material and 
temporal goods derives from the soul’s self-knowledge: it knows itself to be superior 
to bodily goods below it.  Further, the soul knows itself as image of God, and its 
nature is fulfilled by returning to its source.  Thus, the Stoic ethic of apatheia and 
sequi naturam is transposed by Ambrose to fit a Christian telos; Ambrose’s counsel of 
detachment and transvaluation of desire does not so much restrict the soul’s desires as 
conform them to the soul’s nature as imago dei. 
It is in Ambrose’s De officiis that the influence of Stoic ethics is perhaps most 
explicit.
143
  The moral theology of De officiis is rooted in Ambrose’s understanding of 
the image of God.  As in his writings on cosmetics and virginity, so here, Ambrose 
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forma,” in Felici Sergio ed., “Humanitas” classica e “sapientia” cristiana: scritti 
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counsels Stoic apatheia and detachment from material goods not because they are evil 
but because they are dissonant with the nature of the soul, which is “like God.”  The 
soul is called to detachment, so that its desires can be transvalued to that which is in 
keeping with the soul’s true nature; this becomes clear in Ambrose’s discussion of 
what it means to “delight yourself in the Lord” (Ps 36:4).144  This eternal delight, 
suggests Ambrose, is for those who are given to “grasp the higher delights, those who 
can appreciate what the pure, spiritual delight of the soul is really like.”145  To satiate 
this delight, the Lord has offered the bread of wisdom (panis sapientiae).  Ambrose 
contrasts this bread, which fulfills the soul’s true nature, with the bread of which 
Christ was speaking when he said that man shall not live by bread alone.  Ambrose 
urges his clergy, “So let us eat the bread of wisdom, and let us be filled with the word 
of God, for the life of man made in God’s image does not consist in bread alone, but 
in every word of God.”146  Constituted in the imago dei, the goods that the human soul 
should desire ought to be commensurate with its nature.  Likewise, the Stoic 
injunction sequi naturam counsels detachment toward temporal bread in order that 
this desire may be transvalued into desire for the bread of wisdom. 
Ambrose builds on the contrasting desires of temporal and eternal goods later 
on in book one of De officiis.  In this context, “bread” is temporal wealth.  Such riches 
do not enhance your true nature, explains Ambrose; “all they do is remove the image 
of God from you and clothe you with the image of the earthly man.”147  Elaborating 
on the Pauline analogy of the inner man and the outer man, Ambrose suggests that 
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desiring to accumulate goods for the earthly man does not allow for the detachment 
necessary to focus on the heavenly man.
148
  The Bishop of Milan writes,  
You are laying aside the image of the eternal Emperor and setting up 
within yourself the image of death.  Instead, cast out the image of the 
devil from the kingdom of your soul, and raise up the image of Christ.  
This is the image that should shine in you, that should be resplendent in 
your kingdom, or your soul, the one which effaces all the images of evil 
vices.  This is what David has to say about these things: ‘Lord, in your 
kingdom you shall bring their images to nothing.’  When the Lord adorns 
Jerusalem according to his own image, then every image of his enemies is 
destroyed.
149
  
Here Ambrose presents a very stark contrast: the image of Christ is set in opposition 
to the image of the Devil.  The monarch and the tyrant are warring for the “kingdom 
of your soul.”  The city of Jerusalem, then, is an allegory for the kingdom of the soul; 
by rights it belongs to the divine Monarch: he has put his stamp and seal on the 
                                                          
148
 This Pauline trope is also at work in Ambrose’s discussion regarding the “image” 
of Caesar on the coin, in his commentary on Luke.  Ambrose comments, “Questioned 
concerning the penny, [Christ] asks about the image, for there is one image of God, 
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soul.
150
  However, the Devil invites the soul to rebellion, to throw off its true 
allegiance; he does so by luring the soul with bodily delight – temporal and material 
goods that cannot satiate the soul’s desires, but instead obstruct its true desire to live 
according to its nature (sequi naturam).
151
   
De officiis links the discussion of “image” with desire.  By nature the soul 
desires the eternal good because, explains Ambrose, “the Lord adorns Jerusalem 
according to his own image”; the image is created to desire the eternal Emperor.  The 
desire for riches and wealth, then, is a simulacrum of what the soul by nature desires; 
ultimately this simulacrum is an “image of death,” because by desiring materiality and 
temporality the soul partakes in the body of death.  Ambrose’s counsel to transvalue 
the soul’s desires, then, is intended to redirect the soul back to what by nature fulfils 
its desire as image of the eternal Emperor. 
This paragraph of De officiis also makes clear that for Ambrose the image 
becomes what it imitates.  Ambrose is, therefore, more ambiguous than most fourth-
century Latin Fathers on the question of whether the imago dei can be lost.  The 
Hexameron makes clear that the imago dei constitutes what is quintessentially the 
human essence; the image is a created datum of “nature.”  In this sense it seems to be 
a permanent character of the human person.  Nevertheless, for Ambrose, image is also 
realized in imitation.  In this sense, the imago dei is not simply a static datum, but is 
something that reveals itself in desire and movement.  Ambrose writes, “While we are 
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here, then, let us make sure that we preserve the image, so that we attain to the truth 
that awaits us there.  Let us have the image of justice in us, and let us have the image 
of wisdom in us, for that day will come for each of us, and we shall be assessed 
according to the measure in which we display that image.”152  In Ambrose’s moral 
injunctions, the state of the image and likeness in this life seems tenuous; it must be 
resolutely guarded, lest it be lost.  Never let the Devil find his own image in your soul, 
warns Ambrose.
153
  The soul that prefers the temporal to the eternal becomes like that 
which it desires – a being unto death.  In De officiis, then, Ambrose cautions the 
clergy about the double-edged sword that being an image entails; one becomes that 
which he imitates: “You are laying aside the image of the eternal Emperor and setting 
up within yourself the image of death.”154 
It is in Ambrose’s preaching that the ambiguity surrounding the permanence of 
the image of God in the face of human sin is perhaps most pronounced.  In the 
Expositio psalmi cxviii, the moral injunction issuing from the imago dei contains an 
interesting corollary: it appears that, at least in some sense, this image can be lost on 
account of sin.  In sinning, the human person becomes less than his nature; Scripture 
describes him as an animal: “For Scripture calls man those whom God made in his 
own image and likeness. When, however, he sins it usually calls him not man but 
serpent, horse neighing after the mares, little fox, or mule.”155  Thus, it almost seems 
that the imago dei is for Ambrose a treasured gift that can be lost: “Take care not to 
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lose the great gift God has given you, the gift of being made in his own image.”156  In 
sinning, human beings debase themselves; they becomes less than what they were 
created to be, so that they no longer seem to bear the imago dei.  Ambrose writes, 
“Having shed the beauty of the heavenly image we lose also the name of man, for we 
lose the grace of man (gratiam hominis non tenemus).”157  Ambrose is ambiguous 
whether human beings can actually lose the imago dei or whether this is a rhetorical 
flourish to his homily.  He certainly presents a unique and striking anthropological 
nuance to his theology of the image of God: the human person not only has the imago 
dei and not only is capax dei, but this also inscribes a supernatural end already in his 
created nature: by turning away from this supernatural end one becomes less than 
human.  Human volatility underscores the participated nature of the imago dei; the 
teneous state of the image safeguards the genuine dynamism of the divine-human 
relationship. 
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 Ambrose’s moral theology is in many ways the result of a Stoic ethic brought 
to bear on a theology of the image of God.  The soul is called to perfect apatheia in 
the face of material and temporal goods so that, following its true nature, it can ascend 
back to its source.  The nature of the image of God is something moving and dynamic, 
realized by rightly ordered desire and imitation.  Of course, this comes with the 
corollary condition that in imitating that which is less than itself, the soul gets dragged 
down to the material and even seems to lose its spiritual nature.  Ambrose’s writings 
on cosmetics and virginity underscore that it is in transvaluing one’s desires from 
temporal goods to eternal good that one’s nature is fulfilled.  
 
Conclusion 
The sharp and sustained antithesis between soul and body that runs throughout 
Ambrose’s corpus is not primarily a display of thoroughgoing Platonic dualism or a 
rejection of embodied existence.  Instead, it issues from his robust Christology.  
Genesis 1:26 is understood in light of Colossians 1:15.  If Christ is the eternal and 
invisible image of God, the human soul comes to share in this divine nature by desire 
and imitation of eternity.  There is an active, dynamic teleology to Ambrose’s 
theology of the image of God.  He writes, “The soul, then, is made to the image of 
God, in form like the Lord Jesus.  Those men are saints who are conformed to the Son 
of God.”158   Paul’s theology of justification as a dynamic and ongoing transformation 
from glory to glory into the eternal image of God (2 Cor. 3:18) also has much 
currency for Ambrose’s theology of the image of God.159  The image of God is a 
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dynamic movement realized in love as the human image is being “conformed to the 
image of his Son” (Rom 8:29).160   
It is precisely because the nature of the image is realized in imitation that 
Ambrose counsels not only Stoic apatheia but also the transvaluation of desires.  As 
image, the soul is unintelligible apart from that which it images.  Integral to the 
definition of an image, then, is imitation; an image must imitate.  Either the created 
image will imitate and desire material goods so that the soul will be pulled down to 
that which is lower than its nature, or else in keeping with its nature the soul will 
imitate that which is higher and will ascend to the immaterial and eternal good.  In De 
bono mortis Ambrose writes, “Therefore, the soul that cleaves to the invisible God, 
good and immortal, flees from the things of this body, abandons earthly and mortal 
concerns, and becomes like the object of its desire.”161  The urgency of redirecting 
and reordering one’s desires is unequivocal in Ambrose’s preaching to the 
catechumens.  He exhorts the catechumens to understand that in the Canticle Christ 
himself is calling them: “Open to me, my sister….  ‘Open to me,’ but close to 
strangers.  Close to the times, close to the world, do not go out of doors to material 
things.”162  Christ is inviting the soul to come to him, not in the flesh, but in the spirit; 
the soul is to conform itself to Christ, “that she also might be conformed to the image 
of Christ.”163  This union through imitation can only occur, reiterates Ambrose, by 
divesting oneself of attachments to the body, not because the body is evil but because 
it is a penultimate good.
164
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Once the soul has abandoned the lures of the body and is able to detach itself 
from the world, then the soul gains a new allegiance, a new citizenship; it is a citizen 
with the saints.
165
   When the soul has been purified and remade in the image of 
Christ, then the soul “is allowed to imitate Christ” by saying with him, “The prince of 
this world is coming, and in me he will find nothing.”166  The prince of this world 
finds nothing because the soul in imitation of Christ has become dead to the world and 
alive to Christ. 
 Ambrose’s theology of the image of God serves as a point of departure for 
Augustine.  While the common Latin pro-Nicene difficulty in affirming the image of 
God in the human person is evident also in Ambrose, he is less reluctant than Hilary 
and Victorinus to affirm the imago dei of the human person.  The second half of this 
thesis will suggests that Ambrose’s emphasis on the mimetic character of the human 
image, allowing it to return and to be like its source, functions in many ways as the 
theological framework for Augustine’s early theology of image, most especially in his 
description of the soul’s movement of ascent.  In significant ways, however, we will 
see Augustine’s broader theology of image affording him even greater latitude than 
Ambrose to affirm the character of the human person as image in its own right. 
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Chapter IV: The Plotinian Image 
 
This chapter is in a number of ways preliminary to the following three chapters.  In 
this second part of the thesis, I will offer a constructive reading of Augustine’s early 
theology of image.  These chapters will present Augustine’s early theology of the 
imago dei as a significant departure from that of the pro-Nicene theologians 
considered in the preceding three chapters.  The first half of my thesis underscored a 
common challenge that faced Augustine’s immediate Latin theological predecessors: 
How could they affirm the imago dei of the human person when this title was 
immediately associated with the homoousion and implied an affirmation of divine 
equality?  This second half of my thesis argues that Augustine’s appropriation of a 
Plotinian philosophy of image offers him a broader theological conception of the 
“image of God” than was available to his Latin predecessors.  In chapter five I argue 
that Contra Academicos and De ordine overcome the negative evaluation of “image” 
suggested by the Skeptics, who understood “image” as that which is deceptive and 
deluding.  Drawing on a participatory account of image, Augustine proposes instead 
the possibility that image might be revelatory of the truth; in doing so, image 
philosophy becomes the foundation to his early theology of the Incarnation.  In 
chapter six, I demonstrate that Augustine’s anthropology allows him to affirm the 
imago dei of the human person, even in his embodied state.  Finally, chapter seven 
considers Augustine’s theology of ascent in De vera religione as integral to his 
understanding of the imago dei.  To develop this constructive reading in the following 
chapters I need to consider in this chapter the philosophical foundations on which 
Augustine’s early theology of image is predicated. 
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Augustine’s early theology of image is predicated on a Plotinian participatory 
ontology.  “Image,” in this metaphysical framework, is an expression and reflection of 
the One; as derived from the One, “image” is inscribed with a desire to return to its 
source.   I will consider Augustine’s reliance on a Plotinian participatory account of 
image in three steps.  First, I will analyze the vocabulary Augustine employs in the 
Cassiciacum dialogues to express a participatory account of image.  I will look 
especially at the terms imago and similitudo.  Second, I will devote considerable 
attention to Plotinus’s cosmogony in which the philosophy of image plays a 
significant role.  An understanding of image derived from Plotinian cosmogony, is 
critical to Augustine’s early theology of image.  The account of image that Plotinus 
advances presents a tension: the image contains at once something true and something 
false.  The third part of this chapter will consider this tension as it is expressed in the 
Soliloquies.  As such, the conclusions of this chapter are propedeutic to the following 
chapter, in which I argue that in the Contra Academicos and De ordine Augustine 
explicitly links image theology with the Incarnation and asserts the possibility, in the 
face of Skeptic uncertainty, that truth can be grasped within temporal material reality.       
 
Participatio, Imago, Similitudo 
“Image” (imago) and its cognate “likeness” (similitudo) are unintelligible apart from a 
concept of “participation” (participatio).  Somehow an image or likeness conveys the 
source it “participates” in.  All three of these terms are foundational to a basic 
Platonic cosmology, in which the material order is an image of the immaterial world 
in which it participates.  However, rather than speaking generally of a “Platonic” or 
“participatory ontology” in Augustine’s thought, it is propitious to analyze precisely 
how Augustine uses these terms in his early dialogues.  The broad semantic range of 
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participatio revolves around “sharing in” and bespeaks an intimate relationship.  
Although the word appears 585 times in Augustine’s corpus, it occurs only once in the 
Cassiciacum dialogues.
1
  Augustine uses the noun to describe the generous character 
of his patron, Romanianus, who shares his wealth with Augustine.
2
  Participatio is a 
centrifugal theme in Augustine’s writings, around which various other words and 
concepts revolve.
3
  Other words frequently employed by Augustine to denote the 
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 In an article analyzing how Augustine’s theology of participation evolved with his 
growing understanding of the Incarnation, David Meconi analyzes three passages of 
Confessions VII in detail.  David Meconi, “The Incarnation and the Role of 
Participation in St. Augustine’s Confessions,” Augustinian Studies 29 (1998): 61-75.  
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include Christ’s descent to participate in our humanity (participatione tunicae pellicae 
nostrae [Conf. VII. 18.24; CCSL 37, 108]).  Meconi writes, “This use of participation 
represents a significant turning point in Augustine’s thought.  An intellectual 
conversion has taken place.  With this new ability to imagine an undivided, immutable 
essence participating in the imperfect, mutable contingents of this fallen world, 
Augustine is now able to speak of the perfect participating in the imperfect: that 
which-is taking part in that which-is-not.”  Meconi, “The Incarnation and the Role of 
Participation,” 68.  Cf. David Meconi, “Saint Augustine’s Early Theory of 
Participation,” Augustinian Studies 27 (1996): 79-96.  This “downward participation,” 
highlighted by Meconi, is also operative in Augustine’s Cassiciacum dialogues.  The 
condescension of Christ to participate in human nature is, I will argue, an integral part 
of Augustine’s early image theology, although it is less explicitly articulated than in 
the mature corpus.   
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 Acad. II.2.4 (CCSL 29 20): omnia mea uincula etiam patrimonii tui mecum 
participatione rupturum (Even going to share your patrimony with me). 
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 Important literature on Augustine’s theology of participation includes Ianuarius di 
Somma, “De naturali participatione divini luminis in mente humana secundum S. 
Augustinum et S. Thomam,” Gregorianum 7 (1926): 321-38.  This article is an 
epistemological consideration of participation in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas that 
considers divine illumination as an epistemological access to reality. M. Annice, 
“Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation,” The New Scholasticism 26 (1952): 
49-79.  Annice situates Augustine’s thought within a survey of philosophical accounts 
of participation.  Georges Folliet, “Deificari in otio: Augustin, Epistula 10, 2,” 
Recherches Augustiniennes 2 (1962): 225-36.  Patricia Wilson-Kastner, “Grace as 
Participation in the Divine Life in the Theology of Augustine of Hippo,” Augustinian 
Studies 7 (1976): 135-52.  Juan Pegueroles, “Participacion y conocimiento de Dios en 
la predicacion de San Agustin,” Espiritu 27 (1979): 5-26.  This article explores how 
knowledge of God through his created effects remains, for Augustine, real knowledge 
of God because of His participatory presence in all being.  Gerald Bonner, 
“Augustine’s Conception of Deification,” Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986): 
369-86.  Bonner develops an element of Augustine’s theology not frequently 
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same general idea, are connectere, adhaerere, consortium, and even deificare; these 
words are, however, not found in the Cassiciacum works – though cohaerere does 
make a lone appearance in De ordine.  The latter instance is worth some 
consideration.  In the context of discussing what it means to be with God, Licentius 
asserts that it involves a rational union; it is a union through understanding not with 
sense perception but with intellectual knowledge.  This rational union constitutes 
wisdom and is what it means to be with God.  Licentius says, “The soul of the wise 
man [that is] thoroughly cleansed by acts of virtue and already cleaving to God 
(cohaerens deo), merits the name of wise, and it is unfitting that any other part of him 
be called wise.”4  With the term cohaerere, Licentius posits a participatory union of 
the rational soul with God that is different from the way in which all other created 
realities are said to be with God.  Another word that approaches the semantic range of 
participatio is communio; forms of this word occur sixteen times in the dialogues.
5
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
explored, namely deification.  Bonner demonstrates how an account of participation 
sustains Augustine’s theology of deification.  Roland Teske, “The Image and Likeness 
of God in St. Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus,” Augustinianum 
30 (1990): 441-51.  Teske makes explicit the link between participation and the imago 
dei.  Matthias Smalbrugge, “La Notion de la participation chez Augustin: Quelques 
observations sur le rapport christianisme-platonisme,” Augustiniana 40 (1990): 333-
47.  Like Meconi, Smalbrugge notes how Augustine radically alters the Platonic 
account of participation to include a “downward” theology of participation that takes 
the incarnation into its purview: “Augustin renverse donc le schème habituel.  Pour 
lui, l’unité de la réalité n’est pas uniquement une question de l’ascension de l’inférieur 
au supérieur, mais également celle de la descente du supérieur à l’inférieur.”  
Smalbrugge, “La Notion de la participation chez Augustin,” 339. 
4
 Ord. II.II.6 (CCSL 29 109): anima, inquit, sapientis perpurgata uirtutibus et iam 
cohaerens deo sapientis etiam nomine digna est nec quicquam eius aliud delectat 
appellare sapientem  
5
 Acad. II.2.3 (CCSL 29 19): tu in nostro ipso municipio fauore familiaritate 
communicatione domus tuae paene te cum clarum primatem que fecisti.  It is in 
expressing his thanks to Romanianus that Augustine uses the word communio.  A 
number of times the word expresses something that is held in “common” as in Acad. 
II.9.23 (CCSL 29 30): nam ignoratio ueri aut mihi, si illi fingebant, peculiaris est aut 
certe utrisque communis. Acad. III.7.16 (CCSL 43): uoluptatem que illam Epicuri 
solis inter se pecoribus esse commune.  Acad. III.8 (CCSL 45): hoc cum isto commune 
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 Evidently participatio and its synonyms are not vocabulary that Augustine 
frequently uses in the Cassiciacum works, and yet an account of image and its relation 
to truth is a recurring motif.  It seems that despite the absence of the language of 
participation, the concept itself is operative throughout the dialogues and is, in fact, 
key to understanding Augustine’s early expression of the mind’s union with truth.  I 
will suggest that the concept of participatio in truth is most clearly seen in 
Augustine’s use of “image” language.  Forms of the word imago appear 24 times in 
the dialogues, and 28 times forms of the word similitudo is used.  It is worth 
highlighting some of these uses, so as to understand the contexts and breadth of 
Augustine’s use of these words.   
Often a form of imaginare or of imago will be used to describe something 
wrongly “imagined” such as Augustine recounting his desire for a wife, whose 
“imagined caresses and their bitter sweetness” still had a pull on his soul.6  This sense 
is also used to bespeak mistaken judgments: Augustine says, “[O]ne of us must have 
suffered from a mistaken appearance (imaginationem falsam)”7; such misjudgments 
occurs in dreams, when we are “mistaken by the resemblance of images,”8 or in the 
wrong “imagination” of those schooled in the liberal arts, who think that they now 
know the whole truth.
9
  Five times in the Soliloquies “image” is used in the context of 
a mirror that portrays a false image.  Augustine writes, “Is it not evident to you that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
habeo, quod dubitat, quis uestrum uerum sequatur.  At one instance the word is used 
to express a communication, that is, a sharing of information: Acad. III.20.44 (CCSL 
29 61): communicabo ergo eam uobiscum. 
6
 Sol. I.XIV.25 (CSEL 89 38): imaginatae illae blanditiae et amara suavitas 
titillaverit. 
7
 Sol. II.III.3 (CSEL 89 49). 
8
 Sol. II.VI.12 (CSEL 89 61): Quid? cum talia nos uel olfacere, uel gustare, uel 
tangere somniamus, nonne similitudine imaginum eo deteriore quo inaniore 
decipimur? 
9
 Sol. II.XX.35 (CSEL 89 96): Ipsae sunt illae imaginationes magna cautione 
uitandae. 
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your image in a mirror desires, so to speak, to be you, and yet is false precisely 
because it is not you?”10  Three times in Soliloquies II.XX.35, Augustine uses a form 
of the word imago to bespeak the failure of mental images to convey the truth of 
geometric principles.
11
  He explains that although it is geometrically possible to 
infinitely place lines inside a tiny circle, nevertheless, our minds cannot imagine 
(imaginando) filling this space smaller than the hole of the tiniest needle.
12
  In all 
these instances in the Soliloquies, imago conveys a negative connotation – it describes 
a wrongly imagined or dreamed occurrence, the image of a mirror claiming 
authenticity, or the inability of the imagination to express mathematical principles. 
 Contra Academicos and De ordine suggest that a more positive connotation of 
image is also present in Augustine’s dialogues.  When various forms of the word 
imago appear in these works, it is also against the backdrop of a Platonic worldview.  
The material, temporal world is an image of the immaterial, eternal world of forms.  
Augustine speaks approvingly of Plato’s theory of the true world of forms, which is 
the model of the sensible world made in its image.
13
  In this Platonic context, image is 
given a positive connotation – a connection exists between the form and the material 
                                                          
10
 Sol. II.IX.17 (CSEL 89 66-67): An non tibi uidetur imago tua de speculo quasi tu 
ipse uelle esse, sed ideo esse falsa, quod non est? Cf. Sol. II.VI.11 (CSEL 89 59): 
Quis enim in speculum adtendat et recte dicat se esse illius imaginis similem ac non 
potius illam sibi? Sol. II.VI.11 (CSEL 89 59): Quamuis enim pleraque specula 
homines faciant, non tamen ipsi effingunt eas quae redduntur imagines.  Sol. II.VII.13 
(CSEL 89 62): Quid? cum de speculo resultare imaginem uidemus?  Sol. II.X.18 
(CSEL 89 69): unde in speculo uera hominis imago, si non falsus homo? 
11
 Sol. II.XX.35 (CSEL 89 96): Quid tale umquam oculus uidit, aut uidere potest, cum 
ipsa imaginatione cogitationis fingi quicquam huiusmodi non potest?  
12
 Sol. II.XX.35 (CSEL 89 97): An non hoc probamus, cum etiam minimum circulum 
imaginando animo describimus, et ab eo lineas ad centrum ducimus? Nam cum duas 
duxerimus, inter quas quasi acu uix pungi possit, alias iam in medio non possumus 
ipsa cogitatione imaginaria ducere. 
13
 Acad. III.17.37 (CCSL 29 57): Sat est enim ad id, quod uolo, Platonem sensisse 
duos esse mundos, unum intellegibilem, in quo ipsa ueritas habitaret, istum autem 
sensibilem, quem manifestum est nos uisu tactuque sentire; itaque illum uerum, hunc 
ueri similem et ad illius imaginem factum. 
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representation of the form.  The “truth-like” representation participates in its source.  
In this regard, Augustine writes, “Whoever contemplates the exemplar approves the 
representation (imaginem).”14  De ordine and Contra Academicos refer to “image” 
also within a discussion of Proteus.  Five times the word imago is used in the 
Cassiciacum dialogues in reference to this elusive character Proteus, the “image of the 
truth.”15  This positive evaluation of image as revelatory of the truth is the subject of 
the following chapter (chapter five).     
The central theme of human ability to know and participate in truth entails that 
the dialogues also frequently use forms of the word similitudo, with a variety of 
meanings, such as likeness, imitation, similarity, and resemblance.  It is worth 
highlighting some examples in the Cassiciacum works.  Often similitudo appears in 
the same context as the word imago.  When Augustine is told that the difference 
between knowledge of God and knowledge of earthy things is even greater than the 
difference between the splendor and beauty of the heavens and that of the earth, 
Augustine remarks that he finds this comparison (haec similitudo) convincing.
16
  The 
relation between a false resemblance and the truth is a major source of discussion in 
the second book of the Soliloquies, which contains seventeen references to similitudo.  
The discussion surrounding false resemblances is initiated by Augustine’s reason 
saying, “Certainly, that which the eyes see is not called false unless it has some 
                                                          
14
 Acad. III.18.40 (CCSL 29 59): Probat enim bene imaginem, quisquis eius intuetur 
exemplum. 
15
 Acad. III.6.13 (CCSL 29 42): Proteus enim ille, ut uos adulescentes non penitus 
poetas a philosophia contemnendos esse uideatis, in imaginem ueritatis inducitur; 
ueritatis, inquam, Proteus in carminibus ostentat sustinetque personam, quam 
obtinere nemo potest, si falsis imaginibus deceptus comprehensionis nodos uel 
laxauerit uel dimiserit.  Sunt enim istae imagines. Cf. Ord. II.15.43; Acad. III.5.11. 
16
 Sol. I.5.11 (CSEL 89 19).  This same comparative sense of similitudo is found in 
Sol. I.8.15 (CSEL 89 23): Nunc accipe, quantum praesens tempus exposcit, ex illa 
similitudine sensibilium etiam de deo aliquid nunc me docente. 
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likeness to the true (similitudinem veri).  For example, a man whom we see in our 
dreams is, of course, not a true man; he is false for the very reason that he bears a 
resemblance to a true one (habet veri similitudinem).”17  In Contra Academicos 
Augustine explains that the Academics fear the “similarity of things” (similitudinem 
rerum), which is often confused with certain knowledge of philosophical truth, and so 
the Academics only grant knowledge of the “truth-like” (veri simile) or what they 
term the “probable.”18 
 The use of the terms “image” and “likeness” in the dialogues can be 
understood in relation to the concept of participation.  The terms have both a positive 
and a negative connotation: they are positive inasmuch as they participate in and are 
revelatory of eternal truth; they contain a negative implication in that they conceal 
their derived nature and hence deceive.  As such, there is an inauthentic element in an 
image, which remains in some sense a dissemblance.
19
   
 
The Plotinian Image 
The suffusion of “image” language in the dialogues entails that despite the absence of 
the precise langue of participatio, the concept is, without a doubt, operative 
throughout these early works.  The character of Augustine’s early philosophy of 
image is heavily informed by a neo-Platonic, particularly Plotinian, understanding of 
image.  Simply by analyzing the usage of the terms imago and similitudo, I have made 
clear that a participatory ontology marks Augustine’s account of “image” in the 
                                                          
17
 Sol. II.6.10 (CSEL 89 58). 
18
 Acad. II.5.12 (CCSL 29 24).  The Academics, explains Augustine, “are following 
what resembles the true, although they do not know what truth itself is.” Acad. II.7.19.  
Cf. Acad. II.10.24; Acad. II.12.27; Acad. III.10.25; Acad. III.11.26. 
19
 In what follows, I will suggest that this tension between two senses of “image” 
evident in the dialogues is already present in Plotinus’s philosophy of image. 
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dialogues.  Images exist in the temporal, material order as derived representations of a 
more stable form.  
Augustine’s theology of image in his early writings has its philosophical roots 
principally in Plotinian cosmology.
 20
  The vocabulary of “image” in the early works, 
which I have analyzed, makes clear that Augustine unequivocally aligns himself with 
Plato’s teaching on the distinction between the sensible world and the world of the 
forms; Augustine is consonant with the Platonic tradition that recognizes the world of 
the forms as a model for the sensible world.
21
  In what follows, I will limn the 
                                                          
20
 I am not suggesting that Augustine has unmediated access to the Enneads of 
Plotinus; perhaps the Plotinian thought in his early writings comes via the influence of 
his teachers, especially Ambrose and Marius Victorinus, his reading of philosophical 
works, both Stoic and Platonic, and the general neo-Platonic intellectual milieu in 
Milan during Augustine’s time in the city.  In each of these influences, the type of 
Platonism prominent was the neo-Platonism of Plotinus.  Thus, while the influence of 
Plotinus on Augustine is immense, how precisely he was influenced is debated.  The 
suggestion that Augustine first converted to Platonism and only after his period at 
Cassiciacum converted to Christianity was first proposed by Adolf von Harnack and 
Gaston Boissier, “La Conversion de Saint Augustin,” Revue des Deux Mondes 85 
(1888): 43-69.  This thesis was then expounded and enlarged by Pierre Alfaric, 
L’Évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin (Paris: Émile Nourry, 1918).  Charles 
Boyer definitively put the proposition to rest with his L’Idée de vérité dans la 
philosophie de saint Augustin (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1921).  The theory, which 
assumes a false antithesis between Platonism and Christianity, has largely been 
abandoned.  A more substantial question still remains, however, namely, how 
Augustine was influenced by Platonic thought.  And more particularly, was it through 
Plotinus or Porphyry?  John O’Meara has presented the status quaestionis as it now 
stands: “The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine,” in Neoplatonism and Christian 
Thought, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany: State University of New York, 1982), pp. 
34-41.  He explains that while Willi Theiler was adamant that Porphyry was the 
principal influence, Paul Henry held that it was Plotinus.  O’Meara situates himself in 
the middle, arguing that the influence of both philosophers is evident.  Cf. Paul Henry, 
Plotin et l’Occident: Firmicus Maternus, Marius Victorinus, Saint Augustin et 
Macrobe (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1934); Willi Theiler, Porphyrios 
und Augustin (Halle: Niemeyer, 1933); John O’Meara, The Young Augustine (New 
York: Longmans and Green, 1954).  For the purposes of this chapter I will argue from 
the premise that Plotinus was the dominant influence of Augustine’s Platonism.  
21
 In the Timaeus Socrates asks what model the maker and father of the universe used 
to fashion the sensible world.  Timaeus responds, “Now surely it’s clear to all that it 
was the eternal model he looked at, for, of all the things that have come to be, our 
universe is most beautiful, and of course the craftsman is the most excellent.  This, 
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contours of Plotinian cosmology and highlight three elements of this tradition that 
form the basis of Augustine’s early theology of image.  First, Plotinian cosmology is 
an answer to the question of how the One is everything but not one single thing.  The 
emanationist philosophy of Plotinus expresses the relation between the existing world 
and the One with recourse to “image” language.  This relation preserves both the 
origin of the world in the One and the infinite distance of the world from the One.  
Second, on account of this relational dialectic the material order is an image that is 
both true and false; it is at once a reflection of the One and a failure to reflect the One.  
Third, the nature of the material order as image entails not only a movement from the 
One, but also a dynamic desire to return to the One.  Indeed, the longing to “return” to 
the divine, and to find there true happiness through participation in immaterial truth is 
a pervasive theme in Plotinus,
22
  deriving ultimately from Plato.
23
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
then, is how it came to be: it is a work of craft, modeled after that which is changeless 
and is grasped by a rational account, that is, by wisdom.  Since these things are so, it 
follows by unquestionable necessity that this world is an image of something.”  Plato, 
Timaeus, 29a-b. 
22
 Drawing on the images of the Theaetetus, Plotinus writes, “‘Let us flee then to the 
beloved Fatherland’: this is the soundest counsel….  The Fatherland to us is There 
whence we have come, and There is the Father.  What then is our course, what the 
manner of our flight?  This is not a journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from 
land to land; nor need you think of coach or ship to carry you away; all this order of 
things you must set aside and refuse to see; you must close the eyes and call instead 
upon another vision which is to be waked within you, the birth-right of all, which few 
turn to use.”  Plotinus, The Enneads, I.6.8. 
23
 Plato’s allegory of the cave in the Republic springs immediately to mind.  The cave-
dweller has been enlightened to the fact that his true home is in a world much more 
real than the cave with its shadows – the world of the forms.  This is his true home, to 
which he desires to return; it is in participation in this reality that happiness is found.  
Likewise, in the Theaetetus, Socrates gives the injunction, “[W]e should make all 
speed to take flight from this world to the other, and that means becoming divine, so 
far as we can, and that again is to become righteous with the help of wisdom” 
(Theaetetus 176a-b). 
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The question of how the One is all things and yet not a single thing is a 
discussion that harkens all the way back to the Parmenides.
24
  This question is 
expanded upon and answered in more particular language by Plotinus.  Indeed, a 
dominant motif running through the Enneads is the relation of the One to the many.
25
  
How is the One the principle of everything while remaining a monad within itself and 
utterly simple?  Plotinus inquires how all things overflow from the One, which 
remains simple, having no variation or change.
26
  The One is perfect within itself: 
“Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is perfect.”27  
Nevertheless, out of the overflow of its goodness the One generates something.  This 
first being is called Intellect and is constituted by turning and gazing back at the One.  
An account of “image,” then, lies at the foundation of Plotinian cosmology.28  The 
arrival of this image – Intellect – is, however, not an act of creation.  The One, 
although it generates being, is itself beyond being.  Utterly simple and unmoving, the 
One does not create, explains Plotinus, for this would involve movement and change.  
Rather, Intellect is self-generated; it is established by turning back and gazing upon 
the One. 
 Intellect resembles the One and has being, life, and movement from the One.  
Like the One, Intellect overflows with goodness and reproduces of itself an inferior 
                                                          
24
 Cf. Eric R. Dodds, “The Parmenides of Plato and the origin of the neoplatonic 
One,” Classical Quarterly 22 (1928): 129-142; Frederic M. Schroeder, “The Platonic 
Parmenides and imitation in Plotinus,” Dionysius 2 (1978): 51-73. 
25
 Plotinus, Ennead, V.2.1. 
26
 Plotinus, Ennead, V.2.1. 
27
 Plotinus, Ennead, V.2.1. 
28
 Cf. Jean-Françis Pradeau, L’Imitation du Principe: Plotin et la participation (Paris: 
Vrin, 2003), pp. 57-79.  Pradeau writes, “Celle-ci suppose une participation qu’on 
peut dire active du principé à la resemblance qu’il entretient avec son principe: le 
premier montre pour le second un désir comme un besoin qui sont la cause d’une 
imitation, d’une tentative d’assimilation.”  Pradeau, L’Imitation, p. 79.  See also, 
Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). 
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likeness called Soul.  Intellect remains immutable and stable as pure being, but its 
likeness, Soul, is not so.  Soul generates many images of herself; she is the life source 
of plants, irrational animals, and humans.  Nevertheless, all inferior images generating 
from Soul participate in the One, with the One all the while remaining simple and 
immutable: “All these are the One and not the One: they are he because they come 
from him; they are not he, because it is in abiding by himself that he gives them.”29  
The answer, then, to how the One is the principle of all being while nevertheless 
remaining utterly simple lies in a participatory account of image.  The One is 
participated in but does not participate.  Thus, there is an emanation from the One 
through Intellect and Soul to all being; each inferior product turning back to its 
producer, desiring to return and be like its model. 
 As the concept of “image” is foundational to Plotinus’s cosmology, it is also a 
pervasive and all-embracing concept in the rest of his philosophical account in the 
Enneads.  Terms as ὁμοίωσις, εἰκών, εἴδωλον, ὁμοιότης, ἴνδαλμα, μίμημα, ἴχνος, 
σκιά, μίμησις, ὁμοειδής, and ὁμοίωμα are all words that, as in an overlapping Venn 
diagram, approach and shape the concept of “image” in Plotinus’s thought.  
Fundamentally, “image” is always something less than its source.  The sensible 
universe we experience is described by Plotinus as standing almost in a relationship of 
potency to its source and, thus, as tending towards non-being.  Plotinus writes that 
matter “is no more than the image and phantasm of Mass, a bare aspiration towards 
substantial existence.”30  Paul Aubin comments, “On notera donc tout de suite que, 
chez Plotin, la notion d’image est toujours liée à l’idée d’une dégradation et d’une 
                                                          
29
 Plotinus, Ennead, V.2.1. 
30
 Plotinus, Ennead, III.6.7. 
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irradiation.”31  The inverse is also true, namely, that the nearer the image is to its 
source the more “true” it is.  Plotinus describes sensible matter as “molded upon the 
archetype” of the divine Intellect, so that an image as an emanation always retains a 
relation by participation to that which it images, always “preserving some faint 
likeness of the source.”32  Augustine’s early understanding of image in the dialogues 
stresses, like Plotinus, the borrowed character of existence or, to employ the 
terminology I have been using, its participatory character.  The “very nature of an 
image,” states the Enneads, “is that as a secondary it shall have its being in something 
else.”33 
 The image is always, for Plotinus, in some sense “false.”  This is a theme with 
which Augustine will interact in depth in the dialogues.  Plotinus writes, “Its every 
utterance, therefore, is a lie; it pretends to be great and it is little, to be more and it is 
less; and the Existence with which it makes itself is not Existence, but a passing trick 
making trickery of all that seems to be present in it, phantasms within a phantasm.”34  
It is more than simply the spiritualism of Plotinus’s thought that makes him describe 
matter as a “lie” and a “trick.”  Rather, like Augustine after him, Plotinus regards an 
image as false when it is not recognized as existing in a participatory relationship with 
immaterial and eternal being.  I will suggest in the following chapter that Contra 
Academicos and De ordine attempt to counteract the skepticism of the New Academy, 
developed and expressed most notably by Sextus Empiricus.  According to the 
Skeptics all material existence is completely “false,” that is to say, they do not 
understand the temporal order as an image participating and partially reflecting its 
                                                          
31
 Paul Aubin, “L’‘Image’ dans l’oeuvre de Plotin,” Recherches de Sciences 
religieuses 41 (1953): 353. 
32
 Plotinus, Ennead, V.3.7.  
33
 Plotinus, Ennead, V.3.8. 
34
 Plotinus, Ennead, III.6.7. 
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eternal source.  The image is for Plotinus partly “false,” because it deceives those 
who, enticed by its façade of permanence, fail to be reconciled to the fact that it is 
“ghostly and feeble.”35  Plotinus describes the material image as a mirror, “showing 
things as in itself when they are really elsewhere.”36  Images are empty but appear full 
– in reality, the image contains nothing of substance because it lacks form.37  Of the 
material order, Plotinus writes, “Feeble, in itself, a false thing and projected upon a 
falsity, like an image in a dream or against water or on a mirror, it can but leave 
Matter unaffected.”38  Many of the examples that Augustine employs to describe an 
image are already present in the Enneads.
39
   
 For Plotinus, the material order exists as an image derived from the One; 
inasmuch as it originates and participates in the One it is true; it is false when the 
                                                          
35
 Plotinus, Ennead, III.6.7. 
36
 Plotinus, Ennead, III.6.7.  Plotinus is clearly far removed from a materialist notion 
of image.  He writes, “If, then, there is, really, something in a mirror, we may suppose 
objects of sense to be in matter in precisely that way: if in the mirror there is nothing, 
if there is only a seeming of something, then we may judge that in Matter there is the 
same delusion and that the seeming is to be traced to the Substantial-Existence of 
Real-Beings, the Substantial-Existence in which the Authentic has the real 
participation.”  Plotinus, Ennead, III.6.13.  The analogy of the mirror serves to 
underscore the participatory ontology that sustains Plotinus’s account of image.  
Should the source no longer be present to the mirror, neither can the image continue; 
by the same token, should the substantial form be lacking, the ephemeral character of 
matter also ceases to exist.  Plotinus repeats the example of the mirror a number of 
times.  Cf. Ennead, I.4.10, III.6.9 and IV.5.7. 
37
 The form that is conferred on matter comes from above.  In Plotinus’s cosmology, 
when Soul imprints its image on matter it impresses a specific form.  In this way, the 
sensible world retains a likeness and a relation to the immaterial world: “[T]he 
relation is like that of a portrait or reflection to the original which is regarded as prior 
to the water or the painting reproducing it.” Ennead, VI.2.22. 
38
 Plotinus, Ennead, III.6.7. 
39
 Propitious literature on Plotinus’s philosophy of image includes Rein Ferwerda, La 
Signification des images et des métamorphoses dans la pensée de Plotin (Amsterdam: 
Wolters, 1965); John Fielder, “Plotinus’ Copy Theory,” Apeiron 11 (1977): 1-11; 
Claude Gaudin, “La Production des êtres chez Plotin et la question de l’économie des 
principes,” Revue des sciences religieuses 68 (1994): 267-288; Pierre Hadot, Plotin ou 
la simplicité du regard (Paris: Gallimard, 1997); Michel Fattal, Logos et image chez 
Plotin (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1998).  
163 
 
participatory ontology of temporal existence is not recognized.  It is within this 
participatory framework that the desire inscribed on the image to “return” to its source 
can be understood.  Paul Aubin’s foundational 1953 article on “image” in Plotinus’s 
thought traces four distinct “movements” of an image that are reflected in the relation 
between Intellect (which is constituted as image) and the One: genesis, conversion, 
contemplation, and radiance.
40
  The first movement demonstrates the utter causal 
dependence Intellect has on the One.  The eternal generation bespeaks a hierarchal 
relation outside of time.  Plotinus wants to maintain that in the generation of the 
Intellect, a fall occurs from the pure simplicity of the One.
41
  The One, which is, 
therefore, called “source,” “first,” “beginning,” and even “Father.”  In its generation, 
Intellect, as image, is established as a degradation from the supreme reality, a 
dissipation from the centre, and a dispersion of light.  Aubin traces Plotinus’s 
dominant metaphors: rays issuing from the sun, rivers streaming from their source, 
and the flowering of a tree from its roots.  Despite the physicality of the metaphors, 
Plotinus always recalls the immaterial and eternal nature of the generation of Intellect 
as image; it is a genesis without movement or change and so is a relation to be 
believed rather than seen. 
 The second movement of an image is conversion.  After the exitus of its 
generation, the image begins its reditus by turning back to the One.
42
  The vast 
ontological void that marked its generation, however, means that the conversion is 
never complete; rather, its conversion is a constant turning back to the One.  Aubin 
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 Aubin, “Image,” 360-367.  
41
 Cf. Jesús Igal, “La génesis de la inteligencia en un pasaje de las Enéadas de Plotino 
(VI.7.4-35),” Emerita 39 (1971): 129-157. 
42
 Cf. Pierre Hadot, “Epistrophe et Metanoia dans l’historie de la philosophie,” in 
Actes du XI Congrès International de Philosophie 12, Brussels 1953 (Louvain: 
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notes that the conversion of the image is established in contrast to its genesis.  It puts 
a sudden halt to the constant dispersion from the centre and degradation from the 
One.
43
   Unlike its genesis, the conversion of the image is not imposed from outside; 
rather, it desires from its own will to turn back to the One and make its ascent. 
 Thirdly, contemplation follows from conversion.  Again, the desire to “return” 
issues from the image.  Contemplation is almost like a second movement of 
conversion; it adds intentionality and permanence to the conversion.  The stage of 
contemplation marks the dialectic of ascent and return, through which the image’s end 
is identical to its beginning.
44
  The last movement – radiance – is in some sense 
outside of the exitus – reditus schema.  Here the image rests in perfection.  Now the 
image once again resembles its source, as the image is now also fecund, defusing its 
own creative goodness.  Although the image is now “radiance” and mirrors the One, it 
is still of a radically different ontological identity; it is non-being, a reflection, 
shadow, mirror, or emanation.
45
   
 These four movements of the “image” also characterize the human soul.  The 
movement away from and the desire to return are constitutive dimensions of the 
human soul for Plotinus.
46
  Indeed, the human soul is an emanation from the divine 
and can, from its knowledge of this emanation, take courage in its ascent back to its 
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165 
 
home: “The Soul once seen to be thus precious, thus divine, you may hold the faith 
that by its possession you are already nearing God: in the strength of this power make 
upwards towards Him.”47  The divine Soul is our soul’s “upward neighbor” and only a 
step more divine than we who proceed from her, insists Plotinus.
48
  The human soul is 
an image of the divine Soul and desires to return above, to what is clear, true, and 
primary.
49
  While the human image is weak and mutable, it nevertheless retains its 
being by participation (μετοχή) in eternal Being.  The Enneads insist that the soul as 
image “is a thing which can have no permanence except by attachment, by living in 
that other.”50  Thus, the soul as an image is constituted in a participatory ontological 
relationship with its archetype. 
The image for Plotinus not only needs to cling to the divine for being, but is, 
in fact, eager to do so; it desires to be more and more united with its divine source.  
The human intellect becomes illumined by Intellect.  Plotinus writes, “[B]y one light 
it sees another, not through any intermediate agency; a light sees a light, that is to say 
a thing sees itself.  This light shining within the Soul enlightens it; that is, it makes the 
Soul intellective, working it into likeness with itself, the light above.”51  In this 
description of the soul one can also see the last movement of “radiance” in Paul 
Aubin’s description of the “return” of the image, where it too becomes fecund and 
generative.  It is in recognizing itself to be an image of Intellect and dwelling on this 
mystery that the human soul becomes “godlike and intellect-like” and is drawn back 
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up whence it came.  Contemplation (θεωρία), then, becomes the means through which 
union and participation (μετοχή) is realized.  As Plotinus writes, “Every soul is, and 
becomes, that which she contemplates.”52  It is the divine intellect contemplating itself 
in the One that produces the eternal soul.
53
  The created soul in turn participates in the 
divine by turning to the forms and the divine intellect in contemplation.  The noblest 
calling for the human person is to engage in the θεωρία of divine things,54 because in 
the act of contemplation that which is highest in the human person participates in the 
divine.
55
  By growing in the knowledge of the universal Intellect and by truly 
participating in and possessing “the memory” of one’s origin, one matures in the 
likeness of Intellect.
56
 
 
The Philosophy of Image in the Soliloquia  
Thus far I have begun by analyzing how Augustine uses the vocabulary of imago and 
similitudo to express a participatory ontology.  From there I moved to survey the 
Plotinian philosophical backdrop to Augustine’s understanding of image in the 
dialogues.  I will now set the groundwork for subsequent chapters in which I engage 
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with Augustine’s early theology of the imago dei.  An analysis of Augustine’s 
understanding of “image” in the Soliloquia will make clear how dependent 
Augustine’s philosophy of image is on a Plotinian metaphysic.  
 Three critical elements of Plotinus’s philosophy of image become foundational 
in Augustine’s early theology.  First, an account of image is, for Plotinus, a means to 
articulate the relation between the infinite, immaterial, and eternal One to the finite, 
material, and temporal order.  The philosophy of image answers the question, How is 
the One present in all things while at the same time infinitely transcending all things?  
Second, this relational dialectic between the finite and the infinite entails for Plotinus 
that the material order as image is both true and false.  I will argue in subsequent 
chapters that Augustine avails himself of the theological opportunities that this 
dialectic offers.  That the image is false entails that stability, permanence, and eternal 
enjoyment (frui) cannot be found in the material order.  Nevertheless, the temporal 
order is “true” inasmuch as it is recognized to be a derived and participatory 
expression of the One.  In chapter five I will suggest that this “truthful” character of 
the temporal image provides Augustine a way out of the skeptical impasse of the 
Academics.  Third, within the genesis of the image there is, for Plotinus, an inscribed 
desire to “return” to its source.  This innate desire to return on the part of the image 
becomes a key to Augustine’s early theology of ascent (chapter seven).    
 Augustine first broaches the topic of “image” in the Soliloquia by inquiring 
what the relation is between “truth” and “true.”  Are they two separate things or one 
and the same?  Augustine initially suggests a causally predicated relation based on a 
Platonic account of participation: something is true because of its relation to truth.
57
  
Augustine frames this participatory account from an epistemological perspective.  We 
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know things exists that, with various limitations, are truth-like; therefore, the True 
must also exist.  Employing classical Stoic logic Augustine writes, “Therefore truth is 
not in mortal things.  But truth exists, and cannot be nowhere.  Therefore there are 
immortal things.”58  The problem still remains with regard to the human ability to 
know the truth.  This is the recurring problematic of the Cassiciacum dialogues, 
namely, how eternal and immaterial truth can be grasped in the temporal and material 
order, given the comparison (similitudino) according to which knowledge of divine 
things and of human things is as disparate as heaven and earth.
59
 
Soliloquia II.VI.10–II.VII.13 is an extended discussion on the relation between 
the image and its form.  Like Plotinus, Augustine is keen to note the ontological 
difference between the image and its source.  If the image is not the same as its 
archetype, asks Augustine, must we conclude that it is then something false, a 
deceiving imitation?  Since Augustine has already defined “the true” as an objective 
reality irrespective of one’s knowledge of it, he now sets out to offer a definition of 
“the false.”  In the exchange, Augustine and his Reason discover that the false is only 
intelligible in reference to the true, and so falsehood is initially defined as a false 
resemblance.  Augustine’s Reason argues, “We also speak of a false tree which we 
see in a picture, a false face which is reflected in a mirror, the false motion of towers 
as seen by those sailing by, a false break in an oar in the water: these are false for no 
other reason than that they resemble the true (nisi quod verisimilia sunt).”60  Many of 
these same examples of “false images” are also found in the Enneads.  Augustine 
follows the Plotinian philosophical tradition by underscoring the lack of ontological 
density in an image; the image lacks substantial being.  In the Soliloquia, then, 
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Augustine and his Reason are initially agreed that falsehood is a resemblance of the 
true – an image that does not perfectly express its prototype.   
Reason proceeds to delineate two types of resemblances, those that are equal, 
such as a twin or various imprints of a signet ring, and those that are inferior, such that 
they resemble the superior; an example of the latter is the image of a person in a 
mirror.
61
  The discussion is devoted to this latter category.  There is first of all an 
inherent inequality between the object and the image in the mirror.
62
  This inequality 
is causally predicated; no one would look in a mirror and say that he resembles the 
image; rather, the person standing before the mirror causes the image and the image 
resembles him.  Augustine’s example highlights two things: first, the image is a 
production; and, second, it is inferior to what it is representing.
63
 
False resemblances deceive the senses; one can mistakenly hear, touch, or see 
an image and think it to be something other than what it really is.  Reason concludes, 
“Therefore it is clear that in all our senses we are deceived by an enticing 
resemblance, whether it is between equal things or inferior things.  Even if we are not 
deceived, because we keep ourselves from agreeing or because we see the difference, 
nevertheless we call things false because we see in them a resemblance to the true 
(tamen eas res falsas nominare, quas verisimiles deprehendimus).”64  Thus, an image 
is defined in relation to truth; it is true inasmuch as it resembles its archetype.  As 
dissimilitude defines falsehood, so, too, similitude defines truth.  From this Augustine 
concludes that all images desire to be completed, that is, to return to their archetype; 
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to be more like the original from which they are an inferior production.
65
  Reason 
comments, “Does it not seem to you that your image in a mirror wants, in a way, to be 
you, and is false because it is not?”66  The closer the image is to the original, the more 
it is a true image.  It is the nature of an image to desire to return to the original, to be 
similar and true; by extension, an image is false inasmuch as it tries to be like the 
original but is found lacking.  Augustine writes, “Do not all pictures and replicas of 
that kind and all artists’ work of that type strive to be that in whose likeness they are 
made?”67  Augustine’s proximity here to a Plotinian, participatory understanding of 
image is clear.  The image for Augustine, as for Plotinus, is constituted in the exitus 
from the artist, but already in its genesis, it is inscribed with the mark of truth from the 
artist; it bears the artist’s likeness and desires to “return” to its source.  This insight 
will stay with Augustine and appear throughout his early writtings, culminating, I will 
suggest, in De vera religione. 
The issue of the nature of images is not resolved in the Soliloquia.  Material 
participation in truth is understood as to varying degrees false.  When asked whether a 
body could contain truth, Augustine’s Reason suggests that it can only be understood 
as “some sort of an image of truth (quasi quaedam imago veritatis).”68  Ultimately, 
the Soliloquia considers a material instantiation of eternal truth to be always both 
derived and deficient.
69
  At the end of the dialogue, Augustine articulates the failure 
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of images to fully express the truth they signify by using the example of geometrical 
principles.  He points to the example of an infinitely divisible line; this abstraction is 
inherently true despite the mind being unable to imagine the principle instantiated in 
the material order.
70
  Thus, while the Soliloquia retains the participatory link between 
material existence and immaterial forms, that is to say, the relationship between an 
image and its source, this relation is not a perfect adequatio. 
The terms imago and similitudo are used in the dialogues to express a 
participatory relation between the temporal, material order and the eternal immaterial 
world of the forms.  I have suggested that Augustine’s early understanding of image is 
informed by a Plotinian philosophy of image.  Plotinian cosmology expresses the 
origins of the universe as a movement of an image away from the One and, ultimately, 
back to the One.  This image relationship of the material universe to the One entails 
that the finite order is both a true image as a derived reflection of the One and a false 
image on account of its mutability and temporality.  The philosophical tension 
between the “truth” and the “falsity” of an image is explored by Augustine in the 
Soliloquia.  Ultimately, this tension remains unresolved.  Nevertheless, as will 
become clear in wrestling with the dialectical nature of Plotinian image philosophy in 
the Soliloquia, Augustine lays the foundation for his early theology of image.   
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Chapter V: Proteus and Participation 
 
The next three chapters grow out of the tension expressed in the Soliloquia regarding 
the nature of an image as both true and false. In the next chapter, I suggest that Contra 
Academicos affirms that ultimate realities can really be known in the finite order.  The 
elusive mythological figure of Proteus, who appears at a number of key points in the 
dialogue, serves I maintain, as an affirmation by Augustine that eternal truth can be 
incarnated in the temporal and material order.  Proteus is described as an “image of 
the truth” and serves in the dialogue to affirm against the Skeptics that genuine 
knowledge or truth of ultimate realities can be had through the finite order, but only if 
this temporal material order is recognized precisely for what it is, namely, an image. 
 Chapter six considers how Augustine brings this Platonic participatory account 
of image to bear on his early theology of the imago dei.   Finite images participate in 
their source to varying degrees, and, therefore, it is significant to Augustine’s early 
theology of image that not all images are equal; rather, there are different ways in 
which something can be said to be an image.  It is this insight, first articulated in the 
philosophy of image operative at Cassiciacum, that allows Augustine to affirm that 
both Christ and the human person can unequivocally be said to be the imago dei, 
although to different degrees of likeness.  The second part of chapter six considers the 
implications of Augustine’s theology of the imago dei for embodied creatures.  
Focusing on Augustine’s exegesis of the creation narrative I note his repeated 
emphasis on the integrated nature of body and soul.  In this respect also Augustine 
breaks with the received tradition of the imago dei, by affirming that the body also 
participates in the divine image. 
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Finally, chapter seven is devoted to the spirituality of ascent operative in 
Augustine’s early theology of the image of God.  If the Cassiciacum dialogues make 
clear that the fundamental nature of an image in a Plotinian metaphysic is a dynamic 
movement of return, then Augustine’s early catechetical treatise, De vera religione, 
written before his ordination, develops this philosophy of image into a spiritual 
injunction.  De vera religione is Augustine’s most optimistic vision of Plotinian 
philosophy in his early development of the imago dei.  This work, like in the 
Cassiciacum dialogues, underscores the image-like character of all material, temporal 
goods that are penultimate and become “false” when their participatory character fails 
to be recognized.  It is Augustine’s identification with a Plotinian metaphysic of 
image that provides the intellectual framework within which he is able to advance 
beyond the contextually limited position of Latin pro-Nicene theology, for which 
“image of God” could only entail equality with God. 
Augustine is adamantly insistent that eternal truth can be incarnated in the 
temporal order. To make this point, he turns a number of times in the Cassiciacum 
dialogues to Proteus, the Greek literary figure of Homer’s Odyssey.1  Proteus always 
appears in the context of a discussion of “image” and of the participation of the image 
in an immaterial reality more stable than itself.  Proteus, the Greek sea monster whose 
name is a derivation of his status as “first born” of Poseidon, was, according to 
legend, able to tell the future to whoever would capture him.  However, Proteus would 
always change his shape as soon as he was seen, taking on a different form in order to 
avoid capture.  In the Cassiciacum dialogues Augustine links this elusive character 
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with a Platonic account of “image.”  This chapter will argue that Proteus, as an 
“image of the truth,” is a philosophical representation in the dialogues of the person of 
Christ, the image of God.  This is an interpretation of Augustine’s early dialogues that 
has never before been argued.
2
  Proteus both “manifests and bears the person of 
truth”3 and, as image, is at once derived from and revelatory of the truth.  The truth, 
like Proteus, can be grasped only when, in the words of Augustine’s counterpart at 
Cassiciacum, Alypius, “some deity was directing them toward him.”4  The debate 
regarding the validity of the Academics’ claim that truth cannot be known and that no 
real correspondence exists between the truth and the “truth-like” is really, I argue, a 
debate regarding the possibility of the Incarnation. 
What is the relation between an image and its source?  Can a temporal image 
be revelatory of its eternal source?  Can immaterial truth be known in a material world 
that exists in a state of flux?  Although Alypius demanded that the name of Christ be 
excluded from the dialogues,
5
 a major theme at Cassiciacum remains the “image of 
the truth” and the possibility that knowledge of eternal truth might be revealed 
through the image.   
 The problematic “truth-like” nature of temporal and material images is the 
concern of Contra Academicos.  The context is the skeptical stance held by the 
Academics regarding the possibility of knowing eternal truth in a state of flux.  I will 
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suggest that Augustine’s theology of the Incarnation in Contra Academicos bridges 
the chasm posited by the Academics between the truth and the truth-like.  Thus, the 
debate in Contra Acadmicos, I argue, concerns the possibility of the Incarnation.  The 
dialogue is presented as a response to the skepticism of the New Academy.
6
  
Augustine upholds the participatory character of created existence: truth is intelligible 
and can be known in the finite order precisely because this order is an image of the 
truth.  In his preface to Romanianus, Augustine writes, “[Philosophy] promises to 
give a lucid demonstration of the most true and distinct God; and even now it deigns 
to furnish a glimpse of Him, as it were, through transparent clouds.”7  After outlining 
Contra Academicos, I will focus on three significant selections from this dialogue that 
allow one to understand this debate with the Academics about the possibility of 
knowing the truth as, in fact, a debate about the possibility of the Incarnation.  First, I 
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271. 
7
 Acad. I.1.3 (CCSL 29 5). 
176 
 
will discuss three terms used to describe the incarnate Christ in the direct discourse to 
Romanianus in the preface to Book II: “wisdom,” “truth,” and “philosophy.”  Second, 
I will consider how Augustine describes the figure of Proteus in Acad. III.5.11-
III.6.13.  Third, I will demonstrate that in the conclusion to the dialogue (Acad. 
III.17.37-III.20.45), Augustine makes explicit that its aim is to overcome the position 
of the Skeptics about ever knowing the truth with an account of the Incarnation.   
 
Outline of Contra Academicos  
The opening of Contra Academicos finds the consortium at Cassiciacum all in 
agreement that it “behooves us to know truth,” for it is in truth that the happy life is 
found.
8
  Trygetius and Licentius, the son of Romanianus, are not at one, however, as 
to the question as to whether happiness resides merely in searching for truth or in 
actually finding the truth.  How, asks Trygetius, can “a man be at the same time 
perfect and still searching for the truth?”9  A person searching for the truth is in error 
and cannot be happy, maintains Trygetius.  Licentius disagrees.  To be searching, he 
avers, is not to be in error; approving the false as true is the only thing that constitutes 
genuine error.  To be searching is rather the mark of the wise man, contends 
Licentius, taking up the position of the New Academy: “[The wise man] is happy, 
because, to the utmost of his power, he is extricating himself from the entanglements 
of the body and devoting himself to sheer introspection.”10  The conclusion of the first 
book of Contra Academicos, then, frames the debate regarding the validity of the 
skepticism of the New Academy by allowing the reader to attend to the discussion of 
the junior philosophers, Trygetius and Licentius. 
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Before Alypius and Augustine take up the debate from the hands of their 
younger disciples in Book II, Augustine interjects with a discourse to Romanianus 
regarding the trials that beset those seeking wisdom.  The turmoil of life, of which 
Augustine acknowledges Romanianus to have had his fair share, and the ardor of the 
search, leave wisdom rarely attained.  Therefore, one must especially “implore divine 
aid with all devotion and piety,” asserts Augustine.11  He proceeds to delineate the 
position held by the ancient Academics, also known as the Skeptics, whose best 
known exponent was perhaps Cicero.  Indeed, they held a similar position to 
Licentius, explains Augustine, for they thought that certain knowledge cannot be 
achieved in this life, but that the wise man is devoted to the search for true knowledge 
while giving assent to nothing.  The worst thing that could possibly befall a wise man, 
according to the Academics, is to give assent to that of which he was unsure and 
thereby fall into error.  To withhold assent does not, however, condemn the 
Academics to living a life of uncertainty and inactivity, because they maintained that 
the truth contains certain marks that denote a probability of truth.  These “truth-like” 
notes are guides for living the best one can in this life.  The chief difference, then, 
between the Old Academy (“Socrates, Plato, and all the other ancients”12) and the 
New Academy lies in the answer to the question of whether “a wise man can know 
truth.”13 
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For the Academics, the value of speaking about the “truth-like” or the 
“probable” is that it allows for moral action in a state of intellectual uncertainty.14  
But, how could one know something to be truth-like, that is, to resemble the truth, 
unless he first knew the truth?  It would be absurd, argues Augustine, turning to 
Licentius, for someone who has seen only you to tell you that you look like your 
father Romanianus.  Similarly, how can one follow what resembles the true if one 
does not know what the truth is? asks Augustine.
15
  The debate about the ability to 
know the truth is quickly revealed to be a debate about the moral life; how can one 
follow the right path based only on the “probable”?  Book II concludes with Alypius 
and Augustine agreeing on the parameters of the debate to be carried out in the last 
book.  Alypius will carry the position of the Academics: “[T]hat nothing can be 
perceived, and that assent should be given to nothing.”16  Augustine will defend the 
opposite opinion: that “a wise man can reach the truth, and that assent is not always to 
be withheld.”17 
Alypius maintains that even if he should be forced to admit that a wise man 
knows wisdom, he will not be forced to abandon the corollary, namely, that assent is 
not to be given to anything.  Truth in this world is rather like a “reflected image,” 
maintains Alypius – impossible to pin down and forever evasive; this is why the wise 
man withholds assent.  The truth can be compared to the literary figure of Proteus, of 
whom it was said that he successfully evaded all capture unless he was pointed out by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
to follow.”  Augustine asks, “Do you know that by them the probable was also called 
the ‘truth-like’?”  “So it seems,” responds Licentius.  Evidently Licentius has 
carefully listened to Augustine’s description of the opinions of the New Academy and 
is, by his equivocation, attempting to answer according to their tenets. Cf. Acad. 
II.7.16 (CCSL 29 26-27). 
14
 Acad. II.11.26 (CCSL 29 32). 
15
 Acad. II.7.19 (CCSL 29 28). 
16
 Acad. II.13.29 (CCSL 29 33). 
17
 Acad. II.13.29 (CCSL 29 33). 
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some deity.
18
  Alypius continues, “Now, if that deity be with us, and show us that 
truth which is of so much anxiety to us, then I shall admit that the Academics are 
vanquished.”19  At this point ,the dialogue reaches its climax.  Augustine exclaims, 
“That is well said.  I desired absolutely nothing more.”20  Augustine’s jubilant 
response is at first blush perplexing and seemingly out of place.  Why this apparent 
capitulation to Alypius’s position?  Augustine continues, however: “But Alypius, you 
have told us who it is that is able to show us truth, and I must sedulously endeavor not 
to disagree with you.  Alike with brevity and piety, you have said that only some kind 
of deity is able to show a man what truth is…. I have heard nothing more pleasing, 
nothing more weighty, nothing more worthy of approval, and – if, as I trust, that deity 
be present – nothing more true.”21 
The third book of Contra Academicos concludes with Augustine arguing that 
there are in fact wise people in possession of truth and wisdom and thereby made 
happy.  The reluctance of the Academics to assent to truth and wisdom, and to follow 
only the “probable” in practical matters results in a relativism that can only end in 
moral turpitude, by which one would “commit every heinous crime whenever it seems 
probable to him that such an act ought to be performed, provided that he accept 
nothing as true.”22  This then is the argumentative structure of Contra Academicos: 
Augustine and Alypius take over the argument surrounding the validity of the position 
                                                          
18
 Acad. III.5.11 (CCSL 29 41): [S]uamque imaginem et quasi speculum quoddam in 
Proteo illo animaduerti oportere, qui traditur eo solere capi, quo minime caperetur, 
inuestigatoresque eius numquam eundem tenuisse nisi indice alicuius modi numine.  
19
 Acad. III.5.11 (CCSL 29 41). 
20
 Acad. III.5.12 (CCSL 29 41). 
21
 Acad. III.6.13 (CCSL 29 42). 
22
 Acad. III.16.36 (CCSL 29 56-57).  The moral dimension of Contra Academicos has 
been well articulated by John Heil.  He notes that skepticism severs the relation 
between reason and will, so that a moral action is no longer predicated on the 
knowledge of the good.  John Heil, “Augustine’s Attack on Skepticism: The Contra 
Academicos,” Harvard Theological Review 65 (1972): 99-116.   
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held by the New Academy from Trygetius and Licentius.  The figure of Proteus, 
introduced by Alypius, offers Augustine an opportunity to assert that eternal truth can 
in principle be revealed in the temporal and material world of flux.  Finally, it is in 
this revealed “image of truth” that the path to the happy life is discovered. 
 I will now analyze in depth three selections from Contra Academicos, which 
demonstrate that Augustine’s theology of the Incarnation is the answer to the 
difficulty raised by the Academics of the inability to know eternal truth.  The “image 
of the truth” was understood in the Soliloquies and expressed by the Skeptic position 
in Contra Academicos as “truth-like” and “probable,” with the temporal and material 
image having no real participation in eternal, immaterial truth.  Interacting first with 
Augustine’s direct discourse to Romanianus in the preface to Book II (Acad. II.1.1-
II.3.9), second, with the discussion surrounding the figure of Proteus (Acad. III.5.11-
III.6.13), and, third, with the conclusion in which Augustine reworks Plato’s 
philosophy of the sensible world as image of the world of forms (Acad. III.17.37-
III.20.45), I will demonstrate that these all contain veiled references to the Incarnation 
and are, in fact, foundational to Augustine’s attempts to overcome the skepticism of 
the Academics.
23
 
                                                          
23
 The aim of the dialogue as upholding the possibility of the instantiation of wisdom 
in the person of the incarnate Christ has not been brought out in earlier scholarship on 
Contra Academicos.  While most studies written in the first half of the twentieth 
century carefully note the philosophical attack on skepticism and the insistence that 
the intellect is able to know truth, they are unable to link the philosophical goals of the 
dialogue with Augustine’s expressed theological conclusions “never to deviate in the 
least from the authority of Christ, for I find none more powerful.” Acad. III.20.43 
(CCSL 29 61).   Cf. Prosper Alfaric, L’Évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin. I. 
Du Manicheisme au néoplatonisme (Paris: Émile Nourry, 1918), pp. 259-78, 349-58, 
and 415-28; Charles Boyer, L’Idée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin 
(Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1921), pp. 12-46; Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine’s Quest of 
Wisdom: Life and Philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945), pp. 
72-74; Fulbert Cayre, Initiation à la philosophie de saint Augustin (Paris: Études 
augustiniennes, 1947), pp. 67-70 and 97-99; Regis Jolivet, “Contra Academicos: 
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The Preface to Book II (Contra Academicos II.1-II.3) 
At the beginning of the first book of Contra Academicos, Licentius remarks on the 
task laid out for the debaters in attempting to find the happy man: “We are seeking a 
perfect man, but a man, nevertheless.”24  By analyzing the preface to Book II, I will 
suggest that the “perfect man” is the person of the incarnate Christ, later personified in 
the mythical figure of Proteus.  I will analyze the three dominant references used to 
identify the “perfect man” in the direct discourse to Romanianus in the preface to 
Book II: “wisdom,” “truth,” and “philosophy.”   
The language of “wisdom” suffuses all of Contra Academicos.  In the first 
book, Trygetius is insistent that one cannot be happy in this life, because certain 
wisdom cannot be found.  Augustine is asked to abdicate his position as judge 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Introduction,” in Bibliothèque augustinienne (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1948), 4.7-
11 and idem, Dieu soleil des esprits (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1934), pp. 3-20; 
Bernard J. Diggs, “St. Augustine Against the Academicians,” Traditio 7 (1949-51): 
73-93; Étienne Gilson, Introduction à l’étude de saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1949), 
pp. 48-55; Johannes Hessen, Augustins Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (Leiden: Brill, 
1960), pp. 19-50; Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random 
House, 1964), pp. 5-8; Jean Felix Nourrisson, La Philosophie de Saint Augustin 
(Paris: Frankfurt Minerva, 1968), pp. 53-164; Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of 
Medieval Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 30-34.  David 
Mosher has rightly noted the Cartesian underpinning present in many earlier 
twentieth-century studies of Contra Academicos.  The Cartesian quest for epistemic 
certainty is seemingly the only lens through which much traditional scholarship has 
read Contra Academicos.  More recent scholarship by Brian Harding and David 
Mosher has corrected this tendency and noted the importance of faith for Augustine’s 
epistemology; faith in the Augustinian sense as a form of knowing.  Mosher argues 
that Augustine is less concerned with proving the certainty of knowledge than he is 
with expressing an apologia for the place of faith and authority in “knowing” divine 
and human things.  Cf. David Mosher, “The Argument of St. Augustine’s Contra 
Academicos,” Augustinian Studies 12 (1981): 103.  Despite these necessary 
corrections in reading Contra Academicos as an apologia for the place of faith in 
knowledge, Mosher and Harding have not taken the argument to the next level.  
Augustine not only wants to demonstrate the possibility of attaining true wisdom in 
this life through faith, but he also wants to demonstrate that this wisdom has, in fact, 
dwelt on earth, which makes human possession of wisdom a genuine possibility.   
24
 Acad. I.3.9 (CCSL 29 8): perfectum enim quaerimus, sed tamen hominem. 
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between the two debaters in order to propose a definition of wisdom.  The definition 
he proposes is critical: “[W]isdom is the knowledge of divine and human things.”25  
While this is immediately a reference to Cicero’s definition of wisdom,26 it is also, I 
maintain, an oblique reference to the two natures of the incarnate wisdom.  The 
insurmountable gulf between the knowledge of human and of divine things surely 
entails that no one is wise, asserts Trygetius, for if we are honest with ourselves, we 
do not even really know ourselves, much less divine things.
27
  On the contrary, 
maintains Licentius, wisdom involves not just the knowledge of but also the search 
for divine and human things – knowledge refers to God and the search refers to man.28  
Trygetius quickly points out that knowing and searching are two completely different 
things.  Book One ends with the debate surrounding the definition of wisdom as the 
knowledge of divine and human things as yet unconcluded.  
The preface to Book Two contains Augustine’s apologetic appeal to 
Romanianus and seems prima facie unrelated to the discussion in Book One.  
However, when we analyze more closely the vocabulary Augustine employs to entice 
his friend into the “delightful port of wisdom” and the language Augustine uses to 
describe his own conversion narrative, we see that he is, in fact, pointing to the one 
who has knowledge of divine and human things.  Augustine is setting the stage to 
invite Romanianus to consider whether there is a way out of the skepticism of the 
Academics – a way beyond the impasse in which knowledge of divine things eludes 
those searching in this life.  In the preface to Book II, Augustine presents a theology 
                                                          
25
 Acad. I.6.16 (CCSL 29 12). 
26
 Cicero, De officiis 2.2.5; Tuscul. Quaest. 4.26.57. 
27
 “[D]ivine things are universally conceded to be higher and nobler than human 
things, how was he able to reach those things, since he knew not what he himself 
was?”  Acad. I.8.22. 
28
 Acad. I.8.23 (CCSL 29 16). 
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of the Incarnation by borrowing the metanarrative of a Plotinian philosophical 
Weltanschauung of the soul as image that goes out from the Divine and has its return 
to the Divine inscribed in its constitution.
29
  Augustine rearticulates these Plotinian 
movements first in the conversion narrative of Romanianaus and second, in 
recounting his own conversion.  In both cases Augustine blends Incarnation theology 
with Plotininian philosophy of image. 
This search for the face of wisdom necessities that “one implore divine aid 
with all devotion and piety,” for which reason, explains Augustine, “I am beseeching 
the very power and wisdom of the most high God, for what else is He whom the 
Mysteries reveal to us as the Son of God.”30  Scholarship on Contra Academicos has 
not noted the significance of this prayer.  However, when this dialogue is read as 
proposing the possibility of the Incarnation, the prayer’s significance is unmistakable.  
The prayer in this dialogue is the first time Augustine explicitly links wisdom with 
Christ and, equally significant, the prayer is situated within the context of the ecclesial 
rites (mysteria nobis) in which this truth is handed over (tradunt).  The mysteries 
celebrated in the Church, asserts Augustine, proclaim the one who fulfils the 
definition of Wisdom: the one who has knowledge of divine and human things. 
 On account of this “power and wisdom of the most high God,” Augustine 
encourages his friend not to despair of ever arriving at wisdom, because wisdom will 
show itself and will allow others to participate in his intimate knowledge of divine 
and human things.  Augustine writes, “Consequently, will that power not burst forth 
some day and change into dread and amazement the jeers of many who now despair?  
                                                          
29
 Paul Aubin describes this Plotinian movement of the soul as image in helpful ways.  
Cf. Paul Aubin “L’Image dans l’oeuvre de Plotin,” Recherches de science religieuse 
41 (1953): 348-379. 
30
 Acad. II.1.1 (CCSL 29 18): Oro autem ipsam summi dei uirtutem atque sapientiam.   
Quid est enim aliud, quem mysteria nobis tradunt dei filium?  
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And, having shown on earth some signs, as it were, of things to come, will it not 
hasten back to heaven when the burden of the entire body will have been cast off?
31
  
This assurance to Romanianus is, I believe, a description of Augustine’s early 
understanding of the Incarnation.  The divine power (uirtus) challenges the cynicism 
of the Skeptics and converts (conuertet) them of their despair of ever finding truth.  
This power is meant to alter Romanianus towards Christ, who, having spoke on the 
earth (locuta in terris), bridges the way back to heaven (recurret in caelum).  The 
dynamic between the image and its source in Plotinian cosmology is mirrored in 
Augustine’s description of the appearance of Wisdom in the soul of Romanianus.  The 
image is derived from its source and as such is revelatory of its source – showing 
signs on earth of the place from which it proceeds.  Lastly, the image is drawn to 
return to its source, to “hasten back to heaven.”  Thus, within a Plotinianan 
metaphysic of image, Augustine has linked the appearance of Wisdom within the soul 
of Romanianus to the Incarnation of wisdom.  
The preface to Book II of Contra Academicos describes the Incarnation also as 
the revelation of truth.  This is the second term to analyze in the direct discourse to 
Romanianus.  In addition to employing Plotinian cosmology to describe conversion as 
the descent of wisdom into the soul as a type of the Incarnation, Augustine also 
describes the manifestation of truth as a type of the Incarnation.  After thanking his 
generous patron for his unflagging support and his ongoing paternal care Augustine 
writes, 
 
                                                          
31
 Acad. II.1.2 (CCSL 29 19): Ergone non erumpet aliquando ista uirtus et multorum 
desperantium risus in horrorem stuporemque conuertet et locuta in terris quasi 
quaedam futurorum signa rursus proiecto totius corporis onere recurret in caelum?  
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[T]he fact that I have escaped from the chains of excessive desires; that I 
have laid aside the burdens of deadly cares, and am again breathing easily, 
recovering my senses, and returning to myself; that I am most earnestly 
engaged in the quest for the truth, and have already begun to find it; and 
that I am confident of reaching even the ultimate measure; to this you 
urged me, you drove me, you made it possible.  Whose minister you were, 
however, I have grasped to the present time by faith, more than I have 
comprehended by reason.
32
 
 
I want to note three critical elements in this passage.  First, once again we see the 
Plotinian movements of the image rearticulated as Augustine recounts his own 
intellectual conversion.   The exitus-reditus schema by which Augustine is “returning” 
to himself, is anticipated in the preceding paragraph, in which Augustine relates his 
own biographical travel itinerary.  Planning on “returning to Carthage” Augustine 
confided his plans to Romanianus, who had hesitations on account of his “innate love 
of homeland.”  Nevertheless, Romanianus acquiesced, furnishing Augustine’s journey 
for when he “dared to fly” and “sailed away.”  Augustine’s biographical travel 
itinerary mirrors the account in the paragraph under consideration, in which he details 
the spiritual movements of his soul.  Having escaped the chains of desire, Augustine 
relates to Romanianus how he has returned to himself (redeo ad me) and has 
subsequently found peace; the conversion and contemplation he has experienced 
entail that his soul has “already begun to find” truth. 
                                                          
32
 Acad. II.2.4 (CCSL 29 20): quod a superfluarum cupiditatium uinculis euolaui, 
quod depositis oneribus mortuarum curarum respiro resipisco redeo ad me, quod 
quaero intentissimus ueritatem, quod inuenire iam ingredior, quod me ad summum 
ipsum modum peruenturum esse confido, tu animasti, tu inpulisti, tu fecisti.  Cuius 
autem minister fueris, plus adhuc fide concepi quam ratione conprehendi.  
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 The second point of significance I want to focus on in paragraph Acad. II.2.4, 
is Augustine’s confidence “of reaching even the ultimate measure (summum modum)” 
of truth.  Forms of the description “ultimate measure” appear a number of times in 
Augustine’s early writings.33  Of significance is the use in De beata vita.34  The 
discussion in that text considers the consequences of equating happiness with the 
possession of wisdom.  Wisdom is defined as the “measure of the soul, that is, that 
through which the soul keeps its equilibrium.”35  When the soul contemplates wisdom 
(sapientiam contemplatur) and is not misled by the “treachery of images 
(simulacrorum),” then it can be said to posses this measure or wisdom.36  Augustine is 
explicit that this wisdom is taught by divine authority to be the Son of God who is the 
Truth.  He writes, 
 
The truth, however, receives its being though a supreme measure, from 
which it emanates and into which it is converted when perfected.  (Veritas 
autem ut sit, fit per aliquem summum modum, a quo procedit et in quem se 
perfecta conuertit.)  However, no other measure is imposed upon the 
supreme measure…. [N]either has truth ever been without measure, nor 
measure without truth.”37 
 
                                                          
33
 Acad. II.2.4 (CCSL 29 20); beata u. 4.34; div. qu. 6; nat. b. 22, 41. 
34
 See the broader discussion of “ultimate measure” in Lewis Ayres, Augustine and 
the Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 30-33. 
35
 beata u. 33 (CCSL 29 83).  Du Roy suggests that the language of modus as 
connoting a just measure or limit is derived from Cicero.  Du Roy, Intelligence, p. 
152.  Courcelle understands the dialogues as a whole to be “essentiellement 
cicéroniens, pour le fond comme pour la forme.”  Courcelle, Rehcerches, p. 255. 
36
 beata u. 33  (CCSL 29 83). 
37
 beata u. 34 (CCSL 29 84). 
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The mutual indwelling of Father and Son from eternity is expressed in the mutual 
presence of measure and truth.  Augustine writes, “Whoever attains the supreme 
measure, through the truth, is happy.  This means to have God within the soul, that is 
to enjoy God (perfrui).”38  The consubstantial union of Father and Son expressed here 
with the terms “measure” and “truth” is likewise operative in paragraph II.2.4 of 
Contra Academicos; it appears that it is in having found truth in the person of the 
incarnate Christ that Augustine gains confidence “of reaching even the ultimate 
measure.” 
Du Roy has convincingly demonstrated that Augustine’s description of 
attaining the supreme measure through truth is of Plotinian provenance.   It is Enneads 
V, asserts du Roy, “qu’il a pu s’inspirer pour décrire les relations du Père et du Fils 
comme celles de la Mesure et de la Vérite.”39  Du Roy is correct in noting that 
Augustine does not in a servile manner copy Plotinus’s philosophical system but 
rather assimilates his grand themes into his own theology.
40
  De Roy maintains that 
the treatise “The Three Primary Hypostases” (V.1) and the treatise “On the Origin and 
Order of the Beings which Come after the First” (V.2) bear particular importance in 
                                                          
38
 beata u. 34 (CCSL 29 84).   
39
 Du Roy, Intelligence, p. 157.   
40
 Du Roy’s study is representative of other contemporary French studies of 
Augustine’s writings that attempt to suggest precise referencing to the Enneads from 
which Augustine was drawing.  Similarly, see Aimé Solignac, Introduction aux 
Confessions, pp. 79-80; and Pierre Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint 
Augustin, 2nd ed. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1968).  Nello Cipriani has criticized du Roy’s 
study as overly eager to find precise correspondences with Plotinus’s Enneads.  Nello 
Cipriani, “Le Fonti Cristiane Della Dottrina Trinitaria Nei Primi Dialoghi di S. 
Agostino,” Augustinianum 34 (1994): 269.  Cipriani’s criticism of scholarship that 
uncovers more Plotinian influence than Augustine’s dialogues permit certain valid 
and pertains equally well, in my estimation, to other contemporary French studies 
mentioned.  Nevertheless, the seamless assimilation of broad philosophical themes 
into a theology can demonstrate even more influence than the enumeration of precise 
linguistic parallels, as Robert O’Connell has persuasively argued.  Cf. Robert 
O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), p. 15. 
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Augustine’s theological metaphysic.  These treatises express the origin of Intellect, 
which is established as image by gazing back at the One; Intellect proceeds from the 
One and is converted back to the One.  However, lacking in du Roy’s analysis, I 
believe, is the fact that Augustine’s primary aim in the Contra Academicos is not to 
describe the relationship between the truth and the ultimate measure, but to describe 
theologically his own conversion to the truth.  The first person singular is repeated as 
Augustine describes his earnest quest for the truth (quaero intentissimus ueritatem) 
toward which he has now begun to advance (ingredior).  It is Augustine’s certainty 
regarding the possibility of the Incarnation, that is, the possibility of coming face to 
face with wisdom, knowing eternal truth in the temporal image, that causes him such 
joy.   
The last thing to note in paragraph Acad. II.2.4 is the manner in which one 
knows the truth in this life.  The importance of faith in this dialogue has rightly been 
noted.
41
  Augustine is still “reaching” (peruenturum) for the ultimate measure and 
strenuously searching for the truth (quaero intentissimus ueritatem); he admits 
grasping God more by faith than by reason (adhuc fide concepi quam ratione 
conprehendi).  The return of the soul as image is not yet complete.  This is expressed 
with more clarity in the conclusion to De beata vita: “But, as long as we are still 
seeking, and not yet satiated by the fountain itself – to use our word – by fullness 
(plenitudo) – we must confess that we have not yet reached our measure; therefore, 
notwithstanding the help of God, we are not yet wise and happy.”42  And yet, the 
skepticism of the Academics does not have the final word – wisdom and truth can still 
                                                          
41
 Brian Harding, “Skepticism, Illumination and Christianity in Augustine’s Contra 
Academicos,” Augustinian Studies 34 (2003): 197-212; and David Mosher, “The 
Argument of St. Augustine’s Contra Academicos,” Augustinian Studies 12 (1981): 
89-113. 
42
 beata u. 35 (CCSL 29 84). 
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be known, even if they are grasped by faith.  Contra Academicos underscores that the 
way of grasping the “image of truth” is by faith.    
 In the preface to Book II, we see Augustine propose a Christian account of the 
Incarnation within a Plotinian worldview.  The description of wisdom appearing in the 
soul of Romanianus and of Augustine’s own conversion – the “recovering” of his 
senses and his “returning” to himself – is at once Christian and Plotinian.  Augustine 
was, in the words of O’Meara, “a Christian of his time who held certain views that 
were abhorrent to Neoplatonism but nevertheless had been much influenced by 
Neoplatonism in not unimportant ways.”43  Contra Academicos is committed to the 
search for the “perfect man” – the one with “knowledge of divine and human things.”  
This “quest for the truth” is revealed to be a search for the “perfect man” of wisdom.  
Knowing this truth – this “perfect man” – through faith, Augustine is “confident of 
reaching even the ultimate measure.”  
The second part of Augustine’s description of his conversion in the preface to 
Book II (Acad. II.2.5) has received much more scholarly attention.  Augustine 
describes “certain plenteous books (libri quidam pleni)” that took a hold of him and 
changed his life.  Much scholarship has been devoted to analyzing which “plenteous 
books” and which philosophy took such a hold of the young Augustine.  Philosophy is 
the third term of significance to consider in the direct discourse to Romanianus.  
Augustine explains the intellectual aspects of his conversion; despite the account’s 
brevity, it is emotive and gripping, much like the description in Confessions VII of his 
intellectual conversion after reading certain platonicorum libri.  Much attention has 
been devoted to analyzing these paragraphs (Acad. II.2.5) in light of the Confessions, 
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 John J. O’Meara, “The Neoplatonism of St. Augustine,” in Neoplatonism and 
Christian Thought, ed. Dominic J. O’Meara (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983), p, 35. 
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in an attempt to understand what occasioned Augustine to return to the religion of his 
childhood, and particularly what were the “certain plenteous books (libri quidam 
pleni) that Augustine read, which so moved him.  Augustine describes his state after 
reading these books: 
 
I was fast returning completely back to myself.  And, as if at the end of 
a journey, I looked back – I confess – to that religion which is 
implanted in us in our boyhood and interwoven in the marrow of our 
being.  Indeed, she was drawing me unknowing to herself.  And then, 
staggering, hastening, hesitating I seized [the writings of] the Apostle 
Paul…. I read through all of it with the greatest attention and care.  
And then, however small the radiance that before had surrounded the 
face of philosophy, she now appeared so great that if I was able to 
show it – I do not say to you, who even when it was unknown to you, 
still you ever burned with desire for it – to your adversary himself (as 
for him I do not know whether he is an inspiration or an impediment to 
you), then even he would cast away and abandon his seaside resort, his 
lovely gardens, his elegant, sumptuous feasting, his household 
entourage, and, finally, whatever so fiercely agitates him towards all 
kinds of pleasures.  Gazing, panting, seething as an impassioned and 
holy lover he would fly towards this beauty [of the face of 
philosophy].
44
 
                                                          
44
 Acad. II.2.5-6 (CCSL 29 21): Prorsus totus in me cursim redibam.  Respexi tamen, 
confiteor, quasi de itinere in illam religionem, quae pueris nobis insita est et 
medullitus inplicata; uerum autem ipsa ad se nescientem rapiebat.  Itaque titubans 
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In this paragraph we once again have the Plotinian language of “returning,” 
“journeying,” and “flying back,” which suffused also the first half of the preface.  
Most attention to this paragraph has been given to trying to indentify the libri quidam 
pleni that occasioned this moving conversion.  I think this paragraph is better 
understood, however, when read in light of what precedes in the rest of the preface.  I 
have noted how Augustine describes the image-like quality of truth – how it reveals 
itself and the ultimate measure while remaining ultimately grasped by faith.  This 
context accounts for Augustine’s repeated use, in the preface to Book II, of the 
expression “the face of philosophy (philosophiae facies).”  The triad of wisdom, truth 
and philosophy are clearly linked in the dialogues.  Augustine is, however, giving this 
triad a personal character – he is searching for its face.45  The religion that had been 
“implanted in us in our boyhood,” I would suggest, is faith in the person of Christ.  In 
the Confessions, Augustine writes, “When I was still a boy I heard about eternal life 
promised to us through the humility of our Lord God, coming down to our pride, and I 
was already signed with the sign of the cross and seasoned with salt from the time I 
                                                                                                                                                                      
properans haesitans arripio apostolum Paulum…. Perlegi totum intentissime atque 
castissime.  Tunc uero quantulocumque iam lumine asperso tanta se mihi 
philosophiae facies aperuit, ut non dicam tibi, qui eius incognitae fame semper arsisti, 
sed si ipsi aduersario tuo, a quo nescio utrum plus exercearis quam inpediaris, eam 
demonstrare potuissem, ne ille et baias et amoena pomeria et delicata nitida que 
conuiuia et domesticos histriones, postremo quidquid eum acriter commouet in 
quascumque delicias abiciens et relinquens ad huius pulchritudinem blandus amator 
et sanctus mirans anhelans aestuans aduolaret.  
45
 Robert O’Connell has also noted the personal character of the philosophy for which 
Augustine is searching in the Contra Academicos: “Augustine’s imagination pictures 
Philosophia, not as some bland poetical ‘personification,’ but as a vivid hypostatic 
reality, and an unmistakably personal one at that.  Once again, She is Someone who 
bears a striking resemblance to the feminine Sapientia of the Hortensius account in 
the Confessions: the Contra Academicos depicts her as having ‘breasts’ (1, 4), 
‘bosom’ and ‘lap’ (1, 3; 2,7); her “true lovers” come “burning” and “panting” with 
desire for her (1, 1-4; 2, 4-6).”  Robert O’Connell, “The Visage of Philosophy at 
Cassiciacum,” Augustinian Studies 25 (1994): 73. 
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came from my mother’s womb.”46  It is faith in the humble incarnate Christ to which 
Augustine “was fast returning … as if returning from a journey.”  This incarnational 
understanding of philosophy, wisdom and truth accounts for the repeated description 
of the “appearance” of wisdom, its “revelation,” and seeing her “face.” 
Reading Contra Academicos through this lens sheds light on the longstanding 
debate of what the libri quidam pleni consist.  John O’Meara has argued that these 
libri are Christian books rather than the neo-Platonist books as has been traditionally 
assumed.  He notes the many similarities to Book VIII of the Confessions and 
suggests that the parallels should be looked for not in Confessions VII and the 
platonicorum libros, but in Confessions VIII and “the writings of St. Paul and perhaps 
Ambrose and the hearing of the Life of Antony.”47   George Madec has questioned the 
accuracy of O’Meara’s reading.  Madec contends that these libri quidam pleni are 
better understood as neo-Platonic writings.  Of course, here Madec stands within a 
long tradition of interpretation that attempts to posit precise (often Plotinian) texts that 
Augustine read and can be seen in the dialogues and in the Confessions.
48
  
I believe Contra Academicos II.II.5 is simply not clear on whether we can 
equate the libri quidam pleni with the subsequently mentioned writings of St. Paul.  
We cannot know of which books Augustine speaks when he says that they “enkindled 
in me such a conflagration.”  What we can note is the synthesis of, the by now 
familiar Plotinian “image” language of conversion and return with Augustine’s 
renewed embrace of the religion of his childhood.  Augustine blends these two 
                                                          
46
 Conf. 1.11.17 (CCSL 27 9).   
47
 John O’Meara, “Plotinus and Augustine. Exegesis of Contra Academicos II, 
5,” Revue internationale de philosophie 24 (1970): 337. 
48
 Goulven Madec, “Pour l’interprétation de Contra Academicos II,II,5,” Revue des 
études augustiniennes 17 (1971): 322-328.   
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narratives of Christian faith in the Incarnation and a Plotinian image metaphysic in 
Acad. II.2.5, so that they reach their consummation in the first line of the following 
paragraph: “Then, philosophy’s countenance, howsoever dim the light that was cast 
upon it, revealed itself to me.”  Perhaps the “dim light” is the light of faith by which 
Augustine earlier mentioned that he grasped truth and thereby the ultimate measure.  
This strengthens the plausibility of the equation of wisdom, truth, and philosophy as 
representations of the incarnate Christ.  Upon seeing the beauty of this face, maintains 
Augustine, one would abandon all temporal and material beauties: “[T]hen would he 
forsake and relinquish seashore resorts, the beautiful parks, the delightful and elegant 
banquets, the private theatrical exhibition.”49  He would “fly” to eternal beauty, “the 
aim of his desire, and the end of his longing.”  Fleeting beauties are imitations or 
seeds (quasi sementem) of “true beauty (ueram pulchritudinem).”  However, material 
and temporal beauty can make true and eternal beauty visible.  Augustine writes, 
“[T]o the few who peer – insofar as they are permitted – intently and diligently into 
the dense entanglements, it continues to be plainly visible.”50  Philosophy’s 
countenance is revealed by looking diligently with the dim light of faith – 
contemplating the reflected beauty of truth. 
The incarnate Christ is described in the preface of Book II under the terms of 
“wisdom,” “truth,” and the “face of philosophy.”  The effort to overcome the impasse 
of Academic skepticism, that is, the despair of ever finding eternal truth in temporal 
existence, finds resolution in the one who has wisdom – in him who has knowledge of 
divine and human things.  Augustine urges Romanianus to recall his own conversion; 
Augustine also relates his conversion.  In both cases, wisdom has descended into their 
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 Acad. II.2.6 (CCSL 29 21). 
50
 Acad. II.2.6 (CCSL 29 21). 
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hearts.  This manifestation of the truth should give Romanianus hope.  Eternal truth 
can be grasped in faith and will lead even to the “ultimate measure.”  Finally, while 
“philosophy’s countenance” is seen through the dim light of faith, it is still seen to 
have a personal character.  Whether or not Augustine’s conversion was occasioned by 
reading certain neo-Platonic texts in addition to the writings of St. Paul, it is clear that 
the spiritual writings had a profound impact on him; no temporal, material beauty 
compared to the splendor of the revealed face of philosophy.   
 
Proteus (Contra Academicos III.11-III.13). 
The figure of Proteus is first mentioned by Alypius.  This is significant because it was 
Alypius who wanted to keep the name of Christ out of the dialogues in order to retain 
their philosophical integrity.
51
  In the end it is precisely on account of their 
philosophical integrity that Proteus, the “image of the truth,” is suggested at a critical 
moment in Contra Academicos to overcome the skepticism of the Academics.  
Alypius takes up the argument on behalf of the Academics and defends the two 
aphorisms “that nothing is understood” and “that assent is not to be given to 
anything.”  The “truth-like” is represented by the literary figure of Proteus, the 
“reflected image of truth (in imaginem veritatis inducitur),” explains Alypius: 
“[Proteus] is represented as being usually captured precisely when his capture was to 
be least expected.  In fact, it is said that his pursuers never laid hold on him unless 
some deity was directing them toward him.  Now if that deity be with us, and show us 
that truth which is of so much anxiety to us, then I shall admit that the Academics are 
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 In the Confessions Augustine recounts, “For at first [Alypius] was scornfully 
critical of inserting Christ’s name in my books.  He wanted them to smell of the 
‘cedars’ of the schools ‘which the Lord had now felled’ (Ps. 28: 5) rather than of the 
healthgiving herbs of the Church which are a remedy against serpents.” Conf. IX.6.7. 
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vanquished.”52  Augustine seizes the advantage by leaping on the analogy of Proteus.  
Augustine expresses his agreement with the philosophy of the Academics inasmuch as 
it refuses to absolutize the material order.  Attempting to derive certainty and stability, 
that is, eternal wisdom and truth, from transitory existence is as futile as attempting to 
grasp Proteus by the hand, for, like the temporal order, Proteus is always in a state of 
flux and change.   
Alypius uses the analogy of Proteus to demonstrate the incommensurate 
relation, maintained by the Academics, between the truth and the “truth-like.”  For 
them there could be no real relation between the two orders; knowledge of both divine 
and human things was not possible in this life.
53
  Nevertheless, the agnosticism of the 
Academy, which holds “that assent is not to be given to anything,” does not have final 
sway.  Once Proteus, “the image of truth,” is recognized for what he is as an image, 
then the seeker of wisdom and truth will no longer be forced to remain metaphysically 
ignorant among corporeal delusions of sense.  In other words, Augustine turns the 
analogy of Proteus on its head by emphasizing the positive connotations of an image; 
it need not simply be a deluding and deceptive dissemblance, but can be a 
participatory resemblance.  One can, insists Augustine, press through the image to 
partake of eternal truth.  In his various shifting forms, Proteus participates in and 
images the unchanging truth. 
 Even more significant, however, is that Augustine takes Alypius’s analogy of 
Proteus and deploys the mythical figure as an image of the incarnate Christ.  I have 
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 Acad. III.5.11 (CCSL 29 41): suamque imaginem et quasi speculum quoddam in 
Proteo illo animaduerti oportere, qui traditur eo solere capi, quo minime caperetur, 
inuestigatoresque eius numquam eundem tenuisse nisi indice alicuius modi numine.   
Quod si assit et illam nobis ueritatem, quae tantum curae est, demonstrare dignetur!  
Ego quoque uel ipsis inuitis, quod minime reor.  
53
 “[Y]ou will not be wise as long as you are living here below; wisdom is with God, 
and it cannot reach man.” Acad. III.9.20 (CCSL 29 46). 
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already suggested how in Conra Academicos Augustine uses the language of wisdom, 
truth, and the face of philosophy to refer to the incarnate Christ.  In this paragraph 
(Acad. III.5.11), “that truth” pointed out by the deity is seen in the figure of Proteus, 
who comes unrecognized into the material order as an image of eternal truth.  It is at 
this point, I maintain, that the dialogue reaches its culmination.  Augustine exclaims, 
“That is well said.  I desired absolutely nothing more.”54  It is Alypius, states 
Augustine, who has led them to the conclusion regarding who can show human beings 
truth: “Alike with brevity and piety, you have said that only some kind of deity is able 
to show a man what truth is.  Wherefore, in this discussion of ours, I have heard 
nothing more pleasing, nothing more weighty, nothing more worthy of approval, and 
– if, as I trust, that deity be present – nothing more true.”55  Augustine accepts as a 
reality what Alypius has proposed as a hypothetical but necessary condition to grasp 
truth: that a deity has pointed out Proteus, the image of the truth.  Augustine exclaims 
with elation that the mention of Proteus byAlypius is the “very best kind of 
philosophy (optimum philosophiae genus).”  This is because this is the point to which 
Augustine has been driving the dialogue all along.  Proteus is mentioned as “the very 
best kind of philosophy” and “nothing more true (nihil uerius)”56 because he is a 
literary representation of the incarnate wisdom, truth, and philosophy which the 
dialogue was committed to finding.  Augustine writes, 
 
That Proteus – so that you, boys, may see that poets are not to be entirely 
disregarded in philosophy – is portrayed after the image of the truth.  In 
poems, I say, Proteus portrays and bears the truth, which no one can lay 
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 Acad. III.5.12 (CCSL 29 41): Bene habet, inquam, prorsus nihil amplius optaui.  
55
 Acad. III.6.13 (CCSL 29 42). 
56
 Acad. III.6.13 (CCSL 29 42). 
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hold on, if he is deceived by false images, and loosens or loses his hold on 
the nodes of understanding.  For even when the truth is being grasped and, 
as it were, held in our hands, those images strive in the usual manner of 
corporeal things – to deceive and delude us through the very senses which 
we use for the needs of this life.
57
 
 
At this point it becomes quite clear that Augustine is identifying Proteus with the 
incarnate Christ.  Proteus, explains Augustine, both “portrays and bears the truth 
(ostentat sustinetque ueritatis).”  Proteus and Christ are linked in their character as 
image.  Despite them showing their face – in their appearance as the image of truth – 
their character of truth is not immediately perceived.  Although they both “show forth 
and bear the truth,” their corporeal existence “deceives and deludes.”  Proteus escapes 
the very moment he is thought to be captured and “held in our hands” because then he 
is grasped only according to his temporal and material condition; he is, then, not 
perceived as an image translucent to eternal truth (what Augustine terms “grasping 
more by faith”).  Proteus as “image of the truth” poetically attests to the possibility of 
the Incarnation – that eternal truth can be temporally revealed and embodied.  As an 
image, he does not remain in his material manifestation, for this would be “in the 
usual manner of corporeal things” to become a “false image.”  No, the “image of the 
truth” shows itself only for a time; it is revelatory of th truth, bears the truth, and is 
                                                          
57 
Acad. III.6.13 (CCSL 29 42): Proteus enim ille, ut uos adulescentes non penitus 
poetas a philosophia contemnendos esse uideatis, in imaginem ueritatis inducitur; 
ueritatis, inquam, Proteus in carminibus ostentat sustinetque personam, quam 
obtinere nemo potest, si falsis imaginibus deceptus comprehensionis nodos uel 
laxauerit uel dimiserit.  Sunt enim istae imagines, quae consuetudine rerum 
corporalium per istos, quibus ad necessaria huius uitae utimur, sensus nos, etiam cum 
ueritas tenetur et quasi habetur in manibus, decipere atque inludere moliuntur. 
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then destined to “hasten back to heaven when the burden of the entire body will have 
been cast off.”58 
 It is Alypius who has suggested the figure of Proteus as an “image of the 
truth.” Augustine exclaims with thanks that his most “intimate friend” is not only in 
agreement with him on human affairs, “but also on religion itself (religione 
concordat).”59  Alypius had initially expressed his desire to keep the name of Christ 
from the dialogues, yet in mentioning the character Proteus, the image of the truth, 
Alypius effects in Augustine such exultation precisely because Alypius, to 
Augustine’s mind, references the incarnate Christ, thereby providing an escape from 
the skepticism of the Academics.  Eternal, immaterial truth can show itself in the 
temporal, changing material world as an image of itself.  Thus, in relation to his now 
affirmed common bond with Alypius, Augustine again quotes Cicero’s definition of 
friendship at the close of this paragraph: “[A] friendly affectionate agreement on 
human things and on divine (rerum humanarum et diuinarum).”60   
Throughout the dialogue, it was held that the wise person is one who has 
knowledge of human and divine things.  The Academics deny that possibility outright.  
Proteus as a reflected image of the truth is, I have argued, a philosophical 
representation of the incarnate Christ who, having knowledge of both divine and 
human things, comes to share his wisdom, truth, and face of philosophy.  This is the 
“very best kind of philosophy,” than which there is “nothing more true,” because this 
image of truth both “bears and shows forth” the truth allowing Alypius and Augustine 
to participate in eternal wisdom as the common bond of friendship.  Sharing in the 
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 Acad. II.1.2 (CCSL 29 19). 
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 Acad. III.6.13 (CCSL 29 42). 
60
 Acad. III.6.13 (CCSL 29 42). 
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wisdom of him who is both human and divine, they now have the highest bond of 
friendship, suggests Augustine: an agreement on religion itself. 
 In De ordine, Augustine refers back to this discussion of Proteus as image of 
the truth.  Here, Augustine writes that there is a certain unity or numerical proportion 
in all the various branches of study that are perceived by reason through “reflection 
and contemplation.”61  In the temporal and material order, unity is not immediately 
perceived; the senses understand through “shadows and vestiges.”62  But as the soul 
contemplates, it approaches the number of unity and truth.  Approaching eternal truth 
through material existence is like the search for Proteus, “of whom Alypius made 
mention when we were treating of the Skeptics.”63  In the finite order, truth is grasped 
by one seeking “as if Proteus were in his hands,” but truth, like Proteus, quickly 
eludes the searcher, who cannot contemplate beyond truth’s material expression.64  
Augustine writes, “But, false images of the things which we number drift away from 
that most hidden something by which we enumerate, snatch our attention to 
themselves, and frequently make that hidden something slip away even when it has 
been already in our grasp.”65  The image becomes false, like Proteus, the moment it 
obscures and pulls away from us the truth we thought it contained.  A false image 
hides the form so that it slips away, “even when it has been already in our grasp.”  
The image is only true, for Augustine – standing firmly within the Platonic tradition – 
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 ord. 2.15.43. 
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 ord. 2.15.43. 
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 ord. 2.15.43. 
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when it is constituted in relation to eternal truth.
66
  Only when Proteus is “handed over 
by a god” does he become an “image of truth.” 
 Proteus is an image of the incarnate Christ because as a “reflected image of 
truth” he gives himself only to those who see beyond his material and temporal 
constitution the immaterial eternal reality in which they participate.  In clinging only 
to Proteus’s material existence, one is deceived; one ought rather to perceive in his 
materiality the truth that he both “bears and shows forth.”  In the face of Academic 
skepticism, Alypius’s mention of the mythical figure Proteus gives Augustine great 
hope.  Proteus is a pledge that the infinite can be contemplated through the finite and 
that truth can be perceived in the temporal order if it “is handed over by a god.” 
 
The Platonic Image and the Incarnation (Contra Academicos III.17-III.20) 
The conclusion to Contra Acadmicos is the last text I want to interact with in detail.  I 
want to demonstrate that the conclusion of this dialogue weaves together in explicit 
fashion a Plotinian metaphysic with a Christian theology of the Incarnation.  In 
describing the “descent of the Divine Intellect,” Augustine draws together the two 
aspects of his early thought that I have thus far considered (the intimation of a 
theology of the Incarnation in the search for wisdom, truth, and the face of philosophy 
and the discussion surrounding the literary figure of Proteus as an analogy of the 
incarnate Christ).  The conclusion is initiated by Augustine recapitulating the history 
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 From various angles, the dialogues present a unified understanding of the nature of 
images.  Material images are no longer false when one sees in their multiplicity and 
fragmentation the “simple, true, and certain unity” of being (ord. II.16.44); then 
Proteus is grasped not by the hands, but through contemplation.  When one is no 
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immaterial being and the nature of eternity, then “he can search after things divine – 
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of the Academics and, particularly, how they had arrived at the position that true 
wisdom cannot accrue to any person in this life.  The Academics were attempting to 
preserve the theory proposed by Plato.  “I have saved this to the last,” explains 
Augustine, “so that I might explain – if I can – what seems to have been the sole 
purpose of the Academics.”67  It turns out that their intention as the inheritors of the 
Platonic tradition was to preserve, in some way, the “two worlds” metaphysic of 
Plato.  Indeed, this is the very philosophy of participation that constitutes the 
backdrop to Augustine’s early account of image – namely, that the image is a derived 
participation in the eternal form which it serves to reveal.  Augustine writes,  
 
For my present purpose, it is sufficient that Plato held the following 
theories: that there are two worlds – an intelligible world in which the 
truth itself resides, and this sensible world which it is manifest that we 
perceive by sight and touch; that consequently the former is a true world, 
and the present world is truth-like – made unto the image of the other.68 
 
Where the reception of Plato had gone astray among the Academics, explains 
Augustine, is in severing the image from the form and unhinging the participatory 
relationship between them.  For the Academics, this had the corollary effect that 
moral action turned out to be at best an approximation of what should be done based 
                                                          
67
 Acad. III.17.37 (CCSL 29 57). 
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 Acad. III.17.37 (CCSL 29 57). Cf. Matthias Smalbrugge, “La Notion de la 
participation chez Augustin: quelques observations sur le rapport christianisme-
platonisme,” Augustiniana 40 (1990): 333-347.  Isabelle Bochet, “Le Statut de 
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on the “truth-like” or the probable.69   However, all was not lost; it was Philo who 
began to “lead the Academy and its principles back to the authority of Plato.”70  Then, 
finally when all “the persistent sophistry was dead,” “Plato’s countenance – which is 
the cleanest and brightest in philosophy – suddenly appeared, especially in 
Plotinus.”71  It is Plotinus who was so much like Plato that “they would seem to have 
lived together, but there is such a long interval of time between them that Plato is to 
be regarded as having relived in Plotinus.”72  According to Augustine, it is the 
participatory philosophy of image – lost in Academic skepticism – that is restored in 
Plotinus’s philosophy. 
In the dialogues, image is placed within the framework of a Plotinian 
participatory ontology.
73
  The two worlds are causally related.  The world of the forms 
is prior to and generates its own image in the sensible world.  This “truth-like” image 
of the material order, maintains the Soliloquia, remains in some sense false.  Moving 
from the temporal and fleeting to the eternal is like trying to grasp Proteus by the 
hand.  And so, the skepticism of the Academics seems initially insurmountable: 
“[Y]ou will not be wise as long as you are living here below; wisdom is with God and 
it cannot reach man.”74  However, the lack of participation between the two orders in 
the thought of the Academics is a departure from Plato’s vision, maintains Augustine. 
Augustine’s Plotinian patrimony, with its two-world metaphysic, entails that 
he takes seriously the arguments of the Academics that there can be no real 
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correspondence between the truth in the eternal form world and the truth-like in the 
temporal order in flux.  Ultimately, however, Augustine’s Christian theological 
commitments, particularly the doctrine of the Incarnation, vanquishes the skepticism 
of the Academics.  The central place that the figure of Proteus plays in Contra 
Academicos, I have argued, demonstrates the possibility, in Augustine’s mind, of the 
Incarnation.  The dialogue reaches its consummation when Alypius suggests Proteus 
as an image of the truth.  Proteus, as a literary representation of the elusive character 
of truth, is employed by Augustine to demonstrate the possibility of the eternal form 
of truth embodying and showing forth the truth.   
The conclusion to Contra Academicos is, perhaps, the most explicit reference 
to the incarnate Christ, and it is, once again, couched in Plotinian language.  
Augustine writes, 
 
Human reason would never lead such souls to that intelligible world if the 
most high God had not vouchsafed – through clemency toward the whole 
human race – to send the authority of the divine intellect down even to a 
human body, and caused it to dwell therein, so that souls would be 
aroused not only by divine precepts but also by divine acts, and would be 
thus enabled to reflect on themselves and to gaze upon their fatherland 
without any disputatious wrangling.
75
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 Acad. III.19.42 (CCSL 29 60): numquam ista ratio subtilissima reuocaret, nisi 
summus deus populari quadam clementia diuini intellectus auctoritatem usque ad 
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This quotation should be read in two complementary ways.  First, a Plotinian 
metaphysic is obviously operative.  The divine Intellect endows reason and soul so 
that soul comes from the intelligible world to the sensible world; this constitutes the 
fall of the soul into the body.  After this, the soul returns to the fatherland (resipiscere 
patriam) through contemplation and reflecting on itself and its divine origin.  This 
entire movement comports with a Plotinian cosmogony and its understanding of the 
soul as image.   
The second way in which I believe this text should be read is as a description 
of the Incarnation.  It is the mercy of God that comes to span the abyss between the 
two worlds.  The clemency of God towards the whole human race is not a particularly 
Plotinian theme and is, of course, the ratio of the Incarnation.  The phrase “authority 
of the divine intellect (diuini intellectus auctoritatem)” anticipates the use of 
auctoritas in the next paragraph, when Augustine writes, “[W]e are impelled toward 
knowledge by a twofold force: the force of authority and the force of reason.  And I 
am resolved never to deviate in the least from the authority of Christ (Christi 
auctoritate), for I find none more powerful.”76  The sending of the “authority of the 
divine intellect” anticipates the authority of the incarnate Christ come “down even to a 
human body.”  It is the Incarnation that allows souls to return to God, having been 
taught by divine precepts and restored by divine actions.   
It is significant that Augustine notes that the authority of the divine intellect 
comes not only with divine precepts but also with divine actions (non solum 
praeceptis sed etiam factis).  Throughout Contra Academicos, it is alleged that the 
tenets of skepticism particular to the Academics lead to moral uncertainty; without 
knowledge as to what “is” one can never derive an “ought.”  “The Academics were of 
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the opinion,” explains Augustine, “that certain knowledge (scientia) cannot accrue to 
a man with respect to those things precisely which pertain to philosophy.”77  In an 
attempt to extricate themselves from the charge that by accepting nothing as true they 
were relegated to a life of inactivity and the eschewal of all responsibilities, the 
Academics proposed that for moral action they would follow what was “probable” or 
“truth-like.”78  Augustine pointed out that surely this position is absurd: as one cannot 
allege that a person resembles another whom he has never seen, so too one who has 
never seen the truth cannot make a judgment as to what is “truth-like.”  And yet, 
Contra Academicos is emphatic that knowing the truth is vital to doing the truth.  
Augustine writes, 
The present question concerns our life, our morals, and the soul, which – 
destined to return to heaven when rendered more secure, now returning, as 
it were, to the region of its origin – presumes that it will overcome the 
opposition of all deceptive appearances; that, when it will have 
comprehended the truth, it will subdue inordinate desires; and that, when 
it will have thus become wedded, as it were to temperance, it will exercise 
sovereign power.
79
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simile nominabant, nullo modo cessare sapientem ab officiis asserebant, cum haberet 
quid sequeretur, ueritas autem siue propter naturae tenebras quasdam siue propter 
similitudinem rerum uel obruta uel confusa latitaret.)” 
79
 Acad. II.9.22 (CCSL 29 30): De uita nostra de moribus de animo res agitur, qui se 
superaturum inimicitias omnium fallaciarum et ueritate conprehensa quasi in 
regionem suae originis rediens triumphaturum de libidinibus atque ita temperantia 
uelut coniuge accepta regnaturum esse praesumit securior rediturus in caelum. 
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Augustine is adamant that knowing the truth is fundamental to the katharsis requisite 
to the return of the soul.  If the Academics are correct that knowledge constitutes at 
best an approximation of the “truth-like” with no real relation to the truth itself, then 
one is condemned to be overcome by “deceptive appearances (fallaciarum)”80 never 
reaching the end of the soul’s longings.  The rub lies in the epistemic challenge of 
coming to know the immaterial and changeless truth while living in a state of change 
and flux.  The Academics deny this possibility outright.  Augustine agrees that eternal 
truth is not located in the transitory material order.  Further, he concedes to the 
Skeptics that corporeal existence mocks those who attempt to grasp eternal truth 
therein, as Proteus disappears the moment he is thought to be grasped by the hand.  
And yet there must be some real relation between the material, temporal order and the 
immaterial and eternal order.  “This is an important controversy,” insists Augustine “it 
is not one of mere words; it deals with realities.”81 
The Incarnation, a manifestation of the clemency of the most high God, offers 
a bridge to true knowledge and moral action, so that having knowledge of human and 
divine things, that is, by participating in wisdom, truth and philosophy one can live 
according to eternal precepts while dwelling in a state of flux.  The “authority of the 
divine intellect” comes down to dwell even in a human body, maintains Augustine, 
and it thereby models in action the truth it teaches with divine precepts (non solum 
praeceptis sed etiam factis).  It is thus the Incarnation that ultimately overcomes both 
the intellectual and the moral skepticism of the Academics. 
The conclusion to Contra Academicos is more explicit then the rest of the 
dialogue.  The difficulty of the Academics, namely, that truth cannot be known in this 
                                                          
80
 Acad. II.9.22 (CCSL 29 30). 
81
 Acad. II.10.24 (CCSL 29 31). 
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life because no relation exists between immaterial truth and material existence, is 
overcome by Augustine’s theology of the Incarnation.  In Plotinus’s restoration of 
Plato’s two-world metaphysic, Augustine finds philosophical warrant for the descent 
of the divine Intellect, which allows for the return of the soul to participate in the 
higher, more stable realm.  Augustine seamlessly weaves together the two traditions 
of the soul’s descent from and ascent back to the divine Intellect in Plotinian 
cosmogony and the Christian account of the Incarnation.  As such, divine authority 
lives the truth in a human body, thereby linking the truth and the “truth-like,” 
allowing for moral certainty in a state of flux. 
208 
 
Chapter VI: The Analogical and Embodied Imago Dei 
 
The preceding two chapters have proposed a theology of image operative in the 
Cassiciacum dialogues.  In the Soliloquies, Augustine is particularly attentive to the 
dual nature of an image: on the one hand, an image serves to reflect that from which it 
is derived, but on the other hand, it is deceptive; it simulates and imitates, claiming to 
be a substance when it is in fact a lack of substance.  Contra Academicos, however, 
suggests that this negative evaluation of image is, ultimately, incorrect.  In this 
dialogue, Augustine is intent to assert, against the skepticism of the New Academy, 
that a participatory relation obtains between the image and its source.  The 
fundamental nature of an image is to participate in and show forth that of which it is 
an image.  Contra Academicos is committed to defending the proposition that the 
Skeptic position is not unassailable; that truth can be known in the finite order, albeit 
through an image.  Certainly, the temporal, material image remains deceptive when its 
nature as an image is forgotten, that is to say, when the image is absolutized as 
existing apart from its source.  Augustine is explicit that this participatory 
understanding of an image is consonant with the Platonic tradition, finding its best 
expression in Plotinus.  It is this participatory, Plotinian philosophy of image, 
developed in the Cassiciacusm dialogues, that serves as the groundwork for 
Augustine’s early theology of the human imago dei.  
In the first three chapters, I considered three key pro-Nicene theologies of 
image with which Augustine was familiar.  For Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose the 
imago dei was primarily a Christological referent but, nevertheless, had implications 
for their anthropology, as the created image mirrors the eternal image.  How does 
Augustine understand the relation between Christ as image of God and the human 
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person as image of God?  For the preceding pro-Nicene tradition “image” language 
principally identified the unity of substance between Father and Son; “image” 
expressed equality.  As such, Hilary, Victorinus and Ambrose had difficulty affirming 
outright that the human person was constituted in the imago dei.  In this chapter I will 
argue that Augustine breaks with this pro-Nicene tradition in a significant way.  
Rather than positing a contrast between Christ the image and the human person as 
likeness Augustine broadens the language of “image” to include both Christ and the 
human person.  In doing so, he builds on the philosophy of image operative at 
Cassiciacum, by insisting that there are varying ways in which an image can 
participate in its source.  
Augustine is somewhat removed from the fires of controversy that forged the 
theologies of image of his immediate Latin progenitors, and his early theology already 
departs from simply equating the Son’s “image” with identity of substance.  In his 
interaction with the concept of “image” in Diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus and 
in De quantitate animae Augustine offers a nascent theology of “analogy,” which 
enables him to affirm that there are various ways in which an image can participate in 
its source.  As such, he offers a different answer to the common question of how the 
imago dei pertains both to Christ and to the human person.  His account of image is 
exegetically nuanced, while at the same time he regards both the Son and the human 
person as image of God in a way that eluded his predecessors.  Thus, the first part of 
this chapter will demonstrate that, for Augustine, images do not imply equality.  As 
such, Augustine can deploy “image” language to bespeak both Christ and the human 
person in a manner that his pro-Nicene forbearers were simply not able to envision. 
The second half of this chapter will build on Augustine’s understanding of the 
human person as image.  If the human person can, unequivocally, be termed the 
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imago dei, what does this mean for his embodied state?  Engaging especially 
Augustine’s first commentary on Genesis, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, I will argue 
that despite locating the imago dei in the human person’s immaterial, intellectual 
faculties, Augustine does preserve an integrated account of the body-soul relation.  
Thus, while the African theologian does distinguish between body and soul, his early 
theology, nevertheless, is careful to avoid any dualistic conclusions about the image 
of God in the human person. 
 
Analogia, Aequalitas, and the Imago 
I outlined in chapter one how Hilary builds on the anti-Monarchian theology of 
Tertullian and Novatian to present an account of image that affirms the equality of 
Father and Son.  Christ’s nature as image does not lessen his status in relation to the 
Father.  Attempting to educate Latin bishops about the Eastern theology of the 
homoousion, Hilary uses the language of “image” to identify the relationship between 
Father and Son.  “Image” expresses ontological identity between the image and its 
source.  For Hilary, the “image of God” necessarily shares the properties of the 
Father.  Image, then, denotes equality of nature.  Hilary marshals Colossians 1:15 to 
demonstrate the shared creative power of image and source.  Likewise, this verse 
demonstrates the invisible nature that the image shares with the Father.  
Unsurprisingly, the Christological identification of image as denoting co-equality and 
unity of divine substance entails that Hilary cannot refer to the human person as 
“image” in the same sense.  Hilary’s exegesis of Genesis 1:26 refers to the human 
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person as created ad imaginem dei (towards the image of God).
1
  Ad imaginem 
preserves the ontological distinction between Christ, who is unequivocally the imago 
dei (because he partakes of the divine substance), and the human person, who has the 
character of the image of God.  In short, in chapter one I argued that the Nicene 
debate informed Hilary’s exegesis of Colossians 1:15 and Genesis 1:26 and 
committed him to interpreting “image of God” as coequality with God, so that imago 
dei was a Christological rather than an anthropological term. 
In many ways, Victorinus’s theology follows that of Hilary.  Writing 
contemporaneously with Hilary in the first half of the fourth century, Marius 
Victorinus came to similar conclusions in his exegesis of Colossians 1:15 and Genesis 
1:26.  While material images are derivative and secondary, Christ as image of God is 
utterly simple and as image shares everything with his divine source.  Victorinus is 
intent on defending the homoousion with recourse to image theology.  Just as Hilary, 
so too Victorinus defends the theology of Christ as the consubstantial image of the 
Father by appealing to the unity of operations manifest in the creation account, which 
Victorinus describes in his exegesis of Colossians 1:15-16.  I suggested in chapter two 
that the Nicene Trinitarianism that Victorinus defends is evident also in his exegesis 
of Genesis 1:26.  He, therefore, quite simply asserts that the human person is not 
made in the image of God, and is instead made secundum imaginem.  Victorinus’s 
strict identification of image and substance entails that, because the human person is 
radically dissimilar in substance from God, he can only be said to be created 
secundum imaginem.  Thus, for Victorinus, the term homoiousios (similar or like with 
                                                          
1
 Hilary, Psal. 118. iod, 7 (CCSL 61A, 92): Non Dei imago, quia imago Dei est 
primogenitus omnis creaturae; sed ad imaginem, id est secundum imaginis et 
similitudinis speciem.  
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respect to being) expresses the relation of the human soul to God rather than the 
relation of eternal Son to the Father.  
Finally, in chapter three I considered Ambrose’s theology of image.  As with 
other pro-Nicenes, so with Ambrose, Christology drives his theology of the imago dei.  
Christ is principally the image of God – with all the Nicene implications regarding 
unity of substance that accompany that claim.  However, in significant ways, 
Ambrose’s theology anticipates that of Augustine.  Ambrose devotes considerable 
attention to the nature of embodied existence in relation to the image of God in the 
human person.  I suggested that “body” is understood in two ways in Ambrose.  There 
is in the first place an insistence on the integral, composite nature of body and soul, 
which Ambrose describes as a harmoniously constituted unity.  However, there is also 
a Pauline understanding of the body as a body of death that wars against the soul.  It is 
in connection with this latter, negative sense of “body” that Ambrose draws on the 
Plotinian tradition, suggesting that the soul ought to “escape” the body. 
Before considering how Augustine develops theology of the image of God 
consonant with that of Ambrose with respect to the understanding of the body-soul 
composite, I want to pose the same question to Augustine’s early theology that I 
considered in Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose: how is the human person to be 
understood as the imago dei, given that this term is loaded with Nicene Christological 
implications?  As heir to a Nicene legacy that associates image with unity of divine 
substance, how is Augustine able to retain the language of the imago dei to bespeak 
the human person?  The pro-Nicenes I considered in the first three chapters described 
the human person as fashioned secundum imaginem or ad imaginem.  Augustine is 
clearly familiar with this tradition.  In De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 51.4 
Augustine interacts with the position of those who maintain a distinction between ad 
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imaginem dei and imago dei.  While Augustine recognizes the possibility of retaining 
this neat partition in a fashion similar to Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose, he 
ultimately is explicit in refusing to travel down that road.
2
  As if to underscore this 
sentiment, Augustine notes in the Retractationes that although he had distinguished in 
De diversis quaestionibus 51.4 between the image of God simpliciter and being made 
according to the image of God (ad imaginem dei), nonetheless both descriptions apply 
to the human person, since Scripture asserts both that the human person is the image 
and glory of God (1 Corinthians 11:7) and that he is made according to (ad) the image 
of God.  Quoting his early work, De diversis quaestionibus 51.4, Augustine writes in 
the Retractationes, 
 
I also said, ‘Neither is this distinction useless – that the image and 
likeness of God is one thing, and being in the image and likeness of 
God, as we understand that man was made, is another.’  This must not 
be understood as though man is not called the image of God (non 
dicatur imago dei), since the Apostle says, A man should certainly not 
cover his head, because he is the image and the glory of God (I Cor 
11:7).  But he is also said to be in the image of God (ad imaginem dei), 
which is not the case with the Only-Begotten, who is only the image 
and not in in the image (tantummodo imago est non ad imaginem).
3
 
 
                                                          
2
 Quaest. 51.4 (CCSL 44A 81): Neque inscite distinguitur, quod aliud sit imago et 
similitudo dei, qui etiam filius dicitur, aliud ad imaginem et similitudinem dei, sicut 
hominem factum accipimus.   
3
 Retrat. I.26 (CCSL 57 81). 
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Thus, only Christ is not ad imaginem, but simply the imago; nevertheless, the human 
person can without qualification also be called imago.
4
   
The Nicene debate committed Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose to 
understanding imago in reference to the eternal Son of God in light of Colossians 
1:15.  They were, therefore, compelled to strictly identify imago and aequalitas.  
Within the context of the Nicene debate, the human person could not be referred to as 
a created imago, but only as created ad imaginem.  Augustine recognized the 
scriptural and theological conundrum that this position created: first, it could not be 
aligned with the Pauline description of the human person as imago (I Cor. 11:7) and, 
second, it vitiated the very doctrine that image theology was meant to preserve, 
namely, the close relationship between the human person and God, that is to say, 
between the image and its source.  In De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus (388-
396), Augustine attempts to resolve the problem in such a way that he can both refer 
to the human person as imago dei and preserve the unique nature of the Nicene 
Christological referent of imago dei.  This work is a series of 83 questions, some of 
which originated in conversations between Augustine and his confreres at 
Cassiciacum.  A number of the questions interact with the theology of image, and it 
was clearly a source of frequent conversation during Augustine’s time of 
contemplative leisure.
5
   In question 74, Augustine introduces a philosophical 
                                                          
4
 Retrat. I.26 (CCSL 57 81): quod non ita est intellegendum, quasi homo non dicatur 
imago dei, cum dicat apostolus: uir quidem non debet uelare caput, cum sit imago et 
gloria dei, sed dicitur etiam ad imaginem dei, quod unigenitus non dicitur, qui 
tantummodo imago est non ad imaginem. 
5
 The historicity of the dialogues has obvious import for the historicity of the 
questions “discussed” in De diversis quaestionibus.  In Retractationes I.26 Augustine 
does not indicate how the questions were discussed, in what order, or how they were 
recorded.  Cf.  Goulven Madec, “L’Historicité des Dialogues de Cassiciacum,” Revue 
des études augustiniennes 32 (1986): 207-231; John O’Meara, “The Historicity of the 
Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine,” Vigiliae christianae 5 (1951): 150-178.  While 
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distinction predicated on the term aequalitas; he insists that not all images are equal to 
their source.  Augustine writes, “Where there is an image there is necessarily a 
likeness but not necessarily equality…. But when ‘not necessary’ is said, it means that 
is can sometimes exist.”6  Ostensibly, one instance in which an image is equal is that 
of Christ.   
Not all commentators agree that aequalitas functions in such a significant 
manner in Augustine’s early theology of the imago dei.  Robert Markus has suggested 
that Augustine’s early writings follow the conventional distinction articulated by 
Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose.  Markus maintains that just as his predecessors, so 
Augustine in his early writings preserves imago for Christ and employs ad imaginem 
for the human person.
7
  This traditional Nicene distinction Markus sees as “belonging 
to a comparably primitive stage in the development of Augustine’s thought.”8  It is in 
De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 51.4 and De Genesi ad litteram liber 
imperfectus 16.58 (393-394) that Markus suggests one can see the proximity of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
admitting that some elements regarding the setting of the dialogue and the people 
involved may be historically accurate, O’Meara concludes that on the whole the 
dialogues are “emphatically not reliable,” but are rather imitations of Ciceronian 
models.  O’Meara, “Historicity of the Early Dialogues,” 178. 
6
 Quaest. 74 (CCSL 44A 213). 
7
 In a very impressive recent study Luigi Gioia follows Robert Markus’s reading of 
De diversis quaestionibus 51.4: “Only the Son is ‘the image and the likeness’ of God; 
we are ‘to the image and to the likeness of God.’”  The Theological Epistemology of 
Augustine’s De Trinitate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 235.  Augustine 
does mention this distinction: “Neither is this distinction useless – that the image and 
likeness of God (imago et similitudinem) which is called the Son, is one thing, and 
being in the image and likeness of God (ad imaginem et similitdinem dei), as we 
understand that humankind was made, is another.” Quaest. 51.4 (CCSL 44A 81).   
While Augustine knows the previous Latin tradition that distinguishes between ad 
imaginem and imago, and even describes the distinction as “not useless,” I believe 
that he also wants to affirm that the human person is the imago dei.  In other words, 
he does not use ad imaginem dei as the preceding Latin tradition did, namely as a term 
for human beings in contrast to the Christological title; instead, for Augustine, both 
terms can be applied to the human person.   
8
 Robert Markus, “‘Imago’ and ‘similitudo’ in Augustine,” Revue des études 
augustiniennes 10 (1964): 133. 
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Augustine’s early thought to that of his Nicene predecessors.  For Markus, it is only in 
Augustine’s more mature works, starting with De diversis quaestionibus 74, that he 
describes the human person, without qualification, as imago dei. 
Augustine’s discussion of the distinction between imago and ad imaginem in 
De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 51.4 is evidence, for Markus, of 
Augustine’s early adherence to the pro-Nicene distinction of these terms.  Further, in 
De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus Augustine inquires why the human person is 
said to be created in the image and likeness.  Would not one term have sufficed?  The 
tentative answer he gives is that perhaps Scripture intends to teach “that what was 
called the image is not like God as though participating in any likeness, but is the very 
likeness in which all things participate which are said to be like.”9  I do not think that 
these two passages demonstrate that Augustine is marching in step with the pro-
Nicene distinction between the Christological imago dei and the anthropological ad 
imaginem dei.  Rather, when Augustine distinguishes in De Genesi ad litteram liber 
imperfectus between participating being and the being in which all participate he 
articulates a typically Platonic participatory ontology, arguing that all created being – 
particularly in this case the human person – is created in and exists through the Son.10  
I believe, therefore, that one can still take at face value Augustine’s remarks in 
Retractationes I.26 that he did not intend the distinction between ad imaginem and 
imago in De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 51.4 to imply that only the first 
applies to the human person.  Thus, while in these two earlier works, we can see 
Augustine affirming the Nicene anthropological term of ad imaginem, this does not 
imply that Augustine disqualifies the use of imago dei to bespeak the human person. 
                                                          
9 Gen. imp. 16.58 (CSEL 28 498-99).  
10
 Gen. imp. 16.60 (CSEL 28 500): Rationalis itaque substantia et per ipsam facta est 
et ad ipsam. 
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The significance of Augustine’s early use of aequalitas in the discussion of the 
imago dei has not received the attention it deserves.  I want to suggest that it is 
precisely Augustine’s early use of aequalitas that affords him a nascent doctrine of 
analogy with all of its accompanying theological leverage.  Augustine’s Latin 
predecessors do not use the term with the same theological significance; Augustine 
maintains that both Christ and the human person can be described as imago dei 
because not all images are equal to their source.  Augustine’s unique use of aequalitas 
in his early works becomes clear in De quantitate animae and De diversis 
quaestionibus octoginta tribus, and Augustine’s unique use of aequalitas is evident 
particularly in light of Victorinus’s use of the term. 
At the beginning of the dialogue on the soul, De quantitate animae, Evodius 
demands to know about the soul’s nature, particularly how it is like God who made it, 
as Augustine had just asserted (uidetur mihi esse deo similis).
11
  Augustine responds 
that a relation must exist between Creator and creation as is the case with human 
creations, which are like their original.  Evodius notes that surely the vast ontological 
void between mortal and immortal renders any likeness naught.  On the contrary, a 
true connection still exists, insists Augustine: “Just as the image of your body is not 
able to do what your body can do, so it is not surprising if the soul does not possess 
the same power as He in whose likeness it has been made.”12  Augustine uses the 
analogy of a human image in a mirror or in a picture, which is vastly different in 
nature and power from an actual person, in order to explain that despite the 
                                                          
11
 Quant. an. 2.3 (CSEL 89 133).  That the soul as image is “like” God entails a 
dynamic movement of return, so that image theology is woven into Augustine’s early 
theology of ascent.  Cf. “De Quantitate Animae” in Prayer and Spirituality in the 
Early Church, vol. 2, eds. P. Allen, W. Mayer and L. Cross (Brisbane: Australian 
Catholic University Press, 1999), pp. 197-215.  
12
 Quant. an. 2.3 (CSEL 89 134).  
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metaphysical distance there is a real participation of the human soul in the God whom 
it images.  De quantitate animae is the first instance in Augustine’s writings on 
“image” in which he employs a doctrine of analogy to speak of human participation in 
the image in God.  Analogy, therefore, becomes the fulcrum for Augustine’s attempt 
to explain the relation between the image and its source.
13
 
 A thing can be like God in many ways, writes Augustine in Question 51 of De 
diversis quaestionibus: Multis enim modis dici res possunt similes deo.
14
  Because 
God made all things very good and He himself is the supreme good, there are varying 
degrees of participation in God’s goodness and being.  Only a few creatures are 
endowed with wisdom and virtue, participating in God’s “uncreated virtue and 
wisdom.”15  Other creatures are not endowed with reason and will, but share in his life 
                                                          
13
 I speak of “analogy” in Augustine in a broad theological sense and with awareness 
that Augustine himself was not fond of the term.  The theological precision that 
accompanies the term in later Scholastic discourse is clearly unknown to Augustine, 
and Lewis Ayres’s warning is salubrious: “[Scholars] have been somewhat careless 
and imprecise by the very use of the word ‘analogy’ to describe the ‘likenesses’ that 
Augustine explores.”  Lewis Ayres, “Remember That You are Catholic (Serm. 52.2): 
Augustine on the Unity of the Triune God,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 8 
(2000): 59.  Scholarship on Augustine’s use of “analogy” is rightly described as 
imprecise precisely because Augustine does not use the term except in De musica 
with respect to a harmonious relation and in serm. 52.5 to explicitly reject the concept 
of an “analogy” between God and the creature.   In that sermon Augustine writes, “I 
do not say that these three things are in any way to be equated with the Holy Trinity, 
as if arranged according to an analogy (analogia), or according to a ratio of 
comparison (ratio comparationis). This I do not say.” serm. 52.23 (PL 38:364): Non 
dico ista illi Trinitati velut aequanda, quasi ad analogiam, id est, ad rationem 
quamdam comparationis dirigenda: non hoc dico.   Thus, Ayres’s suggested caution 
is predicated on a perspicacious observation: “Simply put, Augustine never directly 
uses analogia or proportio to describe the relationship between God and any aspect of 
the creation.” Ayres, “Remember That You are Catholic,” 61.  What Augustine is 
objecting to in serm. 52.5 is what later will be termed an analogy of proper 
proportionality.  At the same time, all theological discourse is, in the final analysis, 
“analogical.”  It is this broader sense of “theology as analogy” that underwrites 
Augustine’s question proposed in De quantitate animae: how is the soul like God who 
made it? 
14
 Quaest. 51.2 (CCSL 44A 79). 
15
 Quaest. 51.2 (CCSL 44A 79). 
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“because he is most excellently and primordially alive.”16  Still other creatures only 
exist and have being; this they too have by sharing in him who exists most properly.  
All these ways of being have a “likeness” to God.  Analogical predication of the 
imago dei is not simply a logical construct or a case of verbal semantics, but bespeaks 
a genuine participated relationship.  God is the supreme good from whom all good 
proceeds.  Creatures who share in the wisdom of God are so near to his likeness that 
no other creatures share this proximity: “Hence when someone can partake of wisdom 
according to the inner person, he is to such a degree in accordance with his image 
(secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem) that no nature may be placed between them, 
and so there is nothing that is more united to God.”17  Being and goodness exist in 
many ways, suggests Augustine, because there are many modes of participation in 
God’s being and goodness. The human person who shares in the wisdom of God is 
“so close to that likeness that among creatures there is nothing closer.”18  It is 
necessary that the higher contains the lower, and so creatures that share in the wisdom 
of God necessarily share in his existence and life, maintains Augustine in De diversis 
quaestionibus 51.  The outer man participates in God as likeness inasmuch as it is 
exists and is alive; the inner man, however, participates in God as image in the highest 
way possible for the creature: by sharing in divine wisdom. 
                                                          
16
 Quaest. 51.2 (CCSL 44A 79). 
17
 Quaest. 51.2 (CCSL 44A 80): Quare cum homo possit particeps esse sapientiae 
secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura 
interposita formetur, et ideo nihil sit deo coniunctius.  The various degrees of 
participation in God’s goodness is a perennial theme in Augustine’s corpus.  Cf. Trin. 
VIII.5: “And thus it is that there would be no changeable good thing unless there were 
an unchangeable good.  So when you hear a good this and a good that which can at 
other times also be called not good, if without these things, that are good by 
participation in the good, you can perceive good itself by participating in which these 
other things are good – and you understand it together with them when you hear a 
good this or that – if then you can put them aside and perceive good itself, you will 
perceive God.”  
18
 Quaest. 51.2 (CCSL 44A 80). 
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 The notion of various modes of participation in God outlined in De diversis 
quaestionibus 51 is unabashedly Plotinian.  As one moves farther from the pure light 
of the One, obscurity dims the rays that shine so clearly near the One; nevertheless, 
they are never completely eradicated – a trace of the Divine remains in all being.19  
Augustine writes, “And so the things that only exist and yet are not alive are not wise 
(sapiunt) and are not perfectly but tenuously in his likeness, because they are good in 
their own rank, whereas he is good above all things, and from him their goodness 
comes.”20  Augustine, therefore, places his theology of the image and likeness of God 
within the framework of a participatory emanation philosophy. 
While Augustine affirms that the vestigia dei radiate from all being and life, so 
that all of creation bears a “likeness” to God, human beings are able by the inner man 
to participate in a unique way in the wisdom of God and are the only creatures created 
in the imago dei.
21
  Augustine thus introduces in Question 51 of De diversis 
quaestionibus a distinction between similitudo and imago based on an account of 
analogy and, on this score, affirms that the human person can be termed imago 
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 Paul Aubin has noted the Plotinian influence in Augustine’s theology of image.  He 
writes, “C’est dans l’instantané, une dégradation de la réalité suprème, un peu comme 
un éparpillement centrifuge, une dispersion lumineuse.”  Paul Aubin, “‘L’Image’ dans 
l’oeuvre de Plotin,” Recherches de science religieuse 41 (1953): 347-79.  
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21 In Quaest. 67.4 (CCSL 44A 167) Augustine remarks that after the Fall “the mark of 
the image was lost because of sin and the creature alone remained.”  However, he 
goes on to say that this is not a cause for despair, because creation itself shall be 
liberated, as the Apostle Paul teaches in Romans.  The creature shall be transformed 
into a son of God.  Much later, in his Retractationes, Augustine asserts that he did not 
intend to say that the imago dei was lost entirely; rather, the call to conversion was a 
call to the restoration of the imago, a call that would have been futile if the image had 
been completely lost: dixi: Et ipsa creatura, id est ipse homo, cum iam signaculo 
imaginis propter peccatum amisso remansit tantummodo creatura.  Quod non ita est 
accipiendum, quasi totum amiserit homo quod habebat imagines dei.  Nam si omnino 
non amisisset, non esset propter quod diceretur: Reformamini in nouitate mentis 
uestrae.  Retrat. I.26 (CCSL 57 84-5). 
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because imago does not necessarily imply aequalitas, while there are also varying 
degrees of likeness of participation in God.  Question 51 concludes with an analysis of 
this distinction between “image” and “likeness.”  Because analogy bespeaks a real 
relation of passive participation, Augustine wants to distance himself from those who 
sever the two terms “image” and “likeness.”  He is, therefore, is unique from the pro-
Nicenes considered in the first three chapters, Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose, who 
understand “likeness” as a predicate of dissimilarity.  In the Nicene context “likeness” 
is the language of the homoiousion; similitude of being is by definition differentiation 
of nature.  Similitudo was for them reserved for the human person and was to be held 
in contrast with imago – the term reserved for Christ, who is homoousios with the 
Father.  De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 51.4 indicates that Augustine has a 
different understanding of these two terms.  He writes, “[E]very image is in fact a 
likeness (quia omnis quidem imago similis est).”22  Augustine is intent on preserving 
the union between image and likeness.   
It is essential to look at one last text, also from De diversis quaestionibus.  In 
Question 74 Augustine offers a rigorous and clear delineation of the terms imago, 
similitudo and aequalitas.  For my purposes it is necessary to quote the passage in 
full: 
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 Quaest. 51.4 (CCSL 44A 82).  Robert Markus has pointed out the uniqueness of 
Augustine’s position within both the Greek and the Latin traditions.  As far back as 
Irenaeus, the “image” was constituted in creation, and the “likeness” was something 
that the human person matured towards and which awaited its fulfillment in the 
eschaton.  Augustine, however, allows a considerable amount of overlap between the 
terms.  Markus, “‘Imago’ and ‘similitudo’ in Augustine.”  Cf. Pierre Hadot, “L’Image 
de la Trinité dans l’âme chez Victorinus et chez saint Augustin,” Studia Patristica 6 
(1962): 409-42. 
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Image and equality and likeness must be differentiated, because where 
there is an image there is necessarily a likeness but not necessarily 
equality; where there is equality there is necessarily a likeness but not 
necessarily an image; where there is a likeness there is not necessarily an 
image and not necessarily equality, as in a person’s image in a mirror: 
because it is a reflection of him it must also be a likeness, but there is no 
equality because many things are lacking to the image that are in the thing 
whose reflection it is.  Where there is equality there is necessarily a 
likeness but not necessarily an image, as in the case of two of the same 
eggs: because there is equality there is also a likeness, for whatever 
properties one of them has the other has as well, but there is no image 
because neither of them is a reflection of the other.  Where there is a 
likeness there is not necessarily an image and not necessarily equality; to 
be sure, every egg is like every other egg inasmuch as it is an egg, but a 
partridge egg, although it is like a chicken egg inasmuch as it is an egg, is 
nonetheless not its image because it is not a reflection of it, nor is it its 
equal because it is smaller and contains another kind of animal.
23
 
 
A summary of Augustine’s explanation yields the following: 
 
Image implies likeness but not necessarily equality.  Example: a mirror. 
Equality implies likeness but not necessarily image.  Example: two eggs. 
Likeness does not not necessarily imply either an image or equality.  Example: 
partridge egg and chicken egg. 
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Image expresses a relationship of origin, but the relationship to the originating source 
can either be or not be one of equality as the example of the mirror illustrates.  The 
anticipated theological implication is that the begotten Son of God is an image that 
has perfect aequalitas, while created sons of God are images that do not possess 
aequalitas.  Equality, on the other hand, while it implies likeness, does not necessarily 
imply image, as the example of the two similar eggs illustrates.  They look alike, but 
they do not reflect each other.  Likeness, lastly, necessitates neither an image nor 
equality, as the example of the two eggs from different birds illustrates.  Augustine 
goes on to write that “not necessarily” means that at times an image may include 
equality.  Thus, the Son of God is both the image of the Father by derivation and his 
equal by way of divinity, while he is also the Father’s very likeness. 
 The introduction of the term aequalitas in the discussion of image and likeness 
offers Augustine a new avenue through which to approach the issue that had been 
problematic in De diversis quaestionibus 51, namely the various ways in which 
something can be “like” God: multis enim modis dici res possunt similes deo.24  
Various types of being participate in God in different ways, seeing that all being 
shares in his likeness.  Augustine wants to reserve imago for the human person, who 
participates in “wisdom according to the inner person.”  Aequalitas provides a further 
distinction necessary under the category of imago, as it helps to explain how it is that 
both the Son of God and created human beings are called “image of God.”  The 
traditional distinction employed by the Nicenes reserved imago for the Son and ad 
imaginem for created human beings.  Augustine suggests that this distinction falters in 
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the face of St. Paul’s description of both the human person as imago (I Cor. 11:7) and 
Christ as imago (Col. 1:15).
25
  However, positing that imago may or may not involve 
aequalitas allows Augustine to affirm what he thinks is the clear meaning of 
Scripture, namely that the human person is created in the image of God, while still 
retaining the unique character of Christ as the imago who alone is equal to God.  As a 
result, there are different ways to be the image of God, one of which is equal to its 
source (the Son), others of which are not (human persons). 
Aequalitas serves in Augustine’s vocabulary as a way to refine the 
understanding of imago.  It is aequalitas that allows Augustine to speak of the human 
person as imago in an unequal likeness and of Christ as imago in equal likeness.  A 
painting, a mirror, created sons of God, and the eternal Son of God can all justly be 
termed “images.”  However, they do not all have aequalitas because the term “image” 
does not imply this by necessity.  Thus, aequalitas as a term allows for the analogical 
predication of imago.  The introduction of the term aequalitas also allows Augustine 
to preserve the close proximity between “image” and “likeness” that he proposed in 
De diversis quaestionibus 51 and reiterates in question 74.  He does not want to 
follow that part of the Latin Nicene tradition that distinguished sharply between image 
and likeness.  Question 51.4 and question 74 of De diversis quaestionibus can, 
therefore, be read in conjunction.  Contrary to Markus, I do not see a volte-face in the 
two questions.  In fact, the exact same phrase found in question 74 is also used in the 
earlier question: “[E]very image is in fact a likeness, but not everything that is alike is 
also an image.”26  Thus, Augustine’s early understanding of image is consonant with 
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 Quaest. 51.4 (CCSL 44A 81): quia omnis quidem imago similis est, not autem 
omne quod simile est etiam imago proprie. 
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his later thought on the matter: the varying degrees of likeness imply that there are 
various degrees of passive participation in Christ as the image of God. 
 
Aequalitas in Victorinus and Augustine 
Augustine’s early use of the term aequalitas implies a marked departure from earlier 
pro-Nicene understandings of the imago dei.  This contrast becomes clear when 
Augustine’s thought is compared with that of Victorinus.  The theologies of image 
operative in both African theologians are sustained by a Platonic worldview.  
However, the introduction of the term aequalitas in Augustine’s discussion of image 
allows him to go beyond the simple delineation of substance as being and image as 
non-being – the categories to which Victorinus was beholden – and allows Augustine 
to affirm that both the human person and Christ are the imago dei.  In other words, for 
Augustine not all images imply equality or identity of substance.   
 Both Victorinus and Augustine understand “image” in the context of a 
participatory ontology.  As for Victorinus, so too for Augustine, the presence of God 
who pervades all things and gives life and intelligibility to creation is a perennial 
theme.
27
  For Victorinus, this participatory understanding of material existence entails 
a demarcation between substance and non-substance; all material, temporal existence 
is non-substantial; it exists as an image in relation to its source.  Created “images” are 
understood in the Adversus Arium to lack their own substance, and they exist only to 
reflect the life of their source.  Augustine’s early works, however, suggest that an 
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 The omnipresence of God is a pervasive theme in Augustine’s writings.  See, 
Fulbert Cayré, Dieu présent dans la vie de l’esprit (Paris: Desclée, De Brouwer, 
1951); and Stanislaus J. Grabowski, The All-Present God (St. Louis: Herder, 1954).  
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image can, quite properly, be said to have its own substance.  While its existence is 
derived and participatory, it still has substance, existence, and life proper to it as an 
image.  The independent integrity with which Augustine endows “image” situates 
image theology within a broader spectrum than the simple demarcation found in 
Victorinus between substance (form) and lack of substance (image).  Ultimately, this 
broader definition of image allows Augustine to speak of both the human person and 
Christ as “image” in a way that eluded Victorinus.  
 “Substance” in the Adversus Arium is unambiguously defined in relation to 
esse and provides philosophical backing for Victorinus’s defence of the homoousion.  
Pierre Hadot notes that the reason Victorinus reacted so strenuously against the term 
homoiousian (of like being) is that he found it meaningless as a Christological term.  
Likeness, according to Aristotle’s categories, is predicated of a quality rather than of a 
substance and so it is a contradiction in terms to speak of a “like substance”; 
something either is or is not of the same substance, and according to Victorinus, to 
speak of like-being (homoiousian) amounts to nothing more than to resort to fatuous 
Arian evasions.  I suggested in chapter two that, given the Nicene conflict, “image” 
and “likeness” became, in Victorinus’s mind, mutually exclusive.28  Categorically, 
Victorinus states, “Therefore it is one thing to be ‘according to the image’, which 
indeed is substance, but another thing to be ‘according to the likeness’ which is not a 
substance but the name of a quality manifest in substance.”29  “Image” was then a 
Christological referent, and “likeness” was an anthropological referent.   
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 Robert Markus has also noted that it was Victorinus’s unwavering commitment to 
the Aristotelian definition of substance that meant that the Latin philosopher had to 
take the unique position that “image” and “likeness” are mutually exclusive terms.  
Markus, “‘Imago’ and ‘similitudo’ in Augustine,” 128-30. 
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Perhaps being more removed from the fierce polemics surrounding Nicaea, 
Augustine was able to avoid the “either / or” account of imago and similitudo.  I have 
suggested that he did so by introducing the term aequalitas into the discussion.  An 
image, maintained Augustine in his early writings, is not by necessity equal to its 
source.  In this way, Augustine differentiated his account of “image” from the strict 
separation between substance (Christ as image) and non-substance (the human person 
as likeness), which marked Victorinus’s understanding.  Even before his lucid 
delineation of imago, similitudo, and aequalitas in relation to each other in question 
74 of De diversis quaestionibus, Augustine had introduced the term aequalitas in the 
Soliloquies.  This dialogue demonstrates Augustine’s familiarity with a definition of 
“image” similar to that asserted by Victorinus against the homoiousians; the 
Soliloquies attests to the fact that in his early theology, Augustine already finds the 
Nicene understanding of image as proposed by Victorinus insufficient. 
In the Soliloquies, Augustine initially proposes an account of image exactly 
like that advanced by Victorinus: Reason points out that some images are equal, such 
as a twin or the imprint of a signet ring, others are unequal, such as one’s image in a 
mirror.  Images in the mirror lack the substance of the original; therefore, they should 
not technically be termed “images,” but “false images.”30  Images that are said to be 
equal, on the other hand, are those that have their own life and substance.  Thus, 
Augustine’s provisional suggestion in the dialogue is that nature both produces equal 
images, such as the offspring of parents that have their own life and substance, and 
reflects inferior “false” images, such as the image in a mirror.31 
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As Augustine continues to dialogue with Reason, however, the neat 
demarcation between a true image with its own substance and a false image, such as 
that in a mirror, begins to falter.  Reason suggests that more nuance needs to be 
introduced in the discussion: can an image be more or less similar to its source?
32
  In 
fact, is there not in the nature of all images a desire to be like that in whose image 
they are made?  While there might be varying degrees of success in achieving this 
goal, an image is not a strict identity, but permits various levels of likeness.
33
  In the 
Soliloquies, therefore, Augustine demonstrates his familiarity with an account of 
image similar to that suggested by Victorinus, which neatly demarcates between 
substance and non-substance, but as the Soliloquies draws to a conclusion, Augustine 
ultimately rejects this position as insufficiently subtle to account for the various 
gradations of likeness.  Participation in the source of the image is said in many ways.  
There is a broadness and diversity evident already in Augustine’s early 
understanding of “image,” which is not found in Victorinus’s account, which is 
predicated simply on substance or the lack thereof.  Already in his correspondence 
with Nebridius (A.D. 389), Augustine is keen to expand the role of images to include 
memories of people passed away, the city of Carthage in his mind, eternity, and even 
those things that are the figment of the imagination.
34
  Such a Platonic account of 
image can function only if one admits, as Augustine does, of various levels of 
participation.  Equality serves to indicate how alike an image is to its source.  In the 
Adversus Arium, Victorinus’s use of aequalitas serves only to reiterate the ontological 
identity between image and source, that is, between Christ and the Father.  That Christ 
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is “equal to God” demonstrates the insufficiency of the homoiousion claim.35  For 
Augustine, on the other hand, aequalitas is the register of image demarcating various 
types of images farther from and nearer to the originating source. 
How Victorinus and Augustine exegete Colossians 1:15 is perhaps most 
revealing.  In chapter two I indicated that Victorinus understands Paul’s statement that 
Christ is the “image of the invisible God” as an affirmation of the homoousion.  As 
Father and Son are of one substance, only the Son can image the Father.
36
  Victorinus 
writes, “If Jesus is the image of God, he is homoousios (consubstantial).  For the 
image is substance with the substance from which and in which it is image.”37  While 
“image” is contrasted with “likeness” in Victorinus, Augustine allows for 
considerable overlap between the terms image and likeness.  Indeed, the sustained 
discussion in question 74 of De diversis quaestionibus indicates that although Christ 
is the “image of God,” the human person is also the “image of God.”  “Image,” as De 
diversis quaestionibus 74 makes clear, denotes origin, but does necessitate equality.  
Question 74, which is, in fact, titled as a reflection on Colossians 1:15, concludes by 
differentiating between the image in a mirror, which is both a likeness and an image 
but lacks equality, and the image of a child, who is equal in being with his parents and 
shares an image and likeness with them while being of a different substance.  That 
something could be equal as image and likeness but of a different substance, as in 
Augustine’s example of a child, would be inconceivable under the terms of 
Victorinus’s definition of “image,” as for him an image has no substance or existence 
apart from its participation in a substantial source.  However, for Augustine the 
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difference between a child and the image in a mirror perfectly demonstrates that there 
are different kinds of images and that not every image is of necessity equal to its 
source.  
Avoiding the strict distinction between substance (image) and non-substance 
(likeness) that characterized Victorinus’s account, Augustine is able to find a 
theologically compelling answer to the issue of how the imago dei can be both a 
Christological and an anthropological referent.  By insisting in question 74 of De 
diversis quaestionibus that there does not have to be equality for there to be an image, 
Augustine underscores the analogical predication suggested in question 51: multis 
enim modis dici res possunt similes Deo.  Thus, while Victorinus must conclude that 
Christ alone is the image of God, for only the Son is of the substance as the Father, 
Augustine’s insertion of aequalitas in the discussion allows for the differentiation of 
images; one is equal, namely the Son of God, and others are not, such as the human 
person.   
 The uniqueness of Augustine’s early theology of image is especially apparent 
in comparison to that of Victorinus.  Both African theologians operate within a 
Platonic framework, in which created images reflect their substantial source.  Images 
are derived, secondary expressions of what is ontologically prior and without which 
they are unintelligible.  It is within this participatory ontology that Victorinus must 
create a unique theological category for Christ as imago dei.  Only in Christ are image 
and substance one.  The human person is an image in a derived and created sense – 
secundum imaginem.  Victorinus insists, “The substance of man is one thing, the 
substance of God another.”38  “Image” is so identified with “substance” in 
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Victorinus’s Christology that likeness is rejected as Christologically incoherent.  
Christ cannot be like God (homoiousios) because a “like God” is a different God; only 
when “image” language is identified with “substance” does one do justice to the unity 
and simplicity of God while remaining faithful to the scriptural articulation of the Son 
as imago dei. 
  
The Body and the Imago Dei 
The Nicene controversy reserved for Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose the title imago 
dei for the shared, creative and invisible divine nature of the image with its source 
(Colossians 1:15).  Augustine, however, insists that the imago dei can also 
unequivocally be predicated of the created human person.  It is precisely Augustine’s 
robust participatory theology expressed through the analogical predication of 
aequalitas that allows the human person, “according to the inner person,” to be (albeit 
in an unequal manner) in the imago dei.  This raises a particular question that looms 
more ominously over Augustine than over his predecessors:  How can the human 
person in his created, temporal, material, and embodied state be the imago dei, which 
is, by definition, an immaterial, invisible reality?      
 Here I will interact particularly with De Genesi contra Manichaeos to consider 
how Augustine’s theology of the soul as imago dei relates to the body.  How does 
Augustine view the relation of the soul-body composite in his early writtings?  Does 
the body also participate in the imago dei?  In this second part of the chapter I will 
argue that while Augustine does distinguish between body and soul, his early theology 
is ultimately non-dualistic and attempts to offer an integrated presentation of the 
relationship between body and soul.  Augustine’s first commentary on Genesis reveals 
an attempt to wrestle with the materiality and corporeality of the creation narrative 
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and with its implications for a theology of the imago dei.  I will argue that, ultimately, 
Augustine offers an anthropology of an integrated body-soul composite with the 
imago dei remaining an intellectual reality that is hierarchically constituted in relation 
to the body.  Augustine understands the material description of creation as 
anthropomorphic, that is, as drawn up with literary metaphors of the spiritual reality 
of the imago dei.  Thus, for Augustine, the first chapter of Genesis speaks corporeally 
of a spiritual reality.  The distinguishing characteristic of the human person is his 
rational nature by which he is constituted as the imago dei.  Nevertheless, Augustine’s 
understanding of the relation between the original couple demonstrates his 
commitment to the unity of body and soul.  The distinction and unity of soul and body 
that Augustine sees symbolized in the relation of Adam and Eve is developed with 
reference to the Pauline distinction of the inner and outer man; a distinction, however, 
that is situated within an all-encompasing unity. 
 It should not be surprising that in considering Augustine’s account of the 
body-soul relation vis-à-vis the imago dei, we turn first to his De Genesi contra 
Manichaeos.  As the title suggests, Augustine’s first interpretation of Genesis 1:26 
takes the form of a refutation of the Manicheans.  Augustine’s former co-religionists 
were in the habit of ridiculing Catholics precisely because of this verse regarding the 
human person’s creation according to the image and likeness of God.  Augustine 
explains, “What they have in mind, you see, is the shape of our bodies and they are 
misguided enough to ask whether God has nostrils and teeth and a beard.”39  
Augustine considers such taunts utterly ridiculous, not to say impious.  All such 
descriptions of God having ears, lips, and feet, or of Jesus speaking of the finger of 
God casting out demons ought to be spiritually understood.  Scripture frequently 
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employs anthropomorphisms to relate immaterial truth.  In a similar manner, insists 
Augustine, an account of the imago dei is to be understood spiritually: “[W]hen man 
is said to have been made to the image of God, it is said with reference to the interior 
man, where reason is to be found and intelligence.”40  Thus, the first line of defence 
against Manichean literalism is to suggest that the embodied language of Genesis 1:26 
is anthropomorphic and that the imago dei is a spiritual constituent of the human 
person – the “inner man.” 
The second creation account describes God fashioning “man from the mud of 
the earth” (Gen. 2:7).  The Manicheans find this text equally appalling.  They ask why 
God would create the human person from the mud.  “Did he not have anything better, 
celestial material for example, from which to make man?”41  Again, the Manicheans 
understand materially what ought to be interpreted spiritually.  The “enemies” of the 
Old Testament interpret everything “in a fleshly, literal-minded way.”42  Here too, 
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 Gen. Man. II.7.8.  Augustine’s insistence that Genesis 1:26 is speaking 
anthropomorphically is in keeping with the Alexandrian tradition he receives through 
Ambrose.  The influence of Origen via Ambrose on Augustine’s early theology of the 
image of God has been noted by György Heidl, Origen’s Influence on the Young 
Augustine: A Chapter in the History of Origenism (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 
2003), pp. 111-24.  Origen’s criticisms of the literalism of Melito of Sardis finds an 
echo in Augustine’s criticism of Manichaean  literalism.  Other similarities to 
Augustine’s anti-Manichaean  commentary are found in Ambrose’s Hexameron.  
Ambrose maintains that surely the imago dei cannot refer to flesh, for then God would 
be subject to the same contingencies as human existence.  God does not see with his 
eyes or hear with his ears; rather, these are anthropomorphic expressions, which is 
how “the image and likeness of God” spoken of in Genesis 1:26 is to be understood.  
Ambrose, Hex. VI.8.44.  In broad strokes, Herman Somers divides Augustine’s 
exegesis of the creation narrative into three distinct periods.  The first is that of the 
composition of De Genesi contra Manichaeos in 388.  The second period is during the 
composition of De Genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus in 393.  And the last period is 
during the composition of De Genesi ad litteram in 401-414.  Somers notes the 
ubiquity of Alexandrian exegesis in all three periods.  However, he maintains that 
only in the first period is there evidence that Augustine receives this tradition through 
Ambrose.  Later, maintains Somers, Augustine himself read more directly from the 
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Augustine chides the Manicheans for failing to be sufficiently subtle in their 
interpretation.  It is the intellectual capacity of the human person that separates him 
from the animals and constitutes him as the image of God.  Thus, immediately after 
fashioning the human person in the image and likeness of God, explains Augustine, 
the Creator gives him “authority over the fish of the sea and the flying things of 
heaven.”43  Scripture is delineated in such an order “to make us understand that it was 
with reference not to the body that man was made to God’s image, but to the power 
by which he surpasses all cattle, all animals.”44  Augustine is unequivocal that the 
imago dei resides in the human person’s intellectual nature. 
 The anti-Manichean intention of Augustine’s first commentary on Genesis 
ensures that Augustine does not denigrate the body.  The entire thrust of the 
commentary emphasizes the created goodness of the universe and the human body in 
particular, against the Manichean denigration thereof.  Like all of creation, the human 
body is a reflection (vestigium) of God.  Though this alone does not constitute the 
person as an “image of God,”  the physicality of his body has, nevertheless, a 
signatory value, pointing to his spiritual nature whereby he does image God.  
Augustine writes that while all other creatures are bent towards the earth, the upright 
posture of the human person “signifies that our spirit also ought to be held upright, 
turned to the things above it, that is, to eternal, spiritual realities.”45  This description 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Alexandrian tradition.  Herman Somers, “Image de Dieu: Les sources de l’exégèse 
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is symptomatic of the theological precision that Augustine displays throughout his 
corpus in distinguishing something in the human person that signifies (quo 
significatur) and reflects God and something that properly “images” God.  The 
posture of the body, standing upright, corporeally, signifies that “it is above all as 
regards the spirit that man was made to the image and likeness of God.”46  The 
goodness of the body is such that it has a revelatory and signatory value – it points to 
the human spirit wherein he images God. 
In the narrative of the naming the animals, maintains Augustine, we are shown 
that Adam is different from the beasts “in virtue of his rationality.”47  In 
distinguishing and differentiating between the animals, Adam demonstrates his 
rational capacity by rendering a judgment about them.  Judgment is a critical 
component of Augustine’s understanding of reason, and so judgment is demonstrative 
of the imago dei.  In the naming of the animals, we see the principle that it is the 
nature of the higher to judge the lower; this is a pronounced theme also in Augustine’s 
other early works, such as the Cassiciacum dialogues and De vera religione.
48
  The 
mind judges what the eyes see, thereby indicating the hierarchy of the mind in relation 
to the senses.  The mind renders a judgment on the data of sense perception based on 
its participatory knowledge of the eternal form.  In De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 
Augustine argues that in naming the animals Adam reveals his intellectual nature, 
which renders judgments based on his rational capacity, whereby he participates in 
God and is constituted as imago dei.  The dominion of human beings over the rest of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
et non sunt erecta sicut hominis corpus; quo significatur etiam animum nostrum in 
superna sua, id est in aeterna spiritualia, erectum esse debere. 
46
 Gen. Man. I.17.28. 
47
 Gen. Man. II.11.16 (CSEL 91 137): Ex hoc enim apparet ipsa ratione hominem 
meliorem esse quam pecora. 
48
 Cf. Chapter 7 regarding Augustine’s understanding of the role of judgment in the 
human person. 
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creation on account of their rational nature, which is signified by their upright stature, 
is present already in much of the earlier philosophical tradition
49
 and is, in turn, taken 
up in Christian understandings of the imago dei.
50
  Again, it is probably most directly 
from Ambrose’s sermons on the creation narrative that Augustine receives his 
understanding of human dominion over creation on account of man’s rational nature. 
Augustine’s first commentary on Genesis underscores that the imago dei is 
principally to be understood as a spiritual constituent of the human person.  Of course, 
the creation narrative itself is explicit about the embodied nature of the human person.  
Augustine is more sensitive to this reality than some of the previous Nicene exegesis 
had been.  Augustine is familiar with a line of interpretation adopted by Victorinus.  
In this understanding, the second creation narrative (Genesis 2:7), in which Adam is 
described as fashioned from mud, indicates the creation of solely the human body – 
the earthly man.  This material creation is contrasted with the spiritual creation of the 
human person in Genesis 1:26.
51
  This tradition of contrasting the initial creation 
narrative of the imago dei with the second creation of the body came to Victorinus 
from the Eastern Fathers, most notably Clement and Origen.
52
  Augustine indicates 
his awareness that some have read Genesis 1:26 as distinct from Genesis 2:7.
53
  
                                                          
49
 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 90 A-B; Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, II, 10; Ovid, 
Metamorphoses, I, 84; Cicero, De Natura deorum, 140.  
50
 Lactancius, De opificio Dei II, V and Divinae institutiones, II, 1, 15; Ambrose, 
Hexameron, VI, 7, 40; Basil., Hom., IX in Gen,. 2; Sermo III in Gen.; Theodore, I, 24-
27. 
51
 Adv. Ar. I.62. 
52
 In the Alexandrian tradition, Philo first posited a sharp contrast between the 
immaterial creation of the human person in the image of God (Genesis 1:26) and the 
material creation of the body (Genesis 2:7).  Cf. de opif. mundi 134-135 and leg. All. 
I.31.  Origen adopts this distinction (in Genes. Homilia I 13), and it is also found in 
Clement of Alexandria (Strom. VI.16.136.1; VII.12.79.6). 
53
 Gen. Man.  II.7.9: “That, you see, is how I have heard that some of our people 
understand the text.  They say that the reason it didn’t add ‘to his image and likeness,’ 
after saying God fashioned the man from the mud of the earth, is that now it is only 
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However, he is explicit in not wanting to follow this schema.  Augustine wants to hold 
the two creation accounts together in order to preserve the body-soul unity, which he 
understands to be expressed in both creation narratives.   
The “mud” from which Adam was made (Gen. 2:7), explains Augustine, is 
comprised of a mixture of water and earth.  These two elements signify the harmony 
of body and soul.  Thus, the second narrative is a further unfolding of the composite 
nature of the human person mentioned in Genesis 1:26.  Augustine describes the 
water mixing itself in and giving shape to the earth, thereby creating mud, as an 
analogue of the soul animating the material of the body, thereby constituting the form 
of the human person: “Just as water, you see, collects earth and sticks and holds it 
together when mud is made by mixing it in, so too the soul by animating the material 
of the body shapes it into a harmonious unity, and does not permit it to fall apart into 
its constituent elements (sic anima corporis materiam vivificando in unitatem 
concordem conformat et non permittit labi et resolvi.) ”54  A thoroughgoing dualism 
does not fit with this description.  Carol Harrison accurately notes, “Human nature for 
Augustine from the beginning of his works, consists of body and soul inseparably – it 
is a animal rationale mortale.”55  Augustine explicitly rejects the Alexandrian 
understanding of the two creation accounts as representing two different aspects of the 
human person, the first of the soul and the second of the body, and prefers to see both 
                                                                                                                                                                      
talking about the formation of the body, while the moment when the interior man was 
being referred to was when it said: God made man to the image and likeness of God 
(Gn 1:27).”   
54
 Gen. Man. II.7.9 (CSEL 91 128).  Augustine anticipates Thomas Aquinas’s 
teaching of the soul as the form of the body.  St. Thomas’s understanding of the 
composite nature of the human person was also taught at the Council of Vienna and 
the Fifth Lateran Council, which defined the human soul as forma substantialis 
corporis. 
55
 Carol Harrison, Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Augustine (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 152. 
238 
 
accounts as teaching the same reality regarding the composite nature of the human 
person.  The soul, which is principally the image of God, is the form of the body – 
which together constitute a “harmonious unity.”56 
 It is clear to Augustine that the imago dei is a spiritual constituent of the 
human person.  The emphasis on gender in the creation account then presents 
Augustine with a challenge.  How can he relate the immaterial nature of the imago dei 
with the immediate reference to embodied gender?  (“God created man in His own 
image, in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them.”57)  
The clear reference to gender in the second part of the verse challenges a “spiritualist” 
reading of the imago dei.  Somehow, for Augustine, “male and female” must be 
predicated of an immaterial image of God.  In chapter two, I discussed Victorinus’s 
exegetical struggles with this verse.  He proposed that this verse distinguishes the 
inner man from the outer man.  The interior man is an image of the “Triad on high” 
because in his consubstantial unity of esse, vivere, and intellegere he images the union 
of the Holy Trinity.  “Male and female he created them,” on the other hand, expresses 
the bodily nature of the exterior man and anticipates the androgynous state of the 
exterior Logos become flesh.
58
  Augustine, I suggested, is intent on holding the two 
creation narratives together.  Genesis 1:26 and Genesis 2:7 express the same reality: 
the human person is a composite of body and soul, and while the imago dei is 
properly predicated of the soul, the body somehow participates in the life of the soul.   
Augustine, therefore, does not follow Victorinus’s interpretation of “male and 
female He created them.”  Somehow, for Augustine, this second part of the verse also 
has to be understood in light of the first: “In the image of God he created them.”  
                                                          
56
 Gn. c. man. II.7.9. 
57
 Genesis 1:27 
58
 Cf. Chapter 2. 
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Augustine interprets “male and female He created them” as an allegorical or symbolic 
description of the one body-soul unity of the human person.  Augustine suggests that 
the male-female partnership in the garden be interpreted as “a single person” working 
in harmony.
59
  As the soul or reason ought to govern the body, so, for Augustine, the 
natural order makes the woman subject to the man.
60
  The harmonious relation that 
Adam and Even enjoyed prior to the Fall symbolizes reason’s governance over the 
passions and appetites.  Augustine’s explicit intention to avoid Manichean dualism 
propels his intellectualist account of the imago dei, which is ordered according to a 
typically Platonic and Stoic anthropology, in which the soul ought to govern the body.  
Peter Brown remarks, “Augustine refused to believe that Adam and Even had fallen 
from an angelic into a physical state.  He did not see human beings as essentially 
spiritual creatures, to whom physical, sexual and social needs had once been 
irrelevant.  Adam and Eve had originally enjoyed a harmonious unity of body and 
soul.  Their bodies had followed the dictates of their wills.”61  Brown recognizes in 
Augustine’s commentary on Genesis an affirmation of the goodness of the body in 
union and concord with the soul.  Adam and Eve represent symbolically the right 
ordering of the soul’s appetites and desires according to reason.  The communio 
personarum that Adam and Eve enjoy in the state of original bliss is not in and of 
itself the imago dei but is, nevertheless, symbolic thereof, as their rightly-ordered 
nuptial relation is expressive of the right ordering of the body to the soul.   
                                                          
59
 Gen. Man. II.11.15 (CSEL 91 136): Ad huius rei exemplum femina facta est, quam 
rerum ordo subiugat viro, ut, quod in duobus hominbus evidentius apparet, id est in 
masculo et femina, etiam in uno homine considerari possit. 
60
 Gen. Man. II.11.15. 
61
 Peter Brown, The Body and Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 
p. 405. 
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Against the dualism of the Manicheans, Augustine is keen to affirm the close 
proximity between soul and body that is signified in the intimacy and union of the 
male and female pair.  The “relationality” of the original pair is important to 
Augustine, even if it is not definitive of the imago, but only symbolic thereof.  Thus, 
as the woman came from the man’s rib “to signify their being joined together,” so too, 
there is to be a union, guidance, and priority of the soul over the body.
62
  Augustine 
writes that everyone ought to “exercise a proper lordship or mastery over this part of 
ourselves, and become a kind of wedded couple in the very self (fiat quasi coniugalis 
in seipso), with the flesh not warring against the spirit with its desires but submitting 
to it, that is, the desire of the flesh not opposing reason but rather complying with 
it.”63  The “embodied” state of Adam and Eve symbolizes for Augustine the “wedded 
couple in the very self,” in which reason governs the body.  Thus, all of this “was said 
in a figurative way … pointing to mysteries and sacraments.”64  Likewise, Adam’s 
exclamation, “This now is bone out of my bones, and flesh from my flesh” (Gen. 
2:23) is a figurative expression of the two cardinal virtues of the soul that order the 
appetites of the body: the strength of the bones refers to fortitude and the flesh 
corresponds to the temperance that ought to govern the flesh.
65
 
                                                          
62
 Later, as a bishop in 401, Augustine wrote De bono coniugali.  In this work 
Augustine demonstrates that not only does he understand the communio personarum 
of the original couple as symbolic of the right ordering of the passions to reason, but 
he also affirms the literal meaning of the communio personarum.  He writes, “The 
first natural bond of human society is man and wife.  Nor did God create these each 
by himself, and join them together as alien by birth: but He created the one out of the 
other, setting a sign also of the power of the union in the side, whence she was drawn 
and formed.  For they are joined one to another side by side, who walk together, and 
look together whither they walk.”  De bono conjugali I.1.   
63
 Gen. Man. II.12.16 (CSEL 91 138). 
64
 Gen. Man. II.12.17. 
65
 Gen. Man. II.13.18. 
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The opposite side of the same coin is presented in Augustine’s description of 
the Fall: reason gives way to the passions, and the body takes precedence over the 
soul.  Man, that is to say, the soul, ceased “to work and guard” paradise (the is the 
communio personarum of the body-soul composit), and was enticed by the woman’s 
wiles, that is, he succumbed to his carnal desires and allowed himself to be led by 
them.  Reason, Augustine writes, “can only be brought down to consenting to sin, 
when pleasurable anticipation is roused in that part of the spirit which ought to take its 
lead from reason, as from its husband and guide.”66  Eve, offering the fruit to Adam, 
symbolizes the desires of the flesh warring against the spirit and enticing reason to 
consent through suggestion by thought and sense.  When reason no longer “guards” 
paradise but consents to let in the enemy, that is, when Adam takes the fruit and eats, 
the harmonious “wedded couple in the very self” is rent asunder.   
The dualism between body and soul is, for Augustine, a post-lapsarian 
condition in which the original union and right subjection of the passions to reason – 
the body to the soul – becomes disordered.67  Augustine’s “theology of the body,” 
then, highlights the union of Adam and Eve before the Fall as symbolizing the 
“harmonious unity in the very self.”  In like manner, the inconsonance of Adam and 
Eve’s accusatory discourse after the Fall is demonstrative of the flesh warring against 
the spirit.  However, this struggle itself implies that there is still hope after the Fall: it 
is possible that after the passions have been aroused (i.e., after the woman has tasted 
the fruit), the suggestions of the senses will still be resisted by reason.  Augustine 
                                                          
66
 Gen. Man. II.14.20. 
67
 Carol Harrison notes that the body-soul unity that underwrites Augustine’s theology 
of creation is preserved in his eschatology: “It is therefore clear to Augustine that 
when Paul speaks of a risen ‘spiritual body’ he does not mean that the body will 
actually be changed into spirit, but that it will properly serve and be subject to the 
spirit.”  Harrison, Beauty and Revelation, p. 160. 
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writes, “But sometimes the reason valiantly puts the brake on greed even when it has 
been roused, and brings it to a halt.  When this happens, we don’t slide into sin, but 
win the prize with a certain amount of struggle.”68  Thus, the union of the original pair 
is, for Augustine, “said in a figurative way … pointing to mysteries and sacraments,” 
so as to express the composite nature of the restored person according to the image of 
the new Adam.
69
  Thus, Scripture describes the union of the original pair for the same 
reason that it relates the narrative of the naming of the animals: both stories indicate 
the governance of the rational faculties over the animal faculties.
70
 
 In his theology of the imago dei developed in De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 
Augustine maintains the primacy of the soul as the locus of the imago dei.  
Nevertheless, he is attentive to the embodied nature of the human person, which he 
sees symbolized in the union of the sexes who are an allegory of the “wedded couple 
in the very self.”  In this same commentary, Augustine develops his understanding of 
this union with recourse to St. Paul’s distinction between the inner and outer man.  
                                                          
68
 Gen. Man. II.14.21.  Following this leitmotif, Augustine explains that the curse of 
the woman after the Fall is not so much a curse as it is a command.  When God says 
that “in pain shall you bring forth children and your turning round shall be towards 
your man, and he will lord it over you,” this is, in fact, a counsel to advert to reason.  
The Lord is commanding people to direct their bodies according to the lordship of 
their soul; to find freedom from vice and bad habit by submitting to reason (Gen. 
Man. 19.29).  Augustine sees in a disordered home run by a defiant woman the 
disorder of the body-soul relation, not structured according to the hierarchy of nature.  
As “a topsy turvy and miserable household” is one governed by the wife, so too a 
body not governed by the soul brings misery to all (Gen. Man. 11.15 and Gen. Man. 
19.29).  
69
 Gen. Man.  II.12.17.  Augustine’s understanding of the distinction and unity of the 
sexes in the garden symbolizing the original harmony of body and soul is a motif 
likewise attested to in the Alexandrian exegesis of the creation narrative.  Gregory of 
Nyssa and Athanasius develop this exegesis initially received from Philo.  Cf. 
Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man, 17; Athanasius, in ps., 50; Philo, De mundi 
opificio, 46. 
70
 Gen. Man. II.11.16 (CSEL 91 137): Sed haec facilis <conside> ratio est; cito enim 
homo intelligit se meliorem esse pecoribus: illa est difficilis, qua intelligit in seipso 
aliud esse rationale quod regit, aliud animale quod regitur. 
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Augustine insists that the imago dei is said of the inner man: “[T]he moment when the 
interior man was being referred to was when it said: God made the man to the image 
and likeness of God.”71  Nevertheless, Augustine quickly adds that the mixture of mud 
signifies the composite nature of the human person.
72
  This two-step movement of 
maintaining the spiritual nature of the imago while quickly adding that the soul is not 
separate from the body is ubiquitous in Augustine’s early discussion of the imago dei. 
St. Paul’s distinction between the inner and outer man is frequently used in 
Augustine’s theology of the imago dei.73  He deploys the Apostle’s texts already very 
early in his writings, long before he has done a thorough study of the Pauline letters 
after his ordination.  This anthropological distinction of a Pauline trope is likewise of 
Alexandrian provenance.
74
  The Pauline charge to be refashioned according to the 
new man, to which Augustine constantly refers in his mature works on the imago dei, 
has currency already in his thinking at Cassiciacum, as is evident in De diversis 
quaestionibus. 
In addition to De Genesi contra Manichaeos, De diversis quaestionibus also 
builds on Paul’s trope of the inner and outer man in relation to the image of God.  
                                                          
71
 Gen. Man. II.7.9 (CSEL 91 128): tunc autem homo interior significabatur, quando 
dictum est: fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similtudidem dei. 
72
 Gen. Man. II.7.9 (CSEL 91 128): hominem hoc loco ex corpore et anima factum 
intelligamus, non absurde ipsa commixtione limi nomen accepit. 
73
 De quantitate animae frames St. Paul’s injunction to become a new man by putting 
off the old around themes of knowing oneself and becoming a friend of God.  
Augustine writes, “This is an achievement that is utterly impossible unless we remake 
ourselves in His image, the image he committed to our care as something most 
precious and dear, when he gave us to ourselves so constituted that nothing can take 
precedence to us save He Himself.” Quant. an. 28.55. 
74
 Origen in his commentary on Genesis maintains that the image of God is not said in 
reference to the body, for which reason Scripture teaches that the body is formed from 
the dust of the earth, whereas the image of God is referred to as the “inner man”: [I]s 
autem, qui ad imaginem Dei factus est et ad similitudinem, interior homo noster est, 
invisibilis et incorporalis et incorruptus atque immortalis. Origen, In Gen. hom., I, 13.  
Cf. Philo, de mundi opif., 46, 134; Quaest. in Gen., I, 4; Leg. Alleg., I, 12, 31. 
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Augustine initiates the discussion of the “image” and “likeness” of God in Question 
51, which I considered at the beginning of this chapter, with a quotation from St. 
Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, distinguishing between the decaying outer man and 
the inner man who is being renewed from day to day (2 Corinthians 4:16).  Outer and 
inner man are the same man, for they both refer to Adam, explains Augustine.  The 
inner man is spiritual, while the outer man is carnal.  Is the outer man, the body, then 
also created in the image and likeness of God?  Here Augustine – even more explicitly 
than in De Genesi contra Manichaeos – answers yes.  For the outer man who is being 
corrupted day by day will be renewed in the resurrection and be reintegrated with the 
inner man – the soul; the death that reigns in his mortal body will be conquered, and 
his bodily integrity will be restored.
75
  Unlike his former co-religionists, the 
Manicheans, Augustine is keen to avoid a body-soul dualism, and this is reflected in 
his exegesis of Paul.  The created goodness of the body is a pervasive theme in his 
                                                          
75
 Gareth Matthews also notes the ubiquity of Augustine’s homo interior, but he finds 
this developed Pauline theme in Augustine philosophically and psychologically 
untenable.  Matthews argues that biblical personification of body parts (“The ear of 
the wise seeks knowledge” in Proverbs 18:5 or “Everyone who looks at a woman 
lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart” in Matthew 5:28) is in 
Augustine predicated on a rigorous theological and psychological dualism built on a 
Platonic edifice.  Because the human person is comprised of a soul and a body, which 
are distinguished in Augustine’s writing by the operations of the “inner man” and 
operations of the “outer man” (inner speaking, inner smiling, inner almsgiving, inner 
seeing), Augustine, according to Matthews, commits himself to a thoroughgoing 
dualism, in which the relation between the body and the mind is completely 
contingent.  Matthews writes, “[O]nly a metaphysical dualist could allow himself the 
use of the inner-outer locutions without being inconsistent.”  Gareth B. Matthews, 
“The Inner Man” in Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert Markus 
(New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 178.  It is my contention in this chapter that 
while the inner and outer man are distinguished by Augustine, his theology does not, 
in fact, become mired in an intractable dualism, but, in fact, Augustine wants to affirm 
that the imago dei also remotely participates in the life of the “outer man.” 
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theology of creation and likewise does the heavy lifting in question 51, which despite 
distinguishing between the inner and outer man wants to hold them together.
76
 
                                                          
76
 Although Augustine’s work as a whole makes clear that properly speaking the seat 
of the image of God remains the soul, he follows Ambrose in suggesting that the 
upright posture in which the human person was created reflects the image of God that 
resides in the soul.  Thus, although the image does not reside in the body per se, the 
upright body aptly symbolizes the order of the soul to God.  The “soul” is a somewhat 
fluid concept in Augustine’s thought, bespeaking the locus of intellect and will – the 
rational principle in human beings.  Cf. Robert O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Early 
Theory of Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); idem, The Origin 
of the Soul in St. Augustine’s Later Works (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1987).  The soul was created before the body, when God initially created everything 
simultaneously in the rationes seminales.  After some time, when the body had 
become fully formed, the soul came to animate the body.  O’Toole writes, “The soul 
is thus created before the body and lies hidden in the works of God (creata lateret in 
operibus Dei) until the Creator unites it with a human body.”  Christopher O’Toole, 
The Philosophy of Creation in the Writings of St. Augustine (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1944), p. 90.  O’Toole notes three things with 
respect to the creation of the soul in the thought of Augustine.  First, the soul is not an 
emanation or generation from God, but is his creation; the soul is, therefore, not a 
divine substance.  Second, Augustine is intent to emphasize the spiritual nature of the 
soul – it is not corporeal.  Lastly, the soul was created in time and ex nihilo, and yet is 
immortal. 
In his mature thought, Augustine is unequivocal that the imago dei resides in 
the soul: “After all, the authority of the apostle as well as plain reason assures us that 
man was not made to the image of God as regards the shape of his body, but as 
regards his rational mind” (Trin. XII.12).  Therefore, Augustine continues, “It is an 
idle and base kind of thinking which supposes that God is confined within the limits 
of a body with features and limbs.  And does not the blessed apostle say, Be renewed 
in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, the one who was created 
according to God (Eph 4:23); and even more clearly elsewhere, Putting off the old 
man, he says, with his actions, put on the new who is being renewed for the 
recognition of God according to the image of him who created him (Col 3:9)?  If then 
we are being renewed in the spirit of our mind, and if it is this new man who is being 
renewed for the recognition of God according to the image of him who created him, 
there can be no doubt that man was not made to the image of him who created him as 
regards his body or any old part of his consciousness, but as regards the rational mind, 
which is capable of recognizing God” (Trin. XII.12).  This identification of the imago 
dei with the “inner man” is representative of Augustine’s mature writings.  Cf. Gen. 
imp. XVI.55; Faust. XXIV.2; Gen. litt. VI.27; Conf. XIII.22; Spir. et litt. 28-48; 
Tract. eu. Io. III.4; Ciu. XI.2; Retract. I.26.  Nevertheless, in his mature thought 
Augustine still affirms that the body also remotely participates in the image of God 
for the same reason given in question 51 of De diversis quaestionibus, namely the 
inseparability of the body-soul unity.  Thus, St. Paul’s distinction between the “inner 
man” and the “outer man,” who together are one man, continues to do the heavy 
lifting in Augustine’s anthropology.  In his work against Faustus the Manichaean , 
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Question 12 of De diversis quaestionibus provides the contours for the 
discussion of image in question 51 and underscores Augustine’s insistence on the 
union of body and soul.  Question 12 consists of two quotations of a “certain wise 
man.”77  The first quotation warns of the many ways that the Devil pollutes the mind 
of mortals.  The Devil’s ingenuity and adaptability in exploiting the various senses is 
described with great relish.  He enters the soul through the senses: “[H]e assumes 
different shapes, adapts himself to colors, clings to sounds, lies concealed in anger 
and in false speech, hides in odors, pour himself into flavors, and by his turbulent and 
filthy activity casts the senses into the gloom of dark emotions.”78  The Devil comes 
through these various pathways of the senses in order to poison the intellect, the “light 
of reason,” and “the mind’s ray.”79  The tension that existed between the original 
couple after the Fall, which Augustine understood to signify the body warring against 
the soul, is reiterated in De diversis quaestionibus question 12 with great gusto.  The 
body, which ought to be led and governed by the soul, is deceived by the Devil’s 
sensual enticements.  He is, however, not content to abuse the senses, but moves 
through them to dismantle the intellect since there he finds “a mirror of the divine 
presence.”80  It is not enough for the Devil to attack the body; rather, by infiltrating 
the body he intends to undo the soul – the seat of the imago dei.  For Augustine, 
therefore, it is ultimately the Serpent who desires to affect a dualism between body 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Augustine writes, “God then did not make one man to his image and another man not 
to his image; but because the inner and outer man is together one man, he made this 
one man to his image, not in regard to the body and corporeal life, but in regard to the 
rational mind” (Faust. XXIV.3).   
77
 Retractationes 26 indicates that the quotations of the wise man are from a work by 
Fonteius of Carthage, entitled, On Purifying the Mind in Order to See God. 
78
 Quaest. 12. 
79
 Quaest. 12. 
80
 Quaest. 12 (CCSL 44A 19): speculum diuinae preaesentiae. 
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and soul.
81
  Question 12 of De diversis quaestionibus reiterates the theme articulated 
in De Genesi contra Manichaeos: Augustine suggests that the Devil employs a 
“divide and conquer” strategy to drive a wedge between the union of the original 
couple, who now come to signify the warring of soul and body.  In question 12 
Augustine again reiterates that the dualism of body and soul is a post-lapsarian 
condition that undid the original integrity of the imago dei. 
 
Conclusion 
The language of aequalitas is rarely absent from Augustine’s discussions of image 
theology.  For the preceding Nicene tradition, image theology was strictly associated 
with equality and unity of the divine substance for which Colossians 1:15 was the 
preeminent proof text available.  I have suggested that Augustine’s early thought 
already breaks with this Nicene tradition in significant ways.  Where his predecessors 
were keen to note the difference between Christ as the imago dei and the human 
person created secundum imaginem, Augustine wants instead to affirm the continuity 
of image theology in relation to Christ and to the human person.  I have argued that it 
is Augustine’s participatory ontology that affords him the latitude to affirm this 
continuity. 
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 Peter Brown is right to comment that Augustine has a much more positive appraisal 
of intimate relations in the pre-lapsarian state than his predecessors both Greek and 
Latin.  Brown notes that Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, and Jerome would have found 
sexuality, marriage, and the family before the Fall to be inconceivable.  Augustine, on 
the other hand, is much less reticent to affirm the goods of the integrated composite of 
body and soul and the place of sexual relations in the flourishing of society: 
“Augustine invariably wrote of Adam and Eve as physical human beings, endowed 
with the same bodies and sexual characteristics as ourselves.  God had created them 
for the joys of society.  He had implanted in them both ‘the further attractive power of 
friendship.’  They had been set in Paradise to found a populus; and to found a populus 
implied more than the disembodied meeting of like-minded souls.”  Brown, Body and 
Society, p. 400. 
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 The Apostle Paul is clear that the human person is also the image of God (1 
Corinthians 11:7), and so Augustine cannot follow the Latin tradition that reserved 
imago dei to Christology.  Nevertheless, the Nicene controversy had wedded the 
language of imago to that of aequalitas; both terms were employed strictly to affirm 
the unity of divine substance between Father and Son.  In De diversis quaestionibus 
octoginta tribus, Augustine proposes a solution to the issue by insisting that the term 
“image” does not necessitate equality; a burgeoning theological account of analogy 
allows him to affirm that both created human beings and the begotten Son are imago 
dei, but with the caveat that only the Son has aequalitas with the Father.  Augustine 
suggests in De quantitate animae that something can be “like God” in many ways.  
Whether a creature shares in being, life, or (as an intellectual creature) shares in 
wisdom, there are varying degrees of passive participation in God. 
 The earlier Nicene tradition tended to distinguish between “image” and 
“likeness”; image suggested unity of substance, while likeness described a quality of a 
different substance.  Augustine, however, wants to hold these two terms together, 
understanding them in relation to each other and representative of different levels of 
participation.  This contrast is clear when Augustine’s understanding of aequalitas is 
compared to that of Victorinus.  In Victorinus’s theology imago dei functions in 
exactly the same fashion as does the term aequalitas: it serves to highlight the unity 
between the Father and Son; but as such, imago dei is, like the term aequalitas, 
exclusive to the relation of Father and Son.  Augustine suggests a broader and more 
robust account of imago dei; he considers this term in relation both to aequalitas and 
similitudo.  Augustine can now speak of imago in different ways; the human person as 
imago is an unequal likeness while Christ as imago is equal in likeness.  Participation 
affords Augustine a nascent account of analogy – of being able to affirm that image is 
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said in many ways: multis enim modis dici res possunt similes Deo.
82
  Fundamentally, 
I have argued that participation serves in Augustine’s thought to define various 
degrees of similitude proper to an image; this allows Augustine to affirm the imago 
dei both of the human person and of Christ. 
 According to the “interior man,” the soul is an image of God.  The rational 
character of the imago dei necessarily entails a distinction in Augustine’s thought 
between the spiritual and corporeal elements of the human person.  This distinction, 
however, does not evolve into a thoroughgoing dualism.  Rather, in Augustine’s early 
works the body always remotely participates in the life of the soul.  Thus, for 
Augustine, Genesis 1:26 relays in anthropomorphic terms the rational nature of the 
imago dei.  Rejecting the crude materialistic reading of the Manicheans, Augustine 
suggest that “image” in both Genesis 1:26 and Genesis 2:7 bespeaks a spiritual reality.  
Thus, he does not follow Victorinus and others stemming from the Alexandrian 
exegetical tradition who understand the second creation account – the fashioning of 
Adam out of mud – as a description of bodily creation.  Rather, the mingling of the 
mud signifies the same reality that is expressed in Genesis 1:26, namely that body and 
soul are created as an integrated unity.  
 The imago dei, then, remains principally a spiritual reality, but Augustine’s 
understanding of the creation narrative insists that the body participates in the life of 
the soul and, therefore, remotely also in the image of God.  In the harmonious order of 
pre-lapsarian existence, the body was docile to the guidance of the soul.  This tranquil 
relation, Augustine understands to be symbolically represented in the original 
relationship of Adam and Eve.  It is within this rightly ordered relation of body and 
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 Quaest. 51.2. 
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soul that Augustine develops St. Paul’s distinction between the outer and inner man; 
while distinguished these two remain an integrated composite.  In Augustine’s first 
commentary on the Fall in Genesis 3 and in his description in question 12 of De 
diversis quaestionibus of the Devil’s continuous attempts to deceive the human race, 
Augustine suggests that is the Devil who attempts to attack the inner imago through 
the outer senses and thereby to drive a wedge between the integrated composite of the 
image of God.  Despite the Platonic import in Augustine’s understanding of the image 
of God, his commitment to the integrated nature of the body-soul composite expressed 
in the creation narrative entails that, ultimately, Augustine’s early theology of the 
imago dei holds to the unity of body and soul. 
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Chapter VII: The Ascent of the Image in De vera religione 
 
De vera religione is the high-water mark of Augustine’s early theology prior to his 
ordination in 391.
1
  In many ways, this book expresses his early exuberance regarding 
the place of Platonic philosophy, particularly its notion of ascent, within the Christian 
faith.  Among Augustine’s early works, it is De vera religione that most clearly 
demonstrates how, as a young theologian, Augustine envisioned the relationship of 
the Catholic faith to Platonic philosophy.  His theological presentation of the soul’s 
participation in Christ is built on the Platonic edifice of the soul’s return and ascent to 
God. 
This final chapter, then, serves as a capstone to the overall thesis.  I have 
argued that Augustine’s early theology of the imago dei is a significant advancement 
from Latin pro-Nicene theologies only a generation before.  It is his thoroughgoing 
appropriation of a Plotinian metaphysic – evident already in his earliest writings – that 
offers Augustine the insight that there are different ways of affirming the image of 
God.  The human image is also imago dei, but an image unequal to its source.  Christ 
alone is imago dei in equal likeness to his source.  Augustine’s theological reflection 
on the Platonic conception of the world, according to which finite images are both 
true and false – that is to say, they are both a resemblance and a dissemblance – finds 
clearest expression in De vera religione.  I have suggested that this dual perception of 
an image is pervasive throughout Augustine’s early writings.  In the Cassiciacum 
dialogues, Augustine introduces the critical concept of “judgment” in relation to 
                                                          
1
 Frederick Van Fleteren considers De vera religione to be “a kind of capstone to 
Augustine’s philosophical and theological speculation during 386-391.”  Frederick 
Van Fleteren, Background and Commentary on Augustine’s “De Vera Religione,” De 
Utiltate Credendi,” “De Fide Rerum Quae Non Videntur,” in Lectio Augustini 10 
(Pavia: Lectio Augustini, 1994), p. 34.  
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images.   An image becomes a simulacrum when one judges temporal, material 
images to be self-contained, that is, when the finite order is absolutized.  On the other 
hand, an image is “true” inasmuch as its nature as image is recognized.  Finite goods, 
suggests Augustine, are not to be understood as independent or standing alone, but 
ought to be recognized as participating in and showing forth eternal, immaterial truth.  
This recurring Platonic theme of judgment finds clear expression in De vera relgione. 
If De vera religione represents Augustine’s most developed neo-Platonic 
conception of image in his early writings, it is also the most developed and mature 
Christian writing of this period.  Augustine develops key components of Ambrose’s 
image theology expressed in the Bishop of Milan’s preaching, particularly the 
sustained ethical theology of imitation that issues from Ambrose’s understanding of 
the human person created in the image of God.  Like Ambrose’s preaching, De vera 
religione speaks repeatedly about the refashioning and reshaping of the intellect and 
the will to reflect more accurately the image God.  Although the language of ascent 
and return to God is unabashedly Plotinian, this ascent is achieved not so much with a 
Plotinian method of katharis and theōria as it is received as gift.  Thus, a rich 
theology of grace undergirds the ascent and return of the image; the ascent is 
predicated on the prior descent of Christ, the divine image.   
I have argued that already in the Cassiciacum dialogues, a theology of image 
supports Augustine’s theology of the Incarnation.  Through the trope of the literary 
figure of Proteus, who both “manifests and bears the person of truth,” Augustine 
affirms against the Skeptics that eternal truth can be known in the image of the 
temporal order.   Much more explicitly than in the Cassiciacum dialogues, however, 
does a theology of the Incarnation come to the fore in De vera religione.  As such, this 
work is the clearest example of Augustine’s early synthesis of Plotinian and Nicene 
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conceptions of image philosophy.  Whereas previous Latin pro-Nicene theology had 
been hesitant to link an anthropology of the image of God to its Christology of the 
image of God, Augustine unites these two within a neo-Platonic philosophy of image 
constituted by the movements of exitus and reditus.  De vera religione contends that 
the fulfillment of the created image in its ascent and return is predicated on the prior 
descent of the divine image, which takes up the created image in its own return.  
Augustine uses neo-Platonic image theology to express the Apostle Paul’s vision of 
participatory union with Christ – “If anyone is in Christ he is a new creation” (2 Cor. 
5:17).  Through the grace of the Incarnation, asserts De vera religione, the created 
image participates in the ascent of the divine image. 
 Augustine addresses De vera religione to his generous patron Romanianus, 
whose son Augustine had educated.  The immediate context of the short work is an 
apologetic appeal of the intellectus fidei to Romanianus, who had followed Augustine 
into the Manichaean sect, to enter into the Catholic faith.
2
  Thus, the treatise is an 
attempt to save his friend from Manichaean teaching; perhaps Augustine felt a degree 
of guilt for initially enticing his friend into the Manichaean fold.
3
  De vera religione 
presents a two-step argument.  First, Augustine argues that Manichaean dualism 
contains a logical fallacy in the order of being.  Evil, maintains Augustine, is the ill 
                                                          
2
 A critical study of the textual reception history and manuscript tradition of De vera 
religione has been presented in a long article by Klaus-Detlef Daur, “Prolegomena zu 
einer Ausgabe von Augustins De vera religione,” Sacris erudiri 12 (1961): 313-365.  
Daur intends this article to be preparatory to his critical edition of De vera religione in 
the Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 32 (Turnholti: Typographi Brepols Editores 
Pontificii, 1962).  Daur comments on the state of all the major manuscripts, the textual 
families, and the Latin editions up to his time.   
3
 The apologetic character of De vera religione has been pointed out by Joseph Pegon: 
“Peut-être est-ce là que l’on peut le mieux voir la méthode apologétique proprement 
dite de saint Augustin,” in La Foi chrétienne. De vera religione. De utilitate credendi. 
De fide rerum quae non videntur. De fide et operibus; texte latin de l’éd. bénédictine, 
ed and trans. Joseph Pegon, Bibliothèque Augustinienne; Oeuvres de saint Augustin, 
8 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1951), p. 465. 
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use of free will – one might do or suffer an evil, but no subsistent reality is an evil.4  
On the contrary, all being is good inasmuch as it derives from God and is upheld by 
God.  Augustine naturally proceeds to the second step: the nearer the soul is to God, 
the more it is like God and participates in his life and goodness.  In short, De vera 
religione counters Manichaean dualism with a Platonic account of participation and 
an invitation to ascend in Christ to the God in whom is perfect life and goodness. 
 I will make clear that De vera religione 12.24 is a critical passage in 
Augustine’s early theology of the ascent of the soul as imago to participate in the 
Trinity.  This passage has received little scholarly attention, and yet it contains the 
nucleus of the central themes to be developed throughout De vera religione, namely, 
the ascent from the many corporeal changing things to the one supreme, incorporeal 
good – the Holy Trinity.5  De vera religione is an exploration of how the faith and the 
good will necessary to make the ascent are obstructed by intellectual falsitas (33.61-
34.67) and moral cupiditas (37.68-54.106).  It turns out – and this is the main point I 
will argue in this chapter – that Augustine’s enthusiasm regarding Platonism has its 
limits already in this early work: Platonic katharsis proves to be insufficient to 
overcome the fallen human condition.  At this point, Augustine’s theology augments 
and transforms his Platonic proclivities.  The grace of God made present through the 
Incarnation restores the soul to health, so that its innate desire can be fulfilled in union 
with God – to return from “the many (a multis) things that change to the one (unum) 
unchanging good.”6  The one good, De vera religione 12.24 continues, is participation 
                                                          
4
 vera rel. 20.38-39 (CCSL 32 210-211). 
5
 This passage is quoted by Frederick Van Fleteren’s study but he does not develop 
the themes contained in this passage, except to note the Trinitarian reference.  
Frederick Van Fleteren, “Augustine’s De vera religione: A New Approach,” 
Augustinianum 16 (1976): 482. 
6
 vera rel. 12.24 (CCSL 32 202). 
255 
 
in the Holy Trinity.  Thus, the ascent is “to the One … through Wisdom … to enjoy 
God through the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of God” (ad unum … per sapientiam … 
fruiturque deo per spiritum sanctum, quod est donum dei).
7
  
 My argument regarding the ascent of the soul as image to the Holy Trinity will 
proceed by way of four steps.  First, I will consider the Platonic milieu within which 
De vera religione functions, by focusing on Plotinus’s account of the image’s “return” 
to its source.  Second, I will consider the intellectual and moral obstacles that 
according to De vera religione obstruct the ascent.  Third, I will describe Augustine’s 
theology of grace; it is grace that comes to aid and heal the image for its ascent.  
Lastly, I will consider the terminus ad quem of the ascent by discussing how 
Augustine speaks of “enjoying” God.8  In analyzing Augustine’s theology of ascent in 
De vera religione, I build especially on the scholarship of Frederick Van Fleteren, 
Olivier du Roy, and Josef Lössl.  What I am proposing as new to this discussion, 
however, is the significance of a Plotinian account of image to Augustine’s theology 
of ascent.  Indeed, proceeding from De vera religione 12.24, I will argue that a 
theology of image is foundational to understanding the theme of ascent in De vera 
religione.
9
 
 
                                                          
7
 vera rel. 12.24 (CCSL 32 202). 
8
 My argument in this chapter is in line with Frederick Van Fleteren and disagrees 
with Josef Lössl’s understanding of De vera religione: “[T]he term ‘ascent’, he 
suggested as a guiding concept, is not very prominent in the text and expresses mainly 
its anagogic dimension leaving the ontological and epistemological parts of its first 
half uninterpreted.”  Josef Lössl, “‘The One’: A guiding concept in Augustine’s De 
vera religione,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 40 (1994): 102. 
9
 Image theology is once again an important locus of discussion in Augustine studies.  
See Lydia Schumacher’s recent publication linking divine illumination with the 
restoration of the effaced imago dei.  Lydia Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The 
History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011). 
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The Plotinian Metaphysic of Image  
Prior to launching into an analysis of the ascent of the imago in De vera religione, I 
will recapitulate the central movements of the ascent and the return of the image in the 
Plotinian metaphysic – the philosophical Weltanschauung within which Augustine 
penned De vera religione.
 10
  Plotinus asks, “What is it, then, which has made the 
souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though 
they are parts which come from his higher world and altogether belong to it?”11  Evil, 
he answers, has its origins in self-will and in “wishing to belong to themselves.”12  
Moving farther and farther away from its origin with the Divine, the soul forgets its 
own dignity.  The first step, then, in the “return” is to become aware of the value of 
the soul, maintains Plotinus – to understand how near it is to God. 
                                                          
10
 Olivier du Roy devotes a chapter of his magnum opus, L’Intelligence de la foi en la 
Trinité selon saint Augustin (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1966) to De vera religione.  
He is particularly interested in redaction questions regarding the Enneads.  In addition 
to the obviously anti-Manichaean context, du Roy contends that there is also an anti-
Porphyrian narrative that runs through De vera religione.  Du Roy, L’Intelligence, pp. 
309-88.  I am inclined to agree with the assessment of Josef Lössl: “We … cannot try 
to tell exactly which texts are Porphyrian. We cannot even properly distinguish anti- 
Manichaean  and anti-Porphyrian sections; for both have similar functions.”  Lössl, 
“‘The One’,” 102.  For different divisions of De vera religione, see H. Dörries, 
“Neuplatonischen und Christlichen in Augustins ‘De vera religione,’” Zeitschrift für 
neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 2 (1924): 64-102; 
W. Theiler, “Porphyrios und Augustin,” Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten 
Gesellschaft, Geisteswissenschaft Kl. 10 (Halle: Niemeyer, 1933); P. Rotta, Agostino, 
La vera religione, ed. P. Rotta (Torino: Paravia, 1938); W. Thimme, Augustinus: 
Theologische Frühschriften, ed. W. Thimme (Zürich: Artemis, 1962); W. Desch, 
“Aufbau und Gliederung von Augustins Schrift ‘De vera religione,’” Vigiliae 
christianae 34 (1980): 263-77.  The many different attempts at subdividing De vera 
religione are summarized in an excellent manner by Josef Lössl, who then gives his 
own understanding of the structure of the text based on the theme of “the One,” which 
he demonstrates is operative throughout De vera religione.  Cf. Josef Lössl, “‘The 
One’,” 79-103. 
11
 Plotinus, Enneads, V.1.1. 
12
 Plotinus, Enneads, V.1.1. 
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By growing in the knowledge of the Divine and by participating in and 
possessing the “memory” of one’s origin, one matures in the likeness of Intellect.13  
Plotinus describes the movement of return (epistrophē) through this memory as 
follows: 
 
So we must ascend again to the good, which every soul desires.  Anyone 
who has seen it knows what I mean when I say that it is beautiful.  It is 
desired as good, and the desire for it is directed to good, and the 
attainment of it is for those who go up to the higher world and are 
converted and strip off what we put on in our descent; … until, passing in 
the ascent all that is alien to the God, one sees with one’s self alone That 
alone, simple, single and pure, from which all depends and to which all 
look and are and live and think: for it is cause of life and mind and 
being.
14
 
 
Three items in Plotinus’s injunction to ascend come to the fore also in De vera 
religione.  First, there is an innate desire for the ascent.  The soul naturally longs to 
return to its primordial goodness and beauty.  Although the Enneads warn of the many 
distractions which, hindering the soul’s ascent, cause it to obsess about terrestrial 
realities lower than itself, there remains the possibility to divest oneself of “sense 
perception and desires and passions and all the rest of such fooleries, [which] incline 
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 Plotinus, Enneads, V.3.8. 
14
 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.7. 
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so very much towards the mortal.”15  A thoroughgoing confidence that the human soul 
is able to return to God thus underwrites Plotinus’s invitation to ascend.  
 A second observation is related: the ascent is a return.  The invitation to 
ascend is warranted since the soul naturally desires the One, due to the fact that the 
soul has its origins in that higher place and has a “memory” of it.  Plotinus encourages 
the soul to divest itself of all the material baggage and diversions that hinder it and 
cloud its vision of contemplation.  He uses the analogy of those who go up to 
celebrate rites of purification and strip themselves naked to receive unencumbered the 
mysteries of purification.  In the same, way the soul that desires the “simple, single 
and pure” must become like the object of its desire; stripped of all material 
distractions in order to be purified for theōria.  Only after this purification can one 
begin the ascent to the realm of light: “What remains of soul is this which we said was 
an image of Intellect preserving something of its light, like the light of the sun which, 
beyond its spherical mass, shines around it and from it.”16  The return, then, is not to 
something external; rather, after purification the human soul returns to share more 
perfectly in that which has always existed as its centre and origin.  Hence, the return 
or ascent of the soul is to become more clearly what it already is by turning within.   
 Lastly, the natural desire to “return” to the “memory” of the soul is desire for 
the beautiful, which is desired as a good.  Thus, elation and erōs accompany the 
ascent: “If anyone sees it, what passion will he feel, what longing in his desire to be 
united with it, what a shock of delight!”17  Plotinus insists that despite his sensual 
language, he is describing a spiritual reality; he writes as a mystic: “[H]e who has 
seen it glories in its beauty and is full of wonder and delight, enduring a shock which 
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 Plotinus, Enneads, V.3.9. 
16
 Plotinus, Enneads, V.3.9. 
17
 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.7. 
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causes no hurt, loving with true passion and piercing longing.”18  Things of spiritual, 
immaterial beauty are perceived not by sense, “but the soul sees them and speaks of 
them without instruments.”19  This contemplation of immaterial beauty remains 
foreign to one who has not experienced it, just as sight is foreign to one born blind.
20
  
Everyone is born with the ability to turn and gaze at immaterial beauty, but few use 
it.
21
   
How does one arrive at this beauty?  It is already present in everyone.  “Go 
back into yourself and look.”22  The soul must be trained and shaped, so that it may 
become beautiful, and then one can turn to the beautiful within.  Hence Plotinus’s 
celebrated injunction: “[N]ever stop ‘working your statue’ till the divine glory of 
virtue shines out on you.”23  When one’s soul is at last made beautiful and fit for 
introspection and contemplation, one can shut one’s eyes and “wake to another way of 
seeing.”24  By returning into oneself with the eye of the soul, one can see great beauty:  
“No eye ever saw the sun without becoming sun-like, nor can a soul see beauty 
without becoming beautiful.  You must become first of all godlike and beautiful if you 
intend to see God and beauty.”25  By contemplation, the soul makes its ascent, returns 
to the One, and becomes that which he contemplates. 
De vera religione adopts and reworks many of Plotinus’s themes regarding the 
soul’s ascent.  We saw that like Plotinus, Augustine locates evil not in a subsistent 
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 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.7. 
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 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.4. 
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 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.4. 
21
 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.8. 
22
 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.9. 
23
 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.9: “[J]ust as someone making a statute which has to be 
beautiful cuts away here and polishes there and makes one part smooth and clears 
another till he has given his statue a beautiful face, so you too must cut away excess 
and straighten the crooked and clear the dark and make it bright.” 
24
 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.8. 
25
 Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.9. 
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reality, as did his erstwhile co-religionists the Manicheans, but in the perversity of the 
will.
26
  In choosing evil, a good is chosen outside of its proper order; temporal good is 
preferred to eternal good.  But the soul by nature loves the highest good more than the 
lower goods to which it has fallen.  Augustine writes, “The fault in the soul, therefore, 
is not its nature but against its nature.”27  And so the ascent “is not a matter of 
indulging idle curiosity … but of setting up a ladder to things that are immortal.”28  
The soul desires eternal goodness and beauty as something proper to it, and so the 
ascent is, like that of the Enneads, properly speaking, a “return.” 
The soul fell from its intimacy and union with God, explains Augustine, not in 
an eternal battle between a good substance and an evil substance.
29
  Rather, the soul 
fell on account of its own evil will.  And so, life, which is from God and in God, when 
it turns from him, “tilts towards nothingness.”30  Life becomes “fleshly” and 
“earthly”; it loves what is less than life and falls away from the source of life.  In all 
this there is a lack, a privation.  The expulsion from paradise was not a movement 
from good to evil (for, as Augustine specifies repeatedly, there is no such thing as a 
subsistent evil) but a fall “from eternal good to time-bound good, from spiritual good 
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 Van Fleteren maintains that the neo-Platonic character of the “Milanese 
Catholicism,” to which Augustine was beholden during the composition of De vera 
religione, was particularly useful for his rebuttal of Manichaean theology.  Van 
Fleteren, Background, p. 45.  
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 vera rel. 23.44 (CCSL 32 215). 
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 vera rel. 29.52 (CCSL 32 221). 
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 The fall of the soul in Augustine’s early theology is a debated topic.  Cf. Robert 
O’Connell, Saint Augustine’s Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard, 1986), pp. 144-83; idem, “Augustine’s rejection of the Fall of the Soul,” 
Augustinian Studies 4 (1973): 1-32; and idem, “Pre-existence in the Early Augustine,” 
Revue Des Études Augustiniennes 26 (1980): 176-88; Gerald O’Daly, “Did Augustine 
Ever Believe in the The Soul’s Pre-Existence?” Augustinian Studies 5 (1974): 227-35; 
Richard Penaskovic, “The Fall of the Soul in Saint Augustine: A Quaestio Disputata,” 
Augustinian Studies 17 (1986): 135-45.  A responses to O’Connell’s thesis is found in 
Ronnie Rombs, St. Augustine and the Fall of the Soul: Beyond O’Connell and his 
Critics (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 2006). 
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 vera rel. 11.21 (CCSL 32 200). 
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to flesh-bound good, from intelligible good to sensuous good, from the highest good 
to the lowest good.”31  The relation between goodness and being is what makes 
Augustine so intent on affirming that the image remains in the human person after the 
fall.  As a rational creature, he is ordered to God – there is a “return” inscribed on his 
soul. 
So far, I have argued that Augustine’s account of the ascent of the imago in De 
vera religione is framed within a Plotinian understanding of “return.”  It is important 
to note, however, that, although he does not abandon this Plotinian metaphysic, 
Augustine gives a distinctly Christian, and indeed a Nicene shape, I will argue, to the 
injunction to ascend.  At this point, therefore, I will dissect De vera religione 12.24 
and consider each of the constitutive parts of this paragraph in light of the treatise as a 
whole.  The blueprint to De vere religione, I want to suggest, is found in 12.24: 
 
If the soul, however, while engaged in the stadium of human life, beats 
those greedy desires it has been cherishing in itself by mortal enjoyments 
and believes with mind and good will that it has been assisted in beating 
them by the grace of God, then without a doubt it will be restored to 
health and will turn back (reuertetur) from the many things that change to 
the one unchanging good, being reshaped (reformata) by the Wisdom that 
was never shaped but gives its shape to all things, and will come to enjoy 
God through the Holy Spirit, which is the gift of God.
32
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 vera rel. 20.38 (CCSL 32 210). 
32
 vera rel. 12.24 (CCSL 32 202): Si autem, dum in hoc stadio uitae humanae anima 
degit, uincat eas, quas aduersum se nutriuit, cupiditates fruendo mortalibus et ad eas 
uincendas gratia dei se adiuuari credat mente illi seruiens et bona uoluntate, sine 
dubitatione reparabitur et a multis mutabilibus ad unum incommutabile reuertetur 
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The soul for Augustine is the primary locus of the imago dei.  Underlying the 
revertetur reformata of the image’s ascent and return is a Plotinian account of 
katharsis of both mind and will.  The exercise of “mind and good will” is something 
we might expect to find in Plotinus, as for example in his injunction already quoted, 
“[N]ever stop ‘working your statue’ till the glory of virtue shines.” 
A considerable portion of De vera religione is devoted, however, to an 
explanation of the condition of human brokenness, particularly the intellectual falsitas 
(vera rel. 33.61-34.67) and moral cupiditas (vera rel. 37.68-54.106), which, quite 
simply, leave the human soul incapable of making the ascent.  Augustine’s theology 
lacks confidence in human nature’s ability to reform itself, a confidence that is 
integral to Plotinian philosophy.  Thus, the necessity of grace for human reformation 
introduces a theological novum to what would otherwise be a standard neo-Platonic 
philosophy of ascent. The grace of God allows for the revertetur reformata of the 
image, so that it can turn from “the many (a multis) things that change to the one 
(unum) unchanging good.” 
 
Intellectual and Moral Obstacles to the Ascent of the Image 
At this point, it is necessary to analyze Augustine’s account of the ascent of the 
image, outlined in De vera religione 12.24, in light of the entire treatise, by looking at 
three elements: first, the intellectual and moral distractions that obstruct “a believing 
mind and good will”; second, the place of grace in the restoration of the image; and, 
finally, the Trinitarian terminus of the ascent.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
reformata per sapientiam non formatam, sed per quam formantur uniuersa, 
frueturque deo per spiritum sanctum, quod est donum dei. 
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Thirteen times variations of the word imago occur in De vera religione.  
Augustine uses the word with both a positive and a negative connotation.
33
  The 
positive sense adheres closely to the participatory metaphysic operative in his broadly 
Platonic worldview that I have argued was operative in the Cassiciacum dialogues.  
Every image is understood to be derived from and revelatory of the One.  Among 
these images, however, human beings are unique, maintains Augustine, because they 
are made according to the image of the eternal Son of God; they are made “through 
this form in such a way as also to be to it.”34  Because of their rational and intellectual 
nature, human beings are “rightly said to have been made to the image and likeness of 
God.”35   
De vera religione is clear that the eternal Son of God is different from all other 
images, including those of a rational and intellectual nature.  Here Augustine breaks 
with the Plotinian metaphysic in which an image is always ontologically inferior to its 
source because it derives and emanates from that source.  In describing the second 
                                                          
33
 For a discussion of the various senses of “image” in Augustine’s theology, see 
Isabelle Bochet, “Le Statut de l’image dans la pensée augustinienne,” Archives de 
Philosophie 72 (2009): 249-69. 
34
 Of course, Augustine’s Latin text of Genesis 1:26 states that people are created to 
the image and likeness of God.  vera rel. 44.82 (CCSL 32 241): ad ipsam etiam sint.   
35
 vera rel. 44.82 (CCSL 32 241-242): Horum alia sic sunt per ipsam, ut ad ipsam 
etiam sint, ut omnis rationalis et intellectualis creatura, in qua homo rectissime 
dicitur factus ad imaginem et similitudinem dei.  The Platonically informed 
participatory metaphysic that sustains this understanding of image as revelatory and 
derivative of its source – sharing something of its being and life – is likewise present 
in vera rel. 45.85 (CCSL 32 243): Habet enim hoc animi nostri natura post deum, a 
quo ad eius imaginem factus est; vera rel.  46.88 (CCSL 32 244): si natura nostra in 
praeceptis et in imagine dei manens; vera rel.  47.90 (CCSL 32 246): id est creaturam 
dei ad eius imaginem factam.  This participatory account of image is also operative in 
the distinction between the “image of the earthly man (terreni hominis imaginem)” 
and the “image of the new people (imago noui populi).”  vera rel. 27.50 (CCSL 32 
219).  In describing the ascent of the soul to God in seven stages, Augustine explains 
that the sixth stage occurs when the soul has been “perfected in the form and shape 
which was made to the image and likeness of God (quae facta est ad imaginem et 
similitudinem dei).”  vera rel. 26.49 (CCSL 32 219). 
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Person of the Trinity, Augustine uses the term imago in a distinctly Nicene fashion.  
He writes, “[T]he Father of Truth is supremely the One, the Father of his own 
Wisdom, which is called his likeness, in no respect at all unlike him, and his image 
because it is from him.”36  Augustine uses “image” language here to bespeak both the 
Son’s derivation from the Father and his ontological equality with the Father.  All 
other images, explains Augustine, are “through him,” and only the Son is said to be 
“from him.”37 
 A second, negative, sense of “image” is also operative in De vera religione.  
This sense has the connotation of a “false image” or an idol.  Imago, in this sense, is 
often found near its synonym, simulacrum.
38
  It connotes an excessive attachment to 
corporeal reality.  Augustine describes a “cult of images” in which people “worship 
their own fancies” and their own mind’s “imaginations.”39  In this context, “image” 
implies a certain element of deceit; this sense is frequently employed when describing 
material reality deceiving the mind.  Augustine speaks reverently of Plato, who taught 
that the greatest obstacle to contemplation was a life betrayed by such “images.”  The 
chief hindrance to grasping truth, for Plato, was “a life given over to greed and lust 
                                                          
36
 vera rel. 43.81 (CCSL 32 241): quia summe unus est pater ueritatis, pater suae 
sapientiae, quae nulla ex parte dissimilis similitudo eius dicta est et imago, quia de 
ipso est. 
37
 vera rel. 43.81 (CCSL 32 241): Itaque etiam filius recte dicitur ex ipso, cetera per 
ipsum. 
38
 vera rel. 37.68 (CCSL 32 232). 
39
 vera rel. 38.69 (CCSL 32 232): Est enim alius deterior et inferior cultus 
simulacrorum, quo phantasmata sua colunt, et quidquid animo errante cum superbia 
uel tumore cogitando imaginati fuerint.  Similarly, vera rel. 55.108 (CCSL 32 256): 
cum falsa imaginatur, colere non debemus. 
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and the deceitful images of material things, which are stamped on our minds from this 
material world through the body.”40 
 The problem with this second, negative sense of image is that it absolutizes 
material, temporal existence.  Here, “image” no longer functions in the positive sense, 
as something revelatory and participatory of its source, which is anagogically 
operative; rather, this image clouds the mind’s ability to contemplate and to see 
through the material and temporal the immaterial and eternal as an image should.  In 
this case, the created object becomes an image in the negative sense – a false image, 
an idol.  Vision is limited to seeing with the “flesh” the “images of visible things … 
circumscribed within definite limits.”41 
To move from a negative account of image to a positive one is to make the 
ascent that De vera religione enjoins.  However, this is not easy: “O obstinate souls, 
give me someone who can see, without imagining any flesh-bound things seen.”42  
The intellectual and moral divertissements that obstruct the ascent are the many 
material changing goods that claim totality for themselves.  De vera religione 
describes them as not translucent to the eternal goodness and beauty that they 
participate in, but as, instead, immanent to themselves; as images they function by 
way of dissemblance rather than resemblance.  Correct “judgment” regarding the 
nature of material and temporal existence is requisite to overcoming the intellectual 
                                                          
40
 vera rel. 3.3 (CCSL 32 188-189): ad quam percipiendam nihil magis impedire 
quam uitam libidinibus deditam et falsas imagines rerum sensibilium, quae nobis ab 
hoc sensibili mundo per corpus impressae uarias opiniones errores que generarent.   
41
 vera rel. 20.40 (CCSL 32 212): usque ad uisibilium rerum imagines peruenit et 
lucis huius, quam certis terminis circumscriptam uidet.   
42
 vera rel. 34.64 (CCSL 32 228): O animae peruicaces, date mihi, qui uideat sine 
ulla imaginatione uisorum carnalium.   
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falsitas and moral cupiditas that cloud our vision.
43
  Correct judgment, explains 
Augustine, recognizes the participatory and image-like nature of created existence. 
Falsitas pertains to the misappraisal of images, which are given totality, 
eternity, and absoluteness in themselves, failing to admit their character as image.  
The deception of falsitas lies in the fact that their participatory ontology is not 
recognized.  The many material images in the world, restates Augustine, are good 
insofar as they are.  Indeed, inasmuch as they are a passive participation in God they 
are a shining refulgence of the presence of God, meant to lead the human mind back 
to the Divine.  Thus, the falsitas that De vera religione contends obstructs the ascent 
is not the material reality that lies and deceives, but the human mind that wrongly 
judges the resemblance as the reality and the partial goodness as the ultimate Good: 
“For it is trying to understand the things of the flesh and see things of the spirit, which 
cannot be done.”44   
Rightly judging the nature of material beauty and goodness as a participation 
in their eternal forms is a theme that runs throughout Augustine’s early works.45  In 
De vera religione, he recycles many of the examples used in the Soliloquies and in his 
correspondence with Nebridius, to explain how an image participates in and reflects 
its form.  In Epistula 7 to Nebridius Augustine explains that the image of the city of 
Carthage in the mind is not the same as the city in reality, and in the Soliloquies he 
uses the example of an oar that looks bent in the water but in reality is not so.  Both of 
these examples are present in De vera religione: the city of Rome, existing in the 
                                                          
43
 Joseph Pegon again notes the Platonic subtext to the intellectual and moral 
katharsis necessary to make the ascent: “C’est le rôle que le néoplatonisme assigne à 
la philosophie et veut réaliser dans la contemplation de la vérité, rendue possible par 
un certain ascétisme intellectuel et moral.” Joseph Pegon, Foi Chrétienne, p. 472. 
44
 vera rel. 33.62 (CCSL 32 228). 
45
 Cf. De Ordine II and Confessions VII. 
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mind, is a “false image” because it is not the city located on the Italian Peninsula.46  
Likewise, one wrongly judges an oar to be bent when it looks so in the water.
47
  These 
examples attest to a dominant motif throughout Augustine’s writings, namely, the 
place of judgment: the requirement of the mind to judge the truth of what the eyes 
see.
48
  Material reality is to be judged by something higher – namely the mind – and 
this judgment must be in accordance with the eternal form that is still higher and more 
eternal than the mind and is that in which the mind participates.  Thus, right judgment 
of the multiplicity of material being according to the standard of unity that the mind 
knows through participation is propaedeutic to forming the “mind and good will” 
enjoined by De vera religione 12.24 and to overcoming intellectual falsitas. 
Falsitas is the intellectual malaise that, for Augustine, prevents the human 
person from making the ascent through the material to the immaterial and from the 
temporal to the eternal.  Falsitas is wrongly judging the lower as higher.
49
  Human 
beings, maintains Augustine, ought in this life to be able to participate already, to a 
limited degree, in the unified vision of God.  This theme, I suggested, was clearly 
expressed in response to the Skeptics in Contra Academicos.  The task of true 
philosophy then, is to judge all material images in light of this unity.  Augustine 
                                                          
46
 vera rel. 34.64 (CCSL 32 229). 
47
 vera rel. 33.62 (CCSL 32 228). 
48
 Cf. Jean-Marie Le Blond, Les Conversions de saint Augustin (Paris: Aubier, 1950), 
p. 121 and 209.  Bernard Lonergan’s perspicacious work on this aspect of Augustine’s 
thought is germane. In his great work Insight: A Study of Human Understanding 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), Lonergan considers human knowing as 
it moves from experience to understanding, and finally to judgment.  By concluding 
the triad with judgment, Lonergan asserts the power and certainty that human 
understanding can have about reality.   
49
 vera rel. 34.63 (CCSL 32 228): “Let us then not seek the highest things among the 
lowest, and let us not look askance at the lowest either.  Let us make a proper 
judgment of them, in order not to be judged with them; that is, let us attribute to them 
only as much as their outermost look deserves, or, while we are seeking the first 
things among the last, we may find ourselves numbered among the last.”  
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writes, “That light is true by which you come to realize that these things are not true.  
It is by this light that you see that One, by which you judge that whatever else you see 
is one and yet that whatever you see to be mutable is not what that One is.”50  
Contemplation is the means through which the human mind can participate in the 
vision of God and rightly judge material being.
51
  As Augustine puts it, “We are 
certainly seeking the One, than which there is nothing more simple.  So then, let us 
seek simplicity of heart.  Be still, he says, and acknowledge that I am the Lord (Ps 
46:10) – not with the stillness of sloth but with the stillness of reflection, so that you 
may be free of places and times.  For their swollen and fleeting fancies do not allow 
us to see the unity that is constant.”52  Contemplation, maintains Augustine, is the 
recognition of the soul that it is constituted in relation to God, that by nature it desires 
his unity, and that because of the soul’s likeness to him, it inclines towards him.  
Contemplation is the ability to judge all material reality as lower than the soul that 
judges and to judge the soul as lower than the standard by which it judges. 
Cupiditas is the moral corollary to intellectual falsitas.  While distinguished in 
De vera religione, cupiditas and falsitas function nearly synonymously for Augustine; 
both are an absolutizing of temporal, material existence, failing to recognize the 
participatory status of created, contingent matter – the erecting of an idol.  Thus, in 
                                                          
50
 vera rel. 34.64 (CCSL 32 229).  Gerard O’Daly notes that in De vera religione the 
source of falsitas “is said to reside neither in the objects themselves nor in the senses 
… but it the mind’s mistakes.”  Gerard O’Daly, “Error, falsitas,” AugLex 
(Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1986). 
51
 At the time of writing De vera religione, Augustine thought that with the help of 
God’s grace a vision of God can be attained in this life.  In the Retractationes 1.2 he 
criticizes himself for this position articulated in De beata vita 4.25. 
52
 Augustine continues, “Places offer us things to love, times snatch away things we 
do love and leave behind in the soul a crowd of jostling fancies to stir up its greed 
(cupiditas) for one thing after another.  In this way the spirit is made restless and 
wretched, as it longs to lay hold of the things it is held by.” vera rel. 35.65 (CCSL 32 
230). 
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addition to the falsitates that cloud the intellect so that it cannot correctly distinguish 
the One Good from lesser material goods, there are also the moral cupiditates that 
obstruct the will from carrying out the desire of the intellect.  Forms of the word 
cupiditas occur eleven times in De vera religione; each time in the context of 
describing temporal, material, or earthly lust and greed.
53
  
The triad of pleasure, pride, and curiosity, found frequently in Augustine’s 
corpus, are the major obstacle also in De vera religione, hindering the soul in its 
ascent.
54
  Pleasure, pride, and curiosity take what is relatively good and beautiful and 
endow it with the significance reserved for the ultimate good and beauty; as such, they 
are a form of idolatry – a false likeness or image claiming to be that which it is not.  In 
each of the cupiditates Augustine sees a vice trying to imitate and image a virtue.
55
  
Thus, pleasure abuses the virtue of desiring.  The soul wrongly judges that which is 
lower than itself to be higher than itself.  It desires in temporal and carnal bodies the 
                                                          
53
 To take but one example: “Such is the life of human beings living from the body 
and wrapped up in greed and longings focused on time-bound things (cupiditatibus 
rerum temporalium colligate).” vera rel. 26.48 (CCSL 32 218).  Four times forms of 
the word cupiditas are found in vera rel. 41.78 (CCSL 32 238-239) in the context of 
subjugating temporal desires in service of Christ. 
54
 vera rel. 38.69 (CCSL 32 232): Seruiunt enim cupiditati triplici uel uoluptatis uel 
excellentiae uel spectaculi.  This “three-fold greedy longing,” maintains Augustine, is 
the three vices listed in the first epistle of John: “uitia … uel libidine uel superbia uel 
curiositate” vera rel. 38.70 (CCSL 32 233).  Christ conquers this “triple temptation.”  
When tempted by the Devil to change stones into bread, Christ taught “that the lust 
for pleasure (cupiditatem uoluptatis) had to be tamed,” Christ trampled on pride (ita 
calcata superbia est), by not bowing to the Devil in exchange for the kingdoms of the 
world.  Lastly, Christ overcame curiosity (curiositatis) by not testing God on the 
temple peak. vera rel. 38.71 (CCSL 32 233).  Willy Theiler sees in this triad of vice 
both the influence of Porphyry and the more patent presence of 1 John 2:15-16.  
Porphyrios und Augustin (Halle: Niemeyer, 1933), pp. 37-40. 
55
 Van Fleteren points out that Augustine follows a schema used in Plato’s Republic to 
link each virtue with a corollary vice (Republic IV.439d-e).  Frederick Van Fleteren, 
“Augustine’s ‘De vera religione: A New Approach,” Augustinianum 16 (1976): 491-
92.  Vice as an imitation of virtue is also a theme in Confessiones II, in which vices 
are seen as perverse imitations of God. 
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eternal beauty and happiness that cannot be found in the temporal order.
56
  Pride 
wrongly applies the virtue of courage; it wishes to conquer all things and make them 
subject to itself.  Augustine describes pride as a “kind of appetite for unity and 
omnipotence.”57  However, pride tends towards things of the temporal order, and so 
the good of freedom and control, which it desires, passes away like a shadow, leaving 
true freedom unattained.  Lastly, curiosity has the corollary virtue of rationality.  
Rather than using the intellect to see and understand God in and through the material 
and thereby to ascend to him, curiosity does not move beyond temporal and material 
knowledge.  In summary, falsitates are understood by Augustine as erroneous 
attributions or wrong judgments of eternal good to temporal objects, and thus they 
constitute epistemological errors, while cupiditates are the moral evils involved in 
these erroneous attributions.  In other words, they are not two different evils, but two 
angles from which to look at the same problem. 
Significantly, cupiditas also makes an appearance in the passage under 
consideration (De vera religione 12.24).  In this paragraph the soul is called to beat 
“those greedy desires (cupiditates) it has been cherishing in itself by mortal 
enjoyments (fruendo mortalibus).”  The soul that is “restored to health,” which with 
“mind and good will” is reformed by grace to overcome falsitas and cupiditas, “will 
come to enjoy God (fruetur deo).”  Cupiditates are overcome, explains De vera 
religione 12.24, by rightly judging their material and temporal nature.  “In this way,” 
explains Augustine, “you become spiritual, judging all things, so as to be judged by 
no one.”58  The fascinating use of the verb frui in De vera religione 12.24 is hardly 
                                                          
56
 vera rel. 45.84 (CCSL 32 243). 
57
 vera rel. 45.84 (CCSL 32 243). 
58
 vera rel. 12.24 (CCSL 32 202): Ita fit homo spiritalis omnia iudicans, ut ipse a 
nemine iudicetur.   
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accidental.  Indeed, “enjoying” God is at the heart of Augustine’s theology and is 
important already in this early work.  In this section, Augustine uses the verb frui 
twice, and in contrasting ways: it is wrong to “enjoy” mortal goods precisely because 
they are mortal and ought instead to be “used,” so that one may arrive at what is really 
to be enjoyed: frui deo.  The important Augustinian distinction between frui and uti is 
given shape in De vera religione. 
Judgment allows one to distinguish rightly what ought to be used and what 
ought to be enjoyed.  For example, Augustine writes that by not “enjoying 
(fruebatur)” God, but wishing instead to “enjoy bodies (frui corporibus)” the soul 
“tilts towards nothingness.”59  Wrongly judging the material and temporal nature of 
created goods leads to evil, sin, and pain: “And what is the pain of the spirit but the 
lack of those changeable things it used to enjoy or had hoped it would be able to 
enjoy?”60  It is on this account that the Devil fell.  Rather than enjoy God’s greatness 
(fruuntur maiestate ipsius), the Devil wanted “to enjoy what was less” – his own pride 
– and thereby “enjoy his own power more than God’s.”61  It is not that temporal and 
material goods are evil; rather, their image-like nature needs to be rightly judged.  The 
good of the body remains a good, explains Augustine, but it is lower than spiritual 
goods, and so “it is shameful to wallow in the love of this last and lowest of good 
things when you have been granted the privilege of cleaving to and enjoying the first 
and highest.”62  
                                                          
59
 vera rel. 11.21 (CCSL 32 200). 
60
 vera rel. 12.23 (CCSL 32 202): Quid autem dolor qui dicitur animi, nisi carere 
mutabilibus rebus, quibus fruebatur aut frui se posse sperauerat? 
61
 vera rel. 13.26 (CCSL 32 203): quia eo quod minus erat frui uoluit, cum magis 
uoluit sua potentia frui quam dei. 
62
 vera rel. 45.83 (CCSL 32 242): cui primis inhaerere fruique concessum est. 
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Judging rightly between frui and uti, then, is essential to the ascent of the 
image.
63
  In De vera religione 47.91, Augustine considers what we love in another 
human being.
64
  he makes the initially striking claim that we ought to “use” another 
human being.  Here he follows the eudaemonian ethics of Aristotle and the Stoics, 
maintaining that there is “correct use” that befits the nature of any thing or person.65  
When someone is loved in deo he is rightly “used.”66  The person who loves the 
image of God in the other, writes Augustine, “makes use of friends for practicing 
gratitude, makes use of enemies for practicing patience, makes use of whomever he 
can for showing kindness, makes use of everyone for showing good will.”67  
Temporal use, for Augustine, finds its right moral ordering in relation to eternal 
enjoyment of God. 
De vera religione thus presents an account of love of God and neighbor that is 
non-competitive.  In loving one’s neighbor as oneself, love is elevated from the 
                                                          
63
 Henry Chadwick notes, “In ‘correct use’ there is an implication of reflective 
detachment, whereas by contrast what is enjoyed is all-absorbing.  In Augustine the 
content of frui is love.”  Henry Chadwick, “Frui-uti,” AugLex (Basel/Stuttgart: 
Schwabe, 1986).  Relevant literature on this subject includes Ragnar Holte, Béatitude 
et Sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie 
ancienne (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), pp. 200-78; William Riordan 
O’Connor, “The Uti/Frui Distinction in Augustine’s Ethics,” Augustinian Studies 14 
(1983): 45-62; Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in Augustine (New 
Haven: Yale, 1980); idem, “Usus and Fruitio in Augustine, De doctrina christiana I,” 
Journal of Theological Studies, 33 (1982): 361-397; John Rist, Augustine. Ancient 
Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 159-168. 
64
 The discussion here follows a trajectory similar to the more developed and well-
known presentation in De doctrina Christiana 1.3-40.  
65
 Another important touchstone for the discussion is De diversis questionibus 
octaginta tribus 30.  There Augustine more explicitly aligns himself with Cicero’s 
distinction between honestum, that which is desired for itself (propter se petitur), and 
utile, that which is desired for secondary reasons.  Augustine adopts Cicero’s 
terminology and asserts that honestum is the eternal good to be enjoyed and utile all 
temporal and material goods to be used to arrive at the eternal good. 
66
 The phrase frui in deo comes from Paul’s letter to Philemon verse 20: “Ego te fruar 
in Domino.”  
67
 vera rel. 47.91 (CCSL 32 246-247). 
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temporal and material to the eternal and so can partake in the “ascent” that De vera 
religione enjoins.  Another human being ought not to be loved as a mule or a bath or a 
peacock, that is, as “some temporal enjoyment or advantage.”68  Indeed, Augustine 
continues, the other should not even be loved on account of personal relation – loved 
as a brother, sister, or spouse – for even this love is temporal and material; it is to love 
not what belongs to God but to you, maintains Augustine; such love is “personal and 
private to you and not what is common to all.”69  Rather strikingly, Augustine asserts, 
“Let us then hate temporal kinships, if we are on fire with love of eternity.”70  To love 
one’s neighbor as oneself is to love what is eternal in him: not loving his possessions 
or his body but the imago dei in him.
71
 
In short, De vera religione suggests many of the issues surrounding the uti-frui 
distinction that Augustine will address shortly afterward, and in more detail, in the 
first book of De doctrina christiana.  William O’Connor rightly concludes that 
Augustine values the human person in light of the imago dei and that this is the 
theology that undergirds the uti-frui distinction: “Augustine has consistently 
maintained that purely temporal relationships, and the temporal aspects of the human 
being, are not to be enjoyed.”72  In not enjoying “time-bound things,” the correct use 
of temporal and material reality is discovered – it can function as “a ladder to things 
that are immortal”73 and so aid one in his ascent to “return” to God. 
 
The Necessity of Grace in the Ascent 
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 vera rel. 46.87 (CCSL 32 244). 
69
 vera rel. 46.88 (CCSL 32 245). 
70
 vera rel. 46.89 (CCSL 32 245). 
71
 vera rel. 47.90 (CCSL 32 246). 
72
 William Riordan O’Connor, “The Uti/Frui Distinction in Augustine’s Ethics,” 
Augustinian Studies 14 (1983): 45-62. 
73
 vera rel. 29.52 (CCSL 32 221). 
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De vera religione 12.24, which I am arguing contains the blueprint to the entire 
treatise, shows Augustine’s deep awareness that a pure “mind and good will” is 
insufficient for the fallen person to overcome the intellectual falsitas and moral 
cupiditas to make the ascent.
74
  Human beings are often unable to judge what is to be 
used and what is to be enjoyed.  In this, Augustine differs sharply from Plotinus.  For 
Augustine, to return and be reformed (revertetur reformata) necessitates the grace of 
God.  Grace must assist (adiuuari) the intellectual and moral weakness of the human 
person.  Augustine writes in De vera religione 12.24 that when the soul overcomes 
the cupiditas of “mortal enjoyments” by the help of “the grace of God, then without a 
shadow of a doubt it will be restored to health and will turn back.”75  Augustine’s 
attempt to unpack how the grace of the incarnate Christ serves to aid the ascent of the 
image makes up a substantial part of the treatise.  
 Augustine’s disillusionment with a Platonic philosophy of ascent is well 
known.  In Book VII of the Confessions he remarks on the lack of humility in Platonic 
naratives of ascent, which despised the humility of the Incarnation and the humility 
requisite to accept such grace.
76
  These criticisms are suggested already in De vera 
religione.  While embracing the participatory metaphysic espoused by Plotinian 
philosophy, Augustine expresses less optimism with regard to the ability of the human 
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 Joseph Pegon notes that Augustine’s “ascent” mapped in De vera religione is much 
different from that of the Platonic tradition.  It is not a goal that one conquers but one 
that is received.  Pegon writes, “Le terminus ad quem du retour chez Augustin prend 
ainsi un caractère personnel qui ne semble pas exister dans le néoplatonisme.”  Joseph 
Pegon, Foi Chrétienne, p. 480.  Thus, Pegon goes on to explain that the ascent is not 
solely a human effort.  Rather, with mercy Christ comes to span the vast abyss 
between the human person and God; grace comes by way of descent.  Le Blond has 
also noted the Pauline theology of grace present in Augustine’s theology of ascent. Le 
Blond, Les Conversions, p. 46. 
75
 vera rel. 12.24 (CCSL 32 202). 
76
 In Conf. VII.9.14 Augustine writes, “[T]hat ‘the word was made flesh and dwelt 
among us’ (John 1: 13-14), I did not read there.” 
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image to arrive at its goal through a Platonic mode of katharsis, because of his 
awareness of intellectual falsitas and moral cupiditas.  Throughout De vera religione 
there remains an ineluctable tension between a Platonic account of image and its 
“return,” on the one hand, and the recognition of the danger of self-assured pride in 
the idea that such a “return” is possible for fallen man, on the other hand.  
Some of Augustine’s most effusive praise for Platonic philosophy comes from 
De vera religione.  He writes that “with a few changes here and there in their words 
and assertions, [the Platonists] would have become Christians.”77  In the same 
passage, however, he remains critical of the duplicity inherent in their philosophical 
system.  Why, despite having rival philosophical schools, did the philosophers share 
common temples?  They proclaimed to the people their adherence to the pagan gods 
and offered sacrifices in public, but privately they disputed among themselves about 
the nature and even the very existence of the gods.  It was out of civic duty rather than 
doctrinal conviction that they offered their sacrifices.   
The philosophy and the religion of the Platonists were at odds, maintains 
Augustine; their philosophy was not amenable to hoi polloi, and as a result the 
philosophers tolerated lies and myths for the religious lives of their people.  Augustine 
remonstrates, “[T]hey upheld one thing publicly in religion with the people at large 
and defended quite a different position privately.”78  Augustine argues sharply against 
such bifurcation: “[W]e must repudiate all those who neither philosophize about 
sacred matters nor attach sacred rites to philosophy.”79  In particular, Augustine 
lambasts the cult of the angels and the superstitious fortune-telling practices and 
                                                          
77
 vera rel. 4.7 (CCSL 32 192): paucis mutatis verbis atque sententiis Christiani 
fierent. 
78
 vera rel. 1.1 (CCSL 32 187). 
79
 vera rel. 7.12 (CCSL 32 196). 
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augury promoted by Porphyry.
80
  Thus, neo-Platonic religious praxis is emblematic of 
the separation of faith and reason: “[T]here is not one thing called philosophy, that is 
devotion to wisdom, and another called religion.”81 The dualism in Platonic 
philosophy between reason and faith as well as between doctrine and cult reserved the 
“return” of the image to the spiritual élite.  In contrast, salvation offered in the 
Christian faith, while it is an ascent in wisdom, is not divorced from the sacramental 
practice of every Christian.
 82
  To all people, explains Augustine, the Catholic Church 
“offers the possibility of sharing in the grace of God.”83  The harmony of faith and 
reason, for Augustine, entails an economy of grace and an ascent in wisdom that is not 
the preserve of the cultured élite. 
In what is perhaps the most rhapsodic part of De vera religione, Augustine 
declares that the Catholic faith supersedes Platonic philosophy.  The Christian 
approach unites religion and philosophy, faith and reason.  It offers a universal way of 
salvation, available to all.  Indeed, if the ancient Platonists were alive today and could 
see ordinary people believing divine mysteries, witness “whole countries enlightened 
                                                          
80
 Augustine refers to those who “gape open-mouthed over the dregs of yesterday’s 
drinking bout and scrutinize the entrails of dead beasts for divine oracles.” vera rel. 
3.5 (CCSL 32 192).  This is direct satire of Porphyry’s followers, who were given to 
such forms of divinization.  Porphyry is mentioned by name alongside these practices 
in De civitate dei X.9-11.  Likewise, in what du Roy sees as the anti-Porphyrian 
conclusion to De vera religione, Augustine dismisses obsession with placating angels, 
whether good or bad, for, he argues, the good ones will not be slighted with the 
honour going to God, nor will the bad ones have power to vent their anger.  vera rel. 
55.111 (CCSL 32 259). 
81
 vera rel. 7.12 (CCSL 32 196). 
82
 vera rel. 5.8 (CCSL 32 193).  Augustine contrasts the sacramental discipline of the 
Catholic Church with the ecumenism of the philosophers who would worship at the 
same temple as those with whom they disagreed about the nature and existence of the 
gods.  While the Platonists separate philosophy and religion, writes Augustine, “those 
whose teaching we do not approve of are not even admitted to share the mysteries 
with us.”  vera rel. 5.8 (CCSL 32 193).  
83
 vera rel. 6.10 (CCSL 32 194). 
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by the doctrine of salvation,”84 and see that by the blood of the martyrs churches are 
being erected in previously barbarous nations,
85
 if they could see thousands 
renouncing marriage for the kingdom, once desolate islands and empty deserts being 
filled with those “forsaking the riches and honors of this world, [who] wish to 
dedicate their whole lives to the one supreme God,”86 and if they could observe that 
now throughout the entire world the whole human race says in one voice, “we have 
lifted up our hearts to the Lord,” then surely they would with the change of a few 
words become Christians (paucis mutatis verbis atque sententiis Christiani fierent).
87
   
It is precisely the universality of the Christian faith – its insistence that 
wisdom descends to the many – that constitutes its apologetic leverage.  Salvation, 
maintains Augustine, is for the entire human race, which is being refashioned and 
prepared for eternal life.
88
  The soul, which is for Augustine the locus of the image, is 
so “bundled up in its sins” that it is unable to “return,” to “stride up to a likeness of 
God from its earthly life.”89  Grace must assist the intellectual and moral weakness of 
the human person.  It is grace that makes possible the ascent: “God’s inexplicable 
mercy comes to the rescue both of individuals and of the whole human race by means 
of a creature subject to change and yet obedient to divine laws, to remind the soul of 
its primal and perfect nature.”90  This “creature,” is, of course, the Son of God, and the 
Incarnation signals the economy in which God’s grace is diffused to the many.  
                                                          
84
 vera rel. 3.4 (CCSL 32 190). 
85
 vera rel. 3.5 (CCSL 32 191). 
86
 vera rel. 3.5 (CCSL 32 191). 
87
 vera rel. 4.7 (CCSL 32 192). Cf. Goulven Madec, “Si Plato uiueret... (Augustin, De 
uera religione, 3.3),” in Néoplatonisme.  Mélanges offerts à Jean Trouillard, ed. Jean 
Trouillard (Fontenay-aux-Roses: École normale supérieure, 1981), pp. 233-47.  
88
 vera rel. 7.13 (CCSL 32 196). 
89
 vera rel. 10.19 (CCSL 32 199). 
90
 vera rel. 10.19 (CCSL 32 199). 
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De vera religione 12.24 makes clear that it is the “grace of God” that assists 
the soul to overcome moral cupiditas and intellectual falisitas to “return” to the Holy 
Trinity.  Grace, for Augustine, is fundamentally the person of Christ, who diffuses his 
own goodness.  He is presented in De vera religione both as eternal Wisdom and as 
the incarnate Christ.  Augustine writes, “[T]he grace of God (gratiam dei) … came 
through the very Wisdom of God taking to itself the man by whom we have been 
summoned into freedom.”91  De vera religione 16.30-32 presents a consideration of 
what is achieved through the Incarnation.  Christ’s Incarnation is a moral pedagogy 
consonant with the student, namely, “the fleshly-minded.”92  Christ came in a manner 
adaptable to human sense, and he taught by the example of his own life.  His poverty, 
chastity, and obedience were the transvaluation of prevailing values: where people 
were running after riches and pleasures, he chose to be poor; where they chose honor 
and power, he refused to be crowned a king; where they valued children of the flesh, 
he scorned marriage.  For the sake of truth, he chose to suffer the injustice and pain 
from which human beings naturally shrink.
93
  Augustine concludes, “So the whole of 
his life on earth, then, as lived by the man he had the goodness to take to himself, was 
a lesson in morals.”94   
Christ’s life provides the moral example of the ascent precisely in the humility 
that Augustine finds absent in Platonic accounts of ascent.  Self-assured Platonic 
philosophies of “return” taught that some among the fallen human race could avoid 
entrapment in the falisitas and cupiditas of their present condition and ascend back to 
the One.  This was not, however, an option available to the masses.  This, explains 
                                                          
91
 vera rel. 17.33 (CCSL 32 207). 
92
 vera rel. 16.30 (CCSL 32 205). 
93
 vera rel. 16.31 (CCSL 32 206). 
94
 vera rel. 16.32 (CCSL 32 207). 
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Augustine, is why they created a bifurcation of reason and faith, of philosophy and 
cult.  De vera religione insists that the Incarnation offers a universal way of “return.”  
The Incarnation is a testament to the humility of Christ, who stoops to take human life 
upon himself, to teach the “fleshly-minded” the way of ascent.  Christ’s entire human 
life was a divine pedagogy – leading the human person by the hand in his “return.”  
The soul is set free from corporeal, mortal enjoyments by “the grace of God through 
Jesus Christ our Lord.”95  The Incarnation is also a testament to the reality that grace 
is not something extrinsic to the human person but comes to inhere properly in the 
human soul and transform his human, embodied existence.  As such, the Incarnation 
does not remain a remote pedagogical life lesson; instead, as we will see, the 
operation of the Spirit in the life of the Christian allows the ascent to become an 
experienced reality.  
 
Ascent to the Holy Trinity 
The terminus of the “return” is, as De vera religione 12.24 states, to be reshaped by 
Wisdom (reformata per sapientiam) to enjoy (fruetur) God through the Holy Spirit, 
who is the gift of God (donum dei).  For Augustine the Holy Trinity is not only the 
goal of the ascent but is also the means through which this ascent is made possible.  
Through Christ, the Wisdom never shaped but giving shape to all things, and the Holy 
Spirit, the gift of God, the human person is able to ascend once again to him who 
fulfils human nature.  The Trinitarian formula in De vera religione 12.24 makes clear 
how Augustine’s Plotinian proclivities find their fulfillment in Nicene Trinitarianism.  
At this point, then, I will consider each of these references to the three Persons of the 
Trinity in turn (unus, sapientia, and donum dei).   
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 vera rel. 53.102 (CCSL 32 253). 
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In the Platonic mindset, multiplicity is a falling away from primordial unity, so 
that the restoration of the soul is posited as a movement a multis ad unum.
96
  The Fall, 
for Augustine, is the loss of the innocence of paradise; his description, however, is 
given Platonic dress: the Fall drove “man away in all directions from the unity of 
God.”97  Return to unity, which is the aim of the ascent to God, is the drive of De vera 
religione.  This unity is that of the Holy Trinity, but it is the Father who is primarily 
understood as the “One.”  Indeed, the treatise concludes that all things “have been 
made by the One and direct themselves towards the One.”98  The return to unity 
occurs by the refashioning of the image from the “old man” to the “new man.”  To 
describe this process, Augustine mentions in De vera religione 26.49 the same seven 
stages of restoration that he also discusses in De quantitate animae.  The steps 
describe the ascent from changing, temporal, and material loves to unchanging, 
eternal, and immaterial loves; it is a gradual acclimatization to the things of the Spirit, 
through what Augustine describes as “setting up a ladder to things that are 
immortal.”99  In the sixth step, the human person is “perfected in the form and shape 
which was made to the image and likeness of God” for the vision of God.100  These 
steps of ascent are the process of exchanging “the image of the earthly man” for “the 
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 Cf. Miguel Ángel Álvarez Miñambres’s insightful article on the ascent of the 
human soul to the unity of God in De vera religione: “Unidad y Unicidad de Dios en 
De vera religione de San Agustín,” Relgion y Cultura 50 (2004): 653-86. 
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 vera rel. 21.41 (CCSL 32 212-213). 
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 vera rel. 55.113 (CCSL 32 260).  Here Josef Lössl’s analysis regarding the motif of 
“the One” is particularly germane.  He notes that there are over 400 references to unus 
in De vera religione and that Augustine successfully aligns biblical monotheism with 
Platonic philosophy.  “The One,” maintains Lössl, is a theme able to make sense of 
the text as a unit both doctrinally and structurally.  Josef Lössl, “‘The One’: A guiding 
concept in Augustine’s De vera religione,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 40 
(1994): 79-103. 
99
 vera rel. 29.52 (CCSL 32 221). 
100
 vera rel. 26.49 (CCSL 32 219). 
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image of the new people.”101  All things, maintains Augustine, desire to “return” to 
their source, of which they are the image.  He writes, “All things which seek unity 
have this rule, or form, or example, or any other word by which it allows itself to be 
called, because it alone completes the likeness of him from whom it received 
being.”102  
Augustine identifies “wisdom” (sapientia) with the Son, who recreates the 
fallen image after his perfect image.  “Wisdom” is traditional anti-Arian terminology, 
which Augustine inherited.
103
  Using explicitly Nicene language, De vera religione 
12.24 identifies Wisdom as the one who formed creation, while being herself 
unformed (non formatam, sed per quam formantur universa).  As the exact similitudo 
of the Father, Wisdom fashions the image according to herself, judging according to 
the standard she herself is.  Augustine thus understands the role of Wisdom by the 
correlative actions of “judgment” and “formation.”104  Augustine also attributes the 
refashioning of the image to Wisdom, after whom the soul was originally fashioned, 
so that recreation follows the pattern of creation.  Here again, Augustine takes up the 
theme of judgment.  It is the mark of the higher to judge the lower according to the 
standard or measurement that the higher knows.  Eternal Wisdom is alone in not being 
judged, since of her “not even the Father makes judgments, for she is not less than he 
                                                          
101
 vera rel. 27.50 (CCSL 32 219). 
102
 vera rel. 31.58 (CCSL 33 225): Omnia enim, quae appetunt unitatem, hanc habent 
regulam vel formam vel exemplum vel si quo alio verbo dici se sinit, quoniam sola 
eius similitudinem, a quo esse accepit, impleuit. 
103
 The term “Wisdom” for the Son was claimed by both Arians and Nicenes in the 
context of the Son’s role in creation, the former famously insisting that Proverbs 8:22 
favored their case.  By associating “Wisdom” with the adjective “unformed” 
Augustine links himself with the Nicene tradition. 
104
 Cf. Marie-Anne Vannier, “Creatio”, “conversio”, “formatio” chez S. Augustin 
(Fribourg: Éditions universitaires, 1997). 
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is.”105  Wisdom is the perfect resemblance of the One and is, therefore, in perfect 
unity with it.  The wise soul judges all things by knowledge or participation in eternal 
Wisdom, who fashioned all things.  Judging “the way something ought to be” is the 
mark of wisdom; it demonstrates the soul’s conformity in judgment to a higher 
standard; it demonstrates its participation in Wisdom.
106
  Eternal Wisdom is not 
judged but is rather the standard or measure that judges and forms all created 
existents.
107
  In De vera religione, Wisdom creates and recreates judging according to 
its own form or likeness, which it does on account of its perfect union with the One.  
Du Roy notes that in Augustine’s corpus, the title donum dei for the Holy 
Spirit makes its debut in De vera religione; this is also the first time the Spirit is 
identified as the means through which God is enjoyed (fruetur).
108
  Earlier in the same 
work, while arguing from the unity of operations in the creation narrative to the one 
nature of God, Augustine also uses the term donum: “[E]ach and every nature has 
been made simultaneously by the Father through the Son in the Gift of the Holy Spirit 
                                                          
105
 vera rel. 31.58 (CCSL 32 225). 
106
 Augustine explains that judgment is different from knowledge.  Knowledge is the 
ability “to see that something is or is not such-and-such.”  Judgment, on the other 
hand, introduces an “ought”: “[I]t ought to have been such-and-such (ita esse 
debuit).”  In judgment, the mind adverts to a higher standard than the object 
immediately in question; the higher standard is the eternal law in which the wise 
person participates.  vera rel. 31.58 (CCSL 32 225).  Again, see Bernard Lonergan’s 
important contribution, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, which is devoted 
to a study of the relationship between knowledge and judgment.   
107
 vera rel. 31.57 (CCSL 32 224). 
108
 Du Roy, Intelligence de la foi, p. 320.  Du Roy goes on to explain that the very 
first Trinitarian schema in Augustine’s corpus occurs in De beata vita.  In this work, 
the Spirit introduces one to the Truth.  Enjoying this Truth, the soul is united with the 
Supreme Measure, the Father.  In De moribus the Spirit comes as Charity to unite the 
human soul with God.  Thus, there is a gradation of precision in language with respect 
to the role of the Holy Spirit in the early works, culminating in De vera religione, 
where the Spirit is the gift through whom we enjoy God. 
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(dono spiritus sancti).”109  Epistle 11, which was penned during the same time period, 
also uses the term donum for the Spirit.  Du Roy suggests that Augustine inherits the 
language of donum to describe the Spirit from Hilary of Poitiers’s De Trinitate II.1.  
Thus, Augustine’s use of the term donum for the Spirit would indicate that the young 
theologian was familiar with this treatise already in 391.
110
  Du Roy’s hypothesis is 
not beyond the scope of possibility; however, there are few clear indicators that verify 
it.
111
  The application of Ockham’s razor might lead one to conclude that donum as a 
term for the Spirit was simply common Christian vocabulary inherited from the New 
Testament and not necessary proof of Augustine’s early knowledge of Hilary.112  
Regardless, the growing confidence in Augustine’s early theology that the Holy 
Trinity is “enjoyed” through the Holy Spirit, the gift of God, is expressed with 
precision in De vera religione. 
Augustine concludes De vera religione by stating, “That is why it is 
incumbent on us to worship and confess the very Gift of God (donum dei), together 
with the Father and the Son unchanging – a Trinity of one substance, one God from 
                                                          
109
 vera rel. 7.13 (CCSL 32 196): simul omnia et unamquamque naturam patrem 
fecisse per filium in dono spiritus sancti. 
110
 Du Roy, Intelligence de la foi, p. 321.  There is no doubt that at some early point 
Augustine read Hilary’s work on the Trinity.  Lewis Ayres demonstrates that 
Augustine’s use of aeternitas already in De moribus I. 30.62 (CSEL 90 65-66) is 
evidence of the young African theologian’s knowledge of Hilary, who alone in the 
Latin tradition describes the Holy Trinity as “infinity in the eternal (aeternitas), the 
form in the image and the use in the gift.”  Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 58.  The seed of this Trinitarian 
theology (aeternitas, imago, donum) has germinated from its original presentation in 
De moribus to its flowering in De vera religione. 
111
 Du Roy notes the use of aeternitas in De vera religione and De moribus to 
describe the Father, as well as the use of munus and donum in De vera religione to 
refer to the Spirit.  Further, Du Roy points out that munus and donum as terms 
referring to the Spirit are present in the contemporaneous Epistle 11.  Du Roy 
concludes, “On trouve donc dès l’époque du De vera religione les trois titres donnés 
par Hilaire et rapportés par le De Trinitate d’Augustin.”  Du Roy, Intelligence de la 
foi, p. 321. 
112
 Cf. Acts 2:38; Acts 10:44; Romans 5:5. 
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whom we are, through whom we are, in whom we are, from whom we have departed, 
whom we have become unlike, by whom we have not been allowed to perish; the 
Source to which we are retracing our steps.”113  The Triune terminus of the ascent is 
emphatically articulated, as Augustine recapitulates the central terminological 
references to each Person of the Holy Trinity.  This quotation is representative of the 
treatise as a whole.  The Father is identified as unus, the Son as forma and similitudo, 
and the Spirit as donum dei.  The entire movement is presented in the Platonic 
philosophical garb of exitus and reditus; a participatory metaphysic comes to the fore 
in Augustine’s insistence that all created existence originates from, is held in being 
by, and returns to its source, so that the image, which has fallen from its likeness 
(dissimiles facti sumus), is refashioned according to its form.  Significantly, however, 
Augustine’s Platonic proclivities are augmented and transformed by means of 
Christian content: the terminus of the ascent is the enjoyment of the Holy Trinity.  
 
Conclusion 
The ascent of the imago in Augustine’s early writings finds its most precise and 
developed presentation in De vera religione.  Augustine’s injunction to ascend is, in 
many ways, quite similar to that of Plotinus: Augustine urges an intellectual and 
moral katharsis so that the soul can share in what is proper to it.  The ascent is, 
therefore, properly a “return” – the soul has a “memory” of its origin and an innate 
desire to return whence it came.  Like Plotinus, Augustine understands the ascent to 
involve a purification of the senses, which consists in the recognition of the “image-
                                                          
113
 vera rel. 55.113 (CCSL 32 260): Quare ipsum donum dei cum patre et filio aeque 
incommutabile colere et tenere nos conuenit: unius substantiae trinitatem unum deum, 
a quo sumus, per quem sumus, in quo sumus, a quo discessimus, cui dissimiles facti 
sumus, a quo perire non permissi sumus, principium, ad quod recurrimus. 
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like” quality of all created objects that are to be passed through to the reality itself.  
Correct judgment is the sine qua non to overcoming the intellectual falsitas and moral 
cupiditas that obstruct the image’s return. 
I have argued that De vera religione 12.24 constitutes the heart of the treatise. 
Proceeding from this paragraph I have proposed a new reading of De vera religione, 
which takes into account the significance of a Plotinian account of image for 
Augustine’s theology of ascent.  However, in so doing, I have made clear that 
Augustine’s enthusiasm regarding Platonism has its limits, already in this early work.  
In this short paragraph of De vera religione, Augustine expresses the terminus ad 
quem of the ascent and the requisite steps to arrive at the goal – “setting up a ladder to 
things that are immortal.”114  Thus, while in some important ways Augustine adopts 
his Platonic background, he also transforms it significantly.  De vera religione is a 
theological account of how Christ’s grace given in the Incarnation serves to properly 
inhere in the human soul, so that  “with mind and good will” turned back “from the 
many things that change” it can ascend to the one Holy Trinity of which it is an 
image.  Frederick Van Fleteren rightly notes that De vera religione 12.24 “places the 
Trinity in the economy of creation and personal salvation: Through the unformed 
wisdom of God (Christ) and through the gift of God (the Holy Spirit), man will enjoy 
(frui) God.”115  The theology of ascent in De vera religione revolutionizes the 
philosophy that Augustine had received from the Enneads.  While it still involves a 
return ad unum, in Augustine’s approach, the return becomes a return to the unity of 
the Holy Trinity professed at Nicaea.  The refashioning of the “new man” is the work 
of the unformed Wisdom, who refashions the human person according to the standard 
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 vera rel. 29.52 (CCSL 32 221). 
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 Van Fleteren, “Augustine’s ‘De vera religione,’” 482. 
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of her own perfect likeness and unity with the Father.  Lastly, the Holy Spirit as 
donum dei allows the human person to “enjoy” God.  The verb frui, used in precise 
theological distinction from uti in De vera religione, expresses the particularly 
Augustinian insight that all created existence is to be “used” for the ascent to the 
Trinity.  For Augustine, one ought never to rest content “enjoying” material and 
temporal goods, for this would be to create an idol.  The distinction between uti and 
frui, then, is integral to Augustine’s theology of return.  An ersatz “enjoyment” of 
temporal goods falls prey to the dissemblance of created goods – claiming totality for 
them and failing to recognize their participatory character.  De vera religione 
proposes the “use” of created existence as a ladder on which to make the ascent or as 
a transitory image through which one may see a resemblance of the eternal – the 
terminus of the image’s return. 
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Conclusion 
 
It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the theology of the imago dei for 
Augustine’s thought.  The image of God in the human person grounds the 
participatory ontology that is foundational to his anthropology.  The mystery of the 
human person, for Augustine, is ultimately intelligible only in relation to God, in 
whom he lives, moves, and has his being (Acts 17:28).  For obvious reasons do 
students of Augustine turn to De Trinitate for an account of his theology of the image 
of God.  There Augustine expresses the triadic movements within one person of 
understanding, willing, and loving as an image of the unity and threeness of God.  
Indeed, Augustine’s understanding of imago dei as outlined in this thesis lies at the 
basis of his later theological development, both in terms of his anthropology and in 
other areas of his theology.  My thesis has, therefore, has turned to Augustine’s early 
thought to analyze what sources influenced and shaped the African Doctor’s initial 
theology of the imago dei.  By definition, any theology of the imago dei is 
reciprocally constituted: it is in contemplating our own understanding, willing, and 
loving that we come to know something of who God is; at the same time, the nature of 
the image is such that by getting to know God, we also come to know more fully what 
it means to be human, precisely because an image is unintelligible apart from the 
participatory union it has with its source.  This reciprocal structure of image theology 
is the ground of Judeo-Christian theological discourse, and it is Augustine who is 
perhaps the foremost representative of speculative inquiry into this theology of the 
imago dei. 
I have attempted to contextualize Augustine’s theology of the image of God 
by focusing on “input fields” to his early thought.  My thesis has been attentive to two 
288 
 
significant sources of influence.  First, I have argued that Latin pro-Nicene theology 
was committed to an articulation of the “image of God” that was aligned with the 
doctrine of the homoousion.  Defenders of the Nicene cause considered anathema any 
expression of “image of God” that suggested that as image Christ was secondary, 
subordinate, or different from his source in substance.  Latin pro-Nicene theology 
could envision the imago dei only as equality with God.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, it 
was difficult for such theology to link the imago dei with the notion that the human 
person was created in the image of God.  The second significant source of influence 
on Augustine’s early theology of the imago dei is a neo-Platonic, particularly, 
Plotinian, philosophical conception of the world.  At the heart of Plotinus’s 
cosmogony and his metaphysics lies a philosophy of image.  In this framework an 
image is derived, revelatory, and ultimately, ordered to return to its primary source.  
By definition this conception of an image entails subordination.   
These two influences result, at first blush, in diametrically opposed 
conclusions.  Either the image is – as the preceding generation of Latin theologians 
argued – homoousion with its source or, as in the philosophy of Plotinus, the image is 
derived from and of a different substance than its source.  To reformulate this 
problematic: either the imago dei is an expression of the unity of the divine substance 
(here the Latin pro-Nicene party appealed especially to Colossians 1:15) or the imago 
dei is a created reflection of and participation in the divine substance (the traditional 
interpretation of Genesis 1:26).  The theologies of Hilary of Poitiers, Marius 
Victorinus, and Ambrose of Milan reflect this tension.  As Christological 
controversies were foremost in their mind, theology of the image of God served for 
them as an expression of the Nicene faith.  The “image of the invisible God” was 
identical with its source: the image also was invisible, eternal, and existing without 
289 
 
any trace of diversity in substance.  Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose had difficulty, 
therefore, affirming that the human person was the imago dei.  They preferred to 
express this image-like nature with the more guarded phrase ad imaginem dei or 
secundum imaginem.    
The genius of Augustine’s theology, evident already clearly in his early 
writings, is his synthesis of these two influences.  By drawing on Plotinian thought, 
Augustine articulated a theology of the imago dei that had eluded his Latin pro-
Nicene predecessors.  I have argued that although Augustine’s early theology of 
image builds on that of Hilary of Poitiers, Marius Victorinus, and Ambrose of Milan, 
Augustine was able to affirm, in ways that his predecessors were not, that both Christ 
and the human person are the imago dei.  My thesis suggests that this achievement 
was on account of Augustine’s early deep engagement with Plotinian philosophy.  
Differing historical-theological contexts allowed Augustine to start from different 
presuppositions and with different concerns than the preceding generation.   
Augustine’s primary aim was not to demonstrate that the imago dei is 
homoousion with its source; rather, his early dialogues reveal a sustained concern to 
account for the philosophical nature of an image.  What is the relation of an image to 
its source?  Initially, Augustine suggests that an image seems to be false because it 
falsely represents itself to be something while it is only a shadow or reflection or a 
memory – not the reality itself.  Augustine points to the image of a bent oar in the 
water or a city in the mind.  However, in further discussion, the Cassiciacum 
dialogues suggest that these images are “false” only because of a false judgment, 
which fails to take into account their true nature as images.  “Image,” in Augustine’s 
conception, cannot be univocally predicated, but exists as a participatory expression 
of its source; it is to be passed through (uti) to attain eternal enjoyment (frui).  In the 
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final analysis, the dialogues articulate a Platonic vision of an image whose most 
primordial nature is not falsehood, but truth.  An image is recognized as “true” when a 
finite nature is affirmed – a finitude that participates in and reveals the infinite.   
It is this understanding of the nature of an image that Augustine leverages to 
escape the problematic raised by the Skeptics in Contra Academicos.  The Skeptics 
maintained that no correspondence exists between eternal truth and this temporal 
order in flux.  Human temporal and material finitude entails closing the horizon to the 
possibility of ever knowing eternal truth.  Augustine’s positive and Platonic 
evaluation of the nature of an image that participates in eternal truth and reveals it in 
the temporal order establishes the grounds for his theology of the Incarnation.  In 
Contra Academicos, the literary figure of Proteus both “manifests and bears the 
person of truth”; he is described as an “image of the truth” and functions, I have 
argued, as an expression of the Incarnation – he serves to affirm that certainty about 
eternal truth can be had in the temporal order precisely because he is “handed over by 
a god.”  Thus, a broadly positive philosophy of image as participating in and showing 
forth eternal truth frames Augustine’s early understanding of the Incarnation.   
This understanding of an image in Augustine’s early thought reaches its full 
expression in De vera religione, where Augustine speaks unambiguously of all 
temporal, material reality as an image which is to be “used” as a ladder to ascend to 
the eternal and immaterial good to be “enjoyed.”  In this work, Augustine also situates 
his theology of the Incarnation within a broader philosophy of image.  However, 
despite this Plotinian worldview of an image that issues out and returns back to its 
source, Augustine’s understanding of this movement departs in significant ways from 
that of Plotinus.  Unlike the mechanical cosmogony of Plotinus, the descent of the 
divine image is not a fall or dissipation from a luminous realm, but a freely chosen 
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movement of love and grace.  In his loving descent the divine image restores the 
fallen human image within himself, allowing the human image to participate in his 
return and ascent.  
The uniqueness of Augustine’s theology, seen in light of the preceding 
generation of Latin pro-Nicene theologians, is his ability to affirm the imago dei of 
both Christ and the human person.  Augustine structures his early theology of image 
within a Platonic participatory ontology that links image and source, so that the finite 
image shares in and reveals something of the infinite.  It is out of this philosophical 
context of image that Augustine develops his early theology of the Incarnation 
expressed both in the dialogues and in De vera religione.  This Plotinian vantage point 
allows Augustine to maintain that there can be various ways in which an image 
participates in and reflects its source. 
Finally, this participatory ontology enables Augustine to affirm the imago dei 
of both Christ and the human person.  In his earliest theological writings, Augustine 
underscores the broad scope of his philosophy of image, and here Augustine is 
insistent that “image,” as he puts it, can be said in many ways.  Indeed, there are 
differing degrees of likeness to an image.  One particular image (Christ) is to such a 
degree “like” its source that it is said to be equal to God.  Other images also have a 
“likeness” to God but are unequal images.  Augustine’s broad articulation of image 
reveals that he departs from his Latin predecessors in significant ways.  It is out of this 
Plotinian Weltanschauung that Augustine is able to affirm that both Christ and the 
human person are the imago dei. 
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